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The First Consul. 1803.

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WITH 173 CHARTS, MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLES AND TACTICAL MANŒUVRES, PORTRAITS, CUTS OF UNIFORMS, ARMS, AND WEAPONS

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED LIST; AUTHOR OF "THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE," "A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF OUR CIVIL WAR," "PATROCLUS AND PENELOPE. A CHAT IN THE SADDLE," "GREAT CAPTAINS," "ALEXANDER" "HANNIBAL," "CÆSAR," ETC., ETC.

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Sièyes was also persuaded to act with Bonaparte, and the whole army, excepting Bernadotte and Jourdan, could be relied on; and means was taken to win over or neutralize

Bonaparte in 1800. By Corbet.

these, as well as the police under Fouché. Whatever Barras, or the Manège, — Bonaparte's real political opponents, — strove to do was anticipated by the action taken. They were numerous, but lacked unity of leadership.

Bonaparte determined to work for a change of govern-

ment, and was well seconded by his adherents. The 18th Brumaire was selected for a *coup d'état*, and the conspirators, or patriots, as you look at it, though apprehensive of trouble because on the edge of an unknown precipice, were firm in their purpose to carry the matter through. The legislature had for some weeks been in a state of chaos, and such were the conditions that whoso acted first and with sufficient force would be apt to win. Bonaparte could reckon on Sièyes, Ducos and perhaps Barras in the Directory. Lucien Bonaparte was President of the Council, and the Ancients and Deputies who were antagonistic to the Directory were practically subject to his dragooning. On the plea of a Jacobin plot, but within their technical right, the Ancients, accompanied by troops, adjourned to St. Cloud, and forbade the legislature to meet elsewhere; while Bonaparte was put in command of all the forces in and about Paris. These he collected in review at the appropriate moment and won their adherence. The Five Hundred followed the Ancients. Gohier and Moulin, who were not acting with Bonaparte, were temporarily sequestrated, and on the 18th Brumaire (November 9) the Bonapartists carried out their programme at St. Cloud. Some danger was run by the delay incurred in preparing halls for the legislative meetings; still these were held on the day chosen. According to a few contemporary authors, Bonaparte at the critical moment acted in a vacillating manner. His enemies would naturally claim this. The *Moniteur* and the *Journal Militaire*, in issues after the event, represent him as a demi-god. But they were his organs. To judge by the man's character in Italy and Egypt, as well as his course thereafter, though the cry of "Hors la Loi!" might well have been fatal to him, it may be assumed that he bore himself with decision, despite the uncertainty of the issue. His St. Helena note on the 18th

Brumaire is distinct, clear and well poised: but it was written long after the event, and like Cæsar's Commentaries, only gives his own side fully. Lucien, as President of the Deputies, held himself bound by no law or precedent, and ably seconded the action of his friends and brother. At the session, the opposition called for fresh oaths to the Constitution of the Year III. Bonaparte claimed that by repeated violation it had been destroyed, and that a fresh one must be created to save France. As in all such cases, as it is in every battle, civil, political or military, success or failure for a few moments hung by a hair. After the usual confusion of a *coup d'état* Lucien declared the session dissolved, the troops began shouting for Bonaparte, some grenadiers entered the halls, where matters were actually at daggers drawn, and these were cleared of the legislators, who fled in disorder from the place. It had been wise for the Bonapartists to move the legislature to St. Cloud. Had the scene occurred in Paris, the restless element among the people, stirred by the Jacobins to action, might have risen and hurried them to the guillotine, or into flight as outlaws. But at St. Cloud, with Lucien in the chair, and a battalion devoted to Bonaparte and under Murat at hand, the thing was quickly got done. Bonaparte's appeal to the old soldiers: "Have I ever misled you? Did I ever prove traitor to my promises?"

Lucien Bonaparte.

had an overwhelming effect. But while the Bonapartists had intended to uproot nothing but the Directory, as a matter of fact, the legislature was overturned at the same time.

A small group of deputies — a large majority was claimed — were, however, got together again that evening under Lucien, and passed votes expelling a number of dangerous members, and nominating Sièyes, Ducos and Bonaparte as Provisional Consuls. The Council was then adjourned four months. With the troops in his favor, Bonaparte's position was now clear. Paris followed the action of the troops, France followed Paris. The new Consuls took up their residence in the Luxembourg, and ordered another Constitution to be drawn up. The Manège strove to rouse the Parisians, but failed. The people, dazzled by Bonaparte's military successes and tired of uncertainty, accepted the situation as Frenchmen will. Even despotism seemed better than what they had been living under for the past two years.

Once in the saddle, Bonaparte acted with tact and ability, taking the reins of practical affairs in his own hands, while Sièyes worked on the Constitution. Even if it were true that his course during the *coup d'état* was vacillating, it must be allowed that there was nothing but vigor in his conduct after he once became Consul.

The Constitution of the Year VIII. was promulgated to the people December 15, 1799, with the declaration that the Revolution was finished; and it was accepted by the people by a substantially unanimous vote. This vote placed the seal upon Bonaparte's authority as First Consul. Sièyes and Ducos resigned, and were replaced by Cambacérès and Lebrun. Talleyrand became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Berthier was made Minister of War, with an interregnum by Carnot. Lucien Bonaparte was Minister of the Interior, and Fouché of the police. Sièyes' Constitution practically resulted in

giving the powers of a despot to the First Consul, provided he kept within the bounds of reason. The other two Consuls were figure-heads. Bonaparte was wise enough to make his



The First Consul. By Ingres.

policy national, and heartily worked for the people. He was moderate, because he knew himself to be strong. Most of the regicides were excluded from office. Royalists were wel-

comed back, and many French *émigrés* returned. The chief places of France naturally fell to Bonaparte's appointees. Toleration was extended to religion.

But while tolerant, Bonaparte put down revolt with a high hand, and he did in fact, by the arm of Hoche, end the civil war which had lasted for seven years. He worked for the masses and the people, and was at the opening of his autocracy that very best of rulers, — a mild tyrant. Yet free discussions were restricted, as was also the press. The First Consul transferred his residence to the Tuileries.

The last act for which Bonaparte had been noted in Europe was the Peace of Campo Formio. It was not unbecoming in him, when he reached control in France, to strive for the peace which he really desired, even at some personal or national sacrifice, and which was essential to settle the internal affairs of the country, sadly disturbed for the past ten years; and this was accordingly formally proposed to the several powers antagonistic to France. On Christmas Day, 1799, Bonaparte wrote to George III. and to Emperor Francis, opening the way for peace, in terms creditable to himself alike as a new ruler and a man. Great Britain declined the overtures, suggesting as a prior pledge of good faith the restoration of the Bourbons. This was a manifest absurdity, to which Bonaparte properly retorted that on the same principle the Stuarts should be on the English throne. The Austrians sent so diplomatic an answer that Bonaparte stated as the basis of peace the Treaty of Campo Formio, which under the existing military conditions — all northern Italy having been reconquered — was perhaps too broad a demand, and gave Austria a standing in her refusal. That peace could not be accomplished was owing not alone to this, but to the diversity of opinion and purpose of all the European rulers. Russia, however, propitiated by the release and repatriation of some ten

thousand prisoners, and at odds with England on the score of Malta, which Bonaparte quietly offered to help in securing to the czar as Grand Master, withdrew from the Coalition; and in the autumn of 1800, after the English had captured Malta, the czar revived the ancient armed neutrality of Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, — an alliance which was, however, later shattered by Nelson's victory at Copenhagen and the murder of Paul. It has been often alleged that Bonaparte was not sincere in this general proposal of peace; and it is true that subsequent events do not stamp him as a man of peace; but he was not then as properly subject to suspicion as he later became; and the act itself will remain a score to his credit which cannot be obliterated.

When the year 1800 opened, the situation on the Po differed not greatly from what it had been when Bonaparte took command of the Army of Italy in 1796. All that he had accomplished others had undone. Some ten thousand men held the various Alpine passes, and Massena with the Army of Italy stood on a line running from the Colle di Tenda via Savona to Genoa, with thirty-six thousand more. This was substantially as Championnet had left it. The condition of the army was far from sound. In Piedmont, where formerly Colli and Beaulieu had faced the wonderful young leader, Melas now had command of sixty thousand men, while twenty thousand others lay in various garrisons in Lombardy, Tuscany and the Roman States. Melas had interior lines. Would he know how to use them?

On the north of the main chain of the Alps, the French were still behind the Rhine. Largely by Bonaparte's aid Moreau had gathered over one hundred and twenty thousand effective in Switzerland and Alsatia, and these of the finest material; while opposite him on the right bank stood Kray with an army somewhat less in size, leaning his right flank

on the Kinzig, his left near Schaffhausen, and with headquarters at Donaueschingen. By his advice to accept the peace proffered by Bonaparte, Archduke Charles had lost caste with the Aulic Council, "to which from the days of Prince Eugene Austria had owed all her reverses," and forfeited his right, by birth, talents and success, to command the main Austrian army.

Switzerland being in the hands of the French, the Austrians were compelled to advance on two lines, with two armies which could not intercommunicate, while the French forces were able to do so with ease. Yet it was manifest that the French were not in a position to retrieve the disasters of 1799, unless very large accessions were made to the forces already under the colors. This weakness it was Bonaparte's first care to cure. To Berthier, holding the portfolio of war, on January 25, 1800, Bonaparte gave the order to create an Army of Reserve, "the command of which shall be reserved to the First Consul," and the nucleus of which was to consist of the divisions which had been used to suppress the Vendée. The left of this army was to rendezvous at Chalons-sur-Marne; the right at Lyons; the centre at Dijon; and each body was to be recruited up to twenty thousand men. Positive orders were given Berthier to go about this secretly, so far as possible. No one was to suspect that the various isolated bodies which were to rendezvous in eastern France were intended to form one body, and least of all that Bonaparte would control it. And in the event the secret proved to be wonderfully well guarded. This was largely done by much vague but public talk as to large forces assembling in Dijon; and indeed some six or eight thousand men were there brought together; but from them the allied spies learned little, while the real depots were elsewhere situated. This preparation and its result are particularly worthy of note, inasmuch as now, for

the first time, the greatest soldier of modern times was to draw up the plans and control the operations of one gigantic campaign on both the Danube and the Po. And all he did in connection with it has exceptional interest.

The engrossing question was where should the Army of Reserve be used. The possession of Switzerland enabled the French to debouch on the rear of either the Swabian or Italian armies at will. Germany was the more important point; Italy was in a way a side issue. If Kray were beaten, all the successes which the Austrians could win in Italy could not prevent the French from marching on Vienna, or from advancing to a point where Melas would be taken in reverse; but success in Italy would by no means offset an invasion of Alsatia by the Austrians. What might happen in Germany would control operations in Italy; what might happen in Italy would have small effect on the Rhine or the Danube. Suppose Kray to win, the Austrians might cross the Rhine into Belgium, Franche Comté, or Alsatia, and the Army of Italy could lend no effective aid. But with Kray beaten, no Austrian success in Italy could accomplish more than an advance on Toulon or into Provence; and this could at once be checkmated by a French manœuvre from the Danube over the Alps towards the Po. Germany was then manifestly the key-point, and Bonaparte's first idea was to hold his Army of Reserve in hand to sustain Moreau. He would, he thought, secretly assemble behind the Rhine, in the Schaffhausen-Stein region, cross at the first-named place, and as soon as Moreau advanced in front on Kray, he himself would debouch on Kray's left flank, an operation which should annihilate the Austrian army and open the road to Vienna.

The conception of all Napoleon's campaigns and the simple perfection of their opening is a study. Several points are always prominent. The army has but one line of operations.

Along this line the mass is to be projected. The objective is to be the enemy's army. The line chosen is one running around the flank of the enemy, upon his communications. If possible this flank is to be the strategic flank, that is, the one which most surely cuts the enemy off from his own base. And last, while thus threatening the enemy's, the line is to be such as to conserve one's own communications. These were principles on which this great soldier always acted. In other words, his rule for opening a campaign was this: move in one mass upon the enemy's army, along one line of operations, from such a base and in such a direction that you shall turn his strategic flank and threaten his communications, without prejudicing your own. Then if you beat him in the battle it should be your aim at once to bring on, you can destroy him. This theory, put into words, sounds simple; but it has taken twenty-four centuries of war to enable any one to enunciate the rule; and Napoleon has been the one great captain who consistently practiced it.

Here, then, was a plan against Kray's left flank made according to rule. It did not get carried out; but instead of this manœuvre Bonaparte projected his mass, *i. e.* the Army of Reserve, against Melas' right flank and rear, in a similar manner. And it may be noted that the Ulm operation in 1805 around Mack's right flank, the Jena manœuvre around the Prussian left flank in 1806, and the debouching across the Saale in 1813 were all in accordance with this same general theory.

Moreau was a strong man and, despite his having been worsted by Suwarrov, an able soldier; and he possessed, moreover, a backing in the army and in Paris which it would have been unwise to disregard at the present moment. Bonaparte's plan was designed so that he could himself direct the operations of both the Army of the Rhine and the Army of

Reserve; but at the last moment Moreau squarely declined to serve under Bonaparte's orders. The First Consul did not yet feel that his position was solid enough to break with Moreau; neither, on the other hand, could he give Moreau command of both armies, for Moreau's success might bring about a triumph which would make him dangerous to Bonaparte's own personal standing. It soon appeared also that Moreau could not comprehend the value of Bonaparte's plan; indeed, his manœuvres in Italy vouch for this blindness; and when the scheme was submitted to him, he declared against the movement in mass, and suggested as a less dangerous operation the simultaneous crossing of the Army of the Rhine in several bodies at various places from Strasburg to Schaffhausen. This was a crude return to the cordon system. The suggestion amounted merely to a plan for attacking Kray in front where he was strongest, instead of in flank where he was weakest. The very heart of Bonaparte's manœuvre went lost in Moreau's suggestion. And when on March 1 orders were issued for the Army of the Rhine to assemble between Constance and Basle, so as to debouch on Kray's left flank, Moreau sent his chief of staff, Desolles, to Paris with so many and unintelligent objections to the plans of the First Consul, that Bonaparte recognized the folly of expecting Moreau to carry out any operation of his planning. And he was unwilling to father Moreau's failure.

Matters being on this footing, it was manifest that Germany could not be made to play the crucial rôle in the forthcoming campaign; and Bonaparte made up his mind to let Moreau conduct the operation against Kray on his own lines, while he himself would manœuvre the Army of Reserve in Italy. Both France and the First Consul needed victory, and in order best to compass it, he thus yielded to Moreau the command of the finest army France had assem-

bled for many years. Orders were issued March 22 to the effect that the Army of the Rhine should cross the river between April 10 and 20, advance on Stockach, and force Kray behind the Lech, Lecourbe's division meanwhile to remain in Switzerland as reserve. Upon this having been done, three divisions of the Army of Reserve were to rapidly cross by the St. Gothard Pass into Italy and surprise the enemy, and other three divisions, newer and less well organized as yet, were to follow along to Zürich as reserve. As a sample of Bonaparte's activity in planning, as early as February 18 there exists a note of his showing the days' march from Zürich across the Alps, the amount of provision needed to be accumulated for the passage, and the number of pack mules and other means of transportation required.

At this time Bourrienne was Bonaparte's secretary. About the middle of March the First Consul showed him one of his big maps of Piedmont spread upon the floor ; both lay down, — as was the general's habit, — and Bonaparte began to stick red and black headed pins into the map to show the positions of the troops, and then asked, " Where shall we beat the Austrians ? " " How should I know ? " said Bourrienne. " Why, you idiot," was the reply, " don't you see that as Melas is at Alessandria watching Genoa, and has there his magazines and material, if I cross the Alps at the Great St. Bernard I shall cut his communications, and beat him at San Giuliano ? " This illustrates the clear mental methods of the First Consul and his early conception of the coming campaign. He knew, moreover, that he could now execute as he planned.

Moreau had been short-sighted ; by his own default he had lost the chance to command the army which should deliver the important blow in the campaign ; instead of this, he was so to manœuvre as to protect the rear and left of the opera-

tion of the Army of Reserve. In seeking to play the leading rôle in the general scheme, he had actually set himself back into a secondary one. Yet, difficult as he was to control, Bonaparte never tired in efforts to win Moreau's good-will. He wanted his coöperation.

On December 21, 1799, he wrote : "The government has entire confidence in the zeal of General-in-Chief Moreau, and in his military talents, which should in the new campaign wipe out the shame which the last campaign in Italy threw upon the French arms." On March 16 he wrote him a complimentary letter : "I envy you your happy chance; you will with your brave men do fine things. I would trade willingly my Consular purple for an epaulet of chief of brigade under your orders." On April 22 he urged early operations : "The season is fine, your troops are numerous and ably directed. Our confidence is entire. Send us quickly some flags, and make a goodly number of prisoners. Do not let us stop our blows until we shall have achieved results which shall repair our losses." On May 5 he congratulated Moreau on his victory : "Glory and three times glory ! " And again on May 14 he wrote : "You have just illustrated French arms by three fine victories. That will take down a little the Austrian pride. The Army of Reserve is beginning the passage of St. Bernard. It is feeble, it will have obstacles to vanquish, and this has decided me to pass into Italy for a fortnight. . . . You see the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The success of the campaign may depend on the promptness with which you make the operations required. If it is executed by movements prompt and decided, and you do it heartily, Italy and peace are ours. . . . Your zeal for the prosperity of the Republic and your friendship for me say enough."

Bonaparte knew how much he meant by all this. Moreau did not.

In Italy, meanwhile, Austrian affairs had not gone as had been anticipated. The military policy on the Continent, as it had been for centuries, was still dictated by political and not strategical considerations — a fact which distinctly worked in favor of the French arms. Relying on Melas, England promised to assemble twenty thousand men in Minorca, and actu-

ally had half that number at Port Mahon under Abercrombie, to aid Austria in her campaign against Genoa, hoping thus to deprive the French of another of the great ports. Naples was to send twenty thousand men to the Riviera. And when Melas should have reached Provence, the English were to join him there. This scheme fell through, and Melas' operations in Piedmont were in reality such as to give Bonaparte's new plan a better chance of success.

In a dispatch of March 5 Bonaparte had given Massena his views as to what it was advisable for the Army of Italy to do : —

"I have reunited in Dijon an army of reserve, of which I shall keep the direct command. I will send you within eight or ten days one of my aides with a plan of all the operations for the coming campaign, where you will see that your rôle will be a fine one, and will not exceed the means at your disposal. Yet if you should fear that the enemy may open the campaign before us, I see no reason why you should not recall two thousand men of the six thousand in the Alps. The snows cover the Dauphiné, and moreover the army I am about to assemble at Dijon will always be ready to come up promptly. If the enemy reunites his forces near Spezzia, to attack you from that direction, at the same time by way of Novi and Montenotte, leave only a small body at the Colle di Tenda. For two months the snows will protect it sufficiently, and moreover the enemy can undertake nothing against Nice. In your place, during Ventose (March) and all the month of Germinal (April), I should have at Genoa four fifths of my forces. Thus, if the total reaches fifty thousand men, I should have forty thousand in positions which lean on Genoa, two thousand five hundred in all the Alps, one thousand five hundred in Sospello and the Colle di Tenda, two thousand five hundred for the garrison of Antibes, the castle of Nice, the castle of Vintimille, the garrison of Savona ; one thousand five hundred for the Tanaro, Ormea ; and the balance at points of circumference two days from Genoa. In this situation I should not fear that the enemy could take Genoa away from me. As to the months of Floréal (May) and Prairial (June), it will be another thing. We shall then have taken the initiative of the campaign, and the instructions that I will send you in ten days will indicate your

conduct. The fort of Savona must be well provisioned, and all your depots should be able to move there. If the enemy is awakened enough to concentrate twelve thousand men on the Riviera between Spezzia and Genoa, fall on him with all your force and massacre him. Finally, I repeat to you, in your place I find your position fine; take advantage of it. Do not be afraid if the enemy tries to place himself in your rear. Abandon at once all the positions he wishes to attack, to find yourself with all your forces on one of his wings. . . . In the position which we occupy, we cannot be beaten if we strongly will to vanquish. Remember our splendid days. Fall on the enemy with all your forces wherever he shall make any movement. . . . The enemy, in the Austrian manner, will make three attacks: from the coast, by way of Novi, and by way of Montenotte. Ignore two of these attacks, and throw yourself with all your forces on the third."

These instructions must be read with the understanding that Massena was but one piece on the chessboard, and this piece was, so to speak, to keep Melas in check while Bonaparte moved the queen, or Army of Reserve, down upon him to finish with a checkmate. Had Massena better understood the broad meaning of this letter, he would have collected more food in Genoa, and the result might have been different; though, indeed, armies shut up in fortresses are almost uniformly doomed. In these instructions we see the crisp Napoleonic idea, an extension of what Frederick preached, and more to the point. You can afford, said he, to let two columns advance and win a partial success, for it will enable you to destroy the third, and then turn on the two others and take them in reverse.

The official decree for the creation of an Army of Reserve of sixty thousand men and its rendezvous at Dijon was issued March 8; and a proclamation went forth calling on the French people "to force peace on those tyrants who have refused to accept peace;" while another one called on all old soldiers to rejoin their commands, and promised honor and

extra privileges to all volunteers. The return of Bonaparte to power enthused the population and brought in men. As one of the articles of the Constitution of the Year VIII. forbade any of the Consuls to head an army in person, Berthier was, by orders of April 2, placed in command, though up to that date, by a curious lapse, the official papers constantly refer to the First Consul as having reserved to himself the special command of this army. Berthier's appointment created a situation much like that of Grant and Meade in the Army of the Potomac, except that Berthier never exercised as much authority as Meade. Marmont says, "it was retaining Berthier as his chief of staff under another name." As has been already intimated, Berthier had marked limitations; but Bonaparte was used to him, liked his laborious method, and, to quote Bourrienne, "hated new faces" around him. On Berthier's retiring from the department of war, the portfolio was confided to Carnot, who had been acting as Inspector General.

The public decree assigning Dijon as rendezvous, and much loose talk about it, were well calculated to deceive the enemy, and in fact did so. Troops were really assembled at other points and pushed on into Switzerland, and as a result, the inquiries set on foot by the enemy, chiefly through Royalists or spies, to ascertain how many men were being got together at Dijon, misled the Coalition powers into the notion that the Army of Reserve was a fancy, whereas it soon became a tremendous fact. Indeed, this army was so much a myth that it became the butt of allied satire for many weeks, both verbal and pictorial. Bonaparte's review of the "army" at Dijon was in fact a farce. But the laugh was soon turned against the allies.

Marked efforts were made to encourage enlistments and get good men into the ranks, although, to foster culture

and talent, the students winning first prizes in music and art were exempt from conscription. On Christmas Day a proclamation was issued to the French soldiers calling on their patriotism and courage, and in another proclamation to the Army of Italy, giving special powers to Massena, also dated on Christmas Day, a distribution was made of silver-chased muskets, drumsticks and carbines, and of silver trumpets to various distinguished soldiers. On March 20 the erection of Memorial Columns in each department, to be inscribed with the names of those killed in battle, was ordered; and on April 21 a proclamation went forth to young Frenchmen, appealing to their public spirit and desire for glory: "If you are zealous to be in an army destined to finish the wars of the Revolution by assuring the independence, the liberty, the glory of the great nation, To arms! To arms! Rush to Dijon!" Yet while preparing for war, up to the last moment Bonaparte hoped for peace. On March 12 he wrote to Brune, commanding the Army of the West: "If we have war, I hope we shall come out of it brilliantly. If we have peace, the foreign powers will be convinced that we were in a position to force them to it."

Now begins an interesting series of minor alterations in the plan of the campaign, exhibiting its elasticity and in no sense affecting its general character, but depending rather on the advance of the Army of the Rhine, and on the changes of position of the enemy. Assuming that the Army of Reserve was practically all at Zürich, on March 18 Bonaparte assigned it a route over the Splügen to Bergamo, to be undertaken as soon as ordered. On April 9 he wrote Massena to hold himself on the defensive, and draw the enemy's attention to the Army of Italy, until he himself should debouch by the St. Gothard or Simplon on the rear of the enemy, when Massena was to reach out towards Turin to get in touch with

his right. Thus we find Bonaparte selecting passes further west than the Splügen from which to enter Italy. At the same time, with an eye to the general coöperation of the two great armies, he issued orders to Berthier to visit Moreau's headquarters at Basle, indicating three main objects: 1st, to work in connection with the operations of the Army of the Rhine in Swabia; 2d, to penetrate into Italy with the Army of Reserve; 3d, to leave in Switzerland sufficient troops to prevent its being invaded by way of Rheineck or Feldkirch.

On April 6 Melas, in Piedmont, advanced with sixty thousand men on the French, quite in the manner Bonaparte had foretold in his letter to Massena. Of the Army of Italy, Thureau with four thousand men was in the Mont Cenis pass; Miollis with the right of eight thousand men was at Genoa; Soult with the centre of twelve thousand men was in the Bocchetta and Cadibona passes; and Suchet with the left was on the Colle di Tenda, at Nice and on the Var. The French troops were ill-fed, and though Massena was at their head, compelled as they were, owing to the English fleet, to scatter to subsist, they were somewhat discouraged.

Early in April Melas left Kaim to watch the Alps, and in three concentric columns advanced on the Army of Italy. Ott moved up the Trebia with fifteen thousand men, Hohenzollern up the Scrivia with ten thousand; and Melas with forty thousand started across the mountains to break through the French centre. Massena met this advance in a masterful way, utilizing every advantage of the mountain country, ever ready for partial attack, so conducting his operations as to give us a pattern of a campaign in retreat. As Napoleon at St. Helena said, he showed us how to win time with lesser forces. Yet Melas must be praised for handsome work; though Massena held the Bocchetta against superior forces, by April 6 the Austrian leader had broken through the French

line at Savona by debouching from Cairo, on the same line Bonaparte had successfully worked in the reverse direction in 1796, and had cut Soult off from Suchet; and though in a fight lasting several days Massena made a desperate effort to rejoin Suchet, by April 21 Melas had shut him up in Genoa, with twelve thousand men fit for duty and sixteen thousand invalided; he had placed Ott in charge of the blockade with twenty-four thousand men; and while Kaim protected Piedmont, he himself with twenty-eight thousand men had marched along the coast against Suchet, who had but ten thousand, and who, cut off from the Army of Italy, was retiring for safety to the Var.

Massena, outnumbered two to one, could not possibly hold both Genoa and all the Riviera; but if he had left a small force at Nice, and kept the bulk of his fighting forces near Genoa, not only would his presence there have prevented Melas from marching to the Var, but he could have played Bonaparte's game by maintaining himself in the Genoa country. But determined to hold Genoa, and also to keep up his line of communication with the Var, he was unable to do justice to either task. On May 11 Melas entered Nice and took position on the Var.

Some days were consumed before news of these events could reach Bonaparte, as Massena was practically cut off. He knew only that the French and Italian armies had got into fighting contact, and that not an hour must be lost by the Army of Reserve.

He wrote to Carnot, April 24: "I pray you in consequence to give orders to General-in-Chief Berthier. 1st. To move, with all diligence, the Army of Reserve to Geneva. 2d. To send across by the lake to Villeneuve all the provisions of war and victual which have been assembled at Geneva. 3d. To move as rapidly as possible into Piedmont and Lombardy, either by passing the Great St. Bernard, or by passing the

Simplon. . . . The telegraph to-day from Basle and Strasburg tells me that there is nothing new. Repeat the order to General Moreau to attack the enemy. Make him feel that his delays compromise essentially the security of the Republic. . . . Write also to General-in-Chief Massena that we have no official news yet of what is occurring in Italy, and that the Armies of the Rhine and of Reserve are on the march."

Bonaparte was keenly alive to the danger of delay. Not so Moreau, who as yet had failed to open his manœuvre against Kray; and, as above, the First Consul was compelled to have orders issued to him to attack at once. In addition thereto, on April 24 he wrote Moreau, "I hope you have passed the Rhine; every day of delay will be fatal for us." For only by this advance of the Army of the Rhine on Kray could the latter be held from threatening the flank or rear of the Army of Reserve as it marched into Italy. As arrangements had been completed for this army, which Bonaparte valued at forty thousand men, to begin its passage of the Alps, the First Consul was jealous of every day's delay.

Thus we see that, owing partly to Moreau's slowness in driving back Kray, but chiefly to Melas' advance on Massena, Bonaparte, in his plan for crossing the Alps, is again formulating a passage farther to the west, the operation thus gaining in time, but growing less comprehensive in scope. At first the Splügen was the pass; then the St. Gothard and Simplon; now it is the Great St. Bernard, fully one hundred and thirty miles farther west; while the point of issue into Italy is to be Ivrea, ninety miles west of Bergamo, which was at first considered. Thus Melas' advance on Massena really played into Bonaparte's hands by shortening his line of operations. Such changes are not an unusual occurrence, and we shall find the same thing again at Ulm in 1805; but they emphasize the value of the one line of operations on which to project the mass.

Blind as he was to any grand strategic plan, Berthier understood Bonaparte's orders, and the limit to which he might exceed them; and he answered that he would at the moment of advance, which he put at May 13 or 14, choose between the Simplon, the Great St. Bernard and the St. Gothard. Berthier preferred either of the two last-named, as over the Simplon sledges could not be hauled, while over the Great St. Bernard there were only a dozen miles where wheels could not pass. But on April 27 Bonaparte refused to consider the St. Gothard route, because Moreau had not yet advanced on Kray. He wrote to Berthier, "My project would be no longer to pass by the St. Gothard. I do not look upon this operation as possible and within the ordinary rules of prudence, until Moreau shall have obtained a great advantage over the enemy;" and in speaking of helping out Massena, who might be starving in Genoa, "It is therefore by the St. Bernard that I wish to have the passage made." Moreover, the First Consul urged that it might be of the essence, to march at once on Tortona to relieve Massena, and not to march on Milan; for if Massena was shut up in Genoa, he would have food for but a month, and the route over the Great St. Bernard was much the shortest. Bonaparte never forgot Massena, though when later events made it essential to consider the larger problem of regaining all northern Italy, and not merely the saving of Genoa, it was loosely charged that he abandoned his lieutenant.

While the young recruits of the Army of Reserve were getting disciplined in Geneva, the army itself did not grow as rapidly as was to be desired, being in mid-April only twenty-five thousand men, which, said Berthier, looked like crossing the Alps with not over thirty thousand men actually under the colors; and he asked for Lecourbe and fifteen thousand men as reinforcements. But Bonaparte was used

to dealing in bigger blocks; and he had procured the issue of a Consular Order of May 5, addressed to the Minister of War, compelling Moreau to send by the St. Gothard and Simplon from the Army of the Rhine full twenty-five thousand men, so as to bring the Army of Reserve up to ample strength.

Berthier took command in person at Geneva, May 1. Next day, in a lengthy letter to Berthier, Bonaparte said, "You see that I occupy myself much with your details, but that is because in your operation resides the eventual success of the campaign, and that I in no wise doubt but that you will have the glory of reconquering this fine theatre of French valor."

Bonaparte reached the army in Geneva eight days later, and on May 10 the Army of Reserve was thus divided: —

Berthier Commander-in-Chief, Dupont Chief of Staff.

Vanguard Lannes	8,000 men.
Corps of Duhesme, Division Loison . . .	7,000 "
" " " " Boudet . .	8,000 "
Corps of Victor, Division Monnier . .	4,000 "
" " " " Chambarlhac . .	6,000 "
" " " " Chabran . . .	5,000 "
Cavalry Corps, Murat	4,000 "
Total . . .	42,000 "

Chief of Artillery Marmont.

Division commanders were later somewhat changed; and the army acted by divisions throughout the campaign rather than by corps. Orders and Bulletins were now signed by Berthier, but they frequently refer to "the First Consul, who is in the midst of the army," and many were actually written by Bonaparte.

The above forces lay as follows: Lannes was at Martigny in the Rhone valley, with Boudet, Loison, Chambarlhac and Monnier echeloned in his rear from Villeneuve to Lausanne. Chabran was in Savoy, and was to cross the Little St. Ber-

nard. Thureau's motley force of five thousand men, drawn chiefly from the Dauphiné garrisons, which had originally been the left of the Army of Italy, held the Mont Cenis pass, and was to march with some display to Susa to attract the attention of Melas; while Moncey with fifteen thousand men (not twenty-five thousand, as had been ordered), detached from Moreau much against this general's will, was heading for the St. Gothard, and Bethencourt, across the Simplon, was marching on Domo d' Ossola with a small force. The Army of Reserve was starting to cross the Alps, and the enemy as yet disbelieved in its existence. This testifies to exceptional skill and secrecy.

Bonaparte had for many weeks been working, and continued to work as only he could do, to organize and equip the Army of Reserve to the highest grade. Having added the capstone, on May 12 he went to Lausanne, ready to begin his great operation, and, "Events are about to succeed each other with great rapidity," he wrote Brune. . . . "Our superiority on the Rhine is fully sustained. Within fifteen or twenty days, all that will produce results which will place the Republic in the rank of glory and of consideration which it never should have lost."

On the other side of the Alps, unconscious of the fate awaiting him, lay Melas, well satisfied with his apparent gain, — as indeed he had a right to be, — and convinced that he would shortly be able to enter Provence and there win the active aid of the Royalists and the English; whereupon Moreau would be constrained to detach a large part of his forces from the Army of the Rhine towards southern France, which would give Kray a clear opportunity of beating him. The plan was not a bad one, taken all by itself; but he was reckoning without his host, if ever a man did; and so little did he know or understand any of the French operations, that on

the 2d of June he is reported to have written to his mistress at Pavia, "I know what they say in Lombardy, that a French army is coming. Be afraid of nothing. I forbid you to leave." He was about to be rudely awakened.

In view of his project of debouching from Switzerland, Bonaparte could complacently scan the apparently dangerous gain made by Melas. Other Austrian forces were stationed: to watch the St. Gothard pass, at Belinzona, eight thousand men under Wukassovich; in the Dorea Baltea, guarding the Great St. Bernard, three thousand men under Briey; in the valley of the Dorea Riparia, to hold the Mont Cenis pass, five thousand men; in the Stura valley, one thousand. In garrison in Upper Italy were ten thousand men; in Tuscany and the Romagna, three thousand men; in Istria, three thousand men. All these last were under Haddick, Laudon and Kaim. A column of six thousand men was just reaching Melas from the Romagna. This total of over ninety thousand men was dispersed over so vast a territory that Bonaparte himself could scarcely have dictated a better parceling of the enemy's forces.

Moreau had finally broken up, April 25, to move against Kray, and, once started, did good work. Demonstrating as if about to cross at Kehl, he drew Kray's attention thither, passed the Rhine above Basle, joined Lecourbe, who had put over at Schaffhausen, and attacked Kray at Engen May 3, Lecourbe having done his part by seizing Stockach on the enemy's rear. Kray retired down the Danube to Ulm after two other defeats, at Möskirch, May 5, and at Biberach, May 8, and with considerable losses. These operations, to be later detailed, are merely mentioned here to elucidate the situation of the Army of Reserve, the rear of which had thus been swept clear of the enemy.

To cross the Alps, the guns of the Army of Reserve had all

bole by even good authorities, the march of Bonaparte was a mere incident to a brilliant plan of campaign, equaled or surpassed by many modern mountain crossings, except in the size of the army and the glory of the results. During all these years, small and large bodies of troops crossed the Alps at every season, sometimes in midwinter.

At Aosta, on May 16, the two leading columns united. From here down it was Hannibal's route, but not now a pathless one. In the rear of Lannes followed the divisions in the above order, each in turn beginning the ascent. Bonaparte was quite self-contained, impenetrable; but he kept the men in good heart by his activity and cheering words, and the troops were happy and confident. Like any other sensible man, he crossed the mountains on a mule led by a peasant. David's well-known picture, in which an impossible horse with an impossible rider must either slide off a rock into gulfs in his rear, or scale impossible ice-covered mountains in his front, however inspiring, is quite ideal to one who knows the St. Bernard. In the descent, the leader and his officers amused themselves by coasting down the shorter slopes made slippery by the gun-sleds and other baggage.

Bonaparte was well aware of the location of the fort of Bard in a close gorge two thirds way down the Italian slope from Aosta towards Ivrea, — it was within the common knowledge of every one, — and of the importance of seizing it, so as to prevent its checking his vanguard and hence delaying the entire army; and from Lausanne, where, according to his habit, he had personally remained for a while, lest his appearance with the van should permit the enemy to guess the magnitude of his preparations, he repeatedly warned Berthier to have an eye to this danger, and to take measures to capture the place; but, in any event, he insisted that Lannes should be pushed on by any means to Ivrea, which town, at the

outlet of the mountains, must be taken at the earliest possible moment. Even if the rest of the army was delayed, Lannes must be got to Ivrea. He had, indeed, on January 31, sent Duroc to Switzerland to study the mountains, "in order that I may always have near me some one who knows the nature of this country."

On May 13 he wrote Lannes: "General Berthier hopes that you will have made the passage of the mountains the 25th to 26th (May 15 or 16), as has been understood. Arrived at Aosta you will reunite, and your vanguard will move on the castle of Bard. Do not present yourself before this fortress except with all your forces. When you shall have taken the heights which dominate it, forbid musketry fire, which would uselessly consume cartridges. Place your guns at once on some height where you can cannonade the fort with advantage. Place two mortars on the road, and when these two batteries are ready, bombard it with vivacity. At the moment when they shall have produced their effect on the cover which the enemy have made of their batteries, and when there shall be a chance for the musketry, you will permit its fire, which may thus be useful and accelerate the surrender of the fort. General Marescot is ordered to go to the vanguard to take charge of everything relating to the attack on Fort Bard."

On the 17th Lannes began the descent; next day he drove another Austrian detachment out of Chatillon; and on the 19th he found himself, as Bonaparte had expected, blocked by the fort of Bard. The small garrison of four hundred men, though contemporary Austrian accounts speak of the place as unable to resist any fire but musketry, was determined to do its duty. An escalade failed. From Martigny, on the 17th, Bonaparte again urged the seizure of the fort, and Berthier from Aosta impressed on Lannes that the entire success of the operation depended on its being promptly taken. On the 18th Bonaparte wrote Berthier: "Make General Lannes feel that the fate of Italy and perhaps of the Republic depends on capturing the fort of Bard."

But Lannes saw no means of doing this as speedily as was demanded by his chief; and recognizing the importance of reaching Ivrea, fifteen hundred men were put to work to cut a road over the Albaredo, an adjoining mountain, where ran what was in reality only a path for goats and goatherds. In places steps were cut. Walls were built to prevent the men from falling over the precipices. Bridges were thrown across the ravines, and later even cavalry passed over a mountain which was thought inaccessible to footmen. Some soldiers also carried on their backs two four-pounders across the lower Col de la Cou, and after thirty hours of hard labor got these guns in battery on heights commanding the village and castle. Lannes at once started by way of Albaredo mountain with most of his foot, the mere mountain path then permitting no horses or guns to pass; and the men made their way in Indian file over what had seemed an impassable rock. Judged by the Correspondence alone, Napoleon's claim in the Memoirs to have himself discovered the path appears to be founded on forgetfulness — a by no means uncommon and often quite honest lapse in memoirs.

Meanwhile Bonaparte had personally ascended to Etroubles, and on the 20th could see that his plan was being rudely interfered with by the fort of Bard, and by the fact that Lannes, who would soon reach Ivrea, was not supported by other troops, which were halted and massed in the defiles of the Dorea Baltea. "Have a heed," he wrote to Berthier, "in three or four days Lannes will have seven or eight thousand men down upon him." Not that Bonaparte had any fear that this interruption was other than temporary. "If the St. Bernard has not stopped us, a mountain of second rank will not be an insurmountable difficulty," he wrote, and ordered the path over the Albaredo to be more speedily made ready. "It would have to be very bad to be worse than the

St. Bernard, over which we have brought part of our artillery: with pains and time one overcomes many obstacles."

Bonaparte knew something of Melas' situation from Suchet's dispatches; and having heard that a week before Melas was on the Var, he saw that contact with the Austrian mass could not occur for some days more, by which time he could readily reach the plain and be fully prepared. On May 21 several other routes were suggested to get around Bard, and on May 24, in a note to Berthier about filing past the obstacle, he said: "The great difficulty will be the artillery. The people of Bard themselves assure me that one should be able to make a road between Bard and the town by working at this road all night. One might also make the artillery pass at night. . . . Could you not cannonade three or four hours with a number of pieces, and escalade the first enceinte, or else escalade it at night while making a great number of false attacks, meanwhile having all your pieces carried past on sledges?" But the suggestions, however useful, were no longer available: Lannes had already got around the fort.

On the 21st, then, Lannes reached Ivrea, and next day made an unsuccessful attack upon the Austrian troops holding the place. Luckily some batteries now reached him, for Marmont had conceived the intelligent plan of conveying guns and ammunition-wagons past the fort at night, by covering the road through the town with manure, and by wrapping the wheels and rattling parts of the gun-carriages and caissons with hay and straw; and indeed the artillery was thus in large part hauled through the defile road at night by hand and with few casualties, although the garrison discovered that something was going on and opened fire at short range. The fort lay so high above the road, however, that a fire downward in the dark proved ineffective. By this means, and along a new road cut through the rocks of the gorge for

the horses, the army defiled without substantial loss; and though during the passage of the artillery some ammunition-wagons were exploded by the enemy's shot, yet forty guns and one hundred ammunition-wagons soon got by.

With the help of the artillery, Lannes stormed and captured the fort of Ivrea on the 23d, and the town next day, and thus avoided the necessity of siege operations. Meanwhile the infantry divisions had been moving successively along the St. Bernard pass, and by the 22d the rear of column had crossed the summit. By May 24 Boudet reached Ivrea, Loison was at Bard, Monnier at Chatillon, and Chambarlhac at Aosta. Chabran was charged with the reduction of the fort of Bard, which fell May 31. With rearguard the army numbered forty-one thousand men. Moncey with fifteen thousand was crossing the St. Gothard, Bethencourt the Simplon, and Thureau's five thousand the Mont Cenis.

Moncey.

From Aosta, May 24, Bonaparte, who, under the circumstances, seems to have kept surprisingly well posted, wrote Brune: "The enemy seems much astonished at our movement. He does not know what to make of it. He scarcely yet believes it. You can judge of it. Here is the situation of the enemy the 28 Floréal (May 18): twelve thousand men at Nice, six thousand men at Savona and in the Riviera of Genoa, twenty-five thousand before Genoa, eight thousand at Susa, Pignerola, etc.; three thousand in Aosta valley, eight thousand opposite the Simplon and the St. Gothard; all this infantry; two regiments of hussars at Genoa and Nice, four regiments near Turin; the rest cantoned in the vicinity of Acqui and in the interior of Lombardy. He (Melas) remained in this position

until the moment we reached Ivrea. The three thousand men who were in the valley are beaten and dispersed. The whole corps which was near Susa and Pignerola has moved to between Turin and Ivrea. Nice must probably be evacuated at this hour. They even write me from Ivrea that Melas must have reached Turin, but that is not certain."

This was a curiously close estimate, considering the means of information.

On May 13 the Austrian forces had been thus distributed: Ott at Genoa with twenty-five thousand men; Elsnitz on the Var and back of it with twenty thousand; Wukassovich with ten thousand at the St. Gothard and Simplon; Haddick with three thousand at the St. Bernard; Kaim at Mont Cenis with five thousand; twenty thousand odd in fortresses, and six thousand coming up.

The passage of the Alps had ended in success; the Austrians had been surprised, there was nothing to oppose the Army of Reserve from debouching into the plain of the Po, and Bonaparte's hands were free to manœuvre as he saw fit. On the 6th or 7th (26th or 27th) he wrote Brune, "I reckon to have concentrated at Ivrea the entire army, which makes up about thirty-three thousand men. I shall be master of the entire region from the Dorea Baltea to the Sesia. On this same day Moncey will cross the St. Gothard with fifteen thousand men; Suchet and Massena, who are informed of the movement, will follow the enemy so soon as they see that he weakens before them. The castle and the town of Ivrea are ours, as well as the lower fort of Bard. The Hungarian captain, with four hundred Croats, has retired into a dungeon where there are a dozen guns which cover the road; we are going to cannonade him."

On reaching the Var, Melas, still misled by wrong information, had come to the odd conclusion that the Army of Reserve, if indeed there was one, would march through Pro-

vence and meet him along the Riviera; and when on the 18th of May he heard rumors that the French army was actually crossing the Alps, he was not more astounded than he was puzzled as to means properly to meet their oncoming. He had believed the Alpine threat a mere demonstration to distract his attention from Genoa and the Var. He did his best, however, and leaving seventeen thousand men under Elsnitz on the Var to help hold the coast and aid in reducing Genoa, and ordering nine thousand men from the Riviera back to Piedmont, he personally hurried to Turin, where he arrived May 25. In Turin he assembled from five to ten thousand men from the garrison and the troops retiring from Ivrea; but this was no force for field manœuvres. Even now he was quite at sea as to what was about to happen. The descent on Susa May 20 by Thureau he believed to be that of the main column, and when Thureau reached Bussoleno, he prepared to meet him in force, unaware of the storm brewing in his rear.

Nor was this his only weakness. Melas could not bring himself to give up the blockade of Genoa, whereas it was his only chance of salvation to do this at once, and mass all the forces he could by any means collect for an immediate battle with the French, so as to keep open his retreat by way of the pass of Stradella. Of what good was Genoa, if he was to be strategically compromised? His conduct and its results show how wise Bonaparte was when, in 1796, he threw up the siege of Mantua, and massed his entire force to meet the Austrian army of relief under Wurmser. There had been three lines of retreat open to Melas: across the Po at Valencia and the Ticino at Pavia; or through the Stradella defile; or a more difficult one via Genoa and Bobbio, and on through Modena. But he was fast losing them all. The one that ran along the Po right bank he might still hold, if he acted promptly.

Bonaparte had won the first innings by his boldness and secrecy. "Here we are at last in the middle of Italy," he wrote the Consuls, May 27. "In ten days many things will have happened." His original idea had been that when he should have debouched from the Alps, he would at once move on Tortona, on the way to Genoa. Now the field was broadening, and his view seems to have been to rely on Massena being able to hold Genoa a few days longer, to march to Milan, recover all Lombardy, then cross the Po, and thus cut off Melas' line of retreat. Here is shown the intellect of a great captain. The average general would have marched to Turin, beaten Melas and Ott and relieved Genoa, allowing the Austrians to escape to Lombardy and there oppose him, having made themselves safe on their own line of communications, and collected men and material on the retreat. On the other hand, Bonaparte seized the larger view, cut the Austrian line of retreat, and then forced battle on Melas from such a direction that a defeat would ruin him. We shall see this breadth of view again shown in later campaigns. Chiefly therein lay Napoleon's great power. To him a half success was no success at all.

In the conception of a great plan of campaign, much must be left to chance, relying upon one's ability to overcome minor obstacles as they occur. The great captain must assure himself that his subordinates are attending to the details of commissariat and ordnance; he must grasp and organize all factors which go towards feeding his men and enabling them to fight. But the general who, from the time he should devote to the larger problems of strategy, takes hours to provide for every possible future contingency, cannot be said to possess the self-reliance of the true leader. Bonaparte has been blamed for undertaking the passage of the Alps and being almost blocked by the fort of Bard; in other words, he

has been charged with carelessness in his undertaking. As has been shown, he knew about the fort; when he started, he believed that as soon as he reached the obstacle, he would find means to overcome it; and he was not seriously delayed by its being on his route. Whoso exaggerates hindrances in his path before he gets to them will never undertake a bold offensive. Unless a man feels confident of his ability, when he reaches them, to surmount any obstacles which he knows to exist, or which may unforeseen arise, and unless he is content to leave to the intelligence of the moment the means of so doing, he can never conceive, much less conduct, a great plan of campaign; for in every operation there are many difficulties, many changes; and those operations which exhibit the most are the ones most fraught with momentous consequences.

Meanwhile Genoa was approaching its fall. The city lies at the foot of the Apennines, and at that day had a circuit of about three and a half miles, and an enceinte with bastions, outside which was a line of works and detached redoubts. To besiege or bombard Genoa was almost impossible; but an English fleet held the harbor and prevented the place from being victualed, so that with a population of one hundred and fifty thousand souls, Genoa could soon be starved out. Of this Melas took advantage, and forced upon the French a blockade which will always remain famous in history for the heroic manner in which Massena held out against starvation, a turbulent population and his own soldiers.

Ott was put in charge of the blockade. By the end of May provisions were exhausted, and all sorties were driven back. Starvation soon became dangerous. Horses, dogs, cats, rats, were common food; and grass, leaves and nettles were cooked with salt and eaten. The population rose, and became so threatening that the troops had orders to fire on any group in

the streets exceeding four people. Massena took every means to prolong the defense, which was stanch and able in the highest degree; but he had no knowledge of what was going on outside, and deemed succor far away. His soldiers became so weak on their diet of cocoa, linseed and starch, that on June 3 he opened negotiations, and on the 4th signed an honorable evacuation, just at the moment Bonaparte appeared to his rescue. On June 5 eight thousand five hundred men marched out with the honors of war towards France. Some, less able to march, were shipped by sea to Antibes, near Nice. The sick and wounded remained behind, under agreement that they should be cared for and later released. Hohenzollern took command. The Austrians moved to Alessandria.

In these Riviera operations the French had lost fourteen thousand men, and had six thousand invalided; the Austrians had lost twenty thousand men.

The charge that Bonaparte deserted Massena is absurd. Apart from the fact that he knew little about Genoa on emerging from the Alps, he had in any case to do the wisest military thing, and this was to compromise the army of Melas. To march to the relief of Genoa as the main object was equivalent to losing the campaign. One might as well urge that the sacrifice of a division to win a great battle is unjustifiable. War constantly demands the sacrifice of individuals or masses, or their risk, at least, to compass the end sought. Here, from his standpoint, Bonaparte was only risking the capture of Massena and his brave men. Moreover, the broader plan was conceived at Aosta on the 24th, when Bonaparte heard that Melas on the 19th was still at Nice, and before Genoa had thought of surrender. To carry out this plan was, in a military sense, vital; to assist Massena was secondary. Sad as proved the fate of Genoa, it was swal-

lowed up in the splendor of the Marengo campaign. Neither Suchet nor Massena had knowingly worked into Bonaparte's hands. They were ignorant of his plans. Nor was it until June 8 that Bonaparte heard of the surrender of Genoa.

In the St. Helena Memoirs, in discussing his position on emerging from the Alps, Napoleon says : —

"The headquarters of the Austrian army was at Turin, but half the enemy's forces were before Genoa, and the other half were supposed to be and were actually on the road, coming by way of the Colle di Tenda to reinforce the corps which was in Turin. Under these circumstances, what course shall the First Consul take ? Shall he march on Turin to drive out Melas, join Thureau, and thus find his communications assured with France, and with his arsenals at Grenoble and at Briançon ? Shall he throw a bridge at Chivasso, using the boats fortune has thrown into his power, and direct himself in a straight line on Genoa to raise the blockade of this important place ? Or, leaving Melas on his rear, shall he cross the Sesia and the Ticino, to march on Milan and the Adda, and make his junction with the corps of Moncey, composed of fifteen thousand men, which was coming from the Army of the Rhine, and which had debouched from the St. Gothard ?

"Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true principles of war, because Melas had considerable forces with him. The French army thus ran the chance of delivering battle, not having an assured retreat, the fort of Bard not yet being taken. Moreover, if Melas abandoned Turin, and moved on Alessandria, the campaign would have failed ; each army would find itself in a natural position, the French army leaning on Mont Blanc and the Dauphiné, and that of Melas would have had its left at Genoa, and behind it the fortresses of Mantua, Placentia and Milan.

"The second course did not seem to be practicable. How could one adventure into the midst of an army as powerful as the Austrian army between the Po and Genoa, without having any line of operation, any assured retreat ?

"The third course, on the contrary, offered all advantages. The French army being master of Milan, one could seize all the magazines, all the depots, all the hospitals of the enemy's army. One could join the left commanded by General Moncey. One could have an assured retreat by the Simplon and the St. Gothard. The Simplon conducted to the Valais and

Sion, whither had been directed all the supplies of victual for the army. The St. Gothard conducted to Switzerland, which we had been in possession of over two years, and which covered the Army of the Rhine, then on the Iller. In this position the French general could act according to his desire. If Melas marched with his reunited army from Turin to the Sesia and the Ticino, the French army could deliver battle to him with the immense advantage that if it was victorious, Melas, without retreat, would be pursued and thrown into Savoy; and in case the French army was beaten it would retire by the Simplon and the St. Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, directed himself on Alessandria to there join the army which came from Genoa, one might hope in moving to meet him, by passing the Po, to get ahead of him and to deliver battle, the French army having its rear assured on the river and Milan, the Simplon and the St. Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut and having no communication with Mantua and Austria, would be exposed to be thrown on the mountains of the Riviera di Ponente, and entirely destroyed or captured at the foot of the Alps and the Colle di Tenda, and in the county of Nice.

"Finally, after adopting the third course, if, once master of Milan, the French general chose to let Melas pass him and to remain between the Po, the Adda and the Ticino, he could thus without battle have reconquered Lombardy, Piedmont, the Maritime Alps and the Riviera of Genoa, and would have raised the blockade of these towns. These were very handsome results."

While praising to the highest degree "the hero of Rivoli and of Zürich" for the defense of Genoa, Napoleon at St. Helena maintained that he surrendered too soon. While he had no news from the Army of Reserve, yet the very evident hurry in the negotiations by the Austrians should have led him to suspect that help was near at hand. The eagerness to let him march out on such good terms as he obtained should have been another proof of speedy relief. "When Cæsar was besieging Alesia," says Napoleon, "he blockaded it with so much care that this place had no news of what was going on outside. The time had passed for the army of relief to arrive. The council of the Gauls assembled under the

Laudon, but the two with some six thousand men felt obliged to fall back on the Adda, after throwing two thousand men into the citadel of Milan. A retrograde movement was also made by the detachment which had been defending the St. Gothard, to Como. On June 1, then, Murat, Monnier and Boudet collected material for passing the Ticino, and not only actually put over at Buffalora and Turbigo, but had an advance party push on to Milan, which it reached early in the afternoon, the Austrians retiring to Lodi. The First Consul followed rapidly, and personally made a state entry into the capital on June 2. Lannes, his mission accomplished, followed on to Vercelli, whence, to continue the protection of the right of Bonaparte's new line of advance, he was ordered to Pavia, and reached the place June 3; while the mass was now assembling at Milan, Chabran also hurrying up his division from surrendered Bard. Loison was detailed to push the retiring Austrians beyond Lodi; and reaching this place June 4, he found the enemy marching towards Crema. Moncey, who had not made good speed, the leader thought, was also ordered down to Milan by rapid marches, leaving only a small detachment to control the Austrians who had stood in front of the St. Gothard. Bonaparte's immediate problem now was to cross the Po in force and sit down on the communications of the Austrian army; and as Melas would be so placed that he would have to fight for existence, the French army needed every man within call.

It was fortunate for Bonaparte that on June 4 he received through a spy a fairly accurate statement of the enemy's movements, and learned that at the end of May the Austrian mass was still in the Genoa region. He wrote Lannes from Milan, June 6, "I do not think the enemy can have at this moment on the Tanaro more than ten thousand infantry, or can get more than twenty thousand there before the 20th

or 21st (June 9 or 10)." As there was thus abundant time to complete the pending operation, Loison was ordered to follow the Austrian forces back beyond Crema, and, if possible, to take possession of Orzinovi on the Oglio, "a place between Brescia and the Po having a regular bastioned enceinte with a counterscarp;" while Murat was pushed out to the Po at Placentia, and Victor's corps advanced to Pavia. The essential Po crossings would be thus secured, and nothing dangerous left in the French rear. On this day Bonaparte wrote to Carnot, "You understand there will happen in a few days, and rapidly, very important events, which may have a signal influence on the future situation of the House of Austria."

When Melas reached Turin, he had expected that Bonaparte's operations would be directed against that city; but when he ascertained the French march on Milan, he set out to follow them up, and was ready, even with his small force, to operate upon their rear by crossing the Po at Casale.

There had been a moment, at Turin, when Melas might have sallied out on Lannes, dealt him a hearty blow, and driven him back on the main force in the Ivrea defile; but he had not embraced the chance, and now, on hearing that the Ticino had been crossed by the French, and that another column was debouching from the St. Gothard, which would give the First Consul a force, as he estimated, of sixty thousand men, and, moreover, that the Austrians had been defeated by Moreau on the Danube, he began to appreciate the gravity of the situation, and the fact that he could no longer expect to hold on to Genoa and the coast. As already pointed out, there had been for the Austrian army but three lines of retreat: one on the left bank of the Po via Valencia and Pavia; one on the right bank through the pass of Stradella; one from Genoa via Bobbio towards Parma and Mantua. All these

were fast being closed. Melas had still another chance, to fall back on Genoa, await the arrival of the English forces already at Port Mahon, draw in reinforcements from central Italy, and, when strong enough, advance on the Army of Reserve for battle. In any event, by this route he could reach Mantua; and food and transportation were meanwhile assured to him by the presence of the English fleet. Whatever action he took, it was evident that Melas must immediately choose an assembly point for his scattered forces, or he ran danger of being beaten in detail. For this purpose he did select Alessandria, and ordered Ott, as well as the divisions under Elsnitz on the Var, to march at once on this fortress. As it happened, Suchet had received reinforcements which gave him twelve thousand effective, and being of an enterprising nature, he had already turned the tables on the Austrians and forced them back from the Var. On June 1 Elsnitz received orders to withdraw down the Tanaro to Asti. Suchet followed him up so heartily, anticipating him at the Colle di Tenda and obliging him to march via Ormea, that when, on the 7th, Elsnitz reached Ceva and Montenotte, his column numbered but eight thousand men. Suchet then marched by way of Savona to the aid of Genoa; but he arrived too late.

Suchet.

The orders to Ott to approach his chief also reached this officer June 1; but as it happened, negotiations were already in progress for the surrender of Genoa by Massena, and feeling justified by so great a problem, he remained *in situ* in front of the city until the 5th, when the French, owing to the

terms won by the stubborn defense, and to Ott's desire to join the army, marched out with the eight thousand five hundred able men who remained of the garrison, without conditions. Massena's defense of Genoa had been one of the most noteworthy on record. On the 5th Ott, having taken over this great city and put Hohenzollern and a strong garrison in it, started over the Bocchetta pass towards Alessandria.

The various movements left the situation on June 5 as follows: the French headquarters was in Milan, and Bonaparte was still ignorant of the fall of Genoa. Indeed, knowing Massena, he hoped it would hold out until his general strategic scheme would enable him to head thither. Murat and Boudet, who had followed on, had driven a small Austrian detachment from the bridge-head at Placentia. Lannes was at Pavia and Belgiojoso, whither Victor with Chambarlhac's division and that of Gardanne (which had been made up of four thousand men who had followed on after the Army of Reserve), and Monnier with his division, were also marching. Chabran was yet coming up from the Orca, and Thureau lay in the Dorea Riparia valley. Moncey was within a day's march of Milan; and Loison had reached Orzinovi. Thus, up to date, the French army had smartly accomplished its work, and was now well in hand with its chief's purpose clear cut. On the other hand, Melas personally was still in Turin, where were fourteen thousand men, and despite the danger to him of Bonaparte's crossing the Po in mass, which he now began to gauge at its real value, he could do little to forestall him. Still, as battle alone could cut the knot of the problem, and Bonaparte was sure to force one on him, it was daily growing more essential for him to collect all his troops for this purpose. The Lombardy column had been pushed well back, and was not available. Elsnitz's eight thousand men were marching up from Ceva. Ott had twenty thousand

men, just released from the blockade of Genoa. Counting out essential details, here were thirty-five thousand men, which in one body would command respect; but instead of getting and keeping them all in hand for a single heavy blow, as he had started out to do, the Austrian commander, in the effort to prevent the French crossing the Po at Placentia, now ordered Ott to proceed up the Scrivia by forced marches to the latter city instead of to Alessandria; and the Turin forces, as well as those from Ceva, were headed on Alessandria. Melas hoped to seize and hold the Stradella pass, and thus escape by the right bank of the Po. But he was not only miscalculating Bonaparte's marching ability, he was exposing Ott to an attack by overwhelming forces. Melas was several days too late.

Loison, who was charged with pushing back the Austrian detachments which lay on the east of the French army, advanced bodies both towards Brescia and towards Pizzighetone, pushing the enemy ahead of him; and having done this, he marched late June 6 with all his forces on Cremona. The crossing was now begun by each French column. Murat, unable to get over at Placentia, on account of the bridge being partly broken and the town occupied, had gone down river June 6 and begun to pass at Noceto, whence on the right bank he advanced on and took Placentia. Lannes was doing the same at Belgiojoso; and Monnier was to cross a trifle lower down. The few Austrians on hand retired by way of Stradella, after a slight passage of arms.

From Milan, June 5, Bonaparte issued a "Proclamation to the Cis-Alpine People. The French people for the second time break your chains. . . . You have got to know the pitfalls of the enemy, and your happiness. They boast of their respect for property, and they have despoiled numberless families; they pretend zeal for religion, and they have delivered Italy to heretics, even to infidels. Citizens of the Cis-Alpine,

rush to arms, form your national guard, and place your towns in safety against the incursions of the light troops of the enemy." . . .

On June 6 was issued this "Order of the Day. Soldiers, one of our departments was in the power of the enemy. Consternation was in all the south of France. The greatest part of the territory of the Ligurian people, the most faithful friend of the Republic, was invaded. The Cis-Alpine Republic, destroyed since the last campaign, had become the plaything of the grotesque feudal régime. Soldiers, you march — and already the French territory is delivered. Joy and hope succeed in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa. . . . Millions of men, you hear them every day, address you in terms of gratitude. But shall the enemy, unpunished, have violated the French territory? Will you permit the army which had carried the alarm to your families to return to its fireside? You run to arms! Well! march to meet it, oppose its retreat, tear from it the laurels with which it had ornamented itself, and thus teach the world that the malediction of destiny is on those insensates who dare insult the territory of a great people. The result of all our efforts shall be glory without a cloud, and a solid peace. BONAPARTE."

Moncey's head of column now reached Milan, where Bonaparte still remained to await it, and to have the best oversight of the many manœuvres and the quickest reports. He did not believe there could be much Austrian force on the right bank of the Po at any point where they could oppose the first detachments in their crossing, but Lannes was instructed to coöperate, if needed, with Murat to take Placentia. On the 7th the French crossings continued, and the troops concentrated near the pass of Stradella and in its rear at Placentia. But Berthier, who went on to Pavia, was warned not to deplete too much the forces in the advance, as Bonaparte then expected by June 9 to see some twenty thousand Austrians appear in front of Stradella; and he constantly demanded information as to what was taking place.

By a lucky accident Murat captured two couriers who were bearing dispatches, one from the Aulic Council to Melas,

and one dated June 5 from Melas to Vienna; and early on June 8 Bonaparte received these papers. The Aulic Sages again informed Melas that there was no such thing as an Army of Reserve, and he need pay no heed to his rear, but go on and conquer Provence. Hundreds of such blunders encumber the records of this distinguished body of fossils. The dispatch from Melas gave Bonaparte the first news of the capture of Genoa, and indicated the position and strength of the Austrian bodies on the 5th, as well as the plans of the commander-in-chief; and he at once wrote the Consuls, with copies of the dispatches: "The Army (of Reserve) was only at three days' forced march from Genoa; the order to raise the siege had been given by Melas." And having from this news also drawn the conclusion that Melas would not reach Alessandria before the 12th or 13th of June, and then not over twenty-two thousand strong, but that Stradella might be attacked at latest the 10th, Bonaparte added to his hitherto cautious orders a strong offensive, and wrote to Berthier: "As General Moulin is observing the enemy at Casale, it is necessary that you should send spies and a party of cavalry to observe him in the direction of Valencia, so as to be timely instructed of all his movements. . . . Reconnoitre, where your pontoons are, a concentrated position which may serve for retreat. There should be houses, canals, roads. If there is an island, put there two or three siege-guns, so as to protect your passage as much as possible." Other places are also indicated for like treatment. Having thus provided for his line of retreat, he goes on: "Push out detachments sharply and crush all the troops you meet. The van can move forward to Voghera." "Have the cavalry and artillery cross so that the divisions shall be quite complete, having their cartridges and everything in order." "If to-morrow a corps should present itself before Stradella, as is possible, let it be

attacked in force, so as to take from it two or three thousand prisoners. It is certain that this corps can only be weak." Bonaparte thus hoped to beat a part of the Austrians before the mass came up.

Accordingly Lannes broke up early on the 9th in order to march to Voghera, and Victor with Chambarlhac's division followed, while Gardanne was still putting over his men. But Ott, too, with some sixteen thousand men, was on the march, as ordered by Melas, though this division of forces by the Austrians was markedly risky, and by noon had reached Casteggio, thus striking the vanguard of Lannes' division as the French general was pushing out from Stradella. Imagining that he had only a small body of Austrians in his front, for Bonaparte, with his usual underrating of his opponent, had written that if the enemy put in an appearance between Voghera and Stradella he was to be attacked on sight, as he would certainly number less than ten thousand men, Lannes, in accordance with this indication, at once deployed for action with the division of Watrin, nearest at hand. But as he advanced on Ott, part of the Austrian column made a turning manœuvre around his left flank, and Lannes was for the moment thrust back; but as Chambarlhac shortly advanced so as to turn Ott's right, and Gardanne began to put in an appearance, Lannes again went forward, furiously attacked and destroyed Ott's centre at the bridge of Casteggio, and after a desperate resistance the Austrians were forced back and followed to the Scrivia. Ott managed to throw two thousand men into Tortona citadel, and retired on Alessandria. This battle of Montebello cost Ott over three thousand killed and wounded, six guns and some thousands of prisoners. The French loss was under three thousand men.

On Moncey's arrival in Milan, his corps was distributed. Gilly was put in charge of the city, with orders to blockade

the citadel, while Lorge's division was sent out to reconnoitre the region between the Oglio and Chiese, and Lapoype was to advance to the Po and march upstream on the left bank on a level with the divisions operating on the right. Bonaparte still feared that Melas might cross the Po near Valencia and seek to cut his way through the French along the left bank ; and in order to protect his communications with Switzerland as well as to forestall Melas' attempt so to cross the Po, his successive details from his army eventually reached two fifths of his entire force. This was no doubt an excessive number. He was not keeping enough in battle-line. Half of it would have sufficed. Even had Melas crossed and made a dash on Milan, Bonaparte would none the less have won nearly all northern Italy, for he could at once have reestablished his communications along the coast to the Var ; and while Melas would have regained his own line, he would have lost Piedmont before a battle was fought. Bonaparte later acknowledged that he thus ran far too great a risk at Marengo. Meanwhile he dispatched orders through the Austrian lines to Suchet to debouch by way of the Cadibona pass into the valley of the Scrivia.

Having made these dispositions, Bonaparte left for Pavia, and on arrival on the 9th he found Murat and Boudet in Placentia, Monnier, who had just got across, on the march to Stradella, Loison in Cremona. Concluding, in his uncertainty as to the enemy's movements, to leave Murat and Boudet in Placentia for the moment, he ordered Loison up as their reserve ; and Chabran had already been moved on Vercelli. From Pavia Bonaparte rode out to Lannes' battlefield, complimented the future Duke of Montebello on his handsome victory, and established headquarters at Stradella. In accordance with his now usual habit, he had kept himself at the most available place in the rear, — in this case Milan, — where

he could observe, plan and combine, and both receive news from and order the manœuvres of his lieutenants; and he did this in part so as not to allow the enemy to guess his objective from his presence. He went to the front so soon as real contact was apt to occur, inspecting all the positions on the way, and completing his combinations.

At Stradella Bonaparte was in an admirable position for a defensive battle. But the defensive was no part of the First Consul's make-up. We have already seen and shall hereafter see how rarely he indulged in it. Moreover, his fear lest Melas should escape was keen, and he desired to give him no time: it was essential to attack the Austrians before they were reinforced by their various scattered detachments. And as probably no man ever understood the value of the offensive better than Bonaparte, he remained at Stradella only long enough to concentrate such forces as he proposed to fight with, and to dispose the others so that Melas should not escape.

Ott stood at Castelnuovo on the lower Scrivia: Melas would yet require one or two days to assemble all his forces in Alessandria. His communications were cut. Suchet held the Apennines, and might seize the Scrivia and Bocchetta defiles, and thus get possession of the road to Genoa, the city being in Austrian hands. On the Ticino and Po stood Moncey, and Bonaparte was at Stradella. The Austrian army was "bottled up," with no means of escape except sword in hand.

Now, for the first and last time, we see our great captain wandering from his mass theory. In attempting to head Melas off on each of his three lines of retreat, he had dangerously divided his army. A battle was close at hand, — indeed he was to bring it on himself, — and he had not yet concentrated his divisions. These were spread all over the

country in a manner he himself had always so mercilessly condemned. There were immediately available only the troops of Murat, Lannes, Victor, Boudet, Monnier, Loison, in all not over thirty-four thousand men, whom he could deploy in front of his strong post at Stradella; and at a time when the crash might come at any moment, he had failed to



The First Consul. By Ingres.

get within reach Moncey, Chabran, Thureau, — say twenty-three thousand more. A bare three fifths of his actual force was ready for the coming battle; and part of these, should the army advance from Stradella, were not where they could get quickly put in, when he might be in urgent need of men. Jomini properly says that in the opening of this brilliant manœuvre, after reaching the plain, Bonaparte most departed from his principles. Happily Melas had himself committed so many errors that he could not throw his own larger but worse

disseminated mass upon Bonaparte's thirty-four thousand men, and thus take advantage of the French commander's mistake.

Just what persuaded Bonaparte to disregard the first of the principles he had so far uniformly acted on has been the subject of much discussion. Was it a growing contempt for his foe, a too fast rise in self-estimation? Other captains have been subject to this delusion. Perhaps Frederick was overcome by it at Kolin; and the king there profited by his sharp lesson, which may have been a needed, and was certainly a useful one. And in the same sense the all but failure at Marengo drove the truth home to Bonaparte, as nothing else could have done, that it was his mass theory that lay at the root of his success; for thereafter he erred not again in that manner. And yet there is no art in which "Nothing venture, nothing have" is of so constant application as the art of war; and as Frederick risked much at Kolin, and came so close to winning that it was a bare accident which robbed him of his victory, so here Bonaparte risked much, and through initial defeat plucked victory from the venture. Moreover, Bonaparte had many things to consider, and may have deemed himself warranted in risking the division of forces. He could not tell whether Melas might not be still seeking to evade him, and he felt it essential to hold the left bank of the Po with a large force. We shall see that he detached Desaix from the army towards Novi lest Melas should retire to Genoa, and thence via Bobbio regain Mantua. He could not convince himself that Melas was not seeking to avoid battle. His disdain for the Austrian commander, joined to the desire to head him off and surround him, may have led to this singular breach of his own maxims. In any event, he did disregard his mass theory, and if it was from underrating his enemy, this may be set down as the beginning of that singular delu-

sion which eventually wrecked the splendid Napoleonic structure.

After Montebello, as above said, Ott had fallen back behind the Scrivia, and on June 10 Melas' head of column reached Alessandria. Bonaparte now drew Murat and Boudet up a trifle closer to the bulk of the army, but Loison was left at Placentia and Cremona, so that his six thousand men were not able to join in the battle of Marengo. Early on the 11th Desaix arrived at the Stradella headquarters, — he had, as we have seen, been ordered back from Egypt, — and, coming to hand at an auspicious moment, was received with open arms and put in command of Monnier's and Boudet's divisions. The French now concentrated between Voghera and Casteggio, whence next day the several divisions advanced so that Lannes reached Castelnuovo, Murat the vicinity of Tortona, and Desaix Pontecurone. Victor was pushed out as left wing in the same direction. On June 13, at 5 A. M., a letter to Lannes ordered him to attack anything which he found in front of him. Victor was moving on San Giuliano, and Desaix remained in reserve at Pontecurone. At the same time Melas had concentrated near Alessandria, and Ott also withdrew behind the Bormida, leaving a rearguard at Marengo.

The Austrians in this section of Italy had over seventy thousand men. The first column under the immediate command of Melas, with Haddick, Kaim, Morzin, Elsnitz, as lieutenants, comprised fourteen thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry. The second column under Ott had seven thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry. Detached and in garrison were forty-four thousand men. Out of his huge army Melas thus had but twenty-eight thousand in the field. But he had two hundred guns, and was superior in cavalry. The French army aggregated sixty thousand men. The foot under Victor, Lannes, Desaix, numbered nearly twenty-four thousand men,

and the cavalry under Murat thirty-five hundred men. With seven hundred artillery and engineers, the total was also twenty-eight thousand, with forty guns. In garrison and along the Po were over thirty thousand men. Though various accounts change these figures somewhat, substantially the two combatants were equal. But how ill each had manœuvred for battle!

As, one hundred years ago, an observer stood on any one of the moderate hillocks near San Giuliano looking west, he would see before him a slightly rolling plain, gradually falling to a flat one as it reached the Bormida, beyond the extensive loops of which the walls and towers of Alessandria were visible some six or seven miles away, through the woods which at intervals grew on the banks of the stream. This plain was covered by meadows, fields of grain, olive orchards and vineyards; and a number of farms dotted the landscape with their walled inclosures and red-tiled roofs. At places near San Giuliano the vineyards and farms closed in the ground; beyond it was open, and not, as it so commonly is in Italy, cut up by canals and ditches. A broad post-road ran straight out to the south of Alessandria, to connect Tortona, in the observer's rear, with the Bocchetta road between Genoa and Alessandria in his front; from this branched off the old post-road to Alessandria; a road ran north to Sale and south towards Novi, and numerous other country roads and paths connected the several villages and farms. Looking half the distance to Alessandria, the observer would see the village of Marengo, past which, running north, was the meandering brook Fontanana, at places girt by marshes, and with difficult banks, high here and there. Especially owing to the absence of irrigation ditches, a cavalryman would exclaim at the excellence of the central part of this field for the evolutions of his favorite arm.

Army of Reserve had been distant from the immediate presence of the enemy. This left of the French forces, so far as they were assembled, ready to meet the Austrians: Victor with Gardanne, Chambarlhac and later Kellermann's cavalry brigade at and behind Marengo; Lannes with Champeaux's cavalry brigade at and behind San Giuliano; Desaix with Boudet at Rivalta; Monnier and headquarters with the Consular Guard and two regiments of cavalry at Torre di Garofoli, and echeloned back towards Pontecurone. The third cavalry brigade of Murat's division, Rivaux's, was at Sale to cover the right. The French position was distinctly unlike Bonaparte, as we have so far seen him.



Melas.

Yet Melas was not seeking to escape by a back door. He had concluded to make a bold stroke for liberty, to attack the French army, cut through it, and reëstablish his communications along the right bank of the Po. He had held a Council of War. These were the questions put: Should the Austrian army cross the Po at Valencia and fray itself a path via Pavia towards the Mincio? Or should it cut through to Genoa and lean on the English fleet? Or should it deliver battle to the enemy in its front? Inasmuch as the situation was clearly the fault of the Aulic Council, which had constantly misinformed Melas, and largely as a matter of honor, for the Austrian generals were men of the highest tone, it was determined

to fight. If they won, well. If they lost, they had done their duty as soldiers and men of honor.

Melas' offensive plan had been to move Ott on Sale and have him attack the main French army, which he believed to be there; and to march with Haddick, Kaim, Morzin and Elsnitz, by way of Marengo, on San Giuliano so as to break its supposed left flank. For this purpose two bridges had been built on the Bormida, with a bridge-head mounting fourteen guns, but having only one issue. Marengo had been occupied merely as an outpost. But Melas was too late. Victor had, as narrated, attacked Marengo on the afternoon of June 13, and had taken the place, as well as Pietra Bona, a hamlet to the west of it. This quite upset Melas' calculations. Still, determined to attack, but not aware that for some hours he could put in line twice the numbers of the French, the Austrian army, during the night of June 13–14, was made ready for battle.

Bonaparte had ridden back towards headquarters in order to get the news, which would there run in from his various detached divisions, and from the Genoa region; but he had been stopped at the Scrivia by a sudden torrential overflow. He was at some distance from Marengo, two miles east of San Giuliano.

At dawn of day O'Reilly, who had been last in the retreat from Marengo, debouched from the bridge-head, and with Frimont and Haddick in support, fell fiercely on Gardanne at Pietra Bona. But he was alone. The enemy lost much precious time in filing out of their one bridge-head gate, and successive brigades came up and deployed slowly. This enabled Victor to make preparations to hold the Fontanana brook. Bellegarde and Kaim formed the second Austrian line; and Elsnitz, a column of grenadiers and Pilatti's cavalry were in reserve. To Ott were issued orders to march on

Castel Ceriolo. It was fully three hours before the enemy got well into line in front of the Bormida; but by 8 A. M. the first line moved forward on Victor, and struck him so stoutly that he soon retired behind the brook to Marengo.

Early in the morning Melas had heard that Suchet's troops had been seen at Acqui. This was a fact, but one of no immediate bearing on the actual situation; still, lest his rear should be threatened, the Austrian leader detailed Nimptsch and two thousand two hundred cavalry to ride thither and fend off the danger. This detail was really the salvation of the French, for Pilatti, with the balance of the Austrian horse not serving under Ott, proved unable to cope with Kellermann, who soon came up on Victor's left.

Once deployed, the Austrians made a splendid bid to drive the French from Marengo. The town was held by Gardanne, with Chambarlhac on his left extending around to the farm buildings of Stortigliana; and here occurred some of the hottest fighting of the day. The Austrian grenadiers laid temporary bridges of any material available over the stream, and stormed in on the French line time and again at various points. But Victor, ably sustained by Kellermann, fended them off; and when at 11 A. M. (the Memoirs say 10 A. M.) Bonaparte reached the field, the town was still, though feebly, held; and Lannes had moved forward to support his brother officer's right.

Although surprised at the extreme vigor of this onset, Bonaparte's eye quickly grasped the situation. From the early sound of the guns he had already recognized the error he had made, and had dispatched summary orders to Desaix to about face and return to San Giuliano. Having taken this first and proper action, and instructed Victor to hold on to Marengo with all the tenacity he could display, the French commander set to work to concentrate his divisions forward, as he should

have done the night before, had he not drawn a wrong conclusion as to Melas' intention ; as it would have been wise in any case to do ; as his own universal rule prescribed.

Before Desaix received Bonaparte's order, he had begun to hear the booming of the guns on Marengo plain ; and justly interpreting them, so soon as he had ascertained by a cavalry party that there was no Austrian force at Novi, like an intelligent lieutenant he had speeded his foot back towards San Giuliano.

Relying on Victor to gain time by a stubborn defense of the Fontanana brook, Bonaparte pushed Lannes up farther towards his right to prevent Bellegarde from turning it, and sent Champeaux's cavalry brigade forward to sustain him. The third brigade, Rivaux, was still holding Sale, lest the Austrians should attempt a turning manœuvre along the Tanaro. As a fact, Lannes was already taking some of the pressure off Victor; and this general's last effort enabled Lannes to come up into position to the north of Marengo, which Gardanne, though nearly tired out, was still defending, while Chambarlhac, thrown forward, with his right on Marengo and his left on the farm, was clinging to his holding by the aid of Kellermann's brilliant work against Pilatti and what foot came within reach of his sabres. Still the Austrian onset was too hearty, and their numbers superior ; although Haddick was killed, and Kaim after several useless assaults on Marengo fell back, yet, not disheartened, Kaim's battalions soon renewed their activity ; and Ott had passed unopposed along the Sale road, and with a strong column had reached Castel Ceriolo ; whence by a right wheel shortly before noon he had turned in on the right wing under Lannes, which was entirely in the air.

Bonaparte's division of forces was bearing its legitimate fruit. Had Melas kept his cavalry with the army, instead of

detaching it on a wild-goose chase, the day had inevitably been his; but the only cavalry, except Pilatti's, he had left was ill-employed with Ott, and to a considerable extent got stalled in the marshes along the brook. Monnier, one of Desaix's divisions at Torre di Garofoli, was the only force anywhere within reach, and Desaix had reported that he could not arrive until 4 P. M. There were five anxious hours ahead of Bonaparte, and many a pitched battle has been won in less time. But for these five hours he saw that he must hold himself or lose the day. He had at hand in reserve only his eight hundred foot and three hundred and sixty mounted grenadiers of the Consular Guard. These he promptly put in to stay Ott's onset. The gallant handful moved out, ployed into a square, and did noble work, standing like a rock between Castel Ceriolo and Villanova. But a thousand heroes could cover no great front; and heavily met by the victorious Austrians, and attacked in flank and rear by Austrian dragoons and hussars, the Guard was seriously crippled. Under cover of the excellent diversion made by this gallant body, however, the earliest arriving battalions of Monnier's division were advanced, and part of the force under Carra St. Cyr seized Castel Ceriolo on Ott's rear; but the manœuvre was too late to be of use. The second line of Ott came up to meet the Monnier battalions, and attacked them during the march on their left; Monnier in person was cut off from the column with part of his troops, and this division, as a whole, was checked. St. Cyr, all by himself, held on, it

Victor.

is claimed, in Castel Ceriolo, and later in the day became the right of the French advance.

Meanwhile, stoutly attacked in front and turned on the right, Lannes found himself weakening, while Victor, after hours of heroic defense, was finally cut off from his *point d'appui* on the Bormida and fell back; after which Lannes of necessity found that he could do naught further to aid in holding Marengo. The town went lost, and the French divisions drifted, in no very orderly condition, but some of them occasionally turning to exchange shots, back along the old Tortona road. "The plain on the left was covered with our fleeing men, who spread alarm on every side, and some of them even gave out the desperate cry of *All is lost!*" narrate the Memoirs. This reverse compelled Monnier to fall back again along the road to Torre di Garofoli. Happily, the French defense in retreat was not only aided by numerous farms, orchards, vineyards and hamlets in the plain, but vastly more by Austrian slowness in pursuit. Hours were consumed in the withdrawal. The retreat might have been turned into a rout; luckily it kept in places some semblance of organization. Especially Lannes held his men "with an order and coolness most admirable."

Yet the situation was critical. While two of the dangerous five hours had gone by, for it was after one o'clock, yet Desaix was still far away, and Victor and Lannes were falling back more and more rapidly, in a manner less like orderly retreat than flight. Nearly every French gun had been silenced. The army was rapidly losing cohesion. The Austrian cry of victory rang across the plain. A hearty push would make the enemy's success secure. The French generals, and especially Berthier, believed defeat to be certain. Bonaparte was face to face with the worst problem he had yet encountered. Only he and Desaix, who had ridden up ahead of his oncoming

troops, still believed it possible to retrieve the day, — if there were but a fresh regiment or two on which to form. What would not a brigade of horse have been worth to the Austrians?

Some detractors would have it that Bonaparte was all ready for retreat; that he had in fact issued orders to this effect; that Desaix alone upheld his hands. But the same argument they use would award the credit of every one of Napoleon's victories to some lieutenant, — would make of this marvelous leader, after all, a rather commonplace sort of general. Though perhaps the chieftain's "Remember, soldiers, that it is my habit to bivouac on the field of battle!" may sound cold in printed words, one may yet give it fervor by framing it in the heat of battle. A critic who has never felt the *gaudium certaminis* judges such conditions coldly. Lonato and Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli, indeed the great soldier's entire life, sufficiently contradict those who belittle his tactical ability, his power over men, or his wonderful persistency in outfacing defeat in battle.

Censors are not wanting who make Parmenio the victor of Arbela, not Alexander; who assign the conquest of Gaul to Labienus in lieu of Cæsar; to whom not Gustavus Adolphus, but Axel Oxenstiern was the Great Swede. Every captain owes much to his lieutenants. But the creative force which fashions an army, or an engine, as well as the motive power that drives either, have their origin in the head and heart of the chief; both depend on him. The engine must have a driver; every division must have a lieutenant; but the rôle of each is subordinate. It was Bonaparte who stemmed the tide of disaster and won Marengo, not Desaix.

The French had been thrown back three miles. Two thirds of their guns had been captured. The foot was on the point of demoralization. Bonaparte's veterans had lost their proud

invincibility. But now, as it always does, came in the personal element; Melas was not ready to improve his chances, he could not strike at the proper moment. At seventy years of age his blood ran all too slowly. Satisfied, as were at Chotusitz the fathers of his Austrians, that the victory was surely won, — nor was he far wrong in this, — and worn out by two slight wounds and his unusual efforts, he rode back to Alessandria to dispatch the joyful news to Vienna, leaving Kaim in command, and issuing orders to his chief of staff, Zach, to follow up the enemy and complete his defeat. But neither Kaim nor Zach, nor indeed Ott, was prompt. Precious time went by. Finally Zach ployed a number of the Austrian divisions, which themselves had got markedly broken up, into marching column, and directed them on San Giuliano; while Ott, who had started for Sale, obliqued to the right and headed his men by way of Villanova on the country-seat known as La Ghilina, north of San Giuliano.

Zach led the van of St. Julien's brigade, Lattermann's grenadiers and Lichtenstein's dragoons. Nearly a mile in the rear came Kaim, with Bellegarde, Knjashewitz's and Lamarsaille's brigades. Still again a mile behind Kaim was the reserve of Weidenfeld's grenadiers and the relics of Pilatti's and Nobili's cavalry. On the right Briey moved through Spinetta on Casina Grossa, and on the left Frimont on Poggi.

The whitecoats were tired. They had been fighting nine hours, and the pursuit seemed a perfunctory matter. Was not the victory enough? For indeed it was a victory, save against a Bonaparte, with a Desaix at hand, a Lannes and a Victor and a Kellermann.

The afternoon was passing. The head of the Austrian column was approaching San Giuliano, and the broken French masses holding the place evacuated it, ready to retreat towards Torre di Garofoli. To all eyes but Bonaparte's and Desaix's

unlike pursuit, Zach's columns had been advancing along the main road, halting every little while to close up; Ott was at Villanova; the right was at Cassina Grossa. Not only was the enemy too much spread, he was far from ready to fight



The First Consul. By Houdon.

another battle. As Zach's head of column, made up of five thousand troops *d'élite*, reached the immediate vicinity of San Giuliano and came in view of the hitherto hidden new French line, Marmont's guns opened a hot fire of canister at close range, and Desaix broke out from cover upon it with the cheering 9th half-brigade, followed by the 30th and 59th. Enthused by the new aspect of affairs, Victor's men followed Desaix.

Zach's head of column, startled by this quite unexpected reception, paused at the first, and at the second blow fell into confusion and staggered back on Lattermann. In leading his men forward, Desaix was killed at the first fire. Zach was rallying his second line, when the 9th, maddened at the death of its chief, fell with fury on St. Julien with the bayonet, and earned its proud title of *Incomparable.* At the same moment, not waiting for orders, but instinct with the fervor of the *beau sabreur*, Kellermann, who had led his men through the vineyards in small bodies, and collected them in column on the edge of the plain, deployed his leading squadrons, and wheeled furiously down upon Zach's foot with his first line, while sending his second line to hold back the Austrian horse, which was advancing across the plain from Poggi and Guasca. Kellermann's brave dash was helped by the sharp rush of the rest of Desaix's infantry, and in moving forward Boudet was sustained by Lannes and Monnier. The redoubled onset quite demoralized the loosely ordered Austrians, and brought Zach completely to a standstill. With true Gallic *élan* the French pursued their advantage, and in a brief half hour Zach, with forty other officers and nearly two thousand men, was surrounded and captured. His first line was destroyed.

This success turned the tide for the French. Kellermann's force, increased by Champeaux and the mounted Guardsmen, dashed upon and broke through the Austrian horse, which galloped madly back on the main column; and upon this Kellermann now threw himself with fervor, while Lannes advanced across the plain between Kaim and Ott, to the utter demoralization of Kaim's forces.

The effect of this renewal of the battle by a beaten foe had been electrical; the three French arms worked powerfully together; the exhausted Austrian regiments, which had been incessantly moving and fighting ever since early dawn, began

to give way; the French masses, quick to grasp the fact that glory, safety, victory, lay in facing to the front, redoubled their ardor. Kellermann did marvels, and rode down everything in his path. Zach's men, in falling back on the second echelon under Kaim, many hundred yards in the rear, had broken up the order of this body also; the Austrians, lacking one leadership and having at the moment no definite plan, turned from the fight; and as the French, in the wake of Desaix's half-brigades and Kellermann, pressed on, the enemy was hustled off the field and shortly driven in wild flight towards the Bormida. Some Austrian grenadiers at Spinetta kept order, and O'Reilly and Weidenfeld held on strongly to Marengo, and receiving the advancing French cavalry with a lively fire of guns and musketry, checked it there. But the body of the Austrian troops could not be rallied. They fell back to the river, followed by Lannes and Victor. It was barely possible for O'Reilly and Weidenfeld to hold the bridge-head until Ott, who had advanced nearly to La Ghilina, and on his return, harried by Rivaux's cavalry, had just escaped being cut off, could reach the river by skirting Castel Ceriolo, still held by Carra St. Cyr, and retire behind it for safety. O'Reilly and Ott had taken no active part in the second fight. The French victors at ten o'clock camped in front of Castel Ceriolo, and from there down to La Bolla, with the van in Pietra Bona, and the mass in Marengo. The Austrians lost one thousand killed, five thousand five hundred wounded, three thousand captured, with eight flags and twenty-five guns, and one thousand five hundred horses. The French lost eleven hundred killed, thirty-six hundred wounded and nine hundred prisoners. By some contemporary estimates the Austrian loss was seven thousand killed and wounded, and three thousand prisoners; the French seven thousand killed and wounded, and one thousand prisoners.

The former figures are probably the more accurate. Haddick was killed and five generals were wounded on the Austrian side; Desaix was killed and four generals were wounded among the French.

It has been said that Melas had enough men left to fight again on the morrow, or to seek an outlet via Casale, where he had a bridge. But he saw himself surrounded on all sides: Suchet at Acqui and Massena still able to come up, Chabran and Moncey in Lombardy, Bonaparte in his front. It would have scored to his credit to have essayed to cut his way out; but he would have gained naught in the end.

One could wish to know the truth of the many anecdotes current about this and other battles. That Bonaparte was always in a fashion at odds with some of his lieutenants is true; but the color lent to most of the stories by subsequent events or misunderstandings warps their value. Bonaparte's reward of Kellermann's splendid charge is narrated to have been, "General, you have made a good charge!" to which Kellermann, jealous that others should have equal praise for less service, replied, "I am glad you are satisfied. It has placed the crown upon your head." Each of us must gauge such stories by his own appreciation of Bonaparte's character. This much is certain, that in the Bulletin of June 15, the First Consul stated that "General Kellermann executed a charge with so much vigor and so well timed that six thousand grenadiers and General Zach were made prisoner, and several generals of the enemy were killed." This sounds like a desire to do Kellermann justice, despite the anecdote.

Bonaparte's affection for Desaix was marked, and indeed he was an exceptional soldier. To Bourrienne he spoke of him as a character of ancient days; in Upper Egypt Desaix had earned the title of The Just Sultan; at St. Helena Napoleon said he possessed the greatest talents of any of his lieuten-

ants; and on June 15, speaking in the Bulletin of the death of Desaix as "a loss keenly felt by the army, as it will be by the whole Republic, and one which shuts our hearts to joy," Bonaparte says, "He died at once; he had only time to say to young Lebrun, who was beside him, 'Go tell the First Consul that I die with the regret of not having done enough to live in posterity.'"

The victory, absolutely in the hands of the Austrians at four o'clock, was then by their own default turned against them and handsomely won by the French. Early next day a truce was asked by Melas, and before night the Austrian commander had agreed to evacuate all northern Italy to the line of the Mincio. Needing a quickly won triumph to put the seal on his own power, Bonaparte seized the occasion joyfully, and received the keys of Coni, Ceva, Savona, Genoa, Alessandria, Tortona, Turin, Milan, Pizzighetone, Placentia and Arona. "The First Consul considered," say the Memoirs, "that a force of twenty thousand English was about to arrive at Genoa, which, with the ten thousand Austrians who had remained in the place, formed an army; that with no strong place in Italy, the position of the French was full of chances; that they had suffered much at Montebello and Marengo;" that the French forces from Genoa and Suchet had also suffered much in losses; "that Melas, in passing the Tanaro, would for several days be sheltered from all attack; that he could perfectly well rally" and reorganize; and then, with his heavy force of cavalry and fresh accessions, cut his way through the French, and leave the First Consul a number of fortresses to besiege, and but half his triumph. The reasoning is just.

Melas marched away with arms and material. Many of the fortresses were dismantled and others made stronger.

In one month, from May 15 to June 15, Bonaparte had

for the second time conquered the valley of the Po. The plan he had drawn up to retrieve the French disasters in Italy had been crowned with absolute success. He had exemplified what he himself said to Jomini at the opening of the 1806 campaign, "The secret of war lies in the secret of communications." But this implies the intellect to conceive, the character to utilize the secret when once it is won from the study of history and from a careful weighing of the meaning of the existing conditions. As was said at the outset in this history of the art of war, the great captain is the product of exceptional intellect, exceptional character and exceptional opportunity. Many a man has had the intellect to plan and has lacked the character to execute a campaign; many a man has been equipped with mental and moral force and has lacked the opportunity. Brains alone suffice not. Courage alone suffices not. Neither will opportunity alone suffice. Jomini says: "The fine calculations which threatened the status of Wurmser, Melas, Mack and Brunswick were of themselves clever manœuvres: they alone would have brought about the beating of the enemy; but they would only have threatened the fate of these armies, they would not have destroyed them, without this brilliant execution, this strength, this rapidity, which has set the world in wonder." And he qualifies his above dictum by saying: "The art of war does not consist in making sudden dashes at the communications of the enemy, while you tremble at taking a step; it consists properly in seizing the communications, and then marching to battle."

It has been often said that, in the Marengo campaign, Bonaparte did not carry out his own rule, for had he been beaten by Melas, he would have forfeited his own communications. Dumas asserts that he would have been shut up in a fenced-in battleground, where he would have had to perish. But Bo-

naparte's line of retreat through his strong post at the mouth of the Stradella defile and across the Po was safe; and the very division of forces which nearly lost him the battle of Marengo gave him ample numbers to carry on the campaign. "I was in an extraordinary situation," said Napoleon to Antomarchi at St. Helena, "and I risked little to win much. If beaten, I should have withdrawn to my intrenched camp at Stradella, crossed the Po on my five bridges covered by my guns, without the enemy being able to oppose the movement; I should have united my first division with the divisions of Moncey, Lecchi and Thureau; I would have let one of Melas' corps go across the Po, and then, superior in numbers, I could attack him with all my forces. As victor I should then have attained the same result. His army, shut in between us and the river, would have been compelled to lay down its arms and surrender all the fortresses. If I had been defeated, which, as I believe, would have been impossible, I should have begun a regular warfare, and have called Switzerland to my aid."

On June 16 from Marengo, by the hands of the captured Austrian General St. Julien, Bonaparte wrote to the emperor: —

"It is on the field of battle of Marengo, in the midst of suffering and surrounded by fifteen thousand corpses, that I conjure Your Majesty to listen to the cry of humanity, and not to permit this generation of two brave and powerful nations to cut each other's throats over interests foreign to them." He goes on: Is it religion, is it the interests of the Church, for which you fight? Why not, then, fight the English or the Muscovites? Is it the form of the French Government, which is elective? But the government of the German Empire is elective. Is it the interest of the Empire? But the Empire desires peace. Is it territory in Italy? Campo Formio gave you enough. "If Your Majesty desires peace, it is made. Let us execute on either hand the treaty of Campo Formio. If Your Majesty refuses this proposition, hostilities will recom-

mence, and you will be responsible in the eyes of the world. . . . Nothing interests me more than the prosperity of the warlike nation whose courage and military virtues I have admired for eight years."

Having just entered into an engagement with England to act in concert with that power, the emperor could not separately negotiate. St. Julien returned with certain limited powers, under which on July 28 preliminaries were signed according to the Campo Formio programme. These were later disavowed by the Aulic Council. A permanent truce was delayed until Moreau advanced to the border of the Austrian hereditary lands.

The brilliant campaign of the Army of Reserve having come to an end, Brune was left in command of the Army of Italy on the Mincio.

Though Berthier was technically commander of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte did not propose to be forgotten. On June 24, in orders to the army, he said: "In leaving the army the First Consul felicitates it on the victories it has won. The day of Marengo will be celebrated in history. Thirteen strong places, containing a thousand heavy cannon, are in our power, and we find ourselves in position to conclude peace on a solid basis." In an order of July 6 a sword was to be made for Victor, inscribed "Battle of Marengo, Commanded in Person by the First Consul, Given by the Government of the Republic to General Victor."

The First Consul was eager to get back to Paris to consolidate his power by suitable work. But he wrote June 20, from Lyons, a letter to Lucien Bonaparte, that he would enter Paris quietly, and wanted neither arches of triumph nor any ceremony. "I know no other triumph than public satisfaction."

In discussing this campaign, it has been said that Napoleon

carried "on war so as to satisfy his sense of the fitness of things," to establish and maintain his reputation as the master of the art, — at any rate to make his campaigns illustrate the grand principles of strategy. This is scarcely so. Bonaparte's campaigns were artistically complete because everything which is perfect is so. At Marengo Napoleon's principles had not yet been enunciated, were not understood. He planned and executed as he did because it was the proper way to accomplish his end, which was the complete defeat of the enemy. Nor did he, as alleged, in his Marengo strategy, sacrifice safety to brilliancy. What to others might not have been safe was safety to him, because it so utterly nonplused the enemy. Moreau rejected the First Consul's German plan because it appeared to be risky. For him it was perhaps so ; for Bonaparte it would not have been. Moreau's plan, moreover, was safer for Moreau against Kray, but it would not have been any safer for Bonaparte, nor would it have been safe for Moreau against Charles. Caution and recklessness are both relative terms depending largely on the personal element.

Later in life this great captain may be properly taxed with harboring satisfaction in the magnificence, the overwhelming violence of war, for its own sake ; but so early as 1800 neither this sentiment, nor the sense of mere fitness came into play.

Genoa was occupied by Suchet June 24, just before the arrival of the English. The other fortresses, with all their artillery, were successively given over.

The news of the morning defeat of Marengo first reached Paris by a business courier. The news of the victory brought all the more joy. The First Consul, after a visit to Milan, and the establishment of provisional governments there, in

the Ligurian Republic and in Piedmont, returned to Paris. Arriving during the night, he was greeted next day by an immense concourse of people in the gardens of the Tuileries, and at night all Paris was illuminated.

Massena was appointed to the command of the Army of Italy.

Desaix.

teen thousand was cavalry and four thousand artillery. Kehl and Alt Breisach bridge-heads were strongly held on the right bank. Moreau's chief of staff was Desolles. The rival armies were so nearly equal that the superiority of the Austrians in cavalry was offset by the fortified crossings of the French. But the cordon-fashioned fronts of both armies were too extended, and whoso first concentrated for an advance would gain much. Construed in his narrow manner, this advantage was plain to Moreau, and he also appreciated the fact that an operation by his right might cut off Reuss in Switzerland from the main army between the Rhine and the Danube. But he was still held in the meshes of the old style of war.

We have seen that Bonaparte and Moreau had not been of the same mind with regard to the German campaign. The former had proposed that Moreau, protected by the Rhine, should move his army to Schaffhausen, rapidly cross, take the Austrians in reverse by a march on Stockach, and thus oblige them to retreat and abandon their magazines, an operation which would throw Kray back on Bohemia and open the road to Vienna ; or perchance, indeed, oblige Kray to fight faced to the rear in the angle between the Rhine and Main. " The first movement of the campaign would have had for result to separate the Austrian army from Ulm, Philipsburg and Ingolstadt, and to put in our power Würtemberg, all Swabia and Bavaria," said Napoleon at St. Helena. Moreau, self-willed and hyper-cautious, deemed this operation dangerous, because, said he, the French held a concave position along the Rhine, with Kray standing at the centre of the arc ready to fall on him during the proposed flank march ; and he therefore preferred to advance in front upon the Austrians. He modified his own plan but little, and decided to have Ste. Susanne debouch from Kehl and attack the line of the Rench as a diversion, so as to draw part of the Austrian centre and

reserves towards their right, which would enable St. Cyr to quietly cross at Breisach, and himself and Lecourbe at Basle and Schaffhausen, and advance by a frontal manœuvre through the Black Forest on Kray in the Stockach-Villingen country; Molitor meanwhile with eight thousand men safeguarding Switzerland. This march of Ste. Susanne, says Napoleon, was rather a false manœuvre than a proper stratagem; and for some days this and St. Cyr's operation exposed the left of the French army to disaster. And in any case Moreau's opening brought him to Stockach much weaker than he would have been by Bonaparte's method. Moreover, it forced him with his main body to manœuvre by his left to keep in touch with Ste. Susanne and St. Cyr, when he might have better operated by his right to base on Switzerland and move upon the Austrian communications. But Moreau would none of Bonaparte's plan, and his own manœuvre, as we have seen, was finally adopted as one of easy comprehension, while that of the First Consul was too Napoleonic to be quickly grasped by any one still clinging to the ancient methods.

After a delay of many weeks to enable Moreau to complete his equipment, on April 25 Ste. Susanne was advanced from Kehl, threw back Kienmayer, and operated out towards Sztarray at Rastadt. St. Cyr crossed at Alt Breisach, joined hands with Ste. Susanne, forced Giulay back into the mountains and took Freiburg. As Moreau had predicted, Kray at first met this threat by sending a reinforcement of seven thousand men to Kienmayer, and ordered in Sztarray from the Murg; but on learning of Moreau's crossing at Basle, he paused and countermanded his orders. Ste. Susanne, having accomplished his purpose, now recrossed the Rhine at Strasburg, and marching up to Breisach, once more put over and advanced via Freiburg on Neustadt. St. Cyr obliqued to the right on St. Blasien, and Moreau, who had crossed as proposed,

with their cordon system, and Moreau attacked them in like fashion.

Kray had posted Lorraine at Möskirch, with heavy batteries pointing down the defile through the Krumbach woods. Nauendorf was on his right at Heudorf, the reserve being at Rohrdorf. Ferdinand was yet farther off on the right at Neuhausen, Giulay at Wondorf, and Wrede at Buchheim. Moreau moved forward in a broad line of columns. Vandamme was cleverly headed through Klosterwald on Möskirch to take the Austrians in reverse; Montrichard and the reserve cavalry advanced through Krumbach on the same town; Lorge obliqued to the left on Heudorf. Moreau with three divisions followed on in reserve. Montrichard deployed at the edge of the wood opposite Möskirch, but after a fierce assault was forced back; and his second effort to place guns opposite those of the enemy beyond the edge of the wood met with like failure. Lorge, sustained by the cavalry, attacked Heudorf with constancy, but without result. Now was Kray's chance; and so as to begin his attack before the whole French army should get deployed, he moved Ferdinand, Wrede and Giulay forward on the line Altheim-Bietingen to take the French in flank; and these divisions actually forced their way some distance towards the Stockach post-road; but meanwhile Vandamme and Montrichard had threatened Möskirch seriously by advancing upon it from the southeast and south, and feeling compelled to leave it, Lorraine withdrew to Rohrdorf. Undeterred by failure, Lorge had also renewed his attack and captured Heudorf, which he held with great effort

Vandamme.

against repeated Austrian attacks; and Richepanse arrived, and, taking Giuláy in flank, headed off the enemy in attempts to seize the Stockach road. The day was waning, and after some hours more fighting, night put an end to the battle. Kray fell back to the line Buchheim-Rohrdorf, the French bivouacking in his front beyond Heudorf and Möskirch. St. Cyr did not reach Neuhausen until night. Each side had lost some four thousand men. The Austrian army was not seriously impaired.

Kray retired later in the night to Sigmaringen. St. Cyr had done little at Liptingen except to drive out the Austrian van there posted and to reach Neuhausen. Had he pushed home, Kray might have been seriously compromised. The Austrian leader crossed the Danube at Sigmaringen May 6, though to hold his position there would have done much to prevent the French from filing past him towards Bavaria. Moreau availed not of his chance to attack him during the crossing. Ste. Susanne indeed attempted to do so on the left bank; but felt too weak to push hard. That St. Cyr and Ste. Susanne were not better utilized shows that Moreau did not appreciate the value of concentrating for battle. Moreover, as the road to Bavaria was open to him, and his communications were safe through Switzerland, Moreau failed to exhibit the highest enterprise by not at once marching on Augsburg and Munich, meanwhile holding the enemy with a small part of his force.

Kray soon became anxious to save his big Biberach magazine; and on May 8 he crossed the Danube again at Riedlingen, and marching on that town, marshaled his army on the heights along the right bank of the Riss, with ten thousand men out on the left bank.

Unaware of this manœuvre, Moreau kept on slowly pushing forward his right, with the hope of cutting off Reuss in

Switzerland. Lecourbe was ordered to Memmingen via Ochsenhausen, St. Cyr and the reserves to Biberach. Moreau personally joined the column of Ste. Susanne. On reaching Biberach, St. Cyr attacked boldly, drove in the force there stationed, and seized the Austrian magazines. He was indeed preparing to cross and attack Kray's whole army. But the Austrian commander did not wait. He appeared uncertain as to the safety of his situation, and retired to Ulm, sending part of his forces to Memmingen to clear the magazines at that place. In the absence of his chief, St. Cyr did not feel authorized to follow. On May 10 the French in part crossed the Iller at Memmingen, and part occupied the left bank; Ste. Susanne still remained on the left bank of the Danube. Up to date, each side had lost from fifteen to twenty thousand men by the attrition of constant contact, the French the less. Though Moreau had pushed back Kray, his operation appears commonplace when contrasted with that going on in the valley of the Po. At so large a loss, more might have been accomplished.

Early in May Carnot brought to Moreau's camp the predetermined, and to Moreau unwelcome, order to send Moncey and twenty thousand men to Italy. A compromise was effected, and only fifteen thousand were actually dispatched. This detail was taken from all the corps, and left Moreau some eighty thousand men, or a force about equal to Kray's. With this equipment he continued his forward movement, his object being to manœuvre Kray out of Ulm. The right wing, centre and reserve crossed the Iller May 13, and marched to the Gunz; and next day Ste. Susanne reached Erbach above and near Ulm. Here Kray attacked him, separated as he was by the Danube and Iller from the main French army; he was in imminent danger of destruction, but St. Cyr marched back to his aid, and on the latter's appearance on the right

bank near Ulm, Kray weakly gave over his attack. The Austrian commander lost a singular opportunity of utterly crippling St. Cyr and Ste. Susanne by marching on them in force. He had plenty of troops and absolutely no risk to run, while the French corps were in grave danger. But he had lost self-confidence. For a few days Moreau now threatened Ulm as if he would attack it; then sending Lecourbe on Augsburg, May 25, to place himself on the Austrian communications, but with orders to be ready promptly to return to take part in any battle which might supervene, Ste. Susanne was brought across to a position between the Danube and Iller to hold the line of operations, and the rest of the army assembled beyond the Iller, whence they had been for a time withdrawn. Moreau hoped his extended line of nearly sixty miles would induce Kray to come out to battle, and in this position he remained two weeks, running a risk which, had Archduke Charles been in Ulm, might have been fatal. Kray paid no heed to the French manœuvres, but held firm to Ulm, conscious of its strong position from a strategic standpoint. In fact Ulm, for a French army seeking to invade Bavaria, is the first and most important strong place to reach and control. But Moreau did not seem to know how to manœuvre Kray out of it.

Ste. Susanne and Souham were now personally sent to the Lower Rhine to organize fresh reserves, and Richepanse took command of their divisions as a flying left wing, while Molitor in Switzerland was acting as a flying right wing. The real left wing was under Grenier, the centre and reserve under Moreau, the right under Lecourbe. Kray had attempted, June 5, to attack Richepanse, but Moreau quickly reinforced him and the Austrians withdrew. The French army had been a month threatening Ulm to no purpose; and its commander, seeing that nothing could move Kray from his position on the

French left flank except a real thrust at his communications, resolved to manœuvre by his right on Dillingen and Donauworth, and cross the Danube. On June 10 he began the operation by a pivoting movement on Richepanse, who should stand still on the Iller; but Kray held fast in Ulm, sending a few troops to Sztarray, who was watching the Danube corps. After several attempts Lecourbe crossed, June 19, below Hochstädt, and several divisions followed, while the rest of the army came up. With his communications thus threatened, Kray recognized that he must decamp, and this he did in the night of June 20–21, towards Nördlingen via Neresheim. Lack of knowledge of Kray's movements prevented Moreau from seizing this chance of attacking him as he moved past him by the flank. He struck the Austrian rear, however, a hard blow at Neresheim June 25.

Molitor.

As there was no victual provided for an army in Bohemia, as the line of the Lech had not been fortified, and lest he should be taxed with leaving the road to Vienna open, Kray hurried to Neuburg, proposing to cross and defend the line of the Isar. On the other hand, Moreau, who had heard of the Convention of Alessandria, succeeding Bonaparte's victory at Marengo, speeded on to Munich with his centre and right, so as to separate Reuss from Kray, and thus gain all that was possible before peace was declared. He was unwilling that Bonaparte should win all the renown. Richepanse remained in front of Ulm. Kray reached Landshut July 1, and two days later retired to the Inn. On the 7th he got to Ampfing, where Meerfeldt and Condé came up with troops. Klenau was sent to the left bank to protect Ratisbon.

The Austrian army continued its retreat, slowly followed by the French, who did not cross the Isar until July 11. Lecourbe marched back into Vorarlberg to occupy this canton and Grisons, in order to reach out towards the Army of Italy; but he would have gained ten days by marching via Innsbruck and Landeck. Moreau deemed his own further advance a questionable operation on the score of rations (although Napoleon in 1805 demonstrated how easy it was to feed a large army in the Danube valley), and proposed an armistice, at which Kray eagerly grasped; and this was signed July 15 at Parsdorf. The neutral territory between the armies ran from the Splügen via Coire along the Vorarlberg frontier; up the Ill, and down the Lech, and across the Danube to Gmunden and beyond. Grisons remained neutral. The Austrians kept Philipsburg, Ulm, Ingolstadt and Würzburg, with privilege of revictualing these places every ten days. Moreau could have demanded much more.

Reuss had been stretching out his line as Moreau advanced east, and was so placed — from Coire to the outlets to Bavaria — that his army could be readily broken through. Lecourbe was ordered to move against Reuss with the coöperation of Molitor. In mid-July he advanced on Mittenwald, Füssen and Immenstadt, Molitor doing the like from the Rhine on Coire and Feldkirch. The Austrians under Auffenberg and Jellachic, after a handsome resistance, withdrew to the Tyrol. And meanwhile Ste. Susanne cleared up the country in the rear of Moreau's army.

When the First Consul ascertained that the emperor would not sign a separate peace, England withholding her consent, he ordered Moreau, August 26, to break the Parsdorf armistice, and sent instructions to Brune, now commanding the Army of Italy, to resume active operations. This brought about a fresh negotiation, and on September 20 an indefinite

truce was signed, coupled with fifteen days' notice, which lasted some weeks. On November 13 the French resumed operations. During the truce the Austrians had gained much by strengthening the cities and fortifying the rivers, especially the Inn, and the field army had been reinforced up to one hundred and thirty thousand men, of which twenty-seven thousand stood on the Regnitz and Main, and twenty thousand were in the Tyrol. Kray was supplanted by the eighteen-year-old Archduke John, with Marshal Lauer as chief of staff. The Austrian army, eighty-three thousand strong, stood along the Inn.

Archduke John.

Archduke John had made a plan for an offensive movement. Klenau was ordered to debouch from Ratisbon into the country between the Danube and Isar to threaten the French communications, while the main body was to march to the Isar, cross at Landshut, and move forward to seek battle, unless Moreau should avoid it by a retreat behind the Lech. This was accordingly done, and November 29 was the day set for crossing the Isar; but the bad winter roads so seriously delayed the three columns which started from the Inn that Archduke John arrested the advance November 30 at Ampfing, which place only half of the army reached. And here they came in

Klenau.

contact with the French. Kienmayer with the right wing got to Vilsbiburg, while the van of eight thousand men crossed the Isar at Moosburg and sought touch with Klenau, coming from Ratisbon.

The French army had grown to number one hundred and ten thousand men: Lecourbe with the right wing twenty-six thousand, the centre under Moreau thirty-six thousand, the left wing under Grenier twenty-eight thousand, Ste. Susanne twenty thousand. Of these some twenty thousand men had been detailed to watch the Tyrol. The rest, on November 28, stood at Helfendorf, Ebersberg and Hohenlinden, on the roads leading from Munich to the Inn at Rosenheim, Wasserburg and Mühldorf; and as Moreau was himself contemplating an advance, they next day marched on towards the crossings named. The right and centre were approaching the river; the left on November 30, as above stated, struck the Austrians at Ampfing, and was compelled to fall back on Haag; whence next day, on a renewed attack, they further retired on Hohenlinden.

On hearing of this attack Moreau, as much desiring battle as John, sent orders to his right and centre columns also to withdraw and rendezvous at Hohenlinden. On December 2 the left wing and part of the centre did in fact assemble near by that place; Lecourbe reached Helfendorf and Pfraunern; and Ste. Susanne got back to Freising December 3. From the news he gathered, Archduke John judged the French army to be in full retreat, and his own road open to the Isar; and he accordingly ordered his left wing of thirteen thousand men under Riesch to advance by way of Haslach, Albaching and St. Christopher through Hohenlinden on Anzing; the van and reserve, fifteen thousand strong, under Kollowrath, followed by the park and train, were likewise headed thither; and the right wing under Baillet-Latour,

tenbött, in order to protect the right of the French army lying at Kreut. In giving this order Moreau appears to have had no knowledge of the actually existing conditions ; he was building better than he knew.

At 5 A. M., then, of December 3, in accordance with orders, the Austrian army in the three columns named started from Haag to march on Anzing, quite unaware that the French were striving to assemble at Hohenlinden. Kollowrath, along the post-road, got some miles ahead of the right and left columns, the speed of which was cut down by the heavy country roads to a mile an hour. This disjointed marching was unjustifiable in the presence of the enemy, to be explained only by the archduke's conviction that Moreau was in full retreat. About 8 A. M., after detailing two battalions on St. Christopher to protect his left, when the main column of Kollowrath reached Mattenbött, his leading troops became engaged with the French at Kreut, in the effort to debouch from the defile into the open and deploy. A lively fight ensued. But despite their utmost efforts and heavy reinforcements, after two or three hours' hearty work the Austrian regiments were unable to reach the clearing, and the centre column found itself held useless in the defile, and grievously hampered by the enormous train and the reserve artillery moving in its rear, which kept closing up rapidly in the expectation of a speedy exit. This column had a rear-guard of two regiments of cuirassiers. The right and left columns were still somewhat back, reaching Weiher and

Kollowrath.

Albaching at ten; and Riesch sent some foot and horse out to St. Christopher to reconnoitre. Meanwhile Richepanse was hurrying up towards Mattenbött as ordered, he himself heading a small van, while Drouet came slowly along some distance behind, and then Decaen with the main column. Richepanse, brushing away Kollowrath's two battalions, happened to march past the head of column of the Austrian left under Riesch; but Riesch got to Albaching before Drouet, and thus stopped the latter's advance. For awhile Drouet had his hands full, but Decaen came up behind him, and Riesch's column was now in its turn in ill case. Richepanse, meanwhile ordering Drouet to hold back whatever was in his front, marched on, unaware of how much was occurring in his rear, or indeed of what lay before him on the post-road. Even with the orders he is said to have received from headquarters, his manifest duty was to rejoin his own troops, so soon as he heard heavy firing in their direction; but he kept on, and when to his surprise he found himself debouching on the flank of a strong Austrian column standing in the defile, he attacked, partly as a means of extricating himself, partly to open a way through to Hohenlinden for his column, and partly hoping that even a small body on the flank of the Austrian marching column might accomplish some result — he knew not what. His being where he was came about by mere chance, and was the result of no tactical purpose applicable to the situation.

On the Austrian right, Kienmayer's column had reached Buch about 11 A. M., and smartly attacked the near-by villages of Dading, Kronaker, Förstern and Haidberg. Some heavy fighting ensued here. Baillet-Latour, who came up to Mitbach, reached out right and left to get in touch with Kollowrath and Kienmayer. Grouchy and Ney, having thrown back the Austrian van at Kreut, undertook the further offen-

sive in a masterful way, and not only kept Kollowrath from advancing, but forced the Austrians back into the defile ; and Richepanse, having first been thrown back by the Austrian reserve cavalry, posted some guns where they could be effectively served, and by repeated brilliant charges of his small body of horse and foot, managed to breed consternation in the Austrian train ; a condition that soon spread to the entire column. Kollowrath was in a *cul-de-sac.* The teamsters and artillerymen first lost heart ; their fears were soon caught by the soldiers in the rear, who could not get at the enemy, — no one knew how small a handful Richepanse had, — and it was not long before the Austrian troops that were imprisoned in the defile with the train and guns fell into a mass of demoralized men struggling for an exit to the rear. For greater good fortune, this attack by Richepanse happened to coincide with Ney's and Grouchy's ; and as a result the whole central Austrian column, from the front back, began to retreat, grew more and more unsteady, and finally took to senseless flight. Entire battalions were captured, and guns wholesale. Practically all the Kollowrath column and the train fell to the French. By this disaster the other columns were also compelled to fall back. Riesch, however, held himself firmly at Albaching until night, when he retired in good order to Ramsau. Kienmayer, who had a large force of French in his front, displayed much courage, and made good his retreat to Langdorf, and next day to Dorfen, where he joined Baillet-Latour, who had fallen back via Burgrain.



Richepanse.

This battle cost the Austrians five thousand killed and

wounded, and seven thousand prisoners, fifty guns and eighty-five ammunition-wagons. The Bavarian corps was nearly destroyed. The army hurriedly retreated behind the Inn, which it crossed December 4 and 5. The French loss was not heavy.

Hohenlinden was a piece of luck. Moreau had but half his army at hand, and was open to grave disaster. Though the French army had, all told, superior forces, at the point of contact Archduke John could have put more men in line. Moreau's friends strove to make out that Richepanse's attack had been ordered by his chief; but this is pure fabrication. Neither leader knew the other's whereabouts. Had Kollowrath kept back his column until Baillet-Latour could attack Grenier, only Grouchy would have been found in Hohenlinden to resist the central column. So far as Richepanse goes, he advanced with his small force in defiance of all discretion, and was solely by good luck one of the means of winning this great victory. His gallantry none can deny. But this is his only claim.

As to Archduke John, he should never have advanced from the Inn. The season was bad for the offensive. His dispositions were, on the whole, good, but the execution was wanting. The right of the marching columns might to better advantage have been thrown forward and the centre and left refused; so that the attack by the right would occupy the French left and centre and give Kollowrath a chance to debouch from the defile. Hohenlinden was a decisive battle, but it was won by chance and a happy stroke purely, "to be ascribed to no manœuvres, no combinations, no military genius," as Napoleon in the St. Helena Memorial very truly remarks. And this dictum is in no wise inconsistent with his January 9 letter to Moreau: "I do not tell you all the interest I have taken in your fine and learned manœuvres.

You have surpassed yourself this campaign;" nor with his January 2 Message to the Legislative Corps: "The victory of Hohenlinden has resounded throughout Europe. It will be counted in history in the number of the finest days that have illustrated French valor." For each of these latter statements was made with the definite purpose of conserving the coöperation of Moreau and his following.

On December 5 Moreau, with seventy thousand men, began to march in pursuit of the enemy, the left moving on Neumarkt, the centre on Ampfing, the right under Lecourbe on Rosenheim, so as to cross the Inn, march on Salzburg, and cut the Tyrol forces from the main Austrian army. Two days later Moreau obliqued to the right to cross at Mühldorf, Rosenheim and Wasserburg, and got over, after some opposition, December 9, the Austrians, thirty-six thousand strong, falling behind the Salza. On December 13 Lecourbe crossed the Salza, the rest of the army echeloned back to the Inn at Wasserburg. The Austrians had taken a good position at Salzburg, but the French discovered a neglected ford above Laufen, and on December 15 put in an appearance on the Austrians' flank, and advanced on Neumarkt, through which ran their communications. The enemy decamped towards the Traun, followed by the French centre, the left and right towards Lampach, Lecourbe on Gmunden. A number of rearguard exchanges enlivened the march, in which the Austrians lost some four thousand men. At Lampach Archduke John uselessly essayed a stand, but, unable to stop his demoralized army, the whole mass poured on towards Mölk, which place was reached on Christmas Day. The young French generals covered themselves with glory. In three weeks, in repeated combats, they took a hundred and twenty guns, and put twenty-five thousand Austrians *hors de combat.*

Archduke Charles now joined the army, which was in the

worst possible condition, so much so, indeed, that it was evident that it could not hold head to a strong French offensive, and that wisdom demanded a cessation of hostilities, if this could be accomplished. He sent General Meerfeldt to Moreau's headquarters with a proposition to treat, and the latter, recognizing the proper moment to act, for his own position was much advanced, and the Italian army under Brune was still far behind on the Mincio, accepted the proposal. A truce was made at Steyer December 25, looking to a separate peace between France and Austria; but the latter paid dearly for this, yielding Würzburg, Kufstein and Braunau, and all the Tyrol fortresses. The demarcation line ran from the Tyrolese border via St. Michael, Leoben and Mariazell to the Danube, along this river to Ratisbon, and thence, by way of Neumarkt, Nürnberg and Erlangen, to Baiersdorf.

During this time the Army of Italy under Brune lay quietly on the Mincio awaiting the arrival of Macdonald, who was to take Bellegarde in the rear by crossing the Splügen and the Apriga and debouching on Trent. So soon as Macdonald's head of column, after heroically facing the winter Alps, appeared at this place, Brune sent his left under Moncey up the valley to meet him, while the main body crossed the Mincio December 25, and drove Bellegarde beyond the Adige. Brune's manœuvring, however, lacked the energy and skill to which the army was habituated. The Austrians, taken between Macdonald and Moncey, were, to be sure, badly compromised; but Laudon managed to retire beyond the Brenta, and Brune defeated his own success by an armistice which left Mantua to the enemy. This agreement was promptly disavowed by the First Consul, and Mantua was later ceded to the French.

This armistice afforded time to settle the troubles with Naples. Murat, reinforced by Brune up to twenty-seven thou-

sand men, marched on Rome; but by the mediation of Russia, now friendly to Napoleon, the armistice of Foligno was signed. Under this the occupation of Tarentum was yielded to France, — a harbor which might be of great value in the Egyptian complications.

Bellegarde.
From an old print.

On March 18 peace was made with Naples at Florence; its harbors were closed to British and Turkish vessels; its territories in central Italy, including Elba, were given up, and French garrisons were received in some Italian towns.

The truce of Steyer led up to the Peace of Lunéville, signed February 9, 1801, and a nine years' continuous war ceased. This splendid peace practically ratified the terms of Campo Formio. It gave France the Rhine frontier guaranteed by the Empire; Lombardy became a separate power; Austria received Venice up to the Adige; Modena became a part of the Cisalpine Republic, and the Duke of Modena received Breisgau in its stead; Tuscany went to Parma; France ceded to the Empire the strong places of Kehl, Castel and Ehrenbreitstein, the fortifications to remain as they then were; the Empire was held to recompense those German princes who lost possessions in France by the new Rhine boundary; and the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics were declared independent. Spain ceded Louisiana to France, from whom the United States later bought it.

The Peace of Lunéville practically put an end to the Holy Roman Empire; and the old ecclesiastical States were mostly abolished. There remained the Elector of Mainz, the Masters of St. John and the Teutonic orders, and out of the forty-

eight free Imperial States, only Lübeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfort, Augsburg, Nürnberg were left. The rulers of the other forty-two were indemnified. Hesse-Cassel, Baden, Würtemberg, Salzburg were made electorates.

For Austria the German campaign of 1800 was from all standpoints a bitter failure; for Moreau it was a vast credit in results, while in scheme and execution it was subject to criticism. The First Consul's early plan and Moreau's had clashed; and as Moreau was still a power in France, he was permitted to have his own way; for Bonaparte desired to avoid, not create difficulties; nor indeed was he willing to assume too much responsibility for his lieutenant.

At St. Helena Napoleon fully discussed this campaign, in a manner equally interesting and illuminating. But perhaps he applied to its actors the measure by which no one except himself can properly be gauged.

Moreau's plan partook of Bonaparte's suggestions in a small way only. His calculations were wrong. Should Kray stand on the Wutach, Moreau expected to marshal sixty thousand men against forty thousand men the enemy could put in line; and should he fall back to Stockach, Moreau would have all his four corps to fight with what Kray could assemble. According to Moreau's estimates, this was a brilliant status, but as a fact Kray could have put nearly eighty thousand men in line on the Wutach, — a very different matter. Moreover, Moreau was to begin by widely separating his right and left, and then to reunite them he proposed a dangerous flank march between the Rhine and a mountainous country held by the enemy in force, relying upon not being disturbed during its execution. This was markedly risky. Yet Moreau's plan had certain advantages. He saved a Rhine crossing in the face of the enemy; he turned the Schwarzwald defiles; he in a sense neutralized the Austrian right under Sztarray; he

placed himself where, should he win a battle, he would be able to seize the enemy's magazines in Villingen, Donaueschingen, Engen and Stockach; in case of defeat his retreat was open. Bonaparte's plan was far more brilliant, but Moreau was scarcely equal to carrying out what was yet a novelty, a manœuvre only within the great Corsican's power to conceive. But Moreau did execute his own plan with exactitude and ability; and Kray was so much deceived by the operations of the French that he met Moreau's onset with meaningless manœuvres and half-way measures; and over fifty thousand of his men were dispatched to points distant from the place where the blow was to fall. Had he concentrated at any one point, he might have beaten the French detachments in detail. But this was beyond Kray's power, and Moreau relied on this fact. Kray paused while Moreau, in his own slow way, marched. While Moreau was advancing on his army, he spent time in moving his magazines, heedless of the fact that a battle won would save the magazines, a battle lost would forfeit them.

Chasseur. Summer Dress. 1802.

Yet Engen was sharply fought by Kray, Lecourbe's manœuvres on the right winning the day. At Möskirch, St. Cyr by no means came up to the requirements of the case. Kray should not have remained south of the Danube to fight. He had ordered Reuss to remain in and care for Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, and his manifest duty was to join to his fighting force both Kienmayer and Sztarray. After his defeat at Möskirch, the only thing Kray could do was to concentrate

somewhere in the rear and leave the Tyrol to care for itself. He could have kept Reuss where he was, and made a new line of retreat by way of Ulm, Donauwörth and Bohemia, which would have necessitated a change of plan by Moreau. But this would also have enabled Moreau to operate against Reuss in force and even to aid the Italian scheme. Kray's better plan, so soon as Moreau advanced, would have been to concentrate on his left, so as to help Reuss, and thus forward the operations in the valley of the Po, even though this might have opened the Austrian theatre down to the Inn, and lost him his Bavarian contingent. The difficulty was that his entire front was so extended that he could not readily concentrate on either right or left, or indeed draw in either wing on the centre, and his magazines were a constant source of delay. On the other hand, Moreau saw clearly his own proper objective, and operated by his right, though too slowly, towards the Tyrol; Kray, although he felt that he must hold the valley of the Danube, was never quite clear as to what the situation implied, or as to his own purpose. In consequence, two weeks had not elapsed from the opening of the campaign before he had to retire to the protection of the guns of Ulm. Here he might have reunited seventy-five thousand men, more, indeed, than Moreau, who had detached fifteen thousand to Italy; and Ulm was an unequaled position, commanding both sides of the Danube. In fact, Moreau was unwilling to attack Ulm, and manœuvred awhile, first to the right, then to the left, and again to the right; he appeared to lack decision; and only by definitely sending Lecourbe on Augsburg could he induce Kray to retire beyond the Inn. "Field-Marshal Kray," says Napoleon, "showed ability around Ulm; he obtained a great success, because, with an army thrice beaten in a month and much inferior, he retained during forty days, under the guns of his intrenched camp, a superior and victorious army.

Marches, manœuvres, fortifications, have no other aim." Yet Moreau had, in a lesser degree, the same moral superiority over Kray that Bonaparte exerted against Melas. Kray had, says Jomini, been too "methodical," by which he means that he was tied by red tape to certain old-fashioned methods. The German military writers speak of this blind adherence to form as "Methodismus." The use of the word "methodical," as to-day properly applied to war, implies a systematic, well-drawn scheme, which may be varied according to events, but not changed in its real purpose. When the truce ensued, Kray was forced to give way to the Archduke John, without a chance of repairing his record. He was not a bad soldier, though by no means equal to so large a command, especially when hedged about, as all the Austrian generals were, by the haphazard instructions of the Aulic Council. Perhaps no country ever survived such constant unwise interference with its generals as always proceeded from this hypercritical, antiquated body.

Archduke John, a young and inexperienced soldier, was worse than Kray. Moreau had returned to Paris for a while, and it has been claimed by his adherents that General Desolles, his chief of staff, had drawn up a plan to which Moreau gave his assent, of luring the Austrian army from the Inn forward to the Isar woods and marshes, where a victory might be easily won, as it actually was at Hohenlinden. This, however, is pure fiction. The victory of Hohenlinden was a happy accident. In this battle, the results of which were greater, excepting Rivoli, than those of any other during the French Revolution, everything went in Moreau's favor. If the Austrian central column had not marched so fast, or had Riesch happened to march a little faster, Richepanse could not have reached Kollowrath's flank, nor started with his paltry force the demoralization which destroyed the Austrian army.

In one month the First Consul had cleared Italy of the hitherto victorious Austrians. In three months Moreau had driven Kray behind the Inn, and in two winter months forced John back to Vienna. Each had accomplished a vast result. But had Bonaparte not won the great victory at Marengo, and recovered the entire valley of the Po, could Moreau have accomplished what he did?

Sword and Belt of the Period.

Admiral Sidney Smith; and though during the negotiations a truce was made, yet an attempt on El Arish, which the Vizier had begun, did not get countermanded, and this important place fell to the Turks. No help arriving from France, and the condition of the army becoming daily worse, Kleber called a council of war, which voted that it was wiser to vacate Egypt by treaty than to rely on the fortune of war to hold it; and accordingly a Convention was signed in El Arish, January 24, 1800, by which the French agreed to evacuate the country, the troops to be carried back to France, under guaranty of the Porte, on English and Turkish vessels; all places except the ports of embarkment to be gradually given up in March; prisoners to be exchanged; and the Vizier to pay three million francs to the French. The Convention was signed by the Vizier and Kleber, but not by Sidney Smith. The report of these proceedings was sent in duplicate to France. One copy reached Paris, where Bonaparte, unknown to Kleber, had already become First Consul, and the frank antagonism to his late chief therein displayed did not redound to Kleber's credit. The other copy fell into English hands, and producing in London the impression that the French army was defenseless, orders were sent to Admiral Keith to insist on the French troops surrendering as prisoners of war. When, therefore, Kleber, in accordance with the terms made, had already given over a number of the Egyptian places, he received word that England refused its consent to the Convention of El Arish, and made the demand named. He at once fortified Cairo, and the news of the Eighteenth Brumaire now running in, he determined to hold himself at all hazards. To the Order of the Day, explaining to the troops the British attitude, he added: "Soldats, on ne repond à une telle insolence que par des victoires! Préparez-vous à combattre!" Kleber also wrote the Vizier in a positive

though most reasonable spirit; but the latter now deemed his chance of winning back Egypt all too good, and marched on Cairo with forty-five thousand men, leaving fifteen thousand more as reserve and garrisons, and took post at Heliopolis. Kleber could array against this force but fifteen thousand men; but with these he marched out to attack the Vizier, echeloning in squares on his left, so as to force the Turks towards the desert. With his lieutenants, Friant and Reynier, he boldly advanced on the enemy, and after a well-contested battle on the site of the ancient city of the sun-god, March 20, utterly defeated the Turks, pursued them to Salahiyeh, and dispersed the whole force, ten thousand men being killed, wounded or captured. A handful only returned to Syria. The French loss was but two hundred men. But Kleber could scarcely replace himself in the position he occupied before the breach of the Convention. Cairo was in revolt, and all Egypt was in an uproar. Still, though he was left to his own resources, he well accomplished his task by the end of April. Meanwhile, England had concluded that it would be wiser to ratify the Convention of El Arish, and Kleber would have been able to carry out his scheme with honor, had he not been assassinated June 14, 1800. As senior of the generals, Menou took over the command. In September, 1800, Malta surrendered, and Egypt seemed farther off than ever from France, while England benefited markedly, roamed all over the ocean, and threatened every French port in turn.

Though he was an excellent administrator, Menou was far from equal to the difficult situation in Egypt. He somewhat improved the civil condition of the land, but was not abreast of the military demands. Still, when the proposition came to him that the French should deliver themselves up as prisoners of war, he boldly answered that the enemy must first

come to the front and beat his army. England was much in earnest in the Egyptian question. The conditions were such that it had become essential for her to get the French out of the land. While they were no longer an active threat to India, they might at any moment interrupt commerce by the Suez route, and to the task of replacing the Sultan in control England heartily addressed herself.

It was agreed that twenty thousand English should assemble in Gibraltar, sail to and land east of the Delta, and there meet another Turkish army from Syria, to operate jointly against the French, while a further force of eight thousand English from India should land at Suez, and manœuvre on the French rear. But part of the proposed English forces being detached to Lisbon, and the plague at Jaffa having delayed the Syrian army, the expedition lost much time. Menou showed his incapacity by issuing a proclamation declaring Egypt to be a French colony, a publication which created a cabal against him even in his own army. Inasmuch as in March, 1801, he had but sixteen thousand men, these needed to be of one mind and purpose. Not only this, but Menou distributed his men in a way to be overwhelmed in detail, and he had placed no single city in a state of good defense.

Keith and Abercrombie, in command of the allied expedition, had remained in Malta through December, 1800, and thence sailed to Rhodes, in whose harbor of Marmora they organized and drilled for the descent on Egypt. Much delay in coöperating with the Vizier ensued, consequent upon a breaking out of the plague in El Arish; but on February 22 the fleet under Keith set sail, and on March 1, 1801, came to anchor in the Bay of Aboukir, with seventeen thousand land troops under Abercrombie. Keith would perhaps have done well to feint a landing at Damietta, and then, after drawing

away the main French force from Alexandria, return and land at Aboukir, by which proceeding he might have surprised and taken Alexandria out of hand, and thus gained a quite essential place in the first stage of the campaign. But yet Abercrombie made good his landing in Aboukir, after a stout opposition by Friant, who hurried up from Alexandria. The Guards under Ludlow, the reserve under Moore, and Coote's brigade established themselves with the aid of the gunboats, and advanced on Friant, who stood on the well-hillocks. After a lively fight the French fell back to protect Alexandria, followed by the English and the gunboats. Abercrombie advanced his men as fast as they landed, and at once laid siege to Aboukir Fort.

Menou now still further exhibited his lack of military capacity. The English fleet had been sighted March 1, and the troops did not land until the 8th. Instead of concentrating, marching on the enemy, and fighting him before he was ready, — and Menou had plenty of men to give him a chance of victory, especially cavalry, while the English lacked horses for both cavalry and artillery, — he stubbornly maintained his absurd division of forces. Lanusse, however, marched to the sound of the guns, making with Friant a total of four thousand men. The English gradually landed, and took up a strong position on the peninsula of Aboukir, with sixteen thousand men and forty-two guns. Lanusse established his troops on the hillock in front of the old Roman camp, purposing to cover Alexandria, the dunes, the Lake of Mahadieh and the canal. Here Abercrombie attacked him at daylight, March 13, in three columns, and made an effort to turn the French right.

Not seeing the centre column, Lanusse deemed the right and left columns too far apart, and advanced down from his position on the left one, thus permitting the centre column to

take him in flank. He quickly rectified his error, but the English had got into line, and though the French fought hard for their position, Lanusse and Friant were outnumbered and compelled to retire towards Alexandria, where they took up a fresh position. The losses were reported as six hundred French and upwards of one thousand English. Protecting his flanks by leaning his right on the sea and his left on the canal, at 3 P. M. Abercrombie attacked the new French position on the right, but being thrown back, the English retired to the French position of the morning, where they intrenched, meanwhile keeping up the siege of Fort Aboukir. Considering their small force, the French had done well.

Friant.

As he knew the Turks would soon arrive, Menou should now at last have concentrated all his forces from every part of Egypt and thrown them all in a body upon the English. It was his one and only chance. There were still twenty-five thousand French soldiers in Egypt, of whom sixteen thousand could have been put into the field as one corps. He sent instead but a small reinforcement to Lanusse, and left his troops spread over the whole land. Abercrombie's position now made it more difficult for French reinforcements to reach Alexandria; but a shallow ford through Lake Mareotis was discovered by which these could march. Fort Aboukir shortly fell to the English, who made their position impregnable, with gunboats on the sea and Lake Mahadieh, and by stout earthworks. Here with sixteen thousand men and forty guns, Abercrombie awaited the French advance. Menou had finally concentrated in

Alexandria ten thousand men with forty-six guns, and at the head of these he set out to capture the English earthworks. With even this disparity in numbers, an attack of the whole French force on one of Abercrombie's flanks might possibly have succeeded, but instead of this plain manœuvre, the columns were ordered to assault the left and right flanks and the centre about the same time. Menou was frittering away his small forces.

At daybreak of March 21 the French dromedary regiment moved forward and seized an English earthwork, and the French line following hard upon, Lanusse threw the bulk of his division on the biggest of the redoubts, leaving him no reserve. The troops were met by a withering English fire, which arrested their onset and killed Lanusse, and a cross-fire from other works completed their defeat. At the same time Rampon in the centre had also advanced on the big redoubt, and somewhat clashed with Lanusse's troops; and on his right Reynier, after a pause, joined his comrades, gallantly but uselessly striving to drive the English out of their defenses. But any chance of success which there may have been — and every battle hangs by a hair — was forfeited when Menou blindly threw his fifteen hundred cavalry on the English works, perhaps in imitation of Murat's charges some two years before on nearly the same ground against the Turks. The gallant horsemen rode forward on their foolish errand, around the redoubts and into the camp itself; one body, indeed, rode through an English regiment, which opened to their charge and then closed behind them; but the cool and murderous British fire gave them no chance. Their splendid ride, fit prototype of the Six Hundred, was fatal: scarce a man escaped. In the *mélée* Abercrombie was mortally wounded. At 10 A. M. the French were forced to retire, with the loss of fifteen hundred men, including three generals. The English

loss, out of twelve thousand men engaged, was equally severe, including many high officers. The battle of Alexandria, or of the Roman Camp, was claimed by the English as a victory, which it properly was, as they had held their ground, though the French denied the claim. Yet the English had in three actions lost a large percentage of their force; and in order to victual, it now become essential for them to capture Rosetta. Alexandria was too strong to take. The walls were still good, and Forts Cretin and Caffarelli were beyond being captured by a *coup de main*. They had so far only gained the ground they stood on, and many advised retreat.

Late in April the Captain Pasha arrived at Rosetta with six thousand men.

There was nothing now left for Menou to do but to vacate Upper Egypt and concentrate all his forces, except a few garrisons, in a central location, from which to debouch successively against the English and the Vizier. Happily for the French, Abercrombie's successor, Hutchinson, had not as much energy or skill, and took no advantage of the late victory. Rosetta was, however, shut in and captured April 19, Menou's relieving army arriving too late. It was over six weeks after the battle, on May 9, that Hutchinson finally marched forward on Ramaniyeh, the Captain Pasha advancing on the east bank of the Edku Lake, and the English Rosetta forces up the Nile via El Alf. The fleet of gunboats accompanied this advance. The whole French army was antagonistic to Menou, who, indeed, lest the troops should mutiny and elect Reynier as commander, had him and Damas arrested and sent to France under charges. Ill luck followed all the French manœuvres. Victual grew short. A heavy foraging party under Cavalier was sent out only to be captured by the English. The Vizier Jussuf was advancing with fifteen thousand men, and the French garrisons of

Salahiyeh and Belbeys retired to Cairo. Menou remained in Alexandria with the enemy marching on the capital, where Belliard had but twenty-five hundred men under the colors, this being shortly increased by Lagrange's oncoming to nine thousand effective. Belliard, with fifty-five hundred men, undertook, May 15, a reconnoissance in force against the Vizier, but retired two days later. Hutchinson and Jussuf now advanced on Cairo.

The French thus had under Menou in and near Alexandria six thousand men, and under Belliard in Cairo nine thousand more. The English had in and near Aboukir five thousand men; in the marching column seventeen thousand, — twenty-two thousand in all. The Vizier commanded twelve thousand foot and ten thousand horse; the Captain Pasha had six thousand men. The English force under Baird at Suez, not immediately available, was six thousand strong. Taking out Baird and disabled men, there were facing Menou in Alexandria five thousand English, enough to hold him in check; and facing Belliard at Cairo fifteen thousand English and twenty thousand Turks — three to one.

Cairo was in no state of defense. Belliard had no outlet but to capitulate, or to make so good a showing as to force an honorable evacuation. To accomplish this last he lent a strong will and much ability. On June 22 he accepted a truce, and entered into negotiations to vacate Cairo. His individuality alone secured good terms. On July 27 he signed for his own forces a Convention similar to that of El Arish; and thus only Menou with his six thousand men, near Alexandria on the heights of Nicopolis, was left of all Bonaparte's victorious army. Coote, with his force increased to nine thousand men, took no action. Belliard embarked early in August.

Hutchinson, to whom two regiments of reinforcements had

come, and whom Baird was soon to join, now undertook the siege of Alexandria. He put nearly four hundred boats in Lake Mareotis with Coote's division aboard, and sent him to Marabut and the Island of Mariut. Coote shut in Fort Marabut, which surrendered August 21. He then advanced to near the city, Menou still remaining at Nicopolis. Alexandria was nearly starving. The French generals saw no end but capitulation, and on August 31 a Convention similar to Belliard's was concluded. By the end of September, 1801, all French troops — over twenty-six thousand men — were on the way to France.

Such was the lamentable end of Bonaparte's great Oriental expedition. Without control of the sea, the possession of Egypt by France could be but a dream.

Before the English had begun their invasion of Egypt, Bonaparte had essayed means of reinforcing the French army there. But France no longer had a navy. Many of her best naval officers had emigrated, and the knowledge of naval warfare was fast dying away. Some two hundred ships had been lost at sea or in battle, and the country now produced few hardy sailors. The Dutch fleet had been destroyed, the Spanish fleet was blockaded in Brest and Cadiz by the English. France had lost most of her colonies ; San Domingo, Surinam and Demerara, Curaçoa and St. Eustache followed. The disease itself bred disease. So far as regarded Egypt, Bonaparte strove to send men and material thither, but private contractors would no longer undertake to transport them while English ships cruised all over the Mediterranean. Finally Admiral Ganteaume, who had brought Bonaparte back from Egypt, stealing out of Brest with ten ships and six thousand men, made his way through the English fleets off Cadiz and Gibraltar towards Alexandria. Here he might have been of much use, but fearing the English fleet under

Keith, he sailed back to Toulon. Ganteaume was again ordered to Alexandria, and again started, but once more he ran back to Toulon, lest he should endanger the expedition. A third attempt had no better result, and the troops which might have turned the tide in Egypt never reached that country. Ganteaume had manifestly lacked enterprise.

To Desaix, May 14, 1800, Bonaparte wrote: "I received two months ago the capitulation (of Egypt). I made no remark upon it because you had signed it; but how could eighteen thousand French be afraid of thirty thousand Turks? You needed not six thousand men to beat them, take away their guns, their camels, and to put them out of condition to do anything for a year. . . . But after all, let us talk no more about it. Come the quickest that you can to rejoin me wherever I shall be." On May 15, in a letter to the Consuls, he said: "The plague has not been in Egypt this year. It is infamous that they abandoned it. . . . By letters I have received it seems that Desaix, Menou, Davout and several others with a heart did not wish to vacate Egypt." And he wrote on May 22 to Talleyrand, ordering him to put in the *Moniteur* an article showing that "if I had remained in Egypt, this superb colony would still belong to us, as, if I had remained in France, we should not have lost Italy." Boastful, perhaps, but true none the less.

While this conflict was going on in northern Africa, an equally important one was preparing in northern Europe.

England had long had her own way at sea; and the consequent disregard she paid to the rights of the neutral flag afloat was felt to be a source of danger by all the Baltic nations. After long negotiations, in July, 1800, Russia and Prussia finally entered into a Northern Convention — really an ancient treaty revived — and agreed to admit Turkey, Denmark, Sweden and some German States. The seizure of

Malta in September, 1800, by the British was deemed by Paul I., who had been elected Grand Master of its Knights, the equivalent of a declaration of war, and as rendering the Northern Convention all the more essential. Denmark joined the treaty in February, 1801. England retaliated by laying an embargo on Russian, Danish and Swedish ships and goods. All this tended to bring France and Russia nearer, and England, after the Peace of Lunéville, was excluded from most European ports, and had only Portugal and Turkey left as allies. Yet, with her inherited tenacity and the security of her insular position, she continued to hold out.

Under Bonaparte as First Consul, France had made treaties with most of her enemies, who thus had no further need



The First Consul. About 1802.

of British subsidies; and between Paul and Bonaparte grew up a more friendly understanding. The hatred of the French Republic, still virulent in 1799, was now transferred to England, and the First Consul deemed it safe to plan an invasion of the British Isles. In July, 1800, he set free all Russian

prisoners of war in France, and the Batavian Republic, under French persuasion, did the like. A plan was drawn up in Berlin for an universal peace; Naples was pacified in March, 1801, and shut her ports to England. As a means of offsetting the success of the English force in the Nile Delta, Bonaparte arranged in connection with Spain an invasion of Portugal. An army of thirty thousand Spaniards threatened Lisbon by July 1, and Bonaparte made ready to occupy the whole country unless England should come to terms of peace. By her astonishing activity at sea alone was England enabled to maintain her influence in Europe. It had, however, become manifest that if she was to subsist, the Northern Convention must be broken up; and she made ready to do it at any cost and risk; as on the other hand the northern powers made great preparations to resist the British invasion.

On March 12, 1801, the English squadron left Yarmouth, passed the Sund March 30, and on April 2 Nelson won his famous victory at Cohenhagen. Meanwhile Paul I. was murdered, and being succeeded by his son Alexander I., advances by the latter led to a truce. All Europe thirsted for repose. In May Denmark made peace, and shortly the German, Russian and Swedish ports were opened to England, and the English embargo was raised. In June Russia and England made a treaty to which Sweden adhered. But a treaty with France was naturally dependent upon the operations in Egypt. Finally, however, in September, 1801, preliminaries were signed between England and France, France and Portugal, Russia and Spain, Russia and France, and France and Turkey. In the first-named treaty England restored to France and her allies certain colonies, Malta went to the Order, Egypt to the Porte. Portugal, Naples and the States of the Church were evacuated. The result was the Peace of Amiens, March 15, 1802, which ended the wars of the French Republic.

A word of review of the changes made by the French Revolutionary wars may be added. At Lunéville and Amiens the ten years' wars of the French Revolution came to an end. During the first period, from 1792 to 1795, was laid the foundation of the new system of war, by which the people and not the rulers declared war and conducted operations. Carnot, as war minister, was a prime factor in developing this great step, and in organizing the armies of the French nation, and later Bonaparte showed the world how a people in arms could be led. As the soldier of the people was at first ill-armed and undrilled, it was natural for what is called light infantry to increase. The cavalry, especially that of a light order, also grew in number. The artillery was enlarged, and horse batteries came into use. Everything became more mobile. Regimental guns, long in use, were abolished because they hampered the movements of the untrained foot, and the artillery was assembled in light and heavy batteries. Engineers, sappers and miners, pontoniers and artisans, were taken from the artillery arm and added to the new engineer department. To help the fresh recruit, he was encouraged to fight in open order, and the skirmishing line, in which the men took every advantage of the accidents of the ground, was sustained by columns and squares, so as both to increase the fire and to add to the power of attack and defense; and the old line-order of Frederick, in which the troops of all other nations were still marshaled, was given up by the French. Divisions and army corps were organized; tents were abolished; the men were fed by requisitions on the country. The three arms — infantry, cavalry, artillery — were drilled to work better together. By thus taking advantage of the marked genius of the people for war, in four years the French armies were placed in the very front rank of effectiveness. In speed and elasticity they quite outclassed the other European

armies, in which things remained as they had been, improving but slowly. The engineering art grew in importance; field fortifications and artillery were improved, and permanent fortifications as well as sieges were better organized.

In these first four years the French defended France and began their attacks outside. This gain was due to the rapidity, energy and unity of French operations. The allies adhered to the cordon system. In part, so did the French, but the French learned faster, and sooner cast off its shackles.

In the second period, 1796 to 1798, the French assumed the decided offensive, and Bonaparte introduced his new system of war. Had Jourdan and Moreau in Germany accomplished part of what Bonaparte did, the result would have been doubled, but Archduke Charles rose superior to these French generals. To an extent, it was Carnot's pet idea and the Directory's which was at fault on the Danube, namely, that of launching two columns against the enemy's flanks, instead of one column against the centre or one flank. The French armies of this period were ill fed and armed; there was little money to work with. For this Carnot was in no sense to blame; but having many enemies, he was held to account, and was subsequently banished. Yet the French, despite their privations, fought in an unequaled manner. Though discipline decreased, and the requisition system brought about plunder and all the worst military vices, yet the general effectiveness of the French armies was not decreased. It was in this period, on the Po and in Egypt and Syria, that Bonaparte sprang to the highest rank among European leaders. The French had already infused much that was new into much that was old; and basing on this, Bonaparte created a quite new system of war. Of this system the leading features were a series of well-calculated and especially speedy thrusts in force against the enemy's centre, flanks or rear, and strict concentration for battle.

In the third period, 1799 to 1801, much that was wonderful was done by France. One additional great soldier came upon the scene, Suwarrov, and he reconquered Italy as speedily as Bonaparte had conquered it. He could have done more had he not been subject to the Austrian war council and in command of a mixed army, — conditions which curbed his independence. At first the Coalition won in Italy and Germany, and lost in Holland and Switzerland, while England won at sea. Bonaparte as First Consul strove to make peace, but Austria and England would not. Then followed the brilliant Marengo campaign and Moreau's successful advance into Germany. In immediate results this latter work was greater, but it was distinctly owing to the fact that Bonaparte was at the helm that so good a peace for France was won. During this period England carried on war against the Northern Convention and in Egypt, and roamed the sea at will.



Naval Quartermaster of Consular Guard. (1803.)

Although the French National Convention and Directory perhaps exceeded any autocracy in its bloody methods and cruel assertion of power, yet these governing bodies were chosen from and represented the people; and the members were the strongest men in the nation. And it was through their exertions that France, shaken to her foundations by the Revolution, bid defiance to the First Coalition, defended her frontiers against it, and even crossed the Rhine and Alps to attack it, as well as fought against the Second Coalition in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Egypt. This wonder-

ful work was accomplished not only by the uprising in mass of the French people, but by a new system, devised by the men in power, of using the mass. The irregular conscript in line could not withstand the regular soldier; but he could fight singly and in small groups, from behind hedges and garden walls, or shelter of any kind. The parties carrying on this small war were thus naturally grouped into larger ones, and became on an extended scale the open order which the leading generals finally moulded into actual form. Again the leaders built on the sharp, if temporary, audacity of the national character. No man could succeed with the French soldier who had not Gallic fire, who would not actually lead his men; and the habit, when the French forces were superior, as it was intended they always should be, of relying less on fire and more on sudden bayonet charges, grew from the success of these rapid rushes. The most useful single man was Carnot, — truly the "Organizer of Victory" in 1793–95, when he was Minister of War; it was he who formed the new minor tactics for the French Army, organized and inspired it. And although it was also he who prescribed the attack on both flanks as a strategical manœuvre, and this was essentially a false one, yet it held its own against the cordon system until Bonaparte showed the world a better operation.

The requisition system demanded and bred speed. The men who were at the bottom of the French Revolution were of unusual daring. No other virtue could carry through their desperate task; and in this they excelled at the moment all other European nations. Add to speed immense energy, with light foot, horse and guns, and the mobile deep column or the open-order line was able to sweep away anything in its front. The old tactics, much as their adherents despised the Revolutionists, could not oppose this whirlwind; and when the French further invented the so-called Theory of the Im-

possible, that is, the notion of doing in war the exact opposite of what the old system demanded, of undertaking what the enemy deemed quite out of order, they found that they anticipated the opposing manœuvres and encountered no resistance. While Montecuculi, prophet of the "methodical," cried for "Money, money and yet money!" the new French cry was "Audacity, more audacity, always audacity!" The French armies forced great rivers in the teeth of the enemy; they crossed vast mountain ranges with cavalry and artillery; they threw bridges under heavy artillery fire; they bivouacked without tents; they marched and fought without magazines; they waded through rivers breast-high; they made continuous marches in snow ankle-deep. Of all their foes, only Suwarrov and his obedient Russians came near to them in boldness.

Sergeant of Chasseurs.
(1803.)

The two things the French generals strove to do were to turn their enemy's flanks or break through his lines. And in this they succeeded when they had superior forces, while they as often failed when less in numbers, unless by speed and clever tactics they put more men in line at the point of contact. The French armies never won against the odds that Frederick's grenadiers despised. The minor tactics practically remained what they had been. It was a renewed vigor gained by the appeal to a national feeling, to patriotism, which won. With the French soldier the *point d'honneur* was a real thing; not so with the mercenary of the rest of Europe,

who worked for his daily rations and occasional plunder. The French general and private were "Comrades;" all were "Citizens;" the leader really led; and the man in the ranks felt that the burden rested on him. Armies actually rose from the soil at the stamping of a foot, and though ill-equipped and worse fed, they were ready to march and fight. The essential points in the system were superior numbers, simplicity in drilling the soldiers, heed paid to topographical details, mobility, speed, energy, audacity and absolute obedience. From the Directory down, this was the rule.

Among the allies everything remained as it had been — a blind adherence to the misunderstood and outworn system of Frederick. The soldier was a mercenary, without particular incitement, and he was drilled and disciplined *ad nauseam*, looked upon as a brute beast, beaten with stripes, and given no liberty, lest he should desert. The tactics of the brigade was as lumbering as that of the soldier, so slow and pedantic that the bold rush of the French open order surprised the enemy and puzzled him; while the same loose order, in which the men could hide behind every obstacle, gave small chance for cavalry charges, or target to artillery. If the French divisions flew rather than marched, so the German brigades crawled rather than marched — a fact which was, however, partly due to the magazine system. And while the French were gradually sloughing off the cordon system, the allies clove to it, as they did to all the ponderous methods of the past. It almost seemed better to them to lose a campaign by ancient than to win one by novel means. Except only Archduke Charles and Suwarrov, there was scarce a man who could break through the web.

It was only natural that the French should win.

Peace being assured, with the wonderful elasticity which has so often astounded Europe, as indeed we saw in 1870,



The First Consul at Malmaison. By Isabey.

France began to recover in her financial standing, which had been at so low an ebb that a gold piece of twenty-four francs was worth twelve thousand francs in assignats. These improved as Bonaparte infused honesty into the public administration. The *émigrés* were recalled and their property restored. The laws were better enforced. The benefits of religion were reëstablished. The opposition decreased, and Bonaparte had no more rivals.

The First Consul was rewarded, much, to be sure, by his own art, by being made Consul for life. This was done by a plebiscite, August 2, 1802, and a new Constitution was adopted, the Senate becoming stronger and the Tribunes weaker. Piedmont was annexed to France; a revolution in Switzerland was put down; and final peace was made with Russia and Austria.

There was a gradual return in France to the old and beloved worship of the Roman Catholic Church. While Bonaparte often created, he always respected public sentiment, as he always worked for the masses; and in 1802 a Concordat was entered into between the Pope and France, by which ten French archbishops and fifty bishops were to be appointed by the government, confirmed by the Pope, and paid by France. To Pius VIII. were yielded his temporal possessions, less Ferrara, Bologna and the Romagna. At the same time religious toleration was the law and practice of France. Centralization grew in every sense. The old Institut National was divided into four Academies: *Français*, *Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, *Sciences*, *Beaux-Arts*.

Of the great civil work of the Consulate, little can be said in this military history. A period which produced the *Code Napoléon*, which is still the basis of all law in France, Belgium, western Germany, Switzerland and Italy, sufficiently illustrates itself. Western Germany was made free compared

Moniteur. It is hard to say which of the two powers showed the less tendency to abide by the *status quo ;* for England felt that she must demand a colonial equivalent for every accession made on the Continent by France. The failure of Great Britain, according to the French view, to observe the terms of the treaty was, after long diplomatic remonstrances, met in 1803 by Napoleon's summarily taking possession of Naples and invading Hanover. The powers looked askance without taking action ; but on the pretext that England had seized some of her ships on the high seas, Spain decided to join France. Napoleon harbored serious intentions of invading England with an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the threat to do so, which took the shape of assembling transports and troops near Boulogne, Dunkirk and Calais, sent all England into a ferment, and put her in a better state of defense than ever before. The English regulars and militia were increased to one hundred and eighty thousand men, and four hundred thousand volunteers and fencibles were enrolled. Her navy was raised to number over four hundred and fifty war-ships and seven hundred armed boats.

To all the powers, indeed, Napoleon appeared as a peculiarly dangerous member of the European family, being destructive, as it were, of the God-given autocratic status, and it was natural that they should exaggerate his warlike intentions. In a sense, however, they were right. It was hard for Napoleon to set metes and bounds to his ambition. To begin with, he had inherited from the Revolution a tendency to demand more for France than the powers believed to be her just due. Again, there had by her wonderful victories been added to France many non-French lands, and these in the Gallic scheme had to be protected by buffer states on every side. Expansion had become the rule, and Napoleon had received

the training of the aggressive soldier rather than that of the conservative statesman. In his dealings with his brother rulers, he was no doubt *fortiter in re* rather than *suaviter in modo*. His Boulogne army threatened England. His being ostentatiously crowned King of Italy, his making Alessandria an enormous war depot, his seizing on Genoa, Naples, Parma, Placentia, and his posing as the successor of Charles the Great must have been singularly irritating to the hereditary princes of Europe. In the modern idea, France was far in advance of any country of Continental Europe, and was easy to misunderstand. And between England and France there was always a great gulf fixed.

Since his accession as First Consul there had been two attempts to assassinate Napoleon. A third, a Royalist plot, was now discovered, headed by Georges Cadoudal. In this plot Moreau was implicated, as well as Pichegru. Georges was executed. Pichegru died in prison. Moreau fled, and was banished. All this seems to indicate a strong opposition to Napoleon's régime, though under it France was gaining in giant strides each year. Yet it was to be expected from the Royalists, as well as others whom the First Consul could not avoid antagonizing. At this time also occurred the unfortunate episode of the Duc d'Enghien, in which the act of over-zealous police officers was sustained by Napoleon's license, or at least indifference. No doubt he was much besmirched by this and other acts. But Napoleon in these matters was not alone a subject for criticism. Great Britain's attitude was deplorable. There is small wonder that Napoleon was a hearty hater of the English. The connivance of English officials at the attempts to assassinate him, which he himself believed to be the instigation of these plots by the government, was enough to upset the calmest judgment. After all said, the English sense of ethical propriety with reference

to France and Napoleon was at this time curiously dull. It is hard to say who erred most.

Apart from his ambition to keep the succession of French power in his own family, Napoleon felt that he could not suitably maintain his position at the head of affairs unless he made himself a stronger place in the nation. In consequence

Napoleon. Profile by David. Taken at Chapel of the Tuileries at Coronation.

of his efforts to this end, a *senatus consultum*, on May 18, 1804, proclaimed him Emperor as Napoleon I., with descent to his heirs male; and the election was ratified by a signed vote of the people (three and a half million ayes to twenty-five hundred nays). The Emperor was consecrated December 2, in Paris, by the Pope. From May 18 on, all papers and correspondence are signed Napoleon, not Bonaparte.

The official report of the coronation of December 2 says: "The Emperor, sitting with the crown on his head and his hand raised on the Bible, pronounced the oath in these terms: 'I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect and cause to be respected the law of the Concordat and of the liberty of the Cults (religious denominations); to respect and to cause to be respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, the irrevocability of the sales of national property; not to raise any impost nor to establish any tax other than by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honor; to govern in the sole view of the interest, the happiness and the glory of the French people.'"

And in distributing the standards he said: "Soldiers, there are your flags. These eagles will always serve you as a point on which to rally. They will be at every place where your emperor judges them to be necessary for the defense of his throne and of his people. You swear to sacrifice your life to defend them, and to maintain them constantly by your courage on the road to victory. Do you swear it?"

Having Gallicized Charles the Great into Charlemagne, Napoleon, as we shall hereafter call him, did honor to his predecessor by a brilliant court, endless dignitaries and marshals, together with a new nobility which made up the outward show of the absolute monarchy which he inaugurated. And the new emperor bore himself well as the centre of the pageant. It is interesting in the Correspondence to note the natural way in which Napoleon falls into the imperial habit of speaking of "my army," "my ministers," "my finances," etc., and of addressing the other potentates of Europe as "My Brother." Looking back ten years to the day when Bonaparte's future was yet a complete puzzle, his sudden rise to power has surely no modern parallel. It may be confidently asserted that up

to this point France had benefited by Napoleon's victories and labors. Would she so benefit in her future wars?

The Emperor Alexander had offered his mediation between France and England, and at the end of 1803 proposed that Napoleon should withdraw from Naples, Holland and Switzerland. This Napoleon was not entirely unwilling to do; but before England would listen to any overtures, she required that Hanover, the occupation of which was, she claimed, not justifiable, should be evacuated. Napoleon's refusal to listen to this prerequisite originated a coldness between Alexander and himself which later bore bitter fruit. The czar had married the daughter of the Elector of Baden, on whose territory the Duc d'Enghien had been seized; the

Sketch of Josephine at Coronation.

Piedmont indemnity of 1801 had not been paid by France; and these and other matters contributed to the embroilment, which Gustavus of Sweden sedulously fanned. Under these circumstances, Alexander did not kindly recognize Napoleon as a brother monarch, although Austria, Prussia, Spain and

Denmark at once did so; and Turkey followed Russia. As a result, by a series of steps that do not belong to this history of the art of war, in 1805 arose the Third Coalition against France, for the ostensible purpose of restoring the so-called balance of power — that illusive safety-valve of European politics. Let us return to our proper text.

The whole French army had been divided into corps of three divisions each, under a marshal; but the cavalry was mostly assembled in one corps, leaving only a brigade of horse for duty with each army corps. In this fine organization Napoleon made one grievous mistake. He did no justice to his staff corps, which, singularly, he had learned to underrate; and this body, excepting some veterans already field officers or generals, afforded no rank above that of captain. The result was that lack of promotion disgarnished it of what was its leaven. The best subalterns went into the line to seek advancement; and when this and experience were won, they found return to the staff barred. Thus what is truly the soul of an army was lost to the French establishment; Berthier, the senior of the staff corps, made no protest; and later in his wars Napoleon suffered seriously from his error. He had destroyed the tree that bore him good adjutants; and his staff officers, instead of growing into marshals, degenerated into mere orderlies.

There were created seventeen marshals, some of whom, however, did not at once receive commands, viz.: Murat, Bernadotte, Marmont, Davout, Soult, Lannes, Ney, Augereau, Massena, Brune, Mortier, Bessières, Lefebvre, Jourdan, Moncey, Perignon and Serurier. Macdonald and Lecourbe were omitted. Perhaps Massena, Davout and Soult were the only generals capable of commanding an army. But Napoleon desired only able lieutenants; he was averse to having them become colleagues. The first seven were the marshals who

commanded the army corps in the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign. Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, Napoleon's brother-in-law, held in a way the highest rank. He had courage, activity and

Napoleon in Coronation Robes.

some brains; he was a distinguished cavalry officer; but his reputation was in part made for him by Napoleon; alone, he might not have risen so far. Bernadotte was brilliant and clever; but he had no military ability beyond the rôle of lieutenant. Marmont, an artillery officer, of late Napoleon's aide-de-camp, was faithful, able, equally of the stuff which makes good corps commanders, but of the kind who are not sure to succeed in independent command. Davout was highly educated, had intellect, and his conceptions of war were not only accurate, but they went far beyond the average of the marshals. His character was harsh, and he made many enemies. A strict disciplinarian, he was severe but just; he demanded much of his subordinates, and his corps was a

model. Auerstädt showed what he was capable of doing. Soult was masculine, broad, laborious, indefatigable, and had given proofs of great talent. He was taxed with too much ambition. Lannes, "covered with glory and wounds," had not a wide military intelligence; but he had good judgment, and to inspire men on the battlefield he was inferior to none. Ney, "the bravest of the brave," on the field was approached only by Lannes. Not understanding the divine part of war, he yet was unequaled in his *coup d'œil*, gallantry and *aplomb*. The greater the danger, the stronger the man. Augereau had a splendid person, but lacking the larger qualities, was only a good all-round corps commander. Massena might have been more than a lieutenant. He had done some able mountain campaigning, had won renown at the battle of Zürich, and always shone. He had a great character, courage of the highest, and a *coup d'œil* difficult to surpass. His place was in battle rather than on the council board. Brune was only an average soldier. Mortier was more solid, calm and steady. Bessières had valor and a spirit of order, but was timid in council. Lefebvre was simple-minded, soldierly and brave; beloved by his men, he could lead them anywhere; but he had no head. Jourdan had won Fleurus. He was a good administrator and honest, well educated and methodical, but he had not the make-up of an army leader. Moncey, Perignon and Serurier ceased to command troops under the empire. The last had incurred Napoleon's dislike. Macdonald had failed at the Trebia, and had to wait for advancement.

As England still refused to listen to overtures of peace, Napoleon pushed forward the preparations already begun for the Channel campaign. It has been often said that the project was absurd, could not possibly succeed. But this would to-day be said of Hannibal's astounding plan to cross the Alps,

if it had remained a mere plan, and had not been put into execution by a man of genius. Napoleon's project, as such, exhibits a stupendous conception followed up by extraordinary ability in preparing the means. In the initial stages, if the crossing could have been effected, the project might have succeeded; yet no one familiar with the English people could predicate any but temporary gain. To compass a permanent result was impossible. Even had he been able to cross, he would have encountered in the English character a set of conditions as remorseless as those presented by the

The Empress Josephine.

snow-covered steppes of Russia. But Napoleon did not think so. He never quite understood the English. He knew them only skin-deep.

The transports (*bateaux*, *chaloupes*, *péniches*), more or less unseaworthy, were two thousand two hundred in number, and

every part of the equipment of an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men was made ready. The narrowest part of the Channel, at Boulogne, was selected as the place of embarkment, and the French coast here was heavily fortified against any possible descents by the English fleet. As early as June 14, 1803, the order was issued for the creation of six special army corps, to be rendezvoused and drilled each in its own camp. Five of these were at St. Malo, Compiègne, St. Omer and Ghent, and in Holland. The camps were from time to time changed. In July, and again in November, Napoleon visited and studied the coast from Dunkirk to the mouth of the Somme. On the later trip he inspected the camp at St. Omer, which was under Soult. On December 12 a rescript on the "Organization of the Great Expedition" assigned to it four corps, those then at St. Omer, Montreuil and Bruges, and a reserve corps. When once more in January, 1804, Napoleon made a general inspection of the French army, the troops lay as follows: Bernadotte was in Hanover, Marmont in the camp of Zeist near Utrecht, Davout at Bruges, Soult at St. Omer, Lannes near and Ney at Montreuil; and in the rear of the corps were cantoned the dragoon regiments, organized into divisions. A new corps was now created at Brest, under Augereau, intended to invade Ireland. These made up a grand total of one hundred and twenty thousand foot, twelve thousand horse, eight thousand dragoons to be mounted in England; four thousand artillerymen, four hundred and fifty field-guns, seven thousand four hundred horses, all ready; and the men were so well drilled in rapidly embarking and disembarking that they could do either within one hour. The vessels were armed with five thousand guns, and the fleet was divided into squadrons according to army organization. On board were fourteen million infantry cartridges, ninety thousand charges for the artillery, thirty-two thousand extra mus-

kets, one million five hundred thousand rations, one million three hundred thousand flints, thirty thousand engineer tools, eleven thousand cavalry equipments and artillery harnesses. All told, the number of souls aboard reached one hundred and sixty thousand. The ships awaited only the clearing of the Channel, or the absence of the English fleet, to set sail. Except for the wonderful transportation feat of the British in the late Boer war, this was the most gigantic portage enterprise ever assembled. Napoleon figured that in three weeks he could enter London, destroy the ship-yards of Portsmouth and Plymouth, and thus not only dictate peace to England, but frighten the Continent out of all idea of war. And as a final capstone to the structure, on August 16, 1804, the new emperor held a brilliant review of Soult's and Ney's corps at Boulogne, and distributed the order of the Legion of Honor. "The soul of all armies," he wrote to Ganteaume, "is the honest devotion of every part to its leader."

Ever since the peace of Lunéville, Austria had felt that her influence in European matters had been too much curbed, and these preparations against England appeared to her so engrossing to the new emperor as to afford a fine opportunity for recovering her lost power and her lost provinces. As early as October, 1804, a so-called sanitary cordon was erected along the borders of Italy and Switzerland against the yellow fever in Spain; but this was really a menace to France, and in January, 1805, matters came almost to the point of Napoleon's issuing, for a campaign against Austria, marching orders to his troops. The matter blew over, however. In May, 1805, Napoleon was crowned King of Italy; a large French force was assembled in the peninsula, and Austria felt it wise to increase her troops in Carinthia and Venetia to forty thousand men.

The speed at which Napoleon traveled may be interesting.

On July 13, 1805, he wrote to Prince Eugene: "My Cousin, I arrived at Fontainebleau eighty-five hours after my departure from Turin. Nevertheless, I lost three hours more than I ought on the Mont Cenis, and I stopped constantly on account of the Empress. One or two hours to breakfast, and one or two hours to dine, which made me lose eight or ten hours more. Add to that the enormous weight of my carriages, and you can judge by this, that with two good cabriolets you could come to Paris in sixty-two hours, if I called you there. Thus, in sixteen days you could go and come, and remain eight or ten days in Paris."

Whether the Third Coalition against France was originated by England or Russia imports little here; but Pitt's proposal to the Russian ambassador of January 19, 1805, to reduce France to her ante-Revolutionary limits was the basis on which the members acted. Russia and Austria had for some time been negotiating with a view to making common cause on the Continent against France, and in July these nations came to an understanding. Russia was to put on foot two armies. The first, of fifty-five thousand men, was to break up on August 20 from Brody, and, marching in six columns, reach Braunau on the Inn, October 20. This distance was about equal to that from Boulogne to Braunau. The second, of forty thousand men, was to march to Bohemia. If the emperor or an archduke should command the Austrian army, the Russians were to serve under his orders. In addition to this, two expeditions of twenty-five thousand men each were to go, one to Naples and one to Pomerania, where it would join the Swedes and march on Hanover; and a fifth would be stationed at Warsaw to threaten the Prussians, whose king demanded neutrality. The Coalition strove to gain the aid of Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden; but the last two were too near France to make it wise for

them to join it; and the Bavarian Elector deliberately chose to throw in his fortunes with Napoleon.

The Pitt ministry could scarcely have miscalculated worse for this year's campaign. It expected that there would be put in the field against France —

By Austria,	250,000 men.	By Sardinia,	25,000 men.
" Russia,	180,000 "	" Bavaria,	
" Prussia,	100,000 "	" Würtemberg,	25,000 "
" Sweden,	16,000 "	" Baden,	
" Saxony,	16,000 "	" Naples,	25,000 "
" Hesse and			
Brunswick,	16,000 "	Total,	656,000 "
" Mecklenburg,	3,000 "		

The actual total was vastly less.

Austria manifestly desired to reconquer Lombardy; but though the real place to do this was on the Danube, the Austrian plan of campaign, drawn up by Archduke Charles, contemplated a defensive rôle in Germany until the arrival of the Russians, and a strong offensive in Italy. For the latter purpose there were to be assembled in Italy ninety-five thousand men, sustained by thirty-three thousand in the Tyrol, and in Germany fifty thousand men. Austria was convinced that Napoleon was so much engaged with his English expedition that he would have no eyes for Germany.

However serious his intention to attempt the invasion of the neighboring island, yet Napoleon was by no means blind to what was taking place in Germany. The rendezvous of Austrian troops in Italy and of Russian corps on the Bug plainly showed what was afoot. On August 23 he wrote Talleyrand from Boulogne: "My squadron left Ferrol the 26th Thermidor with thirty-four vessels. It had no enemy in sight. If it follows its instructions, joins the Brest squadron and enters the Channel, there is yet time, I shall be

master of England. If, on the contrary, my admirals hesitate and manœuvre ill, and do not fulfill their object, I shall have no other recourse then but to wait for winter to cross with the flotilla. The operation is hazardous; it will be more so if, pressed by time, political events oblige me to pass from here in the month of April." And in speaking of choosing between the continuance of the English scheme and the campaign on the Danube, he said: "In this state of things, I should rush towards the most urgent; I should raise my camps and replace my war battalions by my third battalion, which still affords quite a redoubtable army at Boulogne. On the 1st Vendémiaire I should find myself with two hundred thousand men in Germany, and twenty-five thousand men in the kingdom of Naples. I should march on Vienna, and I should not drop my weapons until I have Naples and Venice, and augment to such extent the states of the Elector of Bavaria, that I shall have nothing more to fear from Austria. In this manner Austria would certainly be pacified for the winter, and I should not return to Paris without having finished the affair." It was from this moment that date the orders looking to an operation in Germany, rather than one across the Channel. At this time Bernadotte was in Hanover, Marmont in Utrecht, Davout in Ambleteuse, Soult and the cavalry reserve under Murat at Boulogne, Mortier at Etaples, Ney at Wimereux, Augereau at Brest. In Lombardy Massena took Jourdan's place.

No sooner was this resolution taken than Napoleon sent Murat and Bertrand to Germany to study the Danube terrain, and to make notes of the roads and towns, of the banks and crossings of the great river and its affluents, as well as the passes into the Tyrol and Bohemia. Late in August, when the plan of campaign had been thought out, Savary was also sent thither to gather specific details. He was to

In 1800 Napoleon had desired to deliver his principal blow in Germany; but, as we have seen, Moreau had by his narrow and critical opposition obliged the First Consul to change his plan, and to make the campaign in Italy the more prominent. Now he had power to act as to him seemed best, and for just the reasons prevailing in the year of Marengo, he saw fit to send but fifty thousand men to Italy, and to operate with his mass of two hundred thousand men on the Danube. Throwing aside all consideration of collateral issues, Napoleon drove straight at the vital point, convinced that success there would bring success on all the other lines. He always recognized that one straight blow would parry numberless short ones. He disgarnished Hanover, feeling sure that the Swedes and Russians would quarrel so long about principles of precedence as to accomplish nothing and to lame the enterprise; and he was lucky in closing the affair of Naples, so that St. Cyr could seasonably join Massena on the Mincio. And as in 1800 his first plan was to concentrate near Basle and to turn Kray's left by debouching from the Alps, so now, owing to the presence of the army on the Channel coast, he decided to turn the nearer Austrian right by moving upon the enemy from the northwest and north.

Such a plan, says Wartenburg, possible in 1805, is no longer available in these days of railroads and telegraphs. When a European government, by seizing all the railroads, can place on its frontier the bulk of its forces at a few days' notice, in every case the result will be the approach of the armies to each other along one vast front. It is only after this has occurred that the real strategical manœuvres of the several parts of each army can be opened. But this alteration in the possibilities of to-day's strategy accentuates all the more the perfection of the Napoleonic operations.

Once the emperor's mind was made up, no time was lost.

While his trusted officers were gleaning for him topographical and logistic information relating to the country over which he proposed to manœuvre, he began his preparations for an about face (*pirouette*, as he calls it) of his Channel army. On August 25 the order to this effect was given; and on the last day of August he wrote to Prince Eugene, from Boulogne: "The Grand Army is in full march; on the first Vendémiaire (September 23) it will all have reached the Rhine." "I will occupy the enemy so that he shall not have the time to bother you in Italy. I need not repeat to you that this is for you alone. You are to say that I am marching away some troops of my coast army, but only thirty thousand men." To protect the Channel fleet an army corps under Brune, consisting of the third or depot battalions of each regiment, was organized and left at Boulogne; another corps under Colland was at Antwerp and Flushing, and four reserve corps were established at Juliers, Mainz, Strasburg and Alessandria. Lefebvre and Kellermann at Mainz and Strasburg were to discipline the eighty thousand conscripts destined to reinforce the Grand Army, and the National Guard of one hundred thousand men was reorganized. The field-artillery was to be supplied from Strasburg. Louis Bonaparte was left to protect Belgium and Holland; and to Massena with fifty thousand men was confided the serious task of opposing Charles' army of a hundred thousand under the colors in Italy. St. Cyr had been sent to Naples; but the treaty of neutrality above referred to, made in September, enabled him then to proceed to the aid of Massena.

The order of march was substantially this: Bernadotte was to rendezvous at Göttingen, and reach Würzburg September 24. Marmont was to assemble in Mainz from September 20 to 25, and thence to join Bernadotte at Würzburg. Davout with the left wing of the Channel army, Soult with the cen-

tre, and Ney with the right wing were to start August 28, from their respective camps, the divisions of each army corps to follow at an interval of one or two days. To prevent the guessing of his intentions, the emperor personally remained at Boulogne, and in the order of August 26, "Prince Murat is named Lieutenant of the Emperor, Commander-in-Chief in the absence of His Majesty." This marshal had been reconnoitring in Germany, and was given orders to reach Strasburg September 11. Three days later the Guard under Bessières broke up from Boulogne towards the same city.

In a letter to Berthier dated from the "Camp of Boulogne, 11th Fructidor, Year XIII." (August 29, 1805), it is ordered: "The Grand Army shall be composed of seven corps . . . each division of three regiments, that is, nine battalions, plus a division of light cavalry of four regiments." The table below shows its working command and strength, slightly altered from the above by subsequent orders.

The Emperor, and Berthier as Chief of Staff.

The Guard, Bessières.			6,000 men.
	Inf'y Div'n.	*Line Cav. Div'n.*	
1st Corps, Bernadotte.	Drouet.	Kellermann.	
	Rivaud.		18,000 "
2d Corps, Marmont.	Boudet.	Lacoste.	
	Grouchy.		
	Dumonceau.		21,000 "
3d Corps, Davout.	Bisson.	*Light Cav. Div'n.*	
	Friant.	Vialannes.	
	Gudin.		27,000 "
4th Corps, Soult.	St. Hilaire.	Margaron.	
	Vandamme.		
	Legrand.		
	Suchet.		41,000 "
5th Corps, Lannes.	Oudinot.	Treilhard.	
	Gazan.		18,000 "

6th Corps, Ney.	Dupont.	Tilly.	
	Loison.		
	Malher.		24,000 men.
Cavalry Reserve.	*Cuirassiers.*	*Dragoons.*	
Murat.	Nansouty.	Klein.	
	Hautpoul.	Walther.	
		Beaumont.	
		Bourcier.	
		Dismounted Dragoons.	
		Baraguay d'Hilliers.	22,000 "
	Inf'y Div'n.		
7th Corps, Augereau.	Desjardin.		
	M. Mathieu.		14,000 "
(A Reserve Corps yet assembling.)			
Bavarian Corps under	Deroy.		20,000 "
Würtemberg Corps under	Seeger.		5,000 "
Baden Corps under	Harrant.		3,000 "
(To join in Germany.)			
	Grand total		219,000 "

Suchet was later detached from Soult ; and Mortier was given a corps made up of Dumonceau, Dupont and Gazan.

"Surely there is in Europe no finer army than the one I command to-day," wrote Napoleon to Cambacérès; and he later characterized it as "the best army which has ever existed." The last statement might be challenged by the armies of each of the great captains in its own era ; the first was no doubt true. The rank and file consisted not largely of veterans, but the men had been in camp for eighteen months. Marmont testifies that he never saw troops reach so high a grade of excellence in so short a time as under Napoleon ; and some expert captains have believed that the best all-round troops are those which have undergone full discipline, but have not been exhausted too much by the rasping of field ser-

vice. Yet, beyond its composition and its independent method, the value of the Grand Army lay in its leaders. Of all the corps commanders, only Bernadotte and Augereau had passed forty: Ney, Soult and Lannes were of the same age as Napoleon, thirty-six, Davout was thirty-five, and Marmont only thirty-one. Of the division commanders, half were in the thirties, only one had reached fifty. The bodily strength thus implied is an element of great utility; and this was coupled with exceptional experience in the past, expectancy for the future, and with enterprise, initiative and courage. Every one was a veteran, every one was familiar with Napoleon's astonishing fashion of doing things, every one knew how to obey.

On the Austrian side there had been equal promptness, and the forces to be encountered were more nearly ready than usual. The strength of the Austrian and Russian armies has been stated at —

Main body under Charles on the Adige	120,000 men.
Danube Army under Ferdinand and Mack	84,000 "
Tyrol Army under John	30,000 "
Reserve	30,000 "
Kutusov's Army	60,000 "
Buxhovden's Army	50,000 "
Bennigsen's Reserve Army	30,000 "
Tolstoy's Army, with Swedes and English	26,000 "
Total	430,000 "

The Austrians calculated on the French army's inability to reach the Danube before November 10. Napoleon beat this time by seven weeks. And in calculating when the Russians would arrive, the Vienna authorities oddly failed to allow for the twelve days' difference between the old and new calendar.

Archduke Ferdinand was put in nominal command of the army to operate up the Danube, with Field-Marshal Mack as

second in command, or rather as a species of Mentor; but as the Emperor Francis reserved the general command over this army to himself, Mack was, as it were, his chief of staff. Mack was considered in Germany a good general, but he had shown no great capacity in Flanders and Italy, and had been a prisoner of war in Paris in 1800, where Napoleon had known him. Bourrienne quotes the emperor as saying that he was a most ordinary man, full of self-importance and pride, and feeling equal to anything; that he could wish Mack some day to meet one of the good French generals: "he would see fine things; . . . he is one of the least able men to be found, and on the top of this he has ill luck." This was the man who was to advise the Austrian emperor or the archduke how to manœuvre. Archduke John with forty thousand men was in the Tyrol; while Archduke Charles with a hundred thousand excellent troops advanced on the Adige.

The head of the Austrian Danube army crossed the Traun into Bavaria at Wels on September 2, purposing to persuade Bavaria to join the Coalition, or else to crush her into submission before Napoleon could arrive. But the Bavarian Elector cleverly delayed the Austrians by negotiation, meanwhile concentrating his army behind the Danube at Amberg and later at Bamberg, so as to be able to rally on Bernadotte. Attaching no importance to this eccentric manœuvre, the Austrians moved on through Bavaria, their head of column reaching Memmingen September 21. The Iller had been selected by Mack as his line of defense, with the right leaning on Ulm. Ferdinand would have been glad, and indeed attempted, to delay the advance beyond the Inn until his new allies, the Russian army, could come up; but the emperor, confident that Mack knew his business, revoked Ferdinand's orders, and the Austrian army deployed forward on the Iller. But Kienmayer was held back and posted

on the line Neuburg-Ingolstadt to observe the Bavarians and Bernadotte, whose advent on the Main had been reported. Why the Austrians should have placed Mack so far out in front to hold head to Napoleon cannot be guessed. That he should invade Bavaria was comprehensible, because it might compel the Elector to come to terms; but the position on the Iller was absurd, unless it was to be used to retard the French by a vigorous and active manœuvring defense on Bavarian soil until the Russians could come up and give the requisite superiority.

Maximilian Joseph, Elector (later King) of Bavaria.

To Napoleon "days were months," as he wrote Daru from Boulogne August 30, in an order to prepare the Hotel de Ville at Strasburg for his reception. When his army had got well on the march, he went to St. Cloud, where he remained some time, lest his presence at the front should too soon divulge his operation; and while here he made arrangements to have the Gregorian Calendar adopted January 1, 1806, thus putting an end to the Revolutionary chronology which has caused the waste of so much brain tissue. He had, a week before, ordered Fouché, his Chief of Police, to forbid newspapers on the Rhine to speak of the presence of the French army, or at most to mention the arrival of a frontier corps of thirty thousand men, and before leaving St. Cloud he had placed an embargo on the mails. "You are to take to-day," he wrote Fouché from St. Cloud, September 22, 1805, efficacious measures, so that from this evening to the 5th or 6th Vendémaire, "no post (courier) shall be sent either for commerce or for the ambassadors; so that whatever shall transpire in the sitting of to-morrow shall not be transmitted.

No horses shall be furnished either along the post or on the frontiers for any but war couriers."

On September 10 Murat, from Strasburg, sent in his report, according to which sixty thousand Austrians stood at Wels, fifteen thousand at the Lake of Constance, and ten thousand at Braunau, where a big camp was staked out for thirty thousand men, and provided with immense stores; and on the borders of Galicia there were eighty thousand Russians. Prior to this report, Napoleon had ordered the reserve camps and magazines to be organized at Strasburg under Kellermann, and at Mainz under Lefebvre, and had prescribed the fortifying of these two cities, and of Neu Breisach and Hüningen. These preparations are another proof of the care the great soldier always exercised for his base and his supplies of men and material. Moreover, his curious interest in everything relating to logistics (what is to-day known as General Staff Corps business) is well shown in the letter of March 14, 1805, to the Minister of the Interior, in which he orders repairs to be made upon the post-roads in France. Those of the first interest, on account of the English expedition, are the ones which lead from Paris to Brest, Havre and Honfleur, and Boulogne. In second order are those leading by way of Lyons to Turin, Alessandria and Placentia, those from Avignon to Toulon and Toulon to Marseilles, those from Paris to Bordeaux and Spain. And in third line come those from Paris to Strasburg, and Paris to Cologne by way of Brussels, Liège and Aix. The same may be noted in the letter to Berthier of October 26, finding fault with delay in producing maps. He needed maps now, he said, and did not care to wait twenty years for fine work. An equal interest is shown in every branch of the service. On March 21, 1805, Berthier was cautioned not to present for promotion officers who had not served long enough. and

his attention was called to the fact that in every regiment there were officers who had been wounded, and who had been through all the campaigns.

Napoleon's knowledge of the Austrian movements was, of course, limited. "My Cousin, It seems that the Austrians have crossed the Inn the 23d Fructidor (September 10). . . . Be on your guard," he wrote Eugene at a moment when the French columns were approaching the Rhine. And on the 17th his first orders for the crossing of the river and the direction of the several columns were issued. No papers of Napoleon's show the master-hand at the game of war more completely, or better exhibit his marvelous grasp of the whole problem and of all its details. He was his own chief of the general staff, Jomini tells us. Spreading out and bending, sometimes lying, over his maps, with a compass in his hand which corresponded to about seven or eight hours' march as the crow flies (being nine or ten actual hours' march), marking the position of his corps and divisions with various colored pins, as well as the supposed locations of the enemy, he ordered the movements of his army with an accuracy of which one can scarcely have an idea. Moving his compass across the map, he judged immediately, according to the topography, roads and season, how many marches any corps required to reach on a given day a certain place where he needed it, and the rate of speed demanded; and with this knowledge (and his judgment was absolute of what troops could do), he dictated the instructions the execution of which made him so famous. Napoleon avoided such general orders as would inform the enemy of his wholesale plan should they reach him; and confined himself when possible to such orders as would apply only to the movements of certain corps. Even in his own army he did not permit the general plan to be known, lest it should leak out. Each corps commander was given orders for his

own manœuvre, and was told what was essential about the neighboring corps. Just because Napoleon was thus particular were his orders such models of precision and clearness. No study will repay the student of war better than the series of orders of one campaign. The exactness of the language, the positiveness of the command, and the manifest fitting of any special order into a general scheme of which he alone is the possessor, is marked. His orders, moreover, were not to be mistaken. "Do not sleep until you shall have sent me all these details," he wrote to Bernadotte, October 11, from Augsburg. "I felicitate you on the success you have obtained.



Handwriting of Napoleon in 1805.

The last paragraph of a letter to Massena: "Je compte passer le Rhine le 5 Vendémiaire. Je ne m'arrêterai pas que je ne sois sur l'Inn, ou plus loin. Je me confie à votre bravoure, et à vos talents. Gagnez-moi des victoires. NAPOLÉON."

But rest not, pursue the enemy, with your sword in his ribs, and cut off all his communications," to Murat, October 17, from Elchingen. "If the enemy is not in Memmingen, come down like a flash of lightning to where we are," to Soult from Augsburg, October 12. "I advise you to have your staff officers and orderlies ride their horses to a standstill . . . so that I may rapidly have news from you," to Soult on the same date. Napoleon's lieutenants never had room to doubt

what the commander-in-chief meant. At his side stood Berthier, and such details as Napoleon had not time to work out, this excellent chief of staff undertook and executed well.

Just as, in the Marengo campaign, it was interesting to see how the First Consul altered towards the west his route across the Alps, as news was brought him of the failure to advance of Moreau and of the actual advance of Melas, so here it will be found interesting by soldiers to trace the several intended routes of the army corps to turn Mack's right flank, which were varied as the emperor learned the details of the Austrian and Russian advance up the Danube in 1805. The final orders were not issued until September 28.

The Order of September 17 was in effect as follows: —

The cavalry reserve was to cross first, at Mannheim, and Nansouty to reach Heidelberg September 25 ; Klein, Bruchsal ; the latter advancing to Bretten, when Soult's first division was across. Bourcier was to cross the 25th at Kehl to protect Ney's passage, and next day to advance towards Durlach. Beaumont to cross at Kehl early the same day and march to Offenburg, and Hautpoul to cross at the same place and time and march to Oberkirch. Baraguay with his own and Walther's forces to cross at Neu Breisach on the same day, and then advance on Freiburg, and from thence to reconnoitre out towards Donaueschingen.

Behind this curtain of reserve cavalry, the foot divisions were to pass :

Davout's first division to cross at Mannheim the 26th, where Davout's headquarters was to be established, his other divisions following on to Mannheim and his own cavalry to be pushed out to Sinsheim.

Soult's first division to cross at Germersheim September 25, and to advance on Bruchsal, where next day Soult's headquarters was to be.

Ney's first division to cross on a thrown bridge at Selz on the 25th and advance to Rastadt, where Ney's headquarters was to be on the 26th.

Lannes' first division to cross on the same day at Kehl.

The crossing having been effected : —

Lannes, September 29, to start along the Kniebis road by way of Oberkirch, Freudenstadt, Rothenburg, Reutlingen, Urach, and reach Ulm October 9.

Ney to start September 27 via Durlach, Pforzheim, Stuttgart, Esslingen, Göppingen, Geislingen, and reach Ulm October 7.

Soult, via Bruchsal, Bretten, Vaihingen, Ludwigsburg, Schorndorf, Gmund, to reach Aalen October 9.

Davout to start September 29 via Mannheim, Heidelberg, Sinsheim, Heilbronn, Oehringen, Hall, Ellwangen, and reach Nördlingen October 10.

Bernadotte and Marmont, to leave Würzburg October 1, and reach Weissenburg October 9.

On October 9 the Guard, Reserve Cavalry Corps and the artillery park to be in Gmund.

In tracing the routes of the several columns on the map, it at times appears as if some of them pursued a more crooked path than need be. But the section of country from the Rhine valley across to the comparative levels north of the Danube in the Nördlingen country is very rugged and full of mountains of no mean height. The best roads between the larger towns are often zigzag; and, moreover, in order to keep all the columns moving towards a common objective, to each could not be assigned the easiest roads. Some of the foot divisions moved over difficult country. At times two columns were compelled to pass the same city, but it will be found that in these cases either there were side roads up which the columns could file so as not to interfere with each other until they again diverged, or else the time of their passing was not such as to necessitate interruption. There was no clashing of columns. This is the country, the crossing of which before Blenheim the English authors make so exceptional a performance on Marlborough's part. But armies had then and have since traversed this section as a regular part of many campaigns, in which the Germans moved to the Rhine or the French moved to the Danube.

These details, carefully worked out by Napoleon in person, mean, in short, that, preceded one day by bodies of reserve cavalry, the several infantry divisions were, on September 26,

to cross the Rhine at various places from Mannheim to Kehl, on a front of nearly seventy miles, advance in part through the defiles of the Black Forest, and in part to the north of it, and mostly bearing to the left, by October 9 be on the line Weissenburg, Nördlingen, Aalen, Ulm. The several columns would be inter-protecting; those which had crossed would protect those later crossing, and all would be apt to create a wrong impression as to their objective in the minds of the Austrians when reports of their presence reached the latter.

The use of the cavalry was excellent. It has been one of the marked characteristics of the great captains that they have understood how to utilize this arm on a large scale. To gain ground with speed this is the only arm available, and whoso knows how to put it to its best, regardless of loss of man or horse, accomplishes what others never reach.

It will be observed that this forward movement of the French army was not the complete manœuvre to turn the Austrian right, for as yet Napoleon did not know how far forward the Austrians had advanced. Indeed, he had good reason to believe that they would await the Russians before marching too far up the Danube. But he had properly concluded that their line of advance would be along the right bank of the Danube; and the above order was really a concentration of the army at a point distant from the enemy, but such that a further manœuvre could place it wherever the blow would best avail. The general direction was, in accordance with the main conception and his then knowledge, around the Austrian right. It was not until a day after the issue of this order that Napoleon heard that the Austrians had crossed the Lech; and on the 18th Murat wrote him that they were nearing Ulm. Upon this Napoleon, by the General Orders of September 20, and the Special Instructions to Songis, Inspector General of Artillery, made an alteration in the detail of the marches, by

which the several corps were to oblique more to the left and keep closer together, and thus be able more quickly to concentrate. This new disposition sent Davout via Heidelberg, Neckarelz, Ilshofen, and Dinkelsbuhl to Nördlingen; Soult across the Rhine at Speier and via Sinsheim, Heilbronn, Oehringen and Hall to Aalen; Ney across at Pforz and via Durlach, Pforzheim, Stuttgart and Gmund to Giengen; and Lannes was to leave the Kniebis road at Rothenburg and march via Tübingen, Mötzingen and Nürtingen to Göppingen.

Full instructions as to victualing, by train and by requisition, were also given.

These orders yet more clearly opened up the emperor's idea; and there is in his own hand a memorandum, undated, but presumed to be September 22, as below, which still further shows the plan in its full force, and indicates his fear that the Austrians, instead of advancing, might retire, and this action demand a still more extensive turning movement.

NOTE.

On the movements of the Grand Army. Saint Cloud, (?) Sept. 22, 1805.

	Sept. 28.	Oct. 6.	Oct. 9.	Oct. 16.
Bernadotte.	Würzburg.	Ansbach.	Nürnberg.	Ratisbon.
Marmont.	Würzburg.	Ansbach.	Nürnberg.	Ratisbon.
Davout.	Mannheim.	Mergentheim.	Ansbach.	Dietfurt.
Ney.	Selz.	Crailsheim.	Weissenburg.	Ingolstadt.
Lannes.	Strasburg.	Gmund.	Nördlingen.	Neuburg.
Soult.	Landau.	Aalen.	Donauwörth.	

This memorandum was not utilized; but it exhibits Napoleon's clearness of mind with regard to strategic values. From Strasburg, September 27, Napoleon wrote Bernadotte: "From Würzburg you will direct yourselves towards the Danube in conformity with the instructions that the Min-

ister of War will address you to-night. You will keep General Marmont on your right, and the Bavarians on your left. I will make connection with General Marmont with all my army, and if I have the good fortune that the Austrian army stays asleep three or four days more on the Iller and in the Black Forest, I shall have turned him, and I hope that only the wreckage will escape from there. . . . It is the moment to deal the great blow; before the 20th Vendémiaire the Austrians will have perished."

Napoleon opened the campaign with the usual proclamation. All these papers have a cousinship; yet they lack not interest.

PROCLAMATION TO THE GRAND ARMY.

STRASBURG, September 30, 1805.

Soldiers, the war of the Third Coalition has begun. The Austrian army has passed the Inn, violated its treaties, attacked and driven from its capital our ally. You yourselves have had to rush by forced marches to the defense of our frontiers, but already you have passed the Rhine. I will not stop until I have assured the independence of Germany, sustained our allies, and confounded the pride of unjust aggressors. We will make no further peace without guaranty. Our generosity shall no longer deceive our politics. Soldiers, your Emperor is in the midst of you. You are but the vanguard of a great people. If it is necessary, that people will rise as a body at my voice to confound and dissolve this new league, which the hatred and the gold of England have woven. But, soldiers, we have forced marches to make, fatigues and privations of all kinds to endure. Whatever obstacle opposes us we will vanquish, and we will take no repose until we shall have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies.

NAPOLEON.

And in a proclamation to the Army of Italy Napoleon said: "Soldiers of Italy! It is on the battlefields where you are, that with a handful of men the Austrian eagle has been constantly humiliated and confounded. One against three, we were constantly victors. . . . You will be worthy of the first Army of Italy. . . . The general who commands you has all my confidence, surround him with yours."

The following has a similar interest: —

NOTE FOR AN ADDRESS TO THE NATION.

Frenchmen, I have crossed the Rhine at the head of my army to replace on his throne one of our allies, whom the injustice and ambition of the House of Austria have chased from his states. . . . One hundred thousand Russians, . . . paid by English gold, are coming to his (the enemy's) aid. Well, then, let one hundred thousand more Frenchmen come and rank themselves under my flags. To live without commerce, without navy, without colonies, and subject to the unjust will of our enemies, is not to live like Frenchmen. . . . I leave few troops in the interior. Be yourselves the guardians of public tranquillity, of order and the law. Let the sixty thousand conscripts that I have called march with eagerness. In all families let them receive the order of their fathers, and let them obey it. I promise you victory and prompt peace!

NAPOLEON.

Carnot's Sword as
One of the Directory.
(Sadi-Carnot Collection.)

A large army of any other nation would occupy days to bring the marching brigades into any position chosen for battle; and once there, on account of their lumbering system, they would prefer to fight on the defensive. On the other hand, the Prussian army could ploy and deploy with considerable rapidity, and was wont to take the offensive; and owing to the immobility of other armies, it could execute flank marches in the presence of the enemy which might not otherwise have succeeded. Nothing instances the lack of manœuvring capacity of the day more than the fact that almost any army of that era, marching by the flank, and wishing to deploy forward on the head of column, would first form line to the right or left, and then perform an enormous wheel so as to reach the line desired. Marches forward in line were also common, but only Frederick's troops could execute them well. And among the Prussians the first and second lines were habituated to change places by moving through each other by the flank of platoons.

The lineal system, — at least that succeeding Frederick, — in which the order of battle was stereotyped, killed all initiative among the officers. Neither officer nor soldier had any liberty of action. The soldier was but a part of the rank, the rank but a part of the platoon, the platoon but a part of the battalion, and the battalion but a part of the line of battle. Too much depended on the commander-in-chief, and the commander of the first and second line of battle. An army of this kind required big plains to operate on to advantage. Ground much cut up was fatal to it.

Frederick's system had accomplished too many wonderful successes for it to be combated during his generation. The disciple of his system in France was Guibert. On the other hand, Mesnil-Durand, under the protection of Marshal Broglie, then the most renowned soldier of France, and fol-

lowed by Joly de Maizeroy and De Bohan, did later combat this system by theorizing on the value of a deeper order. The dispute was bitter, and many young officers followed the novelty. Guibert, however, won the day, and on August 1, 1791, there was issued an Ordinance, or a new set of manœuvre-regulations, which carried forward the system of Frederick in France, so far as the French understood it.

Whether offensively or defensively, under the 1791 shallow-order Ordinance, the battalions were supposed to stand on two lines deployed two or three hundred yards apart. In an advance under fire the first line was intended to move forward according as its fire produced more or less effect. Should the first line be suffering too much, the second line replaced it. This was done as follows. The chief of battalion in first line retired firing, and when within twenty paces of the second



Interchange of Lines.

line, gave the order to march in retreat by the flank of platoons or companies. The chief of battalion of the second line had already caused the right-hand section of each company to file behind the left-hand section, and through the intervals so created the companies or platoons of the first line filed, which done, the sections which had doubled again moved into line. If this operation was performed in advance instead of in retreat, it was the first line that doubled sections, and the second that moved through the intervals, by the flank of platoons. All this was excellent on the parade-ground, but proved worthless in the field. The battalions being in line of battle, the line was without intervals. When the lines were

to be changed, the men, weakened by the enemy's fire, would no longer obey tactical orders, and instead of moving back by the flank of platoons, they would disperse irregularly, and throw into disorder the small bodies into which the second line had been ployed in order to move to the front. This was fatal to the equipoise of the troops.

A line of battalions, each standing as above described, was the formation adopted by the Ordinance of 1791. These regulations did not positively exclude columns of attack and close columns, but the latter were more for the purpose of assembling or rallying troops than for action. Even this was perhaps a concession to the many opponents of Guibert. The chief exercises recommended by the Ordinance were those which have regard to fire, to the march in line of battle, and to columns at deploying distance. But these regulations did not contemplate skirmishers. Had the real column been part of their scheme, skirmishers would have necessarily been prescribed, as a column needs to be covered by light troops, because, owing to its depth, it will suffer much more than a line at a distance exceeding two hundred yards.

These regulations of 1791 remained in technical force throughout the Republic and the Empire, but, except in certain points of organization, they were dormant, as it was impossible to utilize them on the battlefield with the raw levies which were placed under arms at the opening of the wars of the Revolution.

The chiefs who were called on to lead these raw levies found that, in meeting the Coalition regulars, they had two things to accomplish: they must open their battles by replying to the initial fire of the enemy, and they must then bring on the crisis by some act which would drive the enemy from his position. They never contemplated the defensive. Inasmuch as the young officers who led these raw levies were

largely imbued with the doctrines of Mesnil-Durand, and as many of them had served in America among the farmer-marksmen soldiers, it did not take long to develop for the first purpose a system of skirmishers. This indeed had already been tried in camps of instruction, as the result of what had been written and observed. But while these skirmishers, firing from cover, could reply to the volleys of the enemy's line, they could not deliver a fire hearty enough to break it, and to accomplish this second end, deep bodies or columns were contrived which, by a rapid rush forward, could rupture some point in the enemy's array.

All this was at first done in a distinctly crude manner, but the crudeness of the doing was supplemented by the ardor of the soldier, who now for the first time in France found himself a free man. This raw method was known as that of "Skirmishers in Great Bands," and it was gradually brought into shape by forming the Ordinance first line, which consisted of light troops, as skirmishers, and having the Ordinance second line stand behind it in a series of columns. When

"Skirmishers in Great Bands."

later it was found that the skirmishing line did not need to be so heavy as the entire first line made it, only two companies out of the nine in each battalion were thrown forward, while the others were kept behind in close column. Substantially this form, growing gradually more and more regular, remained up to the end of the Consulate.

The word "platoon" in the old tactics and histories meant either a company, or a given part of a battalion momentarily adopted for manœuvring on the battlefield or convenient for the march. These parts or platoons were generally equalized, or made as nearly alike in numbers as possible; but they might be big or little. The word "division" meant two companies or platoons.[1] The word "section" meant half of a company, or half of such a "platoon." According to some authorities, in 1791 companies had fifty men, with two sergeants and two corporals, and there were nine of these in a battalion. In 1793 the companies were of eighty men, with three sergeants and six corporals. In 1808 there were one hundred and thirty-seven men in each company, with four sergeants and eight corporals, and the battalion had six companies. In 1814 the companies were reduced to seventy-two men, with four sergeants and eight corporals. But the authorities are very much at odds. Thus the term "company," or "platoon," becomes quite indefinite as to numbers. The company officers also varied from two captains, a senior and junior, two lieutenants, and two sub-lieutenants in 1784, to half the number later. A regiment (or half-brigade) had two battalions, plus a depot battalion which was not ordinarily with it in the field; and each battalion had nine companies, of which one was of grenadiers and one of chasseurs or voltigeurs.

By an extension of the above-described usage, battalions in close column at deploying distance, or less, grew to be part of the line of battle. They took alignment by the heads of column, and the grenadiers and chasseurs stood on the front line to steady them. When deployed the companies stood in

[1] The word "division" stood for a political department, for a grand-tactical body of several brigades, and for a minor-tactical body of two companies; colloquially, also, for any given body.

three ranks to fire, and in each battalion the company of grenadiers stood twenty-five paces behind the right flank,

Columns in Line.

and the company of chasseurs stood an equal distance behind the left flank, while the three battalions of the half-brigade stood on one front. When about to charge in column the



Battalions in Line.

grenadiers and chasseurs stood on the flanks and slightly in rear of the columns of attack, thus partly filling the intervals.

In such an order of battle there was usually a second line, formed in double columns at deploying distance opposite the



Columns Ready to Charge.

intervals, and ready to move through the first line when needed. Reserves were also formed, and these stood behind the centre, or behind the wings, as most essential.

Cavalry was considered in the shallow tactics as an arm to be used separately. In the deep tactics it was used in connection with the infantry and placed in reserve behind the divisions, or on a wing, if this needed protection. It was later only that cavalry was grouped in great reserves. In the shallow order artillery was placed along the entire front, each battalion having a few pieces. The deep order grouped the batteries so as to break down the enemy's fire and open a

place for the cavalry to attack. These artillery groups were placed on the wings or in the centre of divisions.

Such, in short, was the deep, or perpendicular, or French formation, which had grown up in spite of the Ordinance of 1791, and out of the national fighting spirit of the French citizen-soldier.

Thus in the Prussian system in use by all Coalition nations, operations were made in line of battle, or in columns at full deploying distance. In the French system, marches in line of battle were considered to be parade movements and not movements for the battlefield, on account of the difficulty of making average troops march in such formation with any cohesion; and it prescribed manœuvres of lines of battalions, each ployed into double column. All manœuvres under this system were made by a line of such columns.

The lineal order fired in line, by volleys, and in what we call fire by file. The French system prescribed fire by line only on the defensive, behind cover. It taught that the only effective offensive fire was that of a line of skirmishers, more or less heavy, each man in which would take time to aim, and would shield himself behind any obstacle in reach. This was in great part due to the lessons learned by French officers in the American Revolution.

The fire of the skirmishers was to be constantly kept up as a curtain to the movements of the columns. Should the columns deploy to give fire, the skirmishers were to unmask the front of the battalions and retire to the rear. Should the column advance as such to the charge, the skirmishers were to take place in the intervals, to protect their flanks and keep up fire as long as possible. It was the belief of the French school that a good fire of skirmishers would as a rule permit the columns to advance to charging distance. Should this not be so, the skirmishers could be reinforced, or the

first line could advance deployed, deliver its fire, and then permit the second line in close column to march through it to the charge.

On occasion, for an assault, a single battalion was formed



Battalion Ready to Charge.

into four little columns with intervals of fifteen or twenty paces, and with skirmishers in the rear, acting as supports.

In the shallow system charges of cavalry were received in



Oblique Squares in One Line.

six ranks, and on the march squares were composed of several battalions. In the deep system cavalry was met by placing



Oblique Squares in Two Lines.

battalions in column on the flanks of battalions deployed. Battalion squares were also usual. The half-brigade in line of columns would form oblique squares by a quarter wheel

to the right so as to be able to deliver fire in every direction, and the grenadier and chasseur companies would fill the intervals.

If a half-brigade were marching in two lines, the alternate battalions in each line would wheel to right and left and form



Prussian Oblique Attack.

in oblique square with the grenadiers and chasseurs in the intervals. It will be seen that these squares could deliver a very effective fire.

While the Prussian king showed the value of oblique attacks on the flank of the enemy, these were made under the lineal system in two long lines, with cavalry on the flanks,



The French Oblique Attack.

and the artillery all along the line. In the French order such attacks were made in two lines of columns with a heavy reserve in rear to strengthen the striking flank; and the rest of the army would make an oblique attack in echelon.

In effect the French line of columns is more elastic than the line of battle of the Prussian system. Especially is this true of new troops. Many more manœuvres can be devised for it, and the system of columns makes it possible for an army to employ almost any terrain to advantage.

Napoleon's formations varied infinitely, according to the



Friedland Formation of Half-Brigade.

circumstances. At Friedland, in each line we shall see the centre battalion deployed, and the right and left battalions in column. This was also the formation striven for and rag-



Evening Attack on Zach at Marengo.

gedly obtained in the evening attack on Zach's column at Marengo. At Fuentes de Onoro, of the five battalions of the



Formation at Fuentes de Onoro.

first line the second and fourth were deployed, the others were in column. The attack on the great battery at the Moskwa by Morand's division was made substantially as at Fuentes, but without the interpolated column in the first line,

and with a second line of columns. At Austerlitz the corps of Soult and of Bernadotte were formed with the leading



Morand's Formation at the Moskwa.

brigades in line of battle, followed by a second line of columns, and then a reserve. The artillery was in the first line.

Later on other formations were used by Napoleon. At



Formation of Soult and Bernadotte at Austerlitz.

Wagram we shall see an enormous column composed of eight battalions, one deployed behind another. In Spain this species of column was in general use; and at Waterloo the same thing occurred. This is not a satisfactory formation, lacking homogeneity as well as strength.

Towards the end of Napoleon's career as a soldier, the third rank was discontinued, it having been sufficiently proved that fire could be made by three ranks on parade, but not on the battlefield. The third rank was really intended only to

load the guns for the others, but as a matter of fact it fired, and frequently caused losses in the first two ranks. In all armies the value of the third line had long been doubted. On October 13, 1803, the emperor formally abolished the third rank.

Thus, to resume, from the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars, though it was technically the regulation, the shallow order was abandoned in practice, because it did not suit the raw levies, because the long and rigid lines could operate only by their fire, because they were useless in a mountainous or broken country, and because on the plains their movements had to be made in too slow a manner, so as to avoid disorder and escape attacks of cavalry.

The lineal formation was kept for the defensive, and indeed only for the first line. In the offensive the Revolutionary levies began by throwing forward great bands of skirmishers inexpertly and irregularly formed, and sustained by cavalry. Later this was succeeded by the battalion column with skirmishers from its own numbers in its front. This column could move forward with ease, and could not be broken by cavalry.

The skirmishers in great bands had originally no precise formation; but so that a chain might be relieved or reinforced, and that the tactical connection might be conserved, the battalion at first followed close behind without uniform order. This was by no means a proper formation, yet during the early Revolutionary years the novelty of the idea and the *élan* of the young recruits lent it some value. It was really the ardor of the emancipated citizen quite as much as the open order sustained by columns which lay at the root of success.

As organization was completed and the habits of war were acquired, the loose formation settled down into throwing for-

ward two companies as skirmishers in front of each battalion. Two thirds of these were in the firing line, and one third as supports, one hundred yards to the rear. The companies left remained in column by division two hundred yards behind the supports. The fire of the skirmishers was at first the only one relied on. If it was effective, the battalion moved forward to the attack, the skirmishers opening the way and taking place upon the flanks. If the battalion broke the enemy by its charge, the skirmishers pursued him. If the battalion lost its onward movement, it deployed, recalled the skirmishers, and opened fire in line. As there was usually a second line, this held itself ready to move through the intervals in the first line in column of attack, to fall upon the enemy. The front of battalion columns had the great advantage of permitting either line easily to pass through the other in advance or in retreat without creating disorder.



Battalion with Skirmishers out.

While the numbers in companies and in battalions varied so constantly as to make generalizing an uncertain thing, yet assuming that the battalion averaged eight or nine hundred men, there would be about one hundred men per company.

In theory, the front of this battalion was about one hundred and fifty yards. In reality, on the battlefield a man needs more space and will himself take it. To do his work handily

he would require over two feet, so that the front of the battalion would really be over two hundred yards, and that of the company some twenty-five yards.

In the lineal system the word of command for which the men waited was given by the company commander ("chief of platoon"), who could easily give orders on a front of twenty-five yards. In column the same command was given by the commander of the division of two companies or platoons, thus covering a front of fifty yards. In front of the battalion column two companies of skirmishers would occupy a front of one hundred yards, and each company commander could give orders to his own company spread over fifty yards. The senior company commander would exercise the command of the two companies, taking his general orders from the battalion commander. While the distances given are not too great for eye and ear, yet the word of command in the various bodies of the lineal system was quite as easily given as in the column system.

The commands of the chiefs of division, or those to the whole battalion assembled, could be given on parade by voice; but in the field they had to be given by intermediaries, the chiefs of platoon or division looking to the battalion commander for indication as to what each was to do. In a battalion closed in mass, the commands were much more easily given than for a battalion in line of battle.

Comparing all items, the ease of command was about the same in either system.

So far as fire and losses were concerned, the lineal system had the advantage, but the choice of the early Revolutionary leaders to risk this loss and to forfeit a certain amount of fire efficiency, in order to gain that forward swing whose normal effect so often leads to victory, and which was so thoroughly consistent with the French character, was a wise one.

Despite the fact that a column is more vulnerable than a line, the argument was that the forward movement of the column would so soon tend to rupture the enemy's formation that the gain in time would offset the losses of a deep formation. And with the short-carriage musket of the day the argument was true.

The opinions of some well-known generals who served in the wars of the Revolution and the Empire are worth quoting.

Jomini, in the "Précis de la Guerre," says: —

"The great question of the influence of the fire of musketry in battle is not new. It dates from the reign of Frederick the Great. . . . The discussion, begun at this epoch between the partisans of the shallow order and of the deep order, is known by all military men who are well read. The system of deployed lines, three men or three ranks deep, was adopted for infantry. Cavalry was formed in two ranks, and in order of battle was deployed on the wings, or part of it in reserve.

"The celebrated Ordinance of Manœuvres of 1791 fixed the deployed order as the sole order of battle. It seems not to have admitted the column doubled on the centre of each battalion, except for partial combats, and this was applicable only to the attack on isolated positions, or on a village, on a wood, or on a small intrenchment.

"The little instruction that the troops of the Republic had in the matter of manœuvres forced the chiefs, who were poor manœuvrers themselves, to employ in combat the system of columns, sustained by numerous skirmishers.

"Besides, the nature of the countries where they fought, the Vosges, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the cut-up ground of the Vendée, made this system the only one which could be used.

"How could they have attacked the camps of Saorgio, of Figueras, of Mont Cenis, with deployed battalions?

"Under Napoleon the system of columns was generally applied, because his armies were almost always the attacking ones.

"As to myself, I can affirm that in all the actions where I have been, I have seen these little columns succeed."

Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs of the Campaigns of the Armies of the Rhine and Moselle," says: —

"I have said that what was wanting in the French troops was not the instruction given them in times of peace, but that which is only acquired in the field and under the eyes of the enemy. The first, being only the primary instruction which relates to nothing except the service of peace, finishes indeed, by the abuse too often made of it, by making men less suited to war, while that which they receive in front of the enemy raises their courage and develops their intelligence.

"The infantry had been exercised according to the Ordinance of 1791, which is yet in vigor to-day, despite the defect which its application to war has led us to recognize. These regulations were prepared by well-educated men, but men who for the most part had seen little or no war. They are more suited to make the troops excel in parade manœuvres, than they are applicable before the enemy, because how should a manœuvre be executed in his presence with the delay which the placing of guides demands?

"But it is especially with regard to fire that one recognizes the greatest want of these regulations. It is not an exaggeration to say that the third rank places *hors de combat* a quarter of the men who are wounded in an affair. This statement is not carried high enough, if it is a question of a troop composed of recruits. It is said that the first rank should kneel on one knee in the fire of three ranks, and that in the fire by file the third rank should not fire, but should pass its arm loaded to the men in the second rank. All this can be executed only in drill, but in war soldiers fire as they can without passing their muskets to their comrades, and without kneeling. Whether they are three, four, or six ranks, they fire all together as soon as the balls of the enemy whistle in their ears, and this even without the command of the chief, if he delays giving it.

"The impossibility of executing with celerity the dispositions of these regulations has forced us to look upon them as null. As one could not manœuvre before the enemy in the manner prescribed, often one did not manœuvre at all. In the first campaigns one made scarcely anything but a war of skirmishers. The novelty of this system gained some success. Later the officers acquired experience and felt that something more was required; they formed their troops, and arrived at making them act with more *ensemble*, in approaching whatever in the regulations was least vicious, and most easily executed in the face of the enemy."

General Foy gives us a picture of the French advance of his day:—

"The action was opened by a cloud of skirmishers, on foot and mounted, thrown forward according to some general idea, rather than directed in the detail of the movements. They harried the enemy, escaped from his masses by their speed, and from the effect of his guns by their scattered order. They were relieved so that their fire should not die out, and they were reinforced to give them more efficacy.

"The mounted artillery rode up at a gallop, and fired grape and canister at point-blank range. The line of battle broke up in the direction of the impulse given, the infantry in column, for it had no fire to give, the cavalry intercalated by regiments or squares, so as to be disposable everywhere and for everything. When the rain of balls and bullets commenced to thicken, the soldiers took to the double-quick, charging with the bayonet, the drums beat the charge, the air reverberated with cries, a thousand times repeated, 'Forward! Forward!'"

General Marmont, in his "Spirit of Military Institutions," makes the following suggestions: —

"Troops should be deployed, when they are to receive the enemy marching towards them, so as to subject him to a heavy fire.

"If marching towards him, they can yet be deployed, but it is not without great danger, on account of the wavering which is always brought about by a march in line of battle, and of the disorder which can result from it. It is preferable, then, to have a part of your troops deployed, and to mix them with columns which are so many compact points, where the authority of officers has less difficulty in maintaining order.

"As the attack of a position always requires the most rapid march, and as the ground to be gone over is often covered with obstacles, the troops should always be formed in column by battalion. These little masses are easy to move. They get through all defiles without effort. The rear, being less exposed to the fire of the enemy than the head, pushes this, and the column reaches its goal more quickly.

"As the complement to this disposition, numerous skirmishers must precede the column, and march in a direction corresponding to the intervals of the battalions, in such a manner as to divide the fire of the enemy and to cover the deployment should it become necessary, without masking the heads of the columns, which can at once begin to fire. The skirmishers thus placed find themselves supported. They have designated and near-by points of rallying, and can never be compromised.

"The formation in squares should be only accidental, and for the purpose of resisting in an open country the attacks of a numerous cavalry."

General Morand suggests the exclusive employment in the offensive of the columns of battalion, which, according to him, are the real battle formation. Throughout his work on the army he enforces the idea that this should be the normal formation for battle, as it is one which gives them means of manœuvring, while saving them from cavalry attacks.

We will now return to the Grand Army.

Fifer of Grenadiers. (1800.)

XXVII.

ULM. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1805.

The Austrians should not have come so far forward except for the purpose of delaying the advance of the French, and then retiring upon their allies. The Russians were somewhat belated. Early in October Mack was surprised to find his position turned, but he did not seem to awake to the fact that he must at once retreat to the Tyrol, or counter the blow by a manœuvre upon the French communications north of the Danube. The marches by which the French crossed the Danube, drove back the enemy, and seized Mack's communications were masterly. Mack still loitered on the Iller and in Ulm, and Napoleon saw that he would probably be able to surround and capture his entire force. Not knowing just where the Russians were, he placed Murat in charge of the right wing, while he himself remained at Augsburg with the left. In his advance on Ulm Murat made some serious mistakes, dividing his forces and opening a way for the Austrians to cut the French communications and seize their magazines; but Mack took no advantage of these. Finally, in mid-October the French army advanced upon Mack, and after several days' fighting, culminating in Ney's brilliant assault on Elchingen village, cooped him up in Ulm, where, between threats and cajolery, after a day or two Napoleon secured his surrender. This extraordinary campaign was finished in three weeks from crossing the Rhine.

When, at the end of September, the news ran in that the Austrians would stand on the line of the Iller, the changes of route for the several corps ceased to have their prior value, and on the 28th the final orders were issued to the army by Berthier, by which each corps was to march on a narrower turning manœuvre, as follows: —

Davout, having crossed at Mannheim, via Heidelberg, Obrigheim, Möckmühl, Ingelfingen, Ilshofen, Dinkelsbühl, Oettingen, Monheim, to reach Neuburg October 8.

Soult, having crossed at Speier and Germersheim, via Heilbronn,

Oehringen, Hall, Ellwangen, Nördlingen, to reach Donauwörth October 8.

Lannes, having crossed at Kehl, through Rastadt via Ludwigsburg, Schorndorf, Gmund, Aalen, to reach Neresheim October 8.

Ney, having crossed at Carlsruhe and Selz, via Stuttgart, Esslingen, Weissenstein, to reach Heidenheim October 7.

The cavalry reserve, after making demonstrations through the Black Forest passes, via Stuttgart, Göppingen, Heidenheim, to reach Donauwörth October 8.

Bernadotte from Hanover, via Ansbach, to reach Eichstädt October 8, whence he was later ordered to Ingolstadt.

Marmont, having crossed at Mainz, via Rothenburg, Feuchtwangen, Wassertrüdingen, to reach Treuchtlingen October 7, whence he was later ordered to Nassenfels.

The reserve artillery and train by way of Heilbronn, Hall and Nördlingen. It will be noticed that Ney's route crosses Lannes' west of Ludwigsburg and Stuttgart, but Ney's column was well ahead of Lannes', and there was no clashing.

Ney was compelled to force a passage through Stuttgart; but the emperor subsequently smoothed over this breach of neutral ground and made a treaty for eight thousand men with Würtemberg. Bernadotte and Marmont also crossed Prussian territory at Ansbach without permission, an act which required considerable diplomacy to settle. In explaining the matter, October 5, to the King of Prussia, Napoleon wrote, "I desire to learn, Monsieur my Brother, that Your Majesty has against me no ill-will for what has passed. You will remain persuaded of my desire to be agreeable to you." The total force, including allies, was about one hundred and eighty thousand men; and in the march from the coast to the Rhine there were neither deserters nor sick. This appears to have been the case up to the beginning of October, showing not only the exceptional condition of the Grand Army, but remarkable care and skill in prescribing the days' marches.

To resume, by virtue of the above orders, Ney, Soult,

Lannes and Murat were headed for Donauwörth and Dillingen; Davout and Marmont to Neuburg; Bernadotte to Ingolstadt; while Augereau was to come on later and guard the upper Danube and the Grisons. To mislead Mack, Napoleon continued to make cavalry demonstrations through the Black Forest roads; and Mack was persuaded that Bernadotte and the Bavarians at Würzburg were rather a threat to Bohemia than to his own right flank.

Napoleon had left Paris September 24, and reached Strasburg in two days, just as the army was crossing the Rhine. He was very confident that his operation would be successful, writing Augereau, September 30: "Woe to the Austrians, if they let me gain a few marches; I hope to have turned them and to find myself with my whole army between the Lech and Isar." The marches as finally ordered were as rapidly executed as they had been ably planned, and the weather was propitious to the operation.

Marine of the Guard. (1804.)

On October 3 the emperor issued a safeguard to the University of Heidelberg, "in the intention to give to savants a new proof of the special protection he accords to sciences and those who cultivate them."

Mack meanwhile flattered himself that he had taken up an impregnable position. On his first inspection of the line of the Iller, he had ordered some additional fortifying to be done in Ulm and Memmingen; and at the former fortress he proposed to concentrate his army, in order to await the Russians, or

perchance to fall on some isolated French column. To him "days were not months," and he took his time. Mack was a theorist. He had not yet suffered any one great defeat, and was thus held at far too high a figure. Few soldiers commanding great armies have been so unteachable by manifest facts. To hold the Black Forest defiles and attack the columns debouching therefrom was an excellent plan with equal forces, but an insane plan with the forces Mack had. The line of the Iller should have been held to arrest the initial movements of the French, cause Napoleon to develop his plans, and enable the Austrians to fall back on their Russian allies. Looking only towards the front, Mack from the outset absolutely ignored his right, and the fact that he was there especially vulnerable. Several valleys led from the Rhine to points which compromised his flank. Not to have recognized this looks blind indeed to us to-day. Still, a hundred years ago no one but Napoleon, and the one clear-sighted student of his system, Jomini, understood what the topography of the Black Forest and the upper Danube meant.

On October 3 Mack had as yet done little towards getting his divisions together. Jellachic was in Vorarlberg with fourteen thousand men, Riesch with nineteen thousand and Schwarzenberg with twelve thousand men along the Iller and Danube from Kempten to Günzburg; Kienmayer, as above noted, north of the Danube with his six thousand men, was divided between Neuburg, Ingolstadt, Eichstadt, Ellwangen and Amberg. From the Tyrol some twelve to eighteen thousand reinforcements were coming up, although Mack had lightheartedly refused aid from farther-seeing Charles. But so soon as Mack had concluded to make Ulm his key-point, he ordered Jellachic to approach the Danube so as to close the gap between it and the Lake of Constance, from which direction, owing, as before said, to Murat's dashes through the Black

Forest, he apprehended trouble. This Austrian officer reached Biberach October 8, and later took post on the Iller; Kienmayer was drawn into Neuburg; Schwarzenberg and Riesch

Mack Outflanked.

moved to Ulm. The Austrian front was thus established from Günzburg on the right through Ulm to beyond Illereichen on the left, with Kienmayer out as a flying right wing. Mack was not of the stamp to catch the alarm. He heard rumors of numerous bodies of French north of the Danube, but his over-confidence would not permit him to recognize that these were really one single army which was compromising his position on the Iller. Indeed, shortly after, he imagined that the French were striving to make good their retreat to the Rhine. Such a thing as eluding the snare,

as retiring towards the Tyrol for a base, or deploying on a new front to receive this threatening force, so that if beaten he might withdraw by a circuit to join the Russians, never occurred to him. Had he not fifty thousand men and a stout line of defense facing the Rhine? Who could disturb him?

Mack's concentration came to Napoleon's attention by October 5, when he reached Gmund. Next day, on reaching Nördlingen, he could see that his great strategic manœuvre had been crowned with success; that Mack had as yet not caught the alarm, nor shown any signs of retreat, though the presence of Kienmayer's corps at Neuburg first looked like such intention. The few things which had got belated in the doing were hurried up, sometimes in unmistakable terms. He wrote on October 4 to Marshal Soult: "My Cousin, Marshal Berthier informs you to-day what is the situation of the army. He will give you the order to make my bridge equipage reach Nördlingen for the 14th or 15th. Do not undertake to tell me that that is impossible. Requisition all that you need of horses for this object. Put the pontoniers on the carriages, make the equipage march day and night, and so act that at least I shall have, by the 14th or 15th, five or six boats at Nördlingen, if I cannot have there the entirety of my bridge equipage." The corps commanders were all given orders to support each other in case of attack on right or left, and this would be easy, as the French concentration had been well effectuated. "Never will so large a quantity of troops have manœuvred in so small a space," he wrote to Otto October 5.

During the advance Napoleon had kept his headquarters nearest the French right wing, because, should an attack be made by the Austrians, this wing would be the one first struck; but so soon as he could see that his turning manœuvre

could be completed by crossing the Danube before Mack would become alarmed as to his safety, he had moved headquarters to the centre. On October 6 the army stood thus: Ney was on the right at Heidenheim, protecting the French communications against the Austrians who might debouch from Ulm, Bourcier and Baraguay with their horse being at Geislingen to shield his right. Murat, with Beaumont, Klein and Walther, had been pushed out towards the river. Forming the left wing was Bernadotte, who with the Bavarian corps had reached Weissenburg, and Marmont, who had reached Wassertrüdingen. In the centre was Davout at Oettingen, Soult at Nördlingen and behind him Nansouty; Lannes at Neresheim, and Bessières, sustained by Hautpoul, at Aalen. Vandamme, Soult's van, had taken the bridge at Münster. The French army front extended along a line some fifty miles in length, but every part was connected by many and excellent roads, so as to be easily handled. The army was now ready to cross the Danube, and this began on the morning of the 7th, practically two days ahead of the original calculation.

Though his mind was full of the military situation, Napoleon by no means neglected the lighter side of life. On October 4 he wrote to Josephine: "I am at Ludwigsburg. I leave to-night. There is yet nothing new. All my army marches. The weather is beautiful. My junction with the Bavarians is made. I am well. I hope to have in a few days something else to send you. Keep well and believe in all my sentiments. There is here a beautiful court, with a newly wedded wife." And on the same day he wrote to Joseph: "My Brother, I leave to-night. Things will become every day more interesting. It is enough for you to put in the *Moniteur* that the emperor is well, and that he was still on Friday, the 12th Vendémiaire, at Ludwigsburg; that

the junction of the army with the Bavarians is made. I heard yesterday, at the theatre of this court, the German opera 'Don Juan.' I imagine that the music of this opera is the same as that of the opera which was given in Paris ; it seemed to me very good." And to Champagny, "I heard yesterday some very good music. Still the German song seemed to me a little *baroque*." This last shows less appreciation of what is good in art than the emperor was wont to exhibit.

Murat first crossed the Danube, and moved on Rain, famous for brave old Corporal Tilly's defense against Gustavus Adolphus. Soult came next, and advanced along both banks on Augsburg, October 8, pushing back Kienmayer; and each succeeding corps marched up into place: Bernadotte to Eichstädt, Marmont to Treuchtlingen, Lannes to Nördlingen, Davout to Monheim. The cavalry under Nansouty reached Donauwörth, and Hautpoul Nördlingen. It had been the first intention to have Ney move up in his order and follow the others, but Napoleon concluded to leave him to face Mack at Ulm, and protect the operations against a sudden dash on the French communications. No better strategic reply could be made by Mack to the French turning operation than to debouch from Ulm on the left bank and fall on these, as the emperor well knew. Ney therefore took post at Giengen, with Baraguay's and Bourcier's cavalry at Heidenheim. But, mindful of his mass theory, Napoleon ordered Ney, so soon as the army had safely crossed, to approach the river nearer Ulm, so that in case of battle he could be speedily drawn in to the army. The filing of Murat to his right on Wertingen was taking in reverse the Austrians who on the right bank were facing Ney, and this action made Napoleon's task much more easy.

On October 7 the 1st Bulletin of the Grand Army was issued, detailing the crossing of the Rhine and the present

situation of the forces. "The army is full of health and burning with desire to get at the enemy." "This great and vast movement has carried us in a few days into Bavaria, has made us avoid the Black Forest mountains, the line of the parallel rivers which fall into the valley of the Danube, the inconvenience attached to a system of operations which would always have in flank the debouches of the Tyrol, and finally has placed us several marches behind the enemy, who has no time to lose to avoid entire destruction."

Mack received news with considerable regularity, but a fact never was a fact to this general. He wrote the Aulic Council, October 6, that the French were apparently moving on his communications, and next day he deplored the loss of Donauwörth, and expressed his surprise at it. Archduke Ferdinand construed this fact correctly, and urged immediate retreat; but Mack had conceived the idea of moving on the French communications at Nördlingen. This was truly commendable enterprise, but if he was going to undertake the manœuvre, it was essential for him to act quickly and keep hold of the Danube bridges; and this he did not do.



Mack.

When, late on October 7, Mack ascertained that the French were actually crossing the Danube, he made arrangements to concentrate at Günzburg, where some of his rein-

forcements had come up; but for what reason is not apparent, as the operation on the French rear was preferable. Riesch was started thither, Jellachic was called in to Ulm, and Schwarzenberg on his arrival was to follow Riesch. A corps of five thousand men was detached from Günzburg to Wertingen to head off the French, of whose approach he heard, but of whose real force Mack knew nothing. The fact was that early on October 8 Murat had left Rain and marched on Wertingen, where Lannes and Nansouty joined him; and reaching the place about noon, he ran across the Austrian detachment, surrounded the place, and, aided by Oudinot's grenadiers, cut down or captured almost the entire force. Following those who escaped, Murat reached Zumarshausen next morning. Meanwhile, on the 8th, the Danube crossing went on. Bernadotte was at Ingolstadt, Davout at Neuburg, which place Marmont reached, Hautpoul at Donauwörth, with Bessières coming up behind him. Davout went on to Aichach, Soult got near Augsburg; and Ney advanced towards the Danube in two columns, via Langenau on Ulm, and via Gundelfingen on Günzburg; but his attempt to seize the bridge at Elchingen failed. The emperor in person reached Donauwörth, and from here sent orders urging his lieutenants to speed in completing the turning manœuvre. "Give yourself no repose, and remember that, whether by day or night, you are to capture this corps," — referring to the Austrians at Augsburg. "The least you can send me are three thousand or four thousand prisoners," he wrote to Soult October 8; and to Davout, "Lose not an hour, and let me hear without loss of time that you are occupying Aichach." Kienmayer, surprised at the avalanche of troops, had withdrawn to Dachau; and on October 9 Davout did capture Aichach, while Bernadotte at Ingolstadt and Marmont at Neuburg put over their troops, and Soult,

marching along both Lech banks, reached Augsburg and Friedeberg, soon followed by Hautpoul and Bessières.

On October 9 the 2d Bulletin was issued, detailing the movements up to the fight at Wertingen: "After an engagement of two hours," Lannes and Oudinot captured "flags, cannon, baggage, officers and soldiers; a whole division of the enemy was taken or dispersed." "The final relation of these marches and these events will interest the public and do the greatest honor to the army." Next day the 3d Bulletin was issued. As these Bulletins generally state, or misstate, facts which are more easily understood when detailed in a consecutive narrative, a great part of their interest lies in the anecdotes and other army information which Napoleon as a rule inserts with a manifest purpose. And for this they are quoted, even at the risk of making an occasional patchwork paragraph. In this Bulletin the emperor states that he decorated with the Eagle of the Legion of Honor a soldier of dragoons who saved his captain at the passage of the Lech, though he had been degraded as non-commissioned officer a few days before. "The brave soldier answered, 'I only did my duty; my captain had disgraced me for some fault of discipline, but he knows that I have always been a good soldier.'" . . . "Colonel Maupetit, at the head of the 9th Dragoons, charged in on the village of Wertingen; mortally wounded, his last word was, 'Let the emperor be told that the 9th Dragoons was worthy of its reputation, and that it charged and won with the cry, "Vive l'Empéreur!"'"

Though fully informed of the crossing of the French divisions, and necessarily learning of the Austrian defeat at Wertingen, yet Mack seemed unable to conceive any one consistent plan for avoiding or parrying the stroke of the one hundred and twenty thousand men who were assembling on his rear. Even the report that the French were at Augsburg

and Zumarshausen failed to arouse him to positive action. After he had assembled his mass at Günzburg with his left wing at Memmingen, under Spangen, and his right wing under Kienmayer retiring down the Danube, he again bethought him to cross to the north of the Danube and fall on the French communications; but as Ney turned up opposite Günzburg and seized his end of the bridge before he had had time to put this idea into execution, the Austrian veteran gave it up, and marched back to Ulm on the night of October 9–10. Kienmayer had received orders, if cut off from Mack, to retire to the Inn and join the Russian army. This he proceeded to do. It was indeed his only course.

Early on the 10th, to Napoleon, who was with Murat at Zumarshausen, the situation had seemed to indicate that even Mack could not be so foolish as to remain at Ulm; and he naturally concluded that the Austrians would retire via Memmingen towards the Tyrol — that being the only free exit they had left. Berthier had written Ney, October 8, that "His Majesty did not believe that the enemy would be so insane as to cross to the left bank of the Danube, as all his magazines were in Memmingen, and he had the greatest interest not to break connection with the Tyrol;" and he had ordered Ney to march up to Ulm, seize the city, and follow hard on the heels of the Austrians. At the same time Napoleon intended to march Bernadotte, Marmont and Davout to Munich so as to get between Mack and the oncoming Russians, — whom, however, he did not expect for two weeks, — leaving Ney, Lannes and the cavalry reserve, all under Murat, to cope with Mack. The whole position was so excellently contrived that a check to either half of the army would drive it back into concentration with the other.

Being uncertain just what the Russian operations might be, or what Mack might do, it was with the idea of making

his right wing stronger than it had been that, on October 10, Napoleon placed Ney and Lannes under the orders of Murat. Were the emperor to be suddenly called to Munich, he thought he would have fewer separate leaders to direct. His action proved to be an error, for Murat, though on the ground, fell far short of understanding the situation. This marshal imagined that Mack was concentrating behind the Iller to base upon the Tyrol, and in this view he ordered Ney to cross with all his force to the right bank, take position along the Roth, and attack Ulm from the east. This misapprehension and consequent false manœuvre was about to leave open the route to Bohemia, as well as the French communications and magazines which Ney had been ordered by Napoleon to cover, for which purpose Gazan, Baraguay and Bourcier had been added to his command, and which an advance on Ulm would accomplish. Ney was wise enough to obey Murat's order only in part; and having already sent Dupont and Bourcier forward on Albeck, he was unable to do more for the moment.

On this same 10th of October, while Murat reached Burgau, Bernadotte was marching on Munich, and echeloned in his rear, Davout was near Dachau, and Marmont at Pöttmes. Soult had assembled his corps at Augsburg. On reaching this place in the evening, the reports which had run in convinced Napoleon that he had misinterpreted the enemy's purpose; and that not only was Mack still in Ulm, but that the Russians were in no hurry to come on to his relief. Here was a new situation, and the emperor at once recognized that Bernadotte and Davout would be a sufficient force to neutralize the tardy Russians, while he himself with the rest of the army could cut Mack off from the Tyrol, pen him up in Ulm, and there destroy him. With this in view Soult was sharply headed for Landsberg, Marmont was to come up to Augsburg, Lannes

was to follow Murat to Burgau, Davout and Bernadotte to reach Munich as quickly as possible, with Hautpoul's cavalry division added to their two corps; and Napoleon wrote Bernadotte on the 11th: "My intention is that you rid me of every species of enemy between the Isar and the Lech. . . . Prepare, after having taken breath an instant, to throw the enemy behind the Inn."

Meanwhile, as instructed by Murat, Ney, at Günzburg, had sent Loison over to the right bank, and himself prepared to join later, by way of Leibheim to Kissendorf, with Mahler. Dupont and Bourcier lay at Albeck on his right, ready to march on the morrow to Ulm, as Ney's corps had originally been ordered by Napoleon to do; and on the 11th Dupont drew up his troops and advanced towards that city. At the same time a heavy column of the Austrians was making ready to move on the French rear; and the clash with superior forces could not well result in success, especially as Baraguay, to whom had been sent orders to advance via Langenau to sustain him, had, it was claimed, not received them in time. When, accordingly, Dupont arrived at Haslach with six infantry battalions and three regiments of cavalry, — some seven thousand men, — he came in violent contact with a large part of Mack's force. Seeing how small a body Dupont had with him, the Austrians essayed to envelop it by extending their wings. Dupont replied by boldly massing his troops and driving them through the Austrian centre at Juningen. Here resulted a spirited fight, the village being taken and retaken half a dozen times. Though outnumbered three to one, Dupont held himself till night, and then retired to Albeck, having cut out and kept three thousand Austrian prisoners. This was a noteworthy fight; but on hearing of it Ney prudently called Dupont back to Günzburg, so as to be somewhere within reach of support should he be again attacked.

"On this vast theatre of war, which changes at every instant," as Napoleon wrote Berthier, the French troops were now in position to move in any direction, as might be required by whatever new occurrence should demand a further change.

Napoleon was as yet ignorant of the quality of the Russian soldier, but he was much interested in what he heard about him. He wrote Bernadotte, October 11: "Speak to me also positively of those celebrated Russians. I shall wait for that before taking action. I shall go to them with ninety thousand men, and I hope with God's help to make them continue their route towards France."

Napoleon had cut Mack from his communications, which ran along the right bank of the Danube. But there had constantly been open for Mack two chances, — for escape, or for a return thrust: one a summary retreat to the Tyrol to join the Archduke John; and the other a debouch from Ulm on the Danube left bank, and a series of forced marches via Nördlingen and Monheim to base on Bohemia. Soult had been ordered by Napoleon on Memmingen to check the first; Ney on the left bank was to prevent the second, which was especially dangerous, as Mack, during the manœuvre, could capture and destroy all Napoleon's magazines in the rear of the Grand Army.

By his victory over Dupont, and by the crossing of part of Ney's force to the right bank, Mack was all the more convinced that his scheme of moving down on the left bank was a good one. On October 11 he was led by the appearance of things into the error that Napoleon had turned with his mass against the Russians, and he deemed it wise to send half of his force to cut the French communications on the left bank, and make its way to Bohemia, while the other should open its way through to the Tyrol. But Archduke Ferdinand opposed Mack's plan with so much heartiness that not until

the 13th could it be begun. Here again was the Austrian pet division of forces. What Mack should have done was to leave a few battalions in Ulm, ploy all the rest of his army into one column, and force his way either to the Tyrol, or now preferably to Bohemia — Ney having under Murat's orders left open a passage for the latter manœuvre. But the one thing Mack could not understand was the value of concentration.

Meanwhile Napoleon continued his own concentration so as to make his blow effective. As a further scrupulous preparation for the coming battle, to bring to his side every advantage, to leave nothing to chance or miscarriage, he deferred action until he could have all his forces at hand, and to Murat he wrote from Augsburg, October 12: —

My Cousin, . . . My intention is that, if the enemy continues to remain in his positions and prepares himself to receive battle, this shall not take place to-morrow, but the day after to-morrow, so that Marshal Soult and his thirty thousand men may be in it, that he may turn the right of the enemy, and attack it in turning it, a manœuvre which will insure us a success certain and decisive. Meanwhile have a bridge thrown on the Danube the nearest possible to your line opposite Albeck, so that the corps which is in Albeck may be in communication and connected with the rest of the army, and that if the enemy should operate too hard, or find himself obliged to take refuge on the left bank in the night, you can during the same day fall upon him. Order the generals to make inspection of the arms and the cartridges, to get together all your people, all that may have been detached to the train ; to send away the baggage and the wagons beyond Burgau, to park in the fields, so that there shall be nothing on the big roads. Point out the situation where the artillery reserve and the corps of Marshals Lannes and Ney are to place themselves, and where the cavalry reserve. Assure yourself that the reserves of the three armies (corps) contain enough cartridges, and that they have not been spoilt by the rain. See to it also that the place is designated for the great ambulances for each of the army corps. Let the first surgeon of each army corps, a doctor, a commissary of war and some gendarmes be

placed there. Take measures to have there bread, wine and even beds for the wounded of the day. I do not speak of the ambulances which are to follow the line, four hundred toises in the rear at most. This is not a skirmish, it is not even the attack on a column during the march: it is one on an army which may be more numerous than you think, and on the success of which depend the greatest results. I shall be there personally. Have my headquarters placed where you think is most convenient. I shall leave so soon as I shall have given my orders for the night. I shall be to-morrow morning at the headquarters that you shall have indicated to me. NAPOLEON.

In your letter you put neither the place from which you write, nor the date, nor the hour. This is a very capital omission.

On the same day Bernadotte entered Munich early in the morning, and Davout, with Hautpoul's cavalry, remained at Dachau, both with parties and scouts out towards the Inn. Of the wing facing Mack, Soult reached Mindelheim; Marmont Tannhausen to the north of it; Murat with Lannes and the cavalry stood on the Rothbach along the line Weissenhorn, Pfaffenhausen, Falheim; and Ney prolonged his right to the river. Dupont and Bourcier were still on the left bank, and had been compelled by the Austrians to fall back behind the Brenz. Bessières was at Zumarshausen. Mack was inclosed, and Berthier could write Davout the evening of the 12th from Augsburg: "On the 14th, the day of the battle, the enemy will be destroyed, for he is shut in on all sides." To Otto, October 12, Napoleon wrote: "The discouragement of the Austrian army has no example. Our worst regiments of chasseurs charge the heavy regiments of cuirassiers and put them to flight."

The emperor issued the 5th Bulletin at Augsburg October 12, and a second 5th Bulletin October 15. "Never will more events be decided in less time," he said. "Before two weeks the destinies of the campaign and of the Austrian and Russian armies will be settled."

On the 13th was issued a —

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers ! only a month ago you were camped on the ocean opposite England. But an impious league commanded us to fly to the Rhine. Less than a fortnight ago we passed it, and the Würtemberg Alps, the Neckar, the Danube and the Lech, the celebrated barriers of Germany, have not retarded our march a day, an hour, an instant. . . . The enemy's army, deceived by our manœuvres, by the rapidity of our movements, is entirely turned. It is fighting for its salvation. It would like to escape and return home. It is too late. . . . Remember that to-morrow you fight against the allies of the English. . . . Soldiers, the day of to-morrow will be a hundred times more celebrated than that of Marengo. I have placed the enemy in the same position. . . . Remember that the most distant posterity will pay heed to what each one of you shall do on this memorable day. . . . I can say to my people, "Your emperor and your army have done their duty. Do yours, and two hundred thousand conscripts that I have called will rush with forced marches to reinforce our second line."

On this occasion Napoleon had no need to exaggerate, for his masterly combinations had succeeded to the letter, as every Frenchman in the ranks could see.

In the 5th Bulletin is the following : —

"The emperor was on the bridge over the Lech when General Marmont's Corps d'Armée defiled. He had each regiment formed in a circle, spoke to them of the situation of the enemy and the imminence of the great battle, and the confidence he had in them. This harangue took place during awful weather. Heavy snow fell, the troops were in mud up to the knees, and suffered very great cold ; but the words of the emperor were of flame. In listening to him the soldier forgot his fatigues and his privations, and was impatient to see the hour of combat arrive."

As Napoleon was leaving Augsburg the evening of October 12 for Pfaffenhausen, he heard from Murat that Mack was,

as he had assumed, still in Ulm; whereupon he dispatched a courier to Soult with orders to manœuvre towards that city, and have no further care about cutting the Austrians off from the Tyrol.

In this communication he said: "My Cousin, I shall see with pleasure your hundred and twenty heavy cuirassiers who were captured by the little chasseurs. . . . The decisive moment has arrived. Post to-day your dragoons and some light artillery in front of Memmingen. Push your leading division to-day as near as you can to this town. Let the troops march two hours before day, after having eaten their soup. Arrive at Memmingen with your first division before nine o'clock in the morning, attack at once this place, and place yourself astride the Iller during the day of to-morrow. . . . The enemy offers us an occasion of which we will know how to profit. Tell your army in orders that if they wish to fight, the first division must be at Memmingen before nine o'clock in the morning, failing which they will not be in the battle. NAPOLEON."

And further, intent on perfecting his work, he wrote: "It is not a question of beating the enemy, it is essential that not one shall escape. . . . If I had only wished to beat the enemy, I should not have needed so many marches and fatigues; but I wish to capture him . . . and not to leave a single man to carry the news to Vienna."

Thus worked the great master of war. On the other side, having made up his mind to cut off the French from the Rhine, Mack, instead of massing for one solid blow which would command some result, now detached Jellachic to march to Vorarlberg, picking up some of the outlying troops on the way, and by this circuit to regain the Austrian base, while he himself should march on the French communications. He would have been wise, a week ago, to march his whole army in the direction he now sent Jellachic, and this we have seen was Napoleon's idea of what he would do. But Mack had not learned that a bundle of sticks tied together has strength beyond the single sticks; Æsop could have told him better.

The weather had been stormy ever since the 8th, and the

roads were abominable; each day's march was severe, but the French columns, buoyed up by success, cheerfully marched on. No soldier has ever appreciated a good leader and worked up to his requirements more uncomplainingly than the little Gallic footman. Given the conditions that suit his temperament, and he is a wonder.

In the second 5th Bulletin it is said that "the soldier is in mud up to the knees. For eight days the emperor has not taken off his boots. 'And the emperor,' said the soldier, 'has found a new method to make war; he uses only our legs and not our bayonets.'"

In the 6th Bulletin of October 18 we find, "The emperor, passing through the crowd of the prisoners of the enemy, an Austrian colonel expressed his astonishment to see the Emperor of the French wet through, covered with mud, as much and even more tired than the last drummer of the army. One of his aides-de-camp having explained to him what this Austrian officer said, the emperor had this answer made to him, 'Your master has wished to remind me that I was a soldier: I hope that he will agree that the throne and the imperial purple have not made me forget my first trade.' The soldiers were often gratified by seeing the emperor hard at work among them: 'They are right,' said he, 'for it is to spare them their blood that I make them go through such stern fatigues.'"

While the net was thus being drawn closer around him, Mack, on the 13th, cheerfully started out to cut Napoleon's communications. Debouching from Ulm on the left bank, he formed two columns, one under Werneck to march to Heidenheim, while the other column under Laudon and Riesch should march down the river to Gundelfingen, to fend off any French attempt to cut out Werneck. As they proceeded, the van of the first column reached Heidenheim; the second column ran across a French post at the Elchingen bridge, threw it back, occupied the heights of the town, and partially destroyed the structure. Filled with extraordinary ideas (imagination is an essential part of the great captain's equipment, but it must be

something more than wool-gathering), Mack now conceived the notion, or received information, that Paris was in revolt, that the English had landed on the French coast, and that Napoleon was striving to cut his way back along the line he himself was now threatening. Had this been so, wisdom indeed would have dictated his severing the French communications; but the manœuvre needed all the more to be in force, for, cut off, the French would fight like very devils; and as a matter of fact, instead of strongly supporting the Heidenheim and Elchingen columns, he retained the bulk of his troops in and near Ulm. He had sent a boy to do a man's work. Mack's "dispositions have been constantly false," wrote Napoleon to Talleyrand; "and he never guessed my plans."

Bavarian Light Horse.

On the way to Pfaffenhausen Napoleon first learned of Murat's orders to Ney, and of Dupont's gallant fight at Albeck, and he saw that the Austrians were seeking an outlet along the left bank. He instantly recognized the errors made, sent instructions to Ney to march to Dupont's assistance without a moment's delay, ordered the Guard to Günzburg and Dupont back to Albeck, and himself hurried to Ney's headquarters at Kissendorf. Ney lost no time in heading a column, consisting of Loison and Malher, towards the Elchingen bridge, which he had already begun to repair.

As ordered, Dupont on the 14th moved again towards Albeck. Lannes closed up towards Ulm and occupied the heights of Pfuhl, with Murat's cavalry in support, and Marmont reached the Iller at Kirchberg. Soult on the same day won the sur-

render of Memmingen with four thousand prisoners under Spangen, and marched on to Biberach, which he took on the 15th. Only a small party under Wolfskehl escaped to the Tyrol. This closed the cordon on the French left.

But Napoleon had recognized that the danger, if any, lay on the left bank of the Danube, though Ney had already gone far towards repairing the mistake of Murat. The emperor personally crossed the river, and ordered up thither by night Lannes, Bessières and part of the cavalry reserve; while Marmont should come up and take the Pfuhl position vacated by Lannes and, aided by Beaumont and Baraguay, keep the enemy within walls. On the 14th Ney, at early dawn, set out to regain what he had lost through no fault of his own. The weather had cleared a little. Elchingen village lay like an amphitheatre on heights some little distance from the Danube, the slope being a succession of walled gardens, each one lying, step-like, above the other; and the top was surmounted by a vast monastic building. Each successive inclosure must be fought for. A post more difficult to take could scarcely be imagined, and fifteen thousand able troops held it. To protect the passage of the bridge, which as yet had been but imperfectly repaired, the first houses and gardens were seized by a *corps d'élite*. Ney was omnipresent, as if courting death, and assigned each debouching battalion to its proper place. The French fought with fierce determination, and, garden by garden, escaladed the heights; and finally seizing the monastery, established themselves on the plateau, turning the Austrian left at St. Wolfgang's Chapel. Here, however, heavy fighting ensued to thrust out the enemy; and meanwhile the Austrian right, from a wood which dominated the village, threatened to cut Ney's left from the bridge, until the wood was carried by a regiment of the veterans of the Army of Italy. Loison came up, Malher followed; the cavalry was

put in wherever it could ride, and the Austrians were thrown back through Kesselbrun on Haslach and towards Ulm, with the loss of twenty guns and three thousand prisoners. A small party reached the Albeck road.

Ney established his headquarters at Albeck, which Dupont had reached.

During this fight Dupont had been holding back Werneck, who from Ulm had reached Herbrechtingen and then, on hearing of Mack's sally, had turned back on Albeck to attack Ney's rear. Werneck, baffled, retired to Nerenstetten; Mack took position on the Lahr-Mohringen heights, in front of Ulm, on the left bank. On October 15 Ney, in the midst of a fresh fall of rain, which, however, in no wise checked the ardor of his men, made a further step towards Ulm. Loison and Malher were headed on Haslach, sustained by the cavalry of the Guard. Plucky Dupont still held back Werneck. Lannes got over the rest of his troops and strove to repair the Thalfingen bridge, nearer Ulm. Murat with his cavalry moved from Elchingen towards Ulm, until sent by Napoleon to sustain hard-pressed Dupont. The struggle was not long. Mack, losing heart, retired within walls, his rearguard being stoutly pressed. He had now left but a single outlet, via Blaubeeren, and this was useless.

Ney.

Ulm lies in a low plain, dominated on the left bank by the

Michelsberg, and by the Tuillerie, which in 1800 Kray had fortified. The enceinte had numerous and good bastions, and the ditch was full of water. In following up Mack's retreat, Ney, with Malher's division, captured the Michelsberg, with Loison close behind. Suchet took the Tuillerie. From here a couple of regiments rushed in on the heels of the Austrians and almost penetrated the town, but not being sustained, eventually retired.

Ulm, with Mack's entire force of nearly thirty thousand men and scanty victual, was doomed. In the evening Ney demanded its surrender, but received a refusal. Next day at noon Napoleon bombarded the city for an hour, and then himself renewed the demand, which on the 17th proved successful. Mack agreed to yield up the fortress unless he was relieved by October 25, at midnight. One gate was surrendered to Ney.

On October 17 Bonaparte could write to Talleyrand: "My plan has been executed such as I had conceived it. I have perfectly deceived the enemy, and of its army of one hundred thousand men more than half is taken, killed, wounded or has dispersed. The discouragement of the enemy is extreme."

In discussing the capitulation of Ulm with Prince Lichtenstein, who asked that the officers and soldiers should be permitted to return to Austria, the emperor replied that he would permit the officers to do so, but not the soldiers, "For who will warrant that they shall not be made to serve again?" He added, however, that he would take the word of Prince Ferdinand that they should not do so. On learning that Ferdinand was not in Ulm: "Then I do not see," said the emperor, "who will guarantee that the soldiers that I should thus send back will not serve again." The emperor was unwilling to wait. He was anxious to turn towards the Russians. Within a day, by announcing to Mack the victory over Werneck and Kienmayer, and the presence of Soult on

carried a (captured) flag. This spectacle produced in the inhabitants of Augsburg an astonishment, of which the peasants of all these countries partook."

There is little to be said in favor of Mack. Such a surrender as he made without burning a cartridge can never be justified. At least one sortie should have been made, if but for appearances. Useless slaughter, you may say. But the soldier's life is full of inconsistencies, and the sentiment of honor is no idle thing in war. Indeed, this sentiment, perhaps, gives rise among comrades in war to more and greater Christian virtues than can be found in any other profession. Where else may a man be daily seen to lay down his life for a friend? Old soldiers of many hard-fought fields will understand this assertion, as he who has not been privileged to join in the brotherhood of battle never can. It is said that Mack had been much hampered by divided authority, and failed because never able to carry out his own plans; but in this campaign Ferdinand appears to have had the clearer head.

The archduke, who had not agreed with Mack's opinion, and foresaw the inevitable disaster, had, on Mack's forbidding the evacuation of Ulm, ridden out of that city with a small cavalry party, accompanied by Schwarzenberg, Kollowrath, Giulay and some others, and reached Werneck's column. It is in dispute whether he left Ulm before Elchingen, or after the Austrians had reëntered the city in consequence of the battle; but he is said to have ordered Werneck back to Aalen, purposing to retire to Bohemia. On the morning of the 16th Napoleon sent Dupont, Oudinot and Murat's cavalry to cut Werneck out. The pursuit was vigorous; a long train of five hundred wagons delayed the Austrians, and what was left of the column after its fight with Dupont and all its countermarches surrendered, October 18, at Trochtelfingen. Ferdinand, with a thousand horse, had ridden

ahead, via Gunzenhausen, towards Nürnberg; Murat followed him up, and reached his rearguard; but the archduke made good his escape. In the 10th Bulletin of October 22 the emperor says: "We are filled with astonishment when we consider the march of Prince Murat from Albeck to Nürnberg. Though fighting always, he managed to gain in speed on the enemy, who was two marches ahead of him. The result of this prodigious activity has been the capture of fifteen hundred wagons, fifty guns, sixteen thousand men, including the capitulation of General Werneck and of a great number of flags. Eighteen generals laid down their arms, three were killed."

From Elchingen, October 19, the emperor wrote: "I am feeling, my good Josephine, more tired than necessary. Being wet through and with cold feet for eight days may harm me a little; but to-day, as I have not gone out, I am resting. I have fulfilled my purpose. I have destroyed the Austrian army by simple marches. I have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, more than ninety flags, and more than thirty generals. Adieu, my Josephine, a thousand amiable things everywhere." The exaggeration is pardonable.

This extraordinary success had been accomplished in three weeks from crossing the Rhine, and at a loss not exceeding six thousand men. Rarely in war is a campaign carried out so nearly as it was planned. Napoleon's conception was elastic enough to meet any reasonable variation of the governing conditions, and the clearness, sequence and power of the idea and the execution are a pattern of Napoleon's strategic ability. It has not been unusual to call Napoleon's successes one-sided. "He was really in his element only where the favor of the circumstances permitted the most absolute offensive, taken strictly only when at the head of a superior force,"

says one author. But in 1796 Napoleon was actually outnumbered, and it was by his better strategy alone that he managed to oppose superior forces to the enemy when the contact came. In 1805, too, Napoleon was outnumbered, and it was again his better strategy that enabled him to dispose of Mack before he met the other Austrian army and the Russian. Just this was the secret of Napoleon's strategic power. Archduke Charles remarked that "people tried to weaken Bonaparte's renown by the statement that he thanked most of his results to superior forces. Is there perhaps a greater praise for the statesman, than that he began no campaign without being sure of such superiority? Even where his forces on the whole were equal to the enemy's, or even weaker, as in the 1796 and 1814 campaigns, he knew how to procure a superiority at the decisive points at important moments." To this view of Napoleon's strongest opponent, an educated soldier, a solid author and a prince of broad intelligence and true nobility of character, a single additional word would be superfluous.

Officer of Dragoons. (1805.)

The emperor was always lavish of his praise of the men who served him so patiently and with such real gallantry. Though partly for effect, for, as Frederick says, a commander-in-chief must always be prepared to play the comedian, his words must have proceeded from honest appreciation of their soldierly qualities.

In the 4th Bulletin of October 11 he says: "The conscripts show as much bravery and good-will as the old soldiers. When they have been

once under fire they lose the name of conscript ; and they all aspire to the honor of the title of soldier." And in the 9th Bulletin of October 21: "In the French army, heroism is carried to the highest point. . . . The emperor has to complain solely of the too great impetuosity of the soldier."

On October 21 there was issued to the army a

PROCLAMATION.

Soldiers of the Grand Army, in fifteen days we have made a campaign. That which we proposed to ourselves has been finished. . . . Soldiers, I announced to you a great battle, but thanks to the bad calculations of the enemy, I have been able to obtain the same success without running any risk. . . . Soldiers, this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your emperor, to your patience, your fatigues and privations of every kind, to your rare intrepidity. . . . You are impatient to commence the second campaign. . . . All my care shall be to obtain victory with the least possible effusion of blood. My soldiers are my children.

Napoleon knew the effect of judicious advertising. His proclamations to the people of France, his messages to the Senate, his addresses and his orders to the army, seem to have in view the fact that constant assertion, when backed up by good execution, is convincing in the highest degree. "First get a good thing, and then let the world know you have it," said the American Napoleon of advertising.

The following message was dispatched to the Senate October 18: "Senators, I send you forty flags captured by my army. . . . It is a homage that I and my army make to the wise men of the empire. It is a present that children make to their fathers. Senators, see in it a proof of my satisfaction with the manner in which you have constantly seconded me in the most important affairs of the empire. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march, make them rush forward to fight at our sides, so that without effusion of blood, without effort, we may be able to push far off from us all the

the government was forced at once to change its policy, which until then had controlled the public, seized upon Hanover, which Bernadotte had but just left, reëstablished the Electoral power, and demanded instant satisfaction of the French. The surprising surrender at Ulm made Prussia pause, to be sure; but her attitude rendered it imperative for Napoleon to make speed in dealing with the Austro-Russian allies, for Kutusov was actually at Braunau with fifty thousand men.

The emperor did his best to smooth over the affair. On October 27 he wrote the King of Prussia at length: —

"Monsieur my Brother, I understand that the letter I wrote from Ludwigsburg to Your Majesty has not seemed to you a sufficient satisfaction; yet it was the pure truth. I was absolutely ignorant that the passage of a part of my troops over the territory of Anspach could be questionable. The Treaty of Basle, and the example of the two wars which have taken place since, prevented my considering that this passage should be a subject of difficulties. . . . Whatever will offer me the means of regaining the friendship and confidence of Your Majesty, I am ready to do. . . . But let not Your Majesty put me and my people in the cruel necessity of having no refuge between your enmity and dishonor. My standards know not how to support shame. . . . Your Majesty will see that my heart has dictated this letter," — which indeed contains more in the way of diplomatic argument, and is much to the point.

So far in his career Napoleon had never felt such keen satisfaction as when Mack's divisions filed before him as prisoners of war; but he gave himself little leisure, and scarce was the Ulm incident so dramatically closed, when he issued his orders for the corps which had invested the place to march in three columns towards the line of the Inn, along which lay the Russian army. It was on October 21 that Napoleon himself left headquarters at Elchingen, and drove to Augsburg. He had already chosen as his secondary base the Lech — that river which for centuries had figured for so much in the contests between the Austrians and the French; and its main

city was now turned into a depot of stores, was strongly fortified, and provided with a well-built bridge-head at Friedeberg on the right bank.

For a dozen years the French had turned over a new leaf in logistics. We remember how often Frederick suffered from diminished speed and effectiveness due to the necessity he inherited of relying on magazines and bakeries. Napoleon had found out, thanks to the intelligent audacity of the Revolutionary leaders, that in any rich country, like the valley of the Po or of the Danube, a considerable column could be fed on the resources of the country. To be sure this bore hard on the population of the districts traversed, but this was not the affair of the troops; and as the system of so feeding the men gave a chance to make extra speed, it was properly insisted on. Berthier wrote Marmont, October 6: "In all the letters which General Marmont writes me, he refers to victual. I repeat that in the movements and wars of invasion carried on by the emperor, there are no magazines; it is the affair of the commanding generals of the corps to bring together means of feeding the troops in those lands through which they march." But while insisting on this systematic foraging, so soon as general measures could be adopted to procure victual, it was at once done. Napoleon's letter to Petiet from Augsburg, October 24, proves this: "We have marched without magazines; we have been compelled by circumstances to do so. For this we have had an extremely favorable season, but though we were always victorious, and found vegetables in the fields, yet we have suffered much. In a season when there would be no potatoes in the fields, or when the army had suffered some reverses, the want of magazines would bring us the greatest misfortune. I desire that you should have in Augsburg a million rations of biscuit, ovens to bake eighty thousand rations a day, and flour in bulk

to cook two million rations, three hundred thousand bushels of oats and one hundred thousand pints of brandy. . . . The least negligence, the least delay, may have the worst effect on the army and the empire." Augsburg was accordingly made a depot of the first order.

Napoleon never neglected to get victual together at the points where it might be needed. But the marching troops were still uniformly fed on the country, and the emperor deemed no marshal worthy of his baton who could not keep his men suitably provided in a fairly well-peopled territory. As must be, however, in any army thus fed, those who least well obeyed orders, who straggled and roamed the country, got the best rations; the good soldiers got less. The chief commissaries requisitioned from every town the army entered, or gave orders to the division commissaries to do so, grain, bread, vegetables, beef, beer, wine, brandy, anything and everything on hand and procurable; and these supplies got speedily distributed to the half-brigades and companies, and then to the messes which cooked for the men. The law-abiding, self-respecting soldier got his rations fairly well; but the "bummer" (and Napoleon's men were of a very different class from Sherman's noteworthy Bummers), who dropped out at every chance and rejoined his company in season to escape arrest, managed to collect many a *bonne bouche* denied to the others. And in the French army were many bummers, as the peasants, men and women, found out to their sorrow.

The Isar was the first point of concentration for the advancing corps. Davout, who was at Dachau, was headed on Freising October 20; Marmont, who had assembled at Weissenhorn, marched on Munich, where Bernadotte was already concentrating; from Nördlingen Lannes, with Nansouty's cuirassiers added to his corps, was ordered on Landshut; while Soult, who had got back to Memmingen, started a day

later for Landsberg. Ney remained for the moment at Ulm, and Augereau, who had just crossed at Hüningen, was ordered up towards the army at Kempten, in the Vorarlberg foothills, with the 7th Corps d'Armée.

However appalling to the Aulic Council the disaster of Ulm may have been, it excited no apprehension in the soul of the Russians, who by this time had fully assembled at Braunau on the Inn, while Kienmayer and his Austrians were holding the river as a sort of vanguard at Mühldorf. The corps of Davout and Bernadotte, during the Ulm drama, had merely played a negative part, and Kutusov had contented himself with efforts to get well in hand the thirty thousand Russians and twenty-two thousand Austrians who were hereafter to act under his command. But when Mack personally passed through Braunau on his way to Vienna, and told his sorry story, Kutusov deemed it wise to retire to the line of the Enns; and by the 26th all the bridges over the Inn had been burned, and only a rearguard was left along its right bank. An order from Vienna to defend the Inn came too late, for Kutusov's van, on October 27, had already got to Wels. On the 26th Napoleon was in Munich, with Marmont and the Guard; Soult had passed the city on the way to Mühldorf; Lannes, on the left of the army, was at Landshut, and Davout at Dorfen; Bernadotte had reached Wasserburg; and Ney had left Ulm for Landsberg. The reserve cavalry under Murat, a part of which had ridden as far as Nürnberg in pursuit of Archduke Ferdinand, was mostly at Hohenlinden; but Bourcier and Baraguay were still back at Augsburg and Ingolstadt; and Dupont and Dumonceau were acting as rearguard and marching along the Danube, with Passau as an objective.

On the 27th Murat, followed by Soult, advanced to Mühldorf; Davout did the like, and Lannes headed his divisions in

the same direction. Repairs on the Mühldorf and near-by Oetting and Marktl bridges were begun, as well as on those at Wasserburg and Rosenheim, where stood Bernadotte with Marmont in reserve. By noon of the 28th Murat could begin the crossing and march on Burghausen, sustained by Davout; and Bernadotte crossed his corps, Marmont following to Wasserburg. Lannes reached the vicinity of Braunau and Soult Mühldorf. Napoleon's headquarters was shifted to Haag, and early on the 29th the emperor rode to Mühldorf, where Davout was passing the river with the last of his troops. It was evident that the enemy was on the retreat, and must be rapidly followed, if a lesson was to be taught him. Kutusov had gained two days by his burning of the bridges, and was not to be easily brought to a halt. The Traun was the next important affluent of the Danube, and Napoleon confidently expected the allies to make a stand there. Kutusov's retreat, as an operation, was much easier than Napoleon's advance; the country was yet well provided, the bridges were standing, the roads, then rarely paved, were not cut up; whereas Napoleon found a nearly denuded country, bridges to be rebuilt and roads to be repaired; while in the case of each river athwart his path, the emperor had to plan for driving the enemy from its defense by some tactical manœuvre. Here he proposed to push forward Murat and his cavalry, followed by Davout, Soult and Lannes, on Wels and Lambach, while Marmont should turn the enemy's left flank by way of the foothill

Kutusov.

roads and then file to the left down on Steyer. At the same time Bernadotte was to go on to Salzburg, which was defended by Meerfeldt; Ney, to whose command was added the Bavarian corps under Deroy, was booked to march to Innsbruck, to hold back any reinforcements which Archduke Charles might be tempted to send from the Adige, as well as to reduce this part of the Tyrol; and Augereau was ordered forward from Kempten to sustain and coöperate with the manœuvre. Should Marmont find too much opposition, Bernadotte could move up to assist him.

The capture of Braunau by Lannes on the 29th afforded Napoleon the keenest satisfaction. On October 30 he wrote: "Monsieur Talleyrand, I am enchanted at the capture of Braunau, which is a strong place that I find filled with magazines, powder and munition of every kind. These people no longer have a chief, a panic fear has seized them." Braunau was indeed a fortress of the very first order, and the most important place on the Inn. But so confident had the Austrians been that the year's struggle would be near the Rhine, that scarce a gun had been mounted on the enceinte. Here the French found enormous supplies of food as well as ordnance. Napoleon determined to transfer what Jomini calls his "eventual base" from Augsburg to Braunau, thus advancing it from the Lech to the Inn. Meanwhile, though marching in the same direction, the several corps had been kept spread over some extent of country so as to ration the more easily; and Murat and the cavalry had got to Altheim, Davout was in Burghausen, Marmont had reached Tittmoning, Soult crossed the Inn at Mühldorf, and Bernadotte took Salzburg. This too was a strong fortress, though dominated by neighboring hills; and the Inn-Salza line made a most satisfactory base, because Bavaria and all her cities to the west and north were within the French alliance. The emperor remained in Brau-

nau directing the advance for several days. Here, as in every city where he had his headquarters and there was a theatre, he was apt to spend the evenings at the play, and sometimes the Bulletins speak of his going hunting; the people at home were pleased to know how their new emperor amused himself.

On the last day of October Murat had pushed on as far as Lambach; Lannes was at Schärding on the way to Linz, and Soult at Obernberg heading towards Wels; while Davout at Ried and Marmont at Strasswäldchen were respectively on the road to Lambach and Vöcklabrück.

Officer of Engineers.

All through the Bulletins may be seen the desire to spread a quarrel between Austria and Russia. In the 14th Bulletin of October 30 we find: "The misunderstandings between the Russians and Austrians commence to be seen. The Russians pillage everything. The most intelligent officers among them will understand that the war they are carrying on is impolitic, because they have nothing to gain against the French, whom nature has not placed where they can be their enemies."

The march on Vienna, determined by Napoleon when he was on the Inn, has been called an extravagant piece of strategy, because the Prussian army was about to threaten the upper Danube. It would have been such for most commanders. But Napoleon had calculated the probable Prussian marches and delays, political and military, with curious accuracy, and the success of the Austerlitz campaign justified his reckoning. To remain on the Inn, moreover, meant to afford Archduke Charles time to come in from Italy and defend Vienna by marching up the Danube; to allow

time for the second Russian army to reinforce Kutusov, thus placing forces superior to Napoleon's in his front, while during the delay the Prussians might be reaching the upper Danube in his rear. The French might as well have stayed behind the Rhine as behind the Inn. Nor would the presence of the French on the Inn, faced by the allies in force, enable Napoleon a whit better to handle the Prussian problem. His decision to strike the Russians before they were reinforced was correct. It was attacking the enemy in detail; bold, but safer by far than a hesitating policy. The situation demanded Napoleonic decisiveness, coupled with skill and care in every detail.

Murat had been getting well ahead of the army, had some days before run across the Austrian rear under Kienmayer at Ried, and after a sharp combat had thrown it back into the defile; and while it was essential for the troops to separate to live, they must also be near enough to concentrate to fight; and on October 31 Napoleon wrote Murat that he must allow the infantry corps more hours to get over the ground, and cautioned him against a Russian ambush. "You must give a little time to everybody to make his movements. You must, therefore, not go so quick. . . . You must march with prudence. The Russians are not yet broken. They also know how to attack." No one ever combined discretion with valor to better effect.

After withdrawing all their detachments from the Inn, the Austrians had held the bridge at Lambach on the Traun, while the main body got to Wimsbach and Gmunden, and the Russians to Wels; and when on October 31 Murat with Davout's van reached Lambach, four thousand Russians burned the bridge, and held the right bank long enough to enable the train to get beyond danger. Here Bisson's division crossed swords with the Russians, and the French imperial recruit for

the first time tasted the quality of his new foe, and learned to respect his courage and endurance. Continuing the retreat, by November 2 the allies had crossed the Enns, the Russians near its mouth, the Austrians at Steyer, with rear-guard on the Krems; and here orders were received from Vienna to defend the line of the Enns. The weather ever since leaving Ulm had been rainy, but cold, dry days now set in. Napoleon reached Ried November 1, and next day he paused to let the corps close up, so that Lannes reached Linz, which the Russians had abandoned with its fine bridge over the Danube, Soult Wels, Davout Lambach, and the van Kremsmünster. Murat, in advance of Wels, was to aid Lannes to force the Traun at Ebelsberg, but not to bring on a combat if the foot was far behind. There was no doubt in the emperor's mind that the allies would stand for battle before reaching Vienna; and both Marmont and Bernadotte, respectively at Vöcklabrück and Salzburg, were instructed to get in touch again with the main column at Steyer or Lambach. Headquarters continued at Haag.

Amstetten was the next point to reach, and Murat, followed at a day's interval by Lannes, and he by Soult, crossed at Enns November 4 and headed on that important town; while on a parallel line south, Davout, followed by Marmont and Bernadotte, moved through Kremsmünster to Steyer. The foothills of the Tyrol, here crowding down to the narrow Danube valley, afforded too few roads to march on a deploying front, and Napoleon was much put to it to keep the column of the corps sufficiently closed up. He wrote repeatedly to Murat, Soult and other corps commanders to keep well together, so that the rear could get forward to aid the head of column if attacked. At every succeeding affluent of the great river he expected to find the allies in line to dispute his passage; but Kutusov was minded to retire farther, and early on Novem-

ber 4 his last troops had left the Enns. Next day, at Amstetten, Murat struck the Russian rear under Bagration, who was holding the place to let Kutusov pass with the train, and who stood and gave the French a lusty fight. Oudinot's division came up to sustain Murat, but the French here got a better idea than before of the stubborn courage of the Russian soldiers, who had twice in battle blocked Frederick's wonderful battalions, and done such stout work under Suwarrov on the Po; and the Russians held their ground until it was time to follow the main body to St. Pölten. This place was reached by Kutusov November 7, and here he gave his troops a day's rest, while the Austrians, to do what they could to carry out the orders of the Aulic Council, sent a body of twelve thousand men under Meerfeldt up the Enns to see if a threat to the French right flank might not arrest their advance.

On November 6 Napoleon wrote Murat: "You left me all day yesterday without news. . . . You must write me two or three times a day. If I had known that the enemy was there, I should have at once made my dispositions. . . . You must at every three leagues leave a picket of light cavalry of six men, who shall carry your letters. This will make your correspondence pass very rapidly."

Behind St. Pölten is much sharply accentuated country, where the Wiener Wald, a heavily wooded range, descends from the Sömmering towards the river; and Napoleon was now divided between the idea that the Russians would intrench a position here and fight, and the idea that they would cross to the left bank of the Danube. While remaining in Linz from November 4 to 9 for the corps to close up, the emperor got together under Lostanges a river flotilla. "I need three or four hundred boats, so that there shall be no Danube, and that I may cross it promptly," he wrote Murat November 7. And he also conceived the notion of a flying wing to march

along the left bank. Accordingly on November 6 he created a new 8th Corps of twenty thousand men for Mortier, assigning to it Gazan, Dupont and Dumonceau, with Klein's cavalry division; and as these successively arrived they were sent to the left bank, along which, on a line with Lannes on the right bank, but a little to the rear, Mortier was to operate. Napoleon felt that danger might lurk on the other side, and paying small heed to the fact, provided Mortier could be of some use to the general operation, that he might be single-handed exposed to danger, he set him the task of watching the Russians and the passes leading into Bohemia.

Emperor Francis.

While Napoleon was here in Linz, a deputation arrived from the Austrian emperor asking for an armistice, he himself coming on from Vienna to Mölk to be nearer the scene of action. It did not seem expedient for the French to enter into such an undertaking unless it was accompanied by advantages commensurate with its risks. To Napoleon time was of the essence; to Francis any delay would be helpful. Napoleon therefore demanded as a preliminary that the Russians should at once retire to Poland, that the Hungarian levies should be disbanded, and that Venice and the Tyrol should be given up. This demand was of course refused.

Yet Napoleon's language was diplomatic. On November 8 he wrote to the Emperor of Austria from Linz, . . . "This war is for Russia only a fancy war; for Your Majesty and me it is a war which absorbs all our means, all our sentiments, all our faculties. . . . I desire peace, and I shall

look upon it as a fortunate moment when Your Majesty shall listen only to the interest of his crown and the good of his people, and not the wish of a power which finds itself in so different a position. It is not that I wish to blacken in anything the personal character of the Emperor Alexander. . . . I have had personally many relations with the Emperor Alexander, and these relations have left in my heart traces of his kindness, and of his fine qualities." The Russians were, however, but a temporary butt of the emperor's ill-will. The English always so remained. In the 21st Bulletin of November 10 he says: "There is not, down to the least bourgeois, to the least subaltern officer, one who does not feel that this war is advantageous only for the English; that they have been fighting for them; that they are the makers of the misfortunes of Europe, as, by their monopoly, they are the authors of the excessive dearness of crops."

Still impressed with the feeling that the allies must stand at St. Pölten, Napoleon concentrated his corps as well as was allowed by the single good road from Linz down. Davout and Marmont had reached Steyer the 4th and 5th respectively, heading towards Waidhofen. But Davout was now ordered by way of St. Gaming to Lilienfeld to turn the left of the St. Pölten position; and Marmont was ordered by forced marches over very heavy mountain roads on Leoben to protect the French right. Both these corps would at the same time turn all the rivers which remained to be crossed, should the enemy conclude to defend any of them. Their detachment would also relieve the blockade of the main road, along which nearly the whole army was marching, Lannes having reached Neumarkt on the Ips November 7, with Soult in Amstetten and Bernadotte in Steyer; and on this day Davout was in St. Gaming and Marmont in Weyer, while Murat's van reached Mölk, and two days later tapped at the gates of St. Pölten, the infantry corps crowding along their several lines. On this day, too, Napoleon left Linz, and outstripping all his troops, — each battalion he passed saluting him with a lusty "Vive l'Empéreur!" — reached Mölk, and established headquarters

in the ancient and vast monastery there. The Austrian column under Meerfeldt, which had been sent up the Enns to threaten the French right, was caught between Marmont and Davout, and in attempting to reach St. Pölten via Mariazell, got so roughly handled that in broken fragments it was glad to find its way partly to Bruck and Gratz, and partly to Neustadt.

Though imagining that Kutusov might retreat to Moravia to join the second Russian army, the emperor had more strongly leaned to the idea that the Russians would stand at St. Pölten. He had failed to read Kutusov's intention aright. The Russian commander, now reduced to thirty-five thousand men, had no idea of defending Vienna single-handed. To him the Austrian capital meant little; a junction with the oncoming Russian army much. He saw that he was no match for the French, let alone their commander; and during the night of November 8–9 he continued his retreat, finally halting at Mautern. Here he crossed the river on the twenty-eight-span wooden bridge, and burning the fine structure behind him, took up a position near Krems. This shortened his march on Brünn, where he would unite with the second Russian army, by full four days; and he believed he could now afford his men a short respite. The Austrian cavalry covered the operation and then retired to Vienna.

This escape of Kutusov's did not induce Napoleon to alter his plans. He ordered Murat, unless met in force, to push parties out as far as the Wiener Wald, keeping well closed up, with Soult sustaining him; and he kept the other corps steadily moving forward regardless of hours.

On the 10th Murat got to Sieghart's Kirchen, Lannes passed St. Pölten, Soult was on the Traisen with a division at Mautern, and Bernadotte at Amstetten; while Mortier on the left bank drove back some Austrian outposts, and with

Gazan took position in the defile of Dürrenstein, where stood the castle made famous by the detention of Richard Cœur de Lion on his return from the Crusades. The other divisions were a day's march to the rear.

Napoleon now began to appreciate the danger which Mortier ran from the Russian corps, which was so much his superior in strength ; and it was, moreover, evident that Kutusov could march down river and seize the Danube bridge at Vienna, and render a transfer of the army for operations on the north bank much more difficult. It appeared to the emperor that he had better remain near Kutusov to observe his movements, and that for this purpose Murat had gone too far away from the army ; and he sharply checked his lieutenant's advance, as if it had not been made by his own orders.

Mortier.

On November 11 he wrote Murat : "My Cousin, I cannot approve your manner of marching. You go ahead like a blunderer (*étourdi*), and do not weigh the orders that I cause to be given you. The Russians, instead of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary circumstance ought to have made you understand that you should not act without new instructions. Without knowing what projects the enemy might have, nor knowing what I might wish, you continue to rush my army on Vienna. Yet you have received the order to follow the Russians with your sword in their ribs. It is a singular manner of following them, to move away from them by forced marches. I seek in vain reasons to explain your conduct."

He then instructed Murat to occupy Tulln and reconnoitre in his front. Soult was called back so soon as Napoleon reached St. Pölten ; Davout was not to pass Mödling, and

renstein four thousand French, attacked by twenty-five to thirty thousand Russians, kept their positions, killed three or four thousand of the enemy, took flags and made thirteen hundred prisoners. The 4th and 9th Light and the 100th and 32d of the line covered themselves with glory." Still the emperor acknowledged the heavy losses incurred. On the 14th of November he wrote Bertrand to notify Mortier that "As Gazan's and Dupont's divisions have suffered much, my intention is that from the moment they shall be no longer necessary in the pursuit of the Russians and the present operations, to give them some repose and winter quarters, where they may recover."

But although Napoleon could employ misrepresentation to cover up defeat, he could also make the best of whatever mishap interrupted his plans. Indeed, he instantly saw in the Dürrenstein incident an advantage. He was singular in his ability to thrust aside bad luck, and in it to recognize any gleam of good; and in the fact that this action had delayed Kutusov at Krems, he saw a better chance to seize the Vienna bridge and debouch on the Russian communications. The bridge was now the key of the situation: "This is the great opportunity to cross the Danube, and to drive the Russians from Krems by falling on their rear," said he. At 6 A. M., November 12, he wrote to Murat, whom he had ordered forward and then petulantly held back, to forge ahead again and seize the bridge at all hazards before it could be destroyed; while Davout and Lannes were placed under his orders and hurried forward to sustain him. At 5 P. M. he again wrote: "You should (by this time) have passed the Vienna bridge. If you have been fortunate enough to find intact the Vienna bridge, do not lose an instant, pass the Danube with a portion of the cavalry, the grenadiers and Suchet's division. Have Legrand's and Vandamme's divisions follow you. This Russian army may find itself by this manœuvre quite taken. I will come myself to join you during the day of to-morrow. If, on the contrary, there is no possibility of crossing the Danube

at Vienna, and it is easier to pass it at Tulln or at Klosterneuburg, send the order to make the crossing. I will await your first reports . . . to make my other dispositions. . . . From the moment that you shall have passed the Danube, flood your route with cavalry."

No one has ever claimed that Napoleon was a just man; nor indeed was he free from irascible and often injudicious fault-finding. Naturally of a kind nature, though imperious, he had first been spoiled by his early difficulties, and then by his astonishing success; and his inferiors suffered much from his impatience. Errors were imputed to them which were only the sequence of cross purposes, or the result of that ignorance of the enemy's movements which unceasingly dominates the fortunes of the soldier. Napoleon found fault when he knew that no blame could equitably be attached to the act in question; the officer criticised knew it, too, and knew that the emperor knew it; but it often hit hard. At St. Helena Bonaparte's good side had time again to expand. In the storm and stress of war there was scant leisure for explanations. Orders were short and sharp; they were obeyed, often with a stinging sense of unfairness. And yet every man, recognizing the master, political and military, in intellect and in character, swallowed the bitter dose without a word; and those who did so had a credit-mark scored to them on Napoleon's mental tablets; and the emperor's memory was of the very best.

To hold the situation firmly at both ends, Bernadotte was kept at Mölk, Soult was held *in situ*, so that should Murat not succeed, or should Mortier need aid, Mautern could be made the crossing-place; or in fact Napoleon might thus be able, by crossing at Vienna and Mautern, to inclose the Russians from two sides. But Mortier was no longer on the farther side of the river, as Napoleon at the moment imagined.

On the evening of the battle, with the aid of the flotilla, he had put over to the right bank at Spitz, leaving Klein with his dragoons to scout from the other bank towards the Bohemian passes.

Foot Artilleryman.

At this critical juncture, on November 12, there came to Napoleon's headquarters Count Giulay, with a message from the Austrian emperor relating to the negotiations for an armistice, and Murat's advance was for a moment checked. Giulay also brought news of the Austrian treaty of November 12 with Prussia, expecting it to produce a marked effect. But no terms could be arrived at. Indeed, to stay his hand now without a distinct success would be suicidal for Napoleon. Delay of any kind ran in favor of the enemy. On the 13th he wrote Bernadotte: "The enemy can take one of three courses: 1, move to Bohemia; 2, or to Moravia; 3, or concentrate at Krems. This last course seems so absurd that it has been spoken of solely to present all that is possible. There would be no victual for him because he is not master of the Danube. He would find himself surrounded by the whole French army, of which he knows the power. But all the probabilities are that the enemy is already at this moment on the march." The instructions go on to say that should the enemy march on either Moravia or Bohemia, Bernadotte was to pursue with Mortier in reserve, and the other corps would coöperate. In the belief, then, that Kutusov could not be so imprudent as to stay at Krems, but was about

to start for Bohemia or Moravia, Napoleon again pushed Murat on towards the Vienna bridge by forced marches, so as, if possible, to get between Kutusov and the other oncoming Russian army. To be certain that his orders were understood and obeyed, he sent Bertrand, his aide, with instructions how to capture Vienna, and orders for Murat to seize the bridge at daylight November 13, and push with his cavalry out along the roads to Moravia and Bohemia, Soult with two divisions to follow towards Znaim, Lannes towards Wölkersdorf; the other two divisions of Soult's to remain near Vienna as a reserve.

The capital of Austria had within its walls not far from one hundred thousand souls, with a considerable population in the suburbs. It was well fortified, and contained an immense arsenal. When Emperor Francis had left Mölk on the failure of negotiations, he had gone to Presburg to encourage the Hungarians to raise the Insurrection; and from thence had traveled to Brünn, where Emperor Alexander had joined his own second army. Vienna was thus weakly abandoned, when it could have resisted the French for many days, and been made to play a decisive rôle in the concentration which the allies of all things needed, and Napoleon could least of all things afford. But this was not an era like that of 1683, when Vienna stemmed the tide of Turkish invasion, and her allies fought for Christendom under her very walls. The gates were opened to the French without delay.

Followed by Oudinot, Murat, with his cuirassiers and dragoons, rode into Vienna early November 13. Meerfeldt had retired across the river, and held the north end of the great Danube bridge, which had long been mined, ready to be blown up; and the commanding officer, the Duke of Auersperg, was ready to light the fuse. But Murat, Lannes and Bertrand boldly walked on the bridge, and under the cleverly urged

pretense of an existing armistice, and by ingenious if not ingenuous methods, managed to bring the French troops up to the south end of the bridge, where they smartly seized it, and prevented its destruction. Auersperg, baffled by the ruse, withdrew towards Brünn, and Bertrand with the news galloped back to Napoleon, whom he found in Purkersdorf. A great gain had been scored by the French, who could now at will debouch upon the left bank, and who held at the same moment the one place at which the allies could most effectively concentrate.

Bertrand.

Much that the emperor wrote and said and did was for pure effect upon France, upon the Grand Army and upon the enemy. On November 14 he wrote Berthier to "give the order that all the Russians dangerously wounded shall be transported to Vienna. My principal object is by this measure to make this great city see that the Russians have lost many men. Notify of this at once the magistrates of the hospitals. Neither French nor Austrians are to be placed in the hospitals. The French wounded are not to be allowed to come to Vienna. You are to send those of the Dürrenstein combat to the Abbey at Mölk. The monks are rich enough to treat them well; that will constitute their contribution. You must send thither an ambulance (medical stores)." To Marmont, November 14, he wrote, "I took at Vienna the whole arsenal and all the magazines of artillery; the cannon, guns and munition of all kinds are by thousands and thousands." And in the 23d Bulletin, "The weather has become very fine; to-day

is one of the most beautiful of the winter, though cold. Commerce and all transactions go on in Vienna as usual. The inhabitants are full of confidence, and very quiet at home. The population of the city is a quarter million souls. It is not estimated to have diminished by ten thousand people on account of the absence of the Court and the great lords." In the same Bulletin we read that "the discontent of the people is extreme. They say everywhere that they are badly governed; that for the single interest of England they have been dragged into an unjust and disastrous war; that Germany has been flooded by barbarians a thousand times more to be feared than all other plagues combined."

Sword of the Period.

burg to await orders. Whereupon, feeling reasonably secure now that Davout had reached Vienna, Soult was pushed on to Stockerau, Kutusov having reached Meissau. But as Bernadotte had not yet been able to get his bridge finished at Mautern so as to cross the Danube, Napoleon berated his slowness in no measured terms. On November 15 Berthier wrote him: "The emperor, Monsieur le Maréchal, is angry that, in this moment when Prince Murat and Marshals Lannes and Soult are fighting at two days from Vienna, you have not yet put a single man across the Danube. Your soldiers will be no doubt grieved not to have all the share they should have in the glory of this campaign. On the return of my staff officer, the emperor hopes that you will notify him that all your army has passed, that you are pursuing the Russians, and that you are keeping the bayonet in their ribs."

On November 15, under Napoleon's urgent orders, Murat hurried to head off Kutusov, or at least to interfere with his march and cut out some of his troops; and as Soult's last division had not yet reached Vienna, Caffarelli was pushed out to sustain him. In order to do the manœuvre justice, Murat really needed more men, and Napoleon wrote to Marmont from Schönbrunn, November 15: "I have sent all my forces against the Russians. I have not many, as I must hold Vienna; and as I intend to turn them so as to go at them in earnest, I need more men than if I merely intended to beat them." It will be noticed that Napoleon always kept in mind the idea of fighting *à outrance*, of destroying his adversary — much as Frederick did. The drawn battle, the battle without any particular result, was to him — as it should be to every commander — a waste of energy and men. It was this that has so often been called the gambler's instinct; but though the emperor did in fact possess this instinct, his de-

sire to fight decisive battles came rather from his desire to accomplish real results, than merely from his consciousness of tactical power, or from the fact that his calculation of chances was far closer than that of any of his opponents. Taken as what we call "quality," quite disassociated with the act of gambling, what is characterized as the gambler's equipment is really a network of fine intellectual and characteristic traits. No man can play good poker who lacks the quality that makes for success; and yet from an ethical standpoint there are perhaps better pastimes than playing poker.

Though he had delayed too long at Krems, the Russian commander had meanwhile no idea of being cut off. Having heard of the seizure of the Vienna bridge shortly after its occurrence, having learned of Murat's advance on the Znaim and Budweis post-roads, and believing that Mortier might still be a dangerous element in his rear, he made a severe night march, November 14–15, over the mountain roads to Schrattenthal; and as his men were then in sore need of rest, he dispatched eight thousand men under Bagration south along the Vienna-Znaim road to Hollabrünn, to head off the French, and thus enable the Russian main force to reach the road above him, near Jetzelsdorf. This was neither the first nor the last of Bagration's hard tasks. A body of troops under Nostitz, which was covering the Austrian retreat on Znaim and stood in his way, Murat cleverly sidetracked by again pleading the armistice, and rode ahead with his dragoons; but when, marching northerly along the Znaim road, he reached Bagration drawn up in line at Schöngrabern, he imagined that he had before him the entire Russian army, and having only one of Lannes' infantry divisions at hand, he resorted to the same subterfuge he had twice played on the Austrians with so much success. But the wily Russian was more than his match at this sort of thing. Time was just what

Kutusov stood in need of. To keep Murat in place while awaiting his foot was the very thing to be desired, and Bagration at once went in for a temporary truce with the French marshal. There was one of the so-called Czar's Aides, General Winzingerode, present in Bagration's camp, and him the Russian commander sent to Murat to talk in the czar's name. It was agreed that the French were to advance no farther, and the Russians to march out of Germany, so soon as Napoleon should approve of the negotiation. Meanwhile Bagration kept hard at work intrenching, and Kutusov by forced marches got to Jetzelsdorf — whence to Znaim was but part of a day.

Fusileer of Grenadier Guards.

The meaning of this child's play of Murat's was at once apparent to Napoleon, who with an outburst of anger received the report of it at 8 A. M., November 16, in Schönbrunn. He could see that Kutusov had escaped him, and that a mere rearguard had by clever deception held Murat in place.

He immediately wrote this marshal: "It is impossible for me to find terms to express to you my discontent. You only command my vanguard, and you have not the right to make an armistice without my order. You make me lose the fruits of a campaign. Break the armistice at once, and march on the enemy. You will notify him that the general who signs this capitulation has not the right to make it, that only the Emperor of Russia has this right; but that, whenever the Emperor of Russia shall ratify the convention in question, I will ratify it. But it is nothing but a ruse. March; destroy the Russian army. You are in position to take his baggage and his artillery. The aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia is a rogue; officers are nothing when they have not (written)

authority. This one did not have any. The Austrians let themselves be cheated at the crossing of the bridge of Vienna. You let yourself be cheated by an aide-de-camp of the emperor. I cannot conceive how you can have let yourself be made a fool of to this extent."

Speeding these orders to his lieutenant to attack at once, Napoleon set his Guard in motion towards Hollabrünn, and instructed Davout to draw Gudin in to Vienna so that he might dispose of Caffarelli against the Russians. He was vexed beyond measure at the escape of Kutusov by such a paltry trick, and every one was now put on his mettle to repair the damage. Soult's three divisions had meanwhile all come up, and Murat with a force greatly in excess of his opponent delayed not to attack. The battle began towards sundown. Oudinot, with Vandamme in reserve, assaulted the position of Bagration in front, while Suchet turned the Russian right and Legrand the left flank. The Russian centre was broken in and the right severely handled. The village of Grund was set afire, and the contending forces fought for its possession with fierce tenacity. The Russians, as always in a defensive battle, resisted with the national obtuse courage, and until 11 P. M. Bagration held his own, though with frightful losses, until he had accomplished his task. Then, throwing into one column all that was left of his handful of men, he cut his way through the French turning divisions and, with a red-blazoned scroll of honor in his hand, followed Kutusov, who reached Lechwitz that night.

With his usual habit of exaggerating the French performance, in a style which brings to mind many of the battle reports of our own Civil War, the emperor, in the 26th Bulletin, said of this battle of Guntersdorf: "That part of the Russian army which formed the rearguard was routed, lost twelve pieces of cannon, one hundred baggage wagons, two thousand prisoners and two thousand men remaining on the field of battle. Marshal Lannes attacked the enemy in front, and while he had him turned on the left by the grenadier brigade of General Dupas, Marshal

Soult caused him to be turned on the right by the brigade of General Levasseur of Legrand's division. . . . Had not night fallen, nothing would have escaped. Several times the men fought with the white weapon. A battalion of Russian grenadiers showed intrepidity." The 28th Bulletin says, "The Russian cavalry is well mounted, well equipped, had showed intrepidity and resolution, but the men did not seem to know how to use the sabre, and in this respect our cavalry has a great advantage."

Napoleon came up after the battle, and on the 17th, under his dragooning, the French army made speed in the effort

again to strike the Russian rear. Znaim was reached at night by the cavalry, and the foot divisions came trailing along by forced marches, all — Soult, Lannes, Caffarelli and the Guard

— reaching the town before morning; while Bernadotte was still a march distant, having finally crossed on November 15. Mortier had put over again to the left bank and reached Krems. In the rear were Bourcier's cavalry, which was marching on Vienna, and Baraguay, via Waldmünchen, was scouting out towards Pilsen. Beaumont's dragoons were with Davout, holding the road from Vienna to Brünn; and Klein still watched the Bohemian gaps. Here again is a good example of Napoleon's use of the cavalry reserve. Much as he may have counted on employing it in masses on the battlefield, we see here how skillfully he utilized it as the "feelers" of the army; throughout the march from the Inn to Vienna, Murat had been in the van with every squadron that was not out as distant flankers. All great captains have made effective use of the cavalry arm, to the marked enhancement of their strategic power; and Napoleon was not behind his peers.

In the 25th Bulletin, November 16, is described the recovery by the 76th regiment of the line of two flags lost in the Grisons. These were found in the arsenal of Innsbruck. "In the ceremony, when Marshal Ney returned them the flags, the tears flowed from the eyes of all the old soldiers; the young conscripts were proud to have served in retaking these standards, captured from their elders by the vicissitudes of war. The emperor ordered that this touching scene should be consecrated by a picture. The French soldier has for his flag the sentiment which is close to tenderness. It is the object of his worship, like a present from the hands of a mistress."

The allies kept on with their efforts to concentrate; and Kutusov on November 17 reached Pöhrlitz, and Bagration Frainspitz. At the former place the Vienna garrison joined his army, and made up a force of forty-five thousand men.

Junction with the second Russian army was now near at hand. To push on to Brünn was Napoleon's plan, though it became essential to give the troops some rest. They were now well fed, having bread and meat and wine in abundance; but their shoes had been worn out by the ceaseless marching

Francis II.

from Boulogne to Vienna, and cold weather was upon them. Many men marched barefoot in the snow.

As Napoleon understood the Austrian emperor to be in Brünn, in order to gain what diplomatic credit he could, when giving the Grand Army a day's rest, on November 17 he wrote from Znaim to the Emperor of Austria: —

"Monsieur mon Frère, An officer of Your Majesty has handed me your letter at the moment I was taking horse at Hollabrünn. I hasten to answer Your Majesty, to thank you for the confidence you show, and to assure you of my desire to be agreeable to you; and at the same time the regret that I have to see the moment of reëstablishment of peace between

us retarded further every day. I had desired to push my outposts to-day on Brünn, but I will stop all the day of to-morrow, and all the time Your Majesty remains there; for I would not, when my only object is to pursue the Russian army and force it to evacuate your states, do anything which might be taken as done with the object of being personally disagreeable to you." . . . Then follows much expression of ill-will against the Russians, and of the desire to give the Emperor Francis a proof of esteem and friendship. "The Russians burn, as they retire, the most beautiful villages. If Your Majesty will assure me that they will evacuate your states, I will stop at Brünn and cease to pursue them." But in a letter to Marshal Lannes of November 18, while saying, "I reproach you constantly for exposing yourself too much. It is not really to love me to thus expose my best friends," . . . he adds: "It cost me much to give this day to the grenadiers to repose, but I was induced to do so by the thought that it is better to have less complete victory than to expose such brave men to being sick." Napoleon was always ready with a double reason to meet whoso came.

Bernadotte was this day ordered to Budweis, and Iglau to contain Archduke Ferdinand, who was reported to be again afoot with fifteen thousand men; Mortier was instructed to leave Dumonceau at Krems, and to occupy Vienna with his other two divisions, while Davout should take possession of Presburg. The allied Austro-Russian army camped at and about Schlapanitz, near Brünn.

In Italy, meanwhile, Massena had been well seconding his imperial master. Both Archduke Charles' inaction on the Adige and Archduke John's presence in the Tyrol had been a waste of the Austrian forces. Only a vigorous policy could excuse so large a force in Italy, and an army in the Tyrol could play no part save as spectator of the events on either hand. Charles had over one hundred thousand men on the Adige when Mack crossed the Inn. The rule of war, to strike wherever you are stronger than your opponent, is imperative. Even though Charles could not have prevented the disaster to Mack, the moral effect of an Austrian victory on the Po

would have been immense. If Charles had but driven Massena back of the Mincio, he could have left a reasonable force to contain him, and have retired unperceived, and early enough to reach Vienna and give the allies the preponderance. But under the monitions of the Aulic Council, Charles was more anxious to secure Venice than to reconquer Lombardy, and he thus left the initiative to the French. Each army lay on its side of the Adige, the boundary between France and Austria since the Peace of Lunéville. A truce had been made to last up to October 17. The Austrians stood

Alexander I.

with the right flank at Pescantina and the left at Arcole, holding that part of Verona situated on the left bank, the city being cut in two by the river. The French army had the right flank at Zevio, the left at Bussolengo, and held the right-bank half of Verona. The bridge was barricaded and

partly broken down. In accordance with Napoleon's orders, at midnight on October 17 Massena began hostilities by forcing the Adige at three points, taking possession of the Austrian part of the town, and repairing the bridge; and having strengthened his position, he threw out his van to Caldiero and Colognola, to which place Charles had retired, and here it lay facing the Austrians ten days. Caldiero was the exceptional defensive position which we remember in the Arcole week of 1796. When Massena heard of the capitulation of Ulm on the 28th, and had concluded that the Austrian position was too strong to attack in front, he sent Verdier's division to cross at Zevio and turn Charles' left while Molitor's division marched around his right, he remaining himself with two divisions opposite the Austrian centre, with another at Rivoli. Massena was considerably outnumbered; and Charles, as a mask to begin his retreat, already predetermined by the loss of Ulm, opened the attack in the forenoon of October 30. Massena answered the Austrian onset with great gallantry. Duhesme was on the French right, Gardanne in the centre and Molitor on the left. Molitor was first attacked, but threw back the Austrian right to Colognola. The French right was held all day long at Gombine by Nordmann, but the French centre succeeded in taking Caldiero. Massena saw victory before him, but Charles at the last moment pushed forward at the head of his reserves and threw him back. The French passed the night of October 30–31 behind Gombine and Ca del Ara, and retired next day to Verona. Their loss had been six thousand men and two thousand prisoners. The Austrians lost fifty-seven hundred men. Massena's tenacity, added to the moral effect of Ulm, prevailed on Charles to retire without loss of time. This he did, and Massena followed hard upon his heels, while the strong Austrian force in Venice was masked by St. Cyr, who

At Brünn, the emperor and the Guard	5,300	men.
At Brünn, Lannes. (Oudinot and Suchet.) . . .	12,000	"
At Austerlitz, on the right, Soult. (St. Hilaire, Vandamme, Legrand.)	26,000	"
At Znaim and Budweis, on the left, Bernadotte. (Drouet, Rivaud, Wrede)	19,000	"
At Wischau, in front, Murat. (Nansouty, Hautpoul, Walther.)	4,500	"
At Pöhrlitz, in rear, Caffarelli	6,000	"
At Nickolsburg, in rear, Friant	6,000	"
Out on the Bohemian border, Baraguay	4,500	"
Going to Presburg, Klein, 1,100 men; to relieve Bourcier, coming to Znaim, 2,000	3,100	"
At Presburg, Davout's division, Gudin	8,000	"
At Vienna, Mortier. (Dupont 6,000, Gazan and Beaumont 2,000.)	8,000	"
At Neustadt, Dumonceau	4,500	"
At Leoben and Gratz, Marmont. (Boudet and Grouchy.)	9,000	"
Total under the emperor's hand	115,900	"

A dissection of this table will show that in twenty-four hours Napoleon could have under the colors at Brünn or Austerlitz about fifty-four thousand men; in three days about seventy-five thousand men; on the fourth day about eighty-five thousand men. The allies with ninety thousand men were in camp in front of Olmütz, some forty miles distant, on the old familiar ground so often trodden by Frederick, and should they advance upon him, he might choose to retire one or two days' march, and by drawing in Davout, Mortier and Klein, about face and deliver battle with over one hundred thousand men.

To look over the larger strategic field, we find that Massena with the Army of Italy, thirty-five thousand strong, was at Krain, whence, on November 29, he advanced to Laybach; and from here he got into touch with Marmont at Bruck.

Compelled to retire by the events on the Danube, Archduke Charles now stood near Marburg on the Drave; and he had been, on November 26, joined by Archduke John, whom Ney had driven out of the Tyrol. Together they numbered eighty thousand men. Leaving the Bavarian corps of nine thousand men under Deroy in the Tyrol, Ney had set out from Botzen, November 21, with Loison and Malher, thirteen thousand men, to follow up Archduke John, who, however, had managed to keep ahead of him.

It might be said that the French were ill-concentrated. This was excusable only for one who, like Napoleon, calculated the positions of his armies and knew when and how to concentrate. "The sublime of the art is to know how to divide to pursue, impose on men's minds, deceive the enemy; but to reunite when one must fight," says Jomini. Napoleon above all others had this knowledge. On October 18 he was at Ulm, a month later he was at Brünn, having crossed numerous rivers and fought a half-dozen minor engagements. And there was not a day in this month when his strategic position, even if not entirely satisfactory, was not superior to that of the allies. Moreover, concentration is a relative word, and compared to the allies, the French were well in hand. Archduke Charles could scarcely elude Ney and Massena, avoid Marmont and reach the imperial army, except by a long detour through Hungary. An attempt to do this would soon come to Napoleon's ears, and he would have abundant time to attack the army under the emperors. Should Kutusov and Charles attempt a concentric march on Vienna, Napoleon had the inner line, and could more quickly gather his one hundred and seventy-five thousand men between the two allied armies, and hold one in check with a smaller part while he annihilated the other by overwhelming numbers, as he had already shown in Italy that he knew how to do. Thus, though

the French were stretched over a front of more than two hundred miles, they had the interior lines and were more ready to hand than the two divided armies of the allies under Archduke Charles and Kutusov.

In the order of the day of November 24 it is said: "The intention of the emperor is to give some moments of repose to the army. The chiefs of corps should profit by it to have the clothes and the foot-gear repaired, to have arms cleaned, and to rally all the men. They are with care to make a list of all the stragglers, who without legitimate cause have remained in the rear; they will recommend to the soldiers to make it a shame for them, for in the French army the worst punishment for him who has not taken part in dangers and in glory is the shame which his comrades impose upon him. Finally, if there are any who are in this case, the emperor doubts not that they will be eager at the first occasion to rally on and close around their flags."

Battle was as keenly desired by Napoleon as it had ever been by Frederick, and he remained at Brünn hoping for the approach of the enemy. Conscious of his greater tactical skill, he longed for the chance to test it on the Austrians and Russians, before the formal Prussians, who had worn a threatening look, but as yet done little, could add to his difficulties by their mobilization. He did not want to go far from the Danube to hunt up the allies and force battle on them; he preferred that they should seek him; and fortune favored him, in that the two emperors, after several councils of war and reconnoissances, concluded on November 24 to march down towards Vienna, turn the French right flank, and in case this threat did not compel Napoleon's retreat, to attack him where he stood, by cutting his communications and falling on his left wing at the same time. The entire plan was matured.

On November 25 and following days, while the French army lay cantoned behind the outposts of Murat's cavalry, which stood at Wischau, there was a renewal of negotiations for peace. Napoleon wrote to the Emperor of Russia: "Sire, I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to Your Majesty to compliment you on your arrival in the army. I charge him to express to you all my esteem for you, and my desire to find occasion which will prove to you how much ambition I have to gain your friendship. I pray you to receive him with the kindness which distinguishes you, and to hold me as one of the men most desirous of being agreeable to you. With this I pray God that He will hold Your Imperial Majesty in his Holy and worthy care. NAPOLEON."

Savary.

The 30th Bulletin says that Savary "had been received most cordially by the Emperor of Russia and the Grand Duke Constantine," but that "in consequence of the conversations he had during three days with some thirty coxcombs, who under different titles environed the Emperor of Russia, it was easy to see that presumption, imprudence and inconsideration would reign in the decisions of the military cabinet. . . . The army thus led could not delay to make mistakes. The plan of the emperor was from this moment to wait for them, and to spy out the instant to profit by them. He at once gave orders for retreat to his army; retired at night as if he had met a defeat, took a good position three leagues in the rear, and caused work with much ostentation to be done to fortify it, and to establish batteries in it."

Generals Stadion and Giulay also came on a similar errand from the Emperor Francis to Napoleon's headquarters. The allies hoped that the Prussian adherence to the Coalition would bring Napoleon to less exorbitant demands than he had made at Mölk; but as a matter of fact, no adversaries could be farther apart as to claims. At the same time Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, came to the French headquarters. "To Messieurs Stadion and Giulay the emperor offered an armistice to save blood, but he saw that the enemy was not seriously treating the subject." Indeed, while the discussion was going on, and Napoleon had proposed that it be adjourned to Vienna, the Russians on November 28 were reported as attacking Wischau. From the French view, this act of war pending negotiations at once put any peaceful settlement out of the question.

On November 26 Berthier wrote Marshal Soult: "The emperor has charged me to communicate to you, Monsieur le Maréchal, his ideas on the order of battle which should be taken in face of the Russians; this order of battle should be, as early as it can be done, taken in the following manner: —

"Each brigade, its first regiment in line.

"The second regiment in close column by divisions.

"The first battalion on the right and in rear of the first battalion of the first regiment.

"The second battalion on the left in rear of the second battalion.

"The artillery in the interval of the two battalions which are in line, and some pieces on the right and the left.

"If the division has a fifth regiment, it should be in reserve one hundred paces in the rear, a squadron or at least a division of cavalry behind each brigade, so as to be able to pass through the interval, pursue the enemy if he is broken, and hold head to the Cossacks. In this order of battle you will find yourself able to oppose to the enemy the fire of the line, and have close columns all ready to oppose his own."

Having made up their minds to assume the offensive, though, indeed, they had everything to gain by delay which

should enable Charles to come on, and the reserve, and the Russian guards under Grand Duke Constantine having arrived, the allies began their projected manœuvre from Olmütz to turn the French army by its right and cut it off from Vienna. Starting on the morning of November 27, the vicinity of Prossnitz was reached that day, and on the succeeding one Bagration with the van ran across Murat's dragoons at Wischau, and these promptly retired; Kutusov followed on and occupied the place, and threw detachments beyond it. On receiving the news of this advance from Murat towards evening, the emperor naturally looked for a summary attack on the morrow, November 29, or the day after, and at once dispatched couriers to Caffarelli, Bourcier and Klein, with orders to be at Brünn by early morning of that day, and to Davout, Bernadotte and Mortier to fall in on the main army by forced marches, Bernadotte to leave the Bavarians at Iglau to contain Archduke Ferdinand. Personally, Napoleon started out to ride over the vicinity and see for himself what was doing, repairing at first to Posorsitz, where he found Soult. From the heights of Austerlitz he could see much of the country to the north, but little came in view to show that there was any large body of the enemy near at hand. Napoleon had, however, as we have seen, taken the precaution to send his aide-de-camp, Savary, to the Emperor Alexander at Olmütz with what was really only a trivial message; this officer returned at night, having, as he was ordered, used his eyes to advantage; and from him the emperor learned that the entire allied army was on the march towards him. Savary was at once sent back, with equally useful instructions, and was able to learn much. "Napoleon also proposed an interview with the Emperor of Russia, who sent him his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgoroulki. This aide could notice that everything in the behavior of the French army breathed reserve and

timidity. The placing of the grand guards, the fortifications which were being hurriedly made, everything permitted the Russian officer to see an army half beaten. Against the habit of the emperor, who never received with so much circumspection parliamentarians at headquarters, he himself went to the outposts. After the first compliments, the Russian officer began to open political questions. He talked about everything with an impertinence difficult to imagine. . . . He was, in a word, a young trumpeter of England. . . . The emperor gave no vent to his indignation, and this young man, who has taken a veritable influence on the Emperor Alexander, returned full of the idea that the French army was on the eve of its destruction."

Driver of Artillery Train.

On November 30, at 4 P. M., in the bivouac near Brünn, Napoleon wrote to his minister at Vienna: "Monsieur Talleyrand, I desire to make peace promptly." Then follow certain terms which the emperor is willing to allow. "There will probably be to-morrow a most serious battle with the Russians. I have done much to avoid it, for it is blood shed uselessly. I have had a correspondence with the Emperor of Russia; all that it has come to goes to show that he is a brave, worthy man, led by his surroundings, which are sold to the English, but to that point that they wish to oblige me to give Genoa to the King of Sardinia, and to renounce Belgium. You will fall over backwards when you learn that Monsieur de Novosiltzov has proposed to reunite Belgium and Holland. . . . Send word to Paris that, bivouacking for the last four days in the midst of my grenadiers, I am only writing on my

knees, and that I therefore can write no more. For all that, I am very well. NAPOLEON." And "In writing to Paris, do not speak of the battle, for that would be to disquiet my wife too much. Do not be alarmed, I am in a strong position. I regret all it will cost, and almost without aim."

At this moment the French can scarcely be said to have been ready to meet the allies in a pitched battle. Owing to victualing exigencies, a sharp concentration had not yet been effectuated, and Bohemia and Hungary had each demanded a detachment for observation. To be sure, Bernadotte and Davout had been called in and were coming along fast, but should the allies march in on him at once, they would find him with not much exceeding fifty thousand men to cope with their eighty thousand. Brünn was, however, a strong place upon which to rely, and on this fortress Napoleon ordered Murat, Lannes and Soult to rally. Davout was further ordered to Nickolsburg; Mortier was to leave Vienna in charge of Dumonceau and march to Brünn; Marmont was to fall back from Neustadt on Vienna.

Not only were numbers for the moment against the French, but Napoleon had had a smart taste of the Russians at Hollabrünn, and he knew how they had fought at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf. On the other hand, Alexander had never led an army; his generals were habituated to fight Turks; they were only auxiliaries of the Austrians, — this was not their particular quarrel, — and they were apt to rely on Austrian leadership, of which Napoleon held no high opinion. The plans of the allies were made by Weyrother, who had been at Roveredo, Bassano and Rivoli, and been beaten by Moreau at Hohenlinden; and the emperor felt that, as far as skill was concerned, he had not much to fear, though the numbers and fighting quality of the enemy were not to be underrated.

And he was right. The allies, on the withdrawal of Murat

reinforced. But after a heavy cannonade he again withdrew. The allies advanced along the Olmütz-Brünn road and the roads parallel to it in five columns, with two vanguards and one reserve, these having been adopted for the elaborate manœuvre they had in hand. Inasmuch as Davout and Bernadotte were still at a distance, Napoleon determined to hold himself a day or two on the Schwartzawa to await their coming; and he accordingly drew in his lines, which had extended out beyond Pratzen heights to Austerlitz, and on the 29th he occupied Melnitz, Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz and Schlapanitz, along the Goldbach stream. Outposts were placed at Aujesd, Girzkowitz and Krug. The emperor's bivouac was at first placed on the heights west of and overlooking Dwaroschna, from which the whole country could be seen.

In rallying on Brünn at daylight of November 29, Austerlitz was given up by Soult, who then retired to the line Sokolnitz-Schlapanitz, with Caffarelli in reserve at Latein, Suchet north of the Olmütz road behind the Bösenitz hill, nicknamed the "Santon" by the French soldiers, in memory, it is said, of a similar hill in Egypt. The Guard and Oudinot were in support at Kritschen. The cavalry was divided between Girzkowitz, Bösenitz and Belatitz; and a large party was sent to occupy the plateau of Pratzen. The emperor had been much on Santon hill; but he later changed his bivouac to another high hill, from which the whole country could be seen, and which lay south of the Brünn road and east of Bellowitz.

That the allies were ready to deliver battle was an error. They were more than deliberate. All that Kutusov did after reaching Rausnitz was, back of his outposts, to move the army some distance by the left, feeling, as it were, for every step, so as to be better prepared to get around the French right. From this slow manœuvre Napoleon drew the conclu-

sion that it would be December 1 before the enemy attacked. He knew that Davout and Bernadotte could not get up before that day; and had the battle been forced on him November 29 or 30, he had been of a mind to retire behind the Schwartzawa. Yet more time was allowed Napoleon than even this, for the enemy fairly frittered away his hours. The first intention of the allies seemed to Napoleon to have been to make a long strategic detour around the French right to gain his rear; but soon they appeared to approach within tactical manœuvring distance, where any hour an accidental clash might bring on a general engagement. On the 30th Kutusov carefully advanced his outposts around the French right flank as far as the Satschan pond, and the allied army again made a movement by its left until it stood astride the Littawa facing west, the leading column advancing as far as Hodjegitz. The allies were hyper-cautious.

This further delay would have permitted the French to receive battle on the heights of Pratzen, a position on which Napoleon had kept his eye as one dominating the field. Being in the saddle all day, he was able in one way or other to observe the manœuvres of the allies pretty closely, and his trained eye could not fail to catch their purpose. As it was evident that no battle would be delivered before the 2d, and that by that time he would be in force to meet the allies, the emperor spent the day riding over the entire country to the north of the Littawa. During this ride the conception of the approaching battle began to grow. Almost any ordinary general would have at once seized on the heights of Pratzen and leaned the right on the Littawa for a defensive battle, much as we Federals seized on the Gettysburg heights on July 1, 1863; and out of such a position would have come "only an ordinary battle," as he called it, in which Napoleon would have driven back the allies; and then another battle

would have had to be fought to arrive at a decision. Moreover, to occupy the heights of Pratzen might also bring about the conflict on December 1, and if a day could be gained, the French reinforcements would have all the more surely reached the field, and would have had a rest, of which all the French divisions stood in sore need.

The purpose of the allies had become manifest. By a wide circuit of the French right flank, they would cut Napoleon off from Vienna by seizing the road running south from Brünn, and recover the capital — a marked Austrian desideratum, and in a measure strategically proper, because it enabled them to lean on Hungary as well as reach out towards Archduke Charles. And the latter, should the French withdraw from Vienna and Presburg, could more quickly come on to join them, inasmuch as such a withdrawal by the main army would also oblige Ney and Marmont and Massena to fall back. But viewed from the grand-tactical standpoint the long circuit was an error, and just one of those which Napoleon loved to see his enemies commit. To turn his right flank, the allies would indisputably string out in a long column, a manœuvre that would enable Napoleon, who would keep in close order, to fall on them at some weak point, cut them in two, and thus, instead of an ordinary battle, lead up to a decisive one. His plan was not one for the every-day commander, it is true; but to one who could calculate as closely as Napoleon could, the speed with which his own divisions could manœuvre, and the delays he was certain the allies would be guilty of, it was masterful. To the average commander it would have been a gambling transaction; to Napoleon it was betting on a certainty.

With this object in view, on December 1 Napoleon drew up his army in front of and behind the Bösenitz brook, with the left flank on the Santon hill, which he had caused to be

intrenched and held by a regiment with twelve heavy guns, while Suchet of Soult's corps extended across the Olmütz road south to Girschkowitz, sustained by Caffarelli in his rear. Lannes appears to have had under his immediate orders Suchet and Caffarelli as well as Oudinot. Bernadotte, who had left Wrede at Iglau to contain Archduke Ferdinand, came up during the afternoon with Drouet and Rivaud, and went into position behind Caffarelli, about opposite Girschkowitz. Oudinot, with the Guard in reserve, stood in the vicinity of the hill on which the emperor had bivouacked, south of the road; while Murat and the cavalry were placed behind Caffarelli and Oudinot. Soult, with Vandamme and St. Hilaire, was in line west of the Bösenitz brook, opposite Puntowitz, while Legrand was west of Köbelnitz, and held Sokolnitz and Tellnitz. To sustain Soult's right, which it was not essential to hold in heavy force to carry out Napoleon's plans, Davout came up during the night of December 1–2 with Bourcier's dragoons and Friant's division to Raigern. The French right was intended to contain the allied left, which was reaching around to the Vienna road, and to halt it at the brook and ponds, while with his own massed centre and left Napoleon would take immediate advantage of any opening; and he felt convinced the enemy would so manœuvre as to give him a chance to break their centre.

Wrede.

The emperor kept beside him Marshal Berthier, his first aide, General Junot, and all his staff; and near by stood the ten battalions of his Guard, the ten battalions of Oudinot's

grenadiers, commanded in part by General Duroc, and nine squadrons under Bessières. This reserve was in two lines, in columns by battalions at deploying distance, having in the intervals forty guns served by cannoneers of the Guard.

Lichtenstein.
From an old Print.

From Olmütz down, the allies had been slowly advancing left in front in the five columns above spoken of.

On December 1, at daylight, the outposts clashed, and this was followed by reconnoitring parties. The allies started their operation. The first allied column, eighty-five hundred men under Doctorov, moved by way of Herspitz and Wazan to beyond Hosjeradek, where it occupied the heights in two lines, throwing a regiment of riflemen into Aujesd.

The second column, twelve thousand men under Langeron, marched through Austerlitz and Krzenowitz on to the heights of Pratzen, and fell in on the right of Doctorov in two lines.

Miloradovich.
From an old Print.

The third column, fourteen thousand men under Pribichevski, marched by way of the Walk Mill to the heights north of Pratzen, and drew up in a single line.

The fourth column, Russians under Miloradovich and Austrians under Kollowrath, twenty-five thousand men in all, marched by way of St. Urbain's Chapel, and took place behind the third column in second line.

The fifth column, nearly five thousand cavalry under Lichtenstein, followed the third column, and deployed behind the troops at Pratzen.

The reserves, eighty-five hundred Guards under Constantine, took post on the hills overlooking the Littawa.

Bagration's vanguard of thirteen thousand men drew up between Hollubitz and Kowalowitz.

The vanguard of the left wing under Kienmayer, a mixed force of Croats, Austrians and Cossacks, took post at Aujesd.

The allied headquarters was moved to Krzenowitz.

It was understood that the manœuvre by the left was to continue, the Goldbach was to be crossed at Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and the allied army to establish itself on the right rear of the French, so as to be able at any moment to reach out and seize the Brünn-Vienna post-road.

From these movements Napoleon, who calmly watched them from his bivouac, concluded with unerring judgment that the enemy was about to turn his right; that, with the existing topography, in so doing their right and left wings would almost certainly get separated by the heights of Pratzen, and that this would open to him the opportunity to break through their centre. He now permitted his men to rest quietly behind the Goldbach while he busied himself with watching, from a number of available places, the extended mass of the allies strung out over a huge semicircle eight miles long. Every indication led the allies to believe that the French would fight a defensive battle, if indeed they fought at all. "On the 10th (1st) the emperor, from the heights where stood his bivouac, perceived with inexpressible joy the Russian army commencing at some distance from his outposts the flank movement to turn his right. He then saw up to what point presumption and ignorance of the art of war had led astray the counsels of this brave army. He said sev-

eral times, 'Before to-morrow evening that army is mine.'" The enemy feared the French would escape; and Napoleon strove to encourage them. "Prince Murat advanced a body of cavalry into the plains, but suddenly appeared astonished at the immense forces of the enemy, and retired hastily. Thus everything tended to confirm the Russian general in the badly calculated operation he had decided on." The allies were doing exactly that which would enable Napoleon to take them at a disadvantage.

While dining during the afternoon of the 1st, the emperor assembled his corps commanders and, against his usual habit, went over with them the plan he had conceived for the coming battle, and the rôle each one was to play on the morrow. These were embodied in the General Dispositions which follow: —

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS FOR THE DAY OF THE 11TH.

In Bivouac in Front of Brünn, 10 Frimaire, Year XIV. (December 1, 1805), 8.30 p. m.

Marshal Soult will give orders so that his three divisions shall be placed beyond the ravine (Bösenitz Brook) at seven o'clock in the morning, in such a manner as to be ready to commence the manœuvre of the day, which is to be a march forward by echelons, the right wing leading. Marshal Soult will be personally at half-past seven in the morning near the emperor at his bivouac.

His Highness Prince Murat will give orders to the cavalry of General Kellermann, to that of Generals Walther, Beaumont, Nansouty and Hautpoul, so that the divisions may be placed at seven o'clock in the morning between the left of Marshal Soult and the right of Marshal Lannes, in a manner to occupy the least possible space, and so that at the moment when Marshal Soult shall begin his march, all the cavalry under the orders of Prince Murat shall pass the brook, and find itself placed in the centre of the army.

General Caffarelli is ordered to move at seven o'clock in the morning with his divisions so as to place himself on the right of Suchet's division, after having passed the brook. As Suchet's division will place itself in

two lines, Caffarelli's division will also place itself in two lines, each brigade forming one line, and thus the space which Suchet's division occupies at this moment will be sufficient for these two divisions.

Marshal Lannes will observe that Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions are always to be behind the ridge in such a manner as not to be observed by the enemy.

Marshal Bernadotte with his two infantry divisions will move at seven o'clock in the morning into the same position which is occupied to-day, the 10th, by Caffarelli's division, except that his left shall be close to and behind the Santon (hill), and will remain there in column by regiments.

Marshal Lannes will order a division of grenadiers to place itself in line in front of his present position, the left behind the right of General Caffarelli. General Oudinot will reconnoitre the debouch where he is to pass the brook, which debouch will be the same by which Marshal Soult shall have passed.

Marshal Davout, with Friant's division and the division of dragoons of General Bourcier, will start at five o'clock in the morning from the Raigern Abbey, to reach the right of Marshal Soult. Marshal Soult will dispose of Gudin's division when it shall reach him.

At half-past seven the marshals will be near the emperor in his bivouac, so that, according to the movements the enemy may have made during the night, he may give new orders.

The cavalry of Marshal Bernadotte, in consequence of the above dispositions, is placed under the orders of Marshal Murat, who will indicate to it the hour it is to leave so as to be in position at seven o'clock.

Prince Murat will equally dispose of the light cavalry of Marshal Lannes.

All the troops will remain in the dispositions indicated above until new orders.

As the cavalry of Prince Murat must in its first position occupy as little space as possible, he will put it in column.

Marshal Davout will find at the Abbey a squadron and a half of the 21st regiment of dragoons, which he will send to the bivouac.

Each of the marshals will give the orders which apply to him in consequence of the present dispositions.

NAPOLEON.

The meaning of these dispositions was in brief that Legrand's division of Soult was to defend the crossings at Tell-

nitz and Sokolnitz with the utmost tenacity, while St. Hilaire and Vandamme at and south of Schlapanitz, under Soult's personal eye, were to cross the Bösenitz brook (ravine) at 7 A. M., or as soon as ordered, and advance straight up Pratzen heights. Santon hill was the chief bulwark of the post-road; and here Claparède, with his regiment and battery of twelve heavy guns, had orders to defend the position to the utmost extremity. Some light horse operated in his front out towards Rausnitz. Murat's cuirassiers, in rear of Lannes and Soult and on the latter's left, were to form the centre, and the Beaumont dragoons were added to his force. Caffarelli was to cross the brook at the same hour, and march up on Suchet's right, the latter ploying into two lines to make room for him. These two divisions under Lannes, between the post-road and Bellatitz, were to remain under cover of the hills, ready for action at the proper moment, while Bernadotte, with Rivaud and Drouet in second line on his rear, would sustain them, Oudinot on his right, and the Guards and Bessières' cavalry in reserve behind both, with forty guns. Davout was to break up before daylight from Raigern and form on Soult's right, so as to take in flank any allied column which should force the Tellnitz and Sokolnitz crossings. From a grand-tactical standpoint, Napoleon's real right was Soult at Köbelnitz; the force (Legrand) opposite Tellnitz and Sokolnitz, as well as Davout at Raigern with Friant and Bourcier, were really a flying right wing, not part of the line proper. It was evident that the important rôle was Soult's; and in order that his thrust should be effective, it was essential to attack at such a time as to prevent the allied centre from

Voltigeur of the Guard.

dealing too heavy a blow. Napoleon believed that the emperors would be at Austerlitz, and that a heavy column would debouch from there, and as he desired Soult to seize Pratzen and then wheel to the right so as to compromise the Russian left, he determined at the same moment to advance in force on Blasowitz, to sustain Soult's manœuvre and if possible call away troops from the allied centre. It was a question of doing the work at exactly the proper moment. Not only were the corps commanders put into full possession of the grand-tactics of the approaching battle, but after dark for three or four hours Napoleon rode his lines to view the camp-fires of the enemy and judge their position and strength, as well as to show himself to and encourage the troops. In a proclamation read at the head of each battalion December 1, the emperor went so far as to explain to the soldiers what he was about to do: —

TO THE ARMY.

In Bivouac, 10 Frimaire, Year XIV. (December 1, 1805).

Soldiers, a Russian army presents itself before you to avenge the Austrian army of Ulm. These are the same battalions which you beat at Hollabrünn, and which you have constantly pursued to this place. The positions we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they will present me their flank.

Soldiers, I shall myself direct all your battalions. I shall hold myself distant from the fire, if with your accustomed bravery you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory for a moment be uncertain, you would see your emperor expose himself to the first strokes; for victory ought not to hesitate, in this day especially where there is at stake the honor of the French infantry, which means so much to the honor of all the nation.

On pretext of carrying off the wounded, let not the ranks be disgarnished, and let each one be fully penetrated with this idea, that we must vanquish these stipendiaries of England, who are animated with so great a hatred against our nation.

This victory will finish our campaign, and we can retake our winter

quarters, where we shall be joined by new armies which are forming in France ; and then the peace I shall make will be worthy of my people, of you and of me.

NAPOLEON.

There was no great risk in saying all this, though it was certainly an innovation. Had the enemy received a copy of the proclamation, they would have believed it a ruse to mislead them.

This day was the first anniversary of the emperor's coronation, and the troops were full of enthusiasm. "In the evening the emperor desired to visit on foot and *incognito* all the bivouacs, but he had scarcely taken a few steps when he was recognized. It would be impossible to paint the enthusiasm of the soldiers on seeing him. Torches of straw were put in an instant at the tops of thousands of poles, and eighty thousand men presented themselves before the emperor, and saluted him with exclamations, some to feast the anniversary of the crowning, others saying that the army would to-morrow give its bouquet to the emperor. One of the old grenadiers approached him and said: 'Sire, thou hast no need to expose thyself. I promise thee in the name of the grenadiers of the army that thou shalt have to fight but with thine eyes, and that we will bring thee to-morrow the flags and the artillery of the Russian army to celebrate the anniversary of thy crowning.' The emperor said in returning to his bivouac, which consisted of a poor cabin of straw without a roof, which the grenadiers had made him, 'This is the finest evening of my life, . . . but I regret

Drummer of Grenadiers.

to think that I shall lose a great number of these brave men. I feel, by the way it hurts me, that these are really my children, and in truth I sometimes reproach myself with the sentiment, for I fear that it may end by making me unable to carry on war.'"

The emperor's Bulletins were all penned with a purpose, and all duly appeared in the *Moniteur* at Paris, the official organ of the government. Yet from whatever standpoint one reads them, or however one may construe them, each has its own peculiar interest.

Napoleon's plan was not without its dangers. Every bold strategic operation or tactical manœuvre has a complementary risk. In this case, had the allies ployed substantially their entire force into close column, and made their movement around the French right in one body, in a formation enabling them quickly to deploy to the right to meet the French attack, there would have been such real danger to the French standing that Napoleon would have had summarily to retire behind the Schwartzawa and begin to manœuvre afresh; for the allies were operating towards their own proper base, along the highway to Vienna, and during the movement were keeping their retreat open to Hungary. The allied conception was excellent; it was the execution that was faulty, in that the various columns did not keep closed up, and that two principal attacks were made instead of one.

Some firing was heard in the direction of the Sokolnitz and Tellnitz crossings during the evening of December 1 which arrested Napoleon's attention; and he sent Savary thither to ascertain its cause, while he himself snatched a little sleep. Upon this aide's return with the information that masses of the enemy were assembling near the ponds, but that there seemed no probability of a night attack, the emperor, accompanied by Soult, rode thither about 1 A. M.

of December 2, to see what might, from the watch-fires and other indications, be learned of the allied movements. Quiet apparently reigned, and Napoleon retired and took another short rest, until between 4 and 5 A. M. the French divisions, having had their soup and brandy, began to move into their respective places, the manœuvre began, and the marshals assembled on bivouac hill, to report and receive their final orders. The first thing to ascertain was whether there had been any substantial change of position by the enemy during the night; and the reports of the sounds heard by the outposts seemed to indicate that the allies had been sending more troops over to their left towards Aujesd — as indeed was the case. Nothing else had been discovered.

The allies assumed that Napoleon's left wing stood astride the road to Brünn, and that the right stretched out only to Sokolnitz and Kobolnitz; and that if they could seize the defile — or crossing — at Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, they would turn the French right flank; whereupon an advance could be made on Schlapanitz, and the French army be rolled up. They also believed that the French left had been strengthened at the expense of the centre, and Bagration was ordered with Lichtenstein to strike so hard a blow along the Brünn road as to fully occupy Napoleon on his own left, and to enable the allied left to turn the French right as planned, and move up through Schlapanitz on the Brünn-Vienna highway in their rear.

With this idea the allied army received orders shortly after midnight of December 1–2, as follows: Lichtenstein was to deploy between Krug and Blasowitz and move forward to sustain Bagration, whose task was to take the Santon hill — the key of the French left. Grand Duke Constantine was to act as reserve to these two.

Kienmayer was to cover Doctorov, and move out towards

Raigern Abbey to forestall any French troops approaching from that direction. Doctorov was to march on Tellnitz, and Langeron from Pratzen on Sokolnitz. Pribichevski was to head for the castle of Sokolnitz; and having crossed the Goldbach, the three columns were to file to the right past the ponds back of Kobolnitz. Miloradovich and Kollowrath were to be prepared to follow along. The columns were to be in motion at seven o'clock.

Early on the morning of this day, thrice glorious for the French, the emperor, surrounded by his marshals, was standing on headquarters hill. A thick fog covered the landscape, but by seven the tops of the heights began to appear, and before long all but the valleys were discernible. Suddenly the sun — the "sun of Austerlitz" — burst forth in all its glory, and showed the heights of Pratzen for the moment denuded of troops. The allies had got promptly afoot; many of their battalions had already moved from there, and were getting massed for their blow at Tellnitz and Sokolnitz. Most of these troops were hidden by the lay of the ground; but one column (it was Lichtenstein's) could be seen marching from the allied centre towards Hollubitz. This proved to a tactical certainty that the allied centre was being drawn on to strengthen both right and left. The enemy had dangerously disgarnished his centre, as if to give Napoleon the very chance he sought.

The allied left, which stood under Buxhovden, thirty thousand strong, headed by Kienmayer's cavalry as van, was thus pursuing its march as ordered, the several columns towards Tellnitz, towards Sokolnitz, on the Sokolnitz chateau, along a line straight across the Pratzen plateau. It was understood that so soon as this whole body should have crossed the Goldbach and by a right wheel have reached the Turas wood (from where the Brünn-Vienna highway was easily gained at

a point south of the supposed French position), Bagration, with his own column, and the cavalry column under Lichtenstein on his left, and sustained by the column of Guards under Grand Duke Constantine, was to debouch along the Brünn post-road towards the Santon or Bösenitz hills; and by this manœuvre the French army, which the allies believed to be lying behind Schlapanitz and Bellowitz and extending down no farther than Sokolnitz, would find itself, as they imagined, fully compromised by the four left turning columns. The feeling on the part of the allies was that the French would not stand to defend their position, but that if they did so, it would be with fatal results. Under the planning of Weyrother, they were doing in grand-tactics what they were so fond of doing in strategic operations: they were advancing in several columns, constituting two practically isolated bodies with a huge gap between them, upon the French, the bulk of whose force stood in a single body well massed, opposite their right and almost naked centre. Their turning movement against Napoleon's right was a quite sound operation, but, as observed above, it should have been by substantially the whole army following in echelon, and not by half of it. Napoleon had met this manœuvre, which he had properly guessed, by disgarnishing his right so that the heavy allied left should waste its energies, and by strengthening his centre so as to move forward on to the heights of Pratzen and rupture the enemy there.

The emperor remained on bivouac hill with some of his marshals beside him, moving to no great distance. "Everything was ready for retreat as well as for battle." In passing in front of some regiments he said: "Soldiers, we must finish this campaign by a thunder-clap which shall confound the pride of our enemies!" and immediately hats tossed at the tops of the bayonets and the resounding cries of "Vive l'Em-

péreur!" were a proper promise of victory. By half-past seven the emperor observed that the plateau of Pratzen was still unoccupied by the enemy. This was owing to a considerable interval between the third and fourth allied columns. Continuing to watch the field for some time, he finally turned to Soult, whose troops were now massed in two lines of battalions in "column of attack" in front of Puntowitz. "How long a time do you require to reach the heights of Pratzen?" he asked. "Less than twenty minutes, for my troops are placed in the bottom of the valley covered by the fog and the smoke of the bivouac; the enemy cannot see them." "In that case, let us wait a quarter of an hour more." The emperor knew that when the enemy had begun a false manœuvre, it was well not to disturb him too early in its execution. But Bernadotte was ordered to move up into the line, on Murat's right.

Soon the heavy musketry on the right showed that the enemy was pushing hard for the fords of the Goldbach. Kienmayer opened the fight by an attack on Tellnitz. The French position was excellent, and enabled them to stave off the attack for an hour until the head of the first column came up, when fresh battalions were put in and the French began to weaken. Doctorov's column had debouched from Aujesd about eight o'clock, and within an hour, after sharp fighting and heavy loss from French sharpshooters along the brook, had won the crossing and village of Tellnitz, while Langeron's column after some delay moved on Sokolnitz and got possession of that place, Legrand being much too weak long to fend off either attack. Pribichevski was on his (Langeron's) right rear, but was too much crowded to be able to deploy forward. The allied forces here, over thirty thousand strong, were making good progress, and their heads of column were getting well across the Goldbach, when Davout from

Raigern appeared on the scene with Friant's division, to aid Legrand, took position on the hills back of the Ottmarau ponds, and by 9 A. M. a stout combat had been engaged to stop the progress of the allied divisions. Friant pushed back the allied vanguard which had debouched from Tellnitz, and recognizing that Sokolnitz was yet more important, Davout left Bourcier to hold Tellnitz and marched upstream with Friant. The village of Sokolnitz was attacked and taken, and again retaken by the Russians, who by a gallant onset forced Davout back to Maxendorf. The possession of the Goldbach was contested with the utmost fervor, and with heavy losses on either side. But Davout — with that capacity for fighting which next year, against double numbers, won him Auerstädt — finally gained his point and kept the Russians in check. Indeed, there was small eventual danger to be feared on this flank. The decisive blow was to be delivered elsewhere. It was this early phase of the struggle which settled in the leader's mind the decisive moment for Soult's advance.

Tirailleur.

Napoleon had waited until he became convinced that the troops which had been at Pratzen had been fully withdrawn to move around his right. It was, according to some authorities, getting towards 9 A. M. when, the word having been given to Soult, this marshal, with St. Hilaire and Vandamme, and Levasseur's brigade in support, smartly debouched from hiding in the valley of Puntowitz and Kobolnitz, and set his force in rapid motion towards the Pratzen beights. The other marshals, Murat, Bernadotte, Lannes, galloped down

from bivouac hill to head their respective corps, and Napoleon remained to see the left wing fairly at its work. He had been curiously accurate in his estimates.

As Soult advanced, so from the other side, slightly behind in time, the fourth allied column, from which some heavy details had been made, had been climbing the Pratzen plateau, accompanied by headquarters, the Emperor Alexander and Kutusov in person, and led, the Russian divisions by Miloradovich, and the Austrian by Kollowrath. Imagining itself to be protected by column three, this one was heedlessly marching in route order, strung out in column by platoons. Nothing less than the presence of a large force of the enemy was expected, and as the Russian commander reached the brow of the plateau, he was beyond measure astounded to see that the French, whom he imagined yet far distant, were about to assault the hill with a force much outnumbering his own. Of all battle accidents, nothing disconcerts an army more than a flurry at headquarters. The danger to the allied army was immediately apparent to Kutusov, and yet more plain was the fact that he must hold Pratzen at all hazards, or the allied army would be fatally compromised. Throwing Miloradovich and some battalions into the village, he quickly deployed the oncoming troops forward on the right, and prepared to meet Vandamme and St. Hilaire. Though without reserves, he could see that it would be but a temporary resistance he could offer, yet sending for aid, he made ready to fight, and his Russian troops, with the Austrians in second line, stood bravely to their work. But Soult was too much in force and vigor, and had twenty battalions in reserve. The Russians indeed delivered a hearty attack with the bayonet, but they were met by a short range fire of the French line; and after an hour's contest, which did honor in equal measure to Soult's aggressiveness and Kutusov's defense, the allies began to drift

gallant but irregular, undetermined affair, each side claiming the victory. The Imperial Russian Lancer regiment threw itself against the French cavalry, broke through its first line, and were riding down upon the second, when its leader, Essen, fell, and Rivaud and Caffarelli, facing to left and right, took it between their cross-fire. The decimated regiment fell back behind Bagration at the post-house of Posorsitz. Rivaud, under the eye of the emperor, who had ridden forward to the Blasowitz hills to view the field, though opposed by some of the *élite* Russian troops, captured the village; the Russian Guards made a heroic struggle to regain possession of it, but failed. To aid the efforts of the Guard, Constantine sent in his cuirassiers, and these horsemen, after a brilliant charge, returned with a French standard, but badly cut up. The Russian gain here was not of a nature to prove dangerous; but Napoleon, to put a sharp end to the conflict, ordered in Bessières with his cavalry of the French Guard. These superb squadrons rode down upon the Russian line with marked effect, and with them Bernadotte again advanced. Caffarelli attacked the cuirassiers in the right flank, and by eleven o'clock the whole Russian force here was drifting back on Krzenowitz and across the Littawa River to Austerlitz. The best efforts of the Chevalier Guards, the flower of the Austrian cavalry, could do naught to retrieve the day; and Napoleon sent after them the mounted grenadiers under Rapp.

It was not much later than the advance of Constantine that Bagration moved forward on Bösenitz from the east, while Lannes was marching towards the same village from the west. The two corps met, and around Bösenitz, as at Blasowitz and Girschkowitz, the entire Russian right wing was heartily engaged with Napoleon's left; while far away near the Tellnitz ponds the allied left was being held in check by the superb work of the French right under Davout, and a huge

gap of three miles lay between the two allied wings, where Soult was driving back the disgarnished allied centre. No battle better exhibits the true *coup d'œil*, or the appreciation of the true moment of attack, than Austerlitz. The grand-tactics here displayed will ever remain a pattern.

The emperor's master-stroke was bearing fruit. Kutusov had made a noble bid for the possession of Pratzen heights, but Soult so far outweighed his lesser force, in both preparedness and numbers, that before noon the Russians had been driven quite off the plateau, down the eastern slope towards Krzenowitz. Lichtenstein had early been called on to send some squadrons to the aid of the allied centre; but this help arrived only to find it in full retreat. As Miloradovich and Kollowrath fell back, Drouet was detached by Napoleon from Bernadotte's corps to fall on their right, and despite reinforcements, this column was wholly broken. The allied army had been cut in two, and their left, fighting on the Goldbach, had been caught in the triangle between the brook, the ponds and the Littawa, with its line of retreat quite severed.

Nor was this all. Constantine having been driven back, Murat and Lannes, with Caffarelli and Suchet, could devote themselves to Bagration, who had finally captured Bösenitz. Between Bagration and Constantine there had stood Ouwarof with a considerable body of horse, and against this line the French now went forward with a will. The division of cuirassiers under Hautpoul came up on Lannes' right. French enthusiasm proved irresistible, and shortly the whole allied right wing was in retreat on Rausnitz, whence, between 5 and 6 P. M., Bagration made his way to Austerlitz. In retiring towards this place, however, he gave up the post-road to Wischau, and thus permitted the train and some reserve artillery to fall into the hands of the French.

The emperor had remained near Blasowitz until he saw,

from the defeat of Constantine, that the manœuvre against Pratzen had nothing to fear from the allied right wing, and he then galloped over to Soult, followed by the Guard and the reserve of Oudinot. In passing by the divisions in his path, he stopped to tell the men that the battle was already won, and the word was understood by all and went sweeping onward like a tidal wave from brigade to brigade throughout the army. Soult had cleaned the plateau of the enemy's forces, and then, wheeling to the right to strike the rear of Buxhovden, had reached St. Anthony's Chapel. On the allied left, matters had not gone as well as expected. The second and third columns had interfered with each other in the early fog, and since then Davout and Legrand had done handsome work against them, capturing a number of their guns. Soult now advanced Vandamme on Aujesd and St. Hilaire on Sokolnitz, to help close in on the allied left wing, Drouet following in their rear across the plateau.

At the time when Soult had captured Pratzen, the first and second columns, and that part of the third column which had not been called back by Kutusov, stood with their right leaning on Sokolnitz, and their left stretched out west of Melnitz. The retiring fire on Pratzen heights and the approach of a number of French columns against Sokolnitz, which took the allied line in reverse, first awakened these troops to the fact that they were cut off. Davout, who, in his fine position on the hills beyond the Goldbach, had gallantly held the allies in check ever since nine o'clock and prevented their getting their mass out of the low land along the brook, now, with persistent energy, took the offensive. He moved forward on Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and opened on the Russian lines with canister. Usually so steady, the Russians, finding themselves stopped, turned to fly towards Aujesd, but Vandamme's division had already moved down the slope on the village, and

there he now captured men and guns wholesale. By 2 P. M. the Russians were surrounded by Davout on the west, Vandamme on the east, and St. Hilaire and Legrand on the east and north. Pribichevski's division, after frightful losses, laid down its arms. Half of Langeron's division was captured, and the other half managed to join Buxhovden. This general, who had been wasting his morning in essays on Tellnitz, when he could have accomplished much more by joining the other divisions fighting at Sokolnitz, now, with Doctorov's division, strove to reach an outlet to Aujesd by a path between the two ponds. He had no idea that the French were on every side of him. No sooner had his column reached the vicinity than Vandamme debouched from Aujesd and cut him in two. Buxhovden with the head of the column kept on his way, and abandoning his guns, reached Austerlitz; the rear under Doctorov was penned up on all sides, and sought refuge between the ponds. Some two thousand, attempting to cross on the ice, were destroyed by the French artillery, the shot of which broke their flimsy footing. "And there was seen a horrible spectacle, such as had been seen at Aboukir, twenty thousand men throwing themselves in the water and drowning in the ponds," says the Bulletin. Part of Doctorov's eight thousand men reached Satschan under the fine handling of Kienmayer's cavalry and got away via Neudorf. Guns were abandoned in batteries, and what was left escaped in disorder to the mountains on the southwest. This destruction of the allied left wing the emperor had watched from the chapel.

Says the 31st Bulletin of December 5: "A commandant of the artillery of the Imperial Russian Guard had lōst six pieces. He met the emperor: 'Sire,' cried he, 'have me shot. I have lost my guns!' 'Young man,' answered the emperor, 'I appreciate your tears, but one may be beaten by my army, and yet keep a title to glory.'" The Satschan pond was drained

after the battle, and forty Russian guns and a great number of corpses were recovered.

With the fall of night the two armies were separated by the valley of the Littawa. From Rausnitz to Hosjeradek the French bivouacked in the position the allies had held on the 1st of December. The allies spread out south of Austerlitz with the purpose of making good their retreat on Hungary.

The French had under the colors, at the battle of Austerlitz, about seventy-six thousand men, of which number they probably lost in killed and wounded not less than ten thousand, despite the emperor's clear fabrication in the 30th Bulletin that, "though the reports are not yet in, one can, at a first glance, value our loss at eight hundred men killed and fifteen hundred to sixteen hundred wounded." The allies put into line about eighty-five thousand men, and their loss in killed, wounded and missing was not less than twenty-five thousand men and one hundred and sixty guns. In the 33d Bulletin it is claimed that "the corpses have been counted, with the result that eighteen thousand Russians and six hundred Austrians were killed; and that nine hundred French were killed and three thousand wounded. The loss of the Russians cannot be set at less than forty-five thousand men." This habit of misstating numbers makes it impossible from a French standpoint to do more than estimate the losses. The Austrian records are clearer, and may fairly be adopted.

At dusk Napoleon rode over the field, according to his habit after every general engagement, gazing with an odd kind of curiosity, as is testified by some of his staff, at the great numbers of killed and wounded. As he passed through the bivouac and among the French wounded, he was saluted with cries of, "Is the emperor satisfied with us?" He addressed each regiment, for he knew by heart the history of every one. He said to the 57th, "Remember, years ago I

named you the Terrible." The foot Guard of the emperor shed tears of rage at not having been put in.

The Bulletin description of the battle was mainly intended for the people of France. "Never battlefield was more horrible. From the middle of the immense ponds one yet hears the cries of thousands of men whom one cannot save. It will take three days to send all the enemy's wounded to Brünn. One's heart bleeds; may so much blood shed, may so many misfortunes, finally fall on the perfidious islanders who are its cause: may the oligarchs of London bear the load of so many evils." "The Russian troops are brave, but much less brave than the French troops." "The Russians in fighting have the habit of leaving behind their haversacks. As the whole Russian army was routed, our soldiers took all the haversacks. We also took a great part of the baggage, and the men found a great deal of money. The French soldiers picked up a large quantity of medals and decorations."

Many a man's memory is enshrined in the Bulletins as an example to others. The 36th, of December 14, says: "General Valhubert had his leg carried off by a cannon-ball. Four soldiers came to pick him up. Remembering the order of the day, he cried in a voice of thunder, 'Join your ranks. If you come back victors, you can take me up after the battle. If you are vanquished, I attach no price to my life.'"

By midnight Napoleon took up his quarters at the post-house of Posorsitz. Hither at early dawn of December 3 came Prince Lichtenstein from the Emperor Francis, asking for a truce and a personal interview. Napoleon had as yet scarcely grasped the momentous nature of his victory, but the message from the Austrian Emperor quite opened his eyes, and he determined to secure its full fruits. Refusing the truce, but appointing late next day as the time when he would see Francis, he at once ordered every corps under arms with instructions to pursue the enemy.

December 3, 1805, 8 A. M. To Prince Murat: "Order to Prince Murat to pursue the enemy.

"Order to the division of grenadiers to take position at Rausnitz.

"Order to Marshal Lannes to follow the movements of the cavalry with the rest of his corps.

"Order to Marshal Bernadotte to pursue the enemy on the route of Austerlitz to Göding.

"Order to Marshal Soult, to Marshal Davout, to pursue the enemy.

"Same order to Generals Klein and Bourcier.

"(Signed) MARSHAL BERTHIER, by order of the emperor."

As he wrote Soult from Austerlitz, December 3: "The emperor will personally stick to the heels of the enemy. His opinion is that in war nothing has been done, so long as something yet remains to be done; no victory is complete so long as one can do more. . . . In the position in which we find ourselves, there is only one thing to do and one general order: To do as much damage to the enemy as possible, and to complete the victory." This is what Napoleon meant by pursuit.

Sappers — Full Dress and Fatigue.

To Talleyrand, who was in Vienna, where he had been trying to make terms of peace, Napoleon sent a courier December 3: "I can write you only two words. An army of one hundred thousand men, commanded by the two emperors, is entirely destroyed. All protocols become unnecessary. The negotiations become null, because it is evident that they were a *ruse de guerre* to put me to sleep. General Giulay wrote Prince Charles that there would be a bat-

tle; he is, then, pursuing the trade of spy. Tell M. de Stadion that I was not the dupe of their ruse, that it is for that reason that I sent them away from Brünn; that the battle being lost, conditions cannot be the same."

As Napoleon did not know the direction of the allied retreat, Murat was advanced on the Olmütz road to Prosnitz; Lannes and Soult followed on; and Bernadotte and Davout moved, in a southeasterly direction, towards the crossings of the river March. As Gudin's division had not been able to reach the battlefield, and was at Nickolsburg, Napoleon ordered it to Göding on the March. It was not many hours, however, before it was ascertained that the enemy was not retiring towards Olmütz, but towards Hungary; and Lannes and Soult were ordered on Hradisch or Göding. As a matter of fact, the allies had, on the evening of the battle, assembled at Hodjegitz, and then had moved, during the night, in such order as was most easy, towards the March. On December 4 they had crossed the river at Göding and had reached Hölitsch. And on the afternoon of this day the Emperor of Austria visited Napoleon at his headquarters near the mill of Sarochitz, where an arrangement was made to stop hostilities. The Russians were at once to return to Poland, and terms of peace were, without delay, to be settled on at Presburg. In view of the attitude of Prussia, the oncoming of Charles, the possible rising of Hungary, the presence of Ferdinand at Iglau, and the arrival of further Russian reinforcements, it was wise for Napoleon to end the matter.

Much in the 31st Bulletin is intended to placate the czar as well as to do honor to Napoleon. General Savary is therein said to have accompanied the Emperor of Germany to the czar, to see whether the latter would agree to the capitulation, and found the relics of the Russian army in awful disorder. "Say to your master," the czar exclaimed, "that I am going away; he has done miracles. . . . But can I retire

in safety?" "Yes, Sire, if Your Majesty shall ratify what the Emperors of France and Germany have agreed to." "And what is that?" "That the army of Your Majesty shall evacuate Germany and Poland. With this agreement I have the emperor's order to go to our outposts, which have already turned your army, and give his orders to protect your retreat." "What guaranty is necessary for that?" "Sire, your word." "I give it." Savary then galloped to Davout's headquarters with the orders to permit the Russians to pass. Savary talked an hour with the czar, who asked the details of the day. "You were my inferior, and yet you were superior at all the points of attack." "Sire," replied Savary, "that is the art of war, and the fruits of fifteen years of glory. This is the fortieth battle that the emperor has delivered."

The following order was issued: —

TO THE ARMY.

Austerlitz, 12 Frimaire, Year XIV. (December 3).

Soldiers, I am satisfied with you. You have in the day of Austerlitz justified all that I expected of your intrepidity. You have decorated your eagles with an immemorial glory. An army of one hundred thousand men, commanded by the Emperors of Austria and Russia, has been, in less than four hours, either cut off or dispersed. Those who escaped your steel were drowned in the ponds; forty flags, the standards of the Imperial Guard of Russia, one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, twenty generals, more than thirty thousand prisoners, are the result of this day forever celebrated. This so much vaunted infantry in superior numbers was unable to resist your shock, and from now on you have no rivals to fear. Thus in two months this Third Coalition has been vanquished and dissolved. Peace cannot be distant. . . . Soldiers, when all that is necessary to assure the happiness and the prosperity of our country shall be accomplished, I will lead you back to France. There you will be the object of my most tender solicitude. My people will see you back with joy, and it will suffice you to say, "I was at the battle of Austerlitz," for people to answer, "There stands a brave man."

Napoleon.

Not only had Napoleon ended the 1805 campaign by the brilliant victory of Austerlitz, but he had inaugurated the era of "great battles," which, says Jomini, "have their beginning in 1805." Frederick's battles were not those of Napoleon. However brilliant in grand-tactics, and especially wonderful — unequaled, one may say — in their being fought against superior numbers, they have another mark. In Frederick's typical battles the army as a whole was set in motion by the king, and each and every part was manœuvred by the king and remained within his grasp. So dependent was one part on the other that when one step in the manœuvre went wrong, the entire manœuvre went wrong, and the battle was lost. In the Napoleonic battle, the centre may be broken while a wing wins the victory; one wing may be turned and the other destroy the enemy at the key-point. So strongly is this the mark of the modern battle, that one may almost say that a bait is offered the enemy by permitting him a partial success on one part of the field for the purpose of overwhelming him in his hour of supposed triumph in a more decisive part. Here at Austerlitz Napoleon not only permitted, he lured the enemy on to success against his right flank, in order to lead him to disgarnish his centre so that he could break it; and though weaker than the allies, he was stronger on Pratzen heights, the key of the battlefield. In a less marked degree, at Rivoli, Napoleon neglected his wings in order to break the Austrian centre. The new battle is on a more magnificent scale than the old, though no more perfect of its kind. And in the new, the leader no longer has control of his manœuvring. He can give his troops, and especially the reserves, the direction which they shall take to enter into the seething mass of battle; he can choose the moment for sending them in; but once in, he cannot recall a given corps nor detain a column of reserves. Thus Napoleon

took Drouet from Bernadotte's right and put him in on Soult's left. This he was able to do, but as a matter of fact, once in, he could not have recalled him to Bernadotte's aid. Drouet was bound to follow Soult.

This difference in the battles makes the holding back of reserves all the more essential. Inasmuch as once launched a corps cannot be recalled, it becomes imperative to hold back reserves for use if needed, and not to put them in until needed. At the critical moment the reserves may turn the tide of disaster, or may win the laurels of victory. Napoleon wrote Murat in 1813: "Battles are only won by strengthening the line at a critical moment;" and to do this he always kept some reserves, as at Austerlitz he kept Oudinot and the Guard, in the background. Oudinot and the Guard did not burn a cartridge, because Lannes and Bernadotte and Soult sufficed; but had it been necessary, Napoleon would have sacrificed their last man — at the proper moment. Gouvion St. Cyr says that, after once putting in a corps, Napoleon paid little further heed to it, but was very careful not to listen too much to the cry for reinforcements which came from the fighting line. Only at "the critical moment which decides the winning or losing of the battle" would he use his reserves. Napoleon's former battles were not of the order of Austerlitz; this was the first pattern of a great battle he had shown the world.

It has been asked what Napoleon would have done had he here been beaten. His line back to the Lech was a long one, and his crossing into Moravia was an eccentric march. As an offset to this, it has been asked whether any captain, at the moment he fought one of his great battles, ever thought of lines of retreat. This is no answer, for as a matter of fact they all did so. Although tactical victory cures many strategic errors, war cannot be conducted on so risky a basis. And

Napoleon was peculiarly careful in watching his rear. Bourrienne says, "Before he delivered battle, Napoleon paid little heed as to what he would do in case of success, but much heed to what he would do in case of failure." At Austerlitz he had determined not to do what the allies thought he would do, that is, retire on Vienna, but to retire through Bohemia on Ratisbon or Passau. Until he committed the grave errors of the Russian campaign, Napoleon's scrupulous care as to his movements if defeated was always apparent. It was so even in Russia: but the stupendous conditions overwhelmed him.

Few victories have been more splendid than Austerlitz, or better earned. So soon as Soult had taken Pratzen and Bernadotte Blasowitz, that is, by ten o'clock, the victory was secure. As in every great battle, there had been an opportunity for mischance. Had Buxhovden been less blindly obedient to the orders drawn up by Weyrother, which were for him to capture and debouch from Tellnitz, and had he, on hearing the heavy firing at Pratzen, drawn the only possible conclusion as to what it was, and then and there with the greater part of his sixty battalions filed to the right towards Sokolnitz and Kobelnitz, so as to take in reverse the French force which was attacking the Austrian centre on the plateau, he might by eleven have obliged Napoleon to withdraw his real right on his reserves, and back it up on Schlapanitz. Even then he would probably have held a gap in the allied centre and have won the battle, but it would not have been so easy a victory, nor as decisive an one. But Buxhovden was only obeying orders. Weyrother's plan, which disgarnished the centre and sent the headquarters column unprotected out to the fighting line, was really at fault.

As already observed, what the allies should have done was to follow up the Buxhovden lead by abandoning the Olmütz line of retreat in favor of that to Hungary, and gradually

massing all their forces on the French right. This was a wise strategic operation, because it brought them nearer to Archduke Charles, who was rapidly approaching. Or, immediately on Soult's attack, Buxhovden should have had speedy orders to wheel to the right so as to bring his wing within supporting distance of the others.

Napoleon never ceased to feel that Austerlitz was his most brilliant battle. Marengo, Ulm, Jena, were battles won as the result of able strategic combinations. Rivoli, Austerlitz, Dresden, exhibited Napoleon's grand-tactics on the battlefield as the others did not. The former came as an immediate result of the strategic operations; a fresh and favorable strategic position succeeded Austerlitz. Augereau was in Bavaria; Ney was at Salzburg; Massena and Marmont were approaching Vienna; Napoleon's victorious army marched on that capital. The emperor was now concentrating in earnest, and though the allies had still more forces than he had, they were not near at hand, and were on exterior lines.

Napoleon was judicious in making terms. He offered peace to the Russians, which Alexander refused, showing the spirit which won in 1812. To the Prussians Napoleon was generous. He offered them Hanover in exchange for Anspach (which Napoleon proposed to add to Bavaria), Cleves and Neuchâtel. This should have made an ally of Prussia, while it embroiled her with England, and, indeed, Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, eagerly accepted the terms.

There was made for the Emperor Alexander by Field-Marshal Kutusov an official report of the battle of Austerlitz, dated at St. Petersburg, February 20 (4th March), 1806. This report came into the hands of Napoleon, who, under the *nom de plume* of "A French officer," published in the *Moniteur* of March 28 certain "Observations" upon it. Kutusov's report makes the best of a very bad piece of business, in the way with which all soldiers are familiar. In the criticisms he speaks of several occasions in which the Russians routed bodies of French largely superior

in numbers, and for this he is roundly held to task in the Observations. On his side Napoleon is equally disingenuous about numbers, proving to his own satisfaction and to that of the French people at the time, that with fifty thousand men he beat the allied hundred thousand, and that the loss of the French, officially known, did not exceed a thousand killed and thirty-five hundred wounded. Some of the statements in the Observations are interesting.

"But the battle of Austerlitz itself was only the result of the plan of campaign in Moravia. In an art as difficult as that of war, it is frequent in the system of campaign that one conceives the system of a battle; only very experienced soldiers will understand this. People who were near the emperor heard him say, two weeks before, on the heights between the post-road and the lakes, in coming back from the Wischau reconnoissance, 'Make a careful note of all these heights; it is here you will fight before two months are over.' They did not at first pay heed to these words, but the day after the battle they remembered them."

"The French did not pass the night in placing their troops near Pratzen, but by a system, opposed to that of the Russians, that held them united in such a manner that these sixty-five thousand men were in the hand of the emperor like a battalion in the hand of a good major, ready for anything, even to retire if the enemy was wise, for the emperor knew that the Russian army was numerous and brave, and he wanted neither a dear nor a doubtful victory. . . . Thus the emperor said the night before, in passing over the heights of Pratzen, and the villages of Sokolnitz, Tellnitz and Mönitz, 'If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here I would place myself; but I should have only an ordinary battle. If, on the contrary, I refuse my right by withdrawing it towards Brünn and the Russians abandon these heights, were they three hundred thousand men they would be taken *en flagrant délit*, and lost without recourse.' . . . All was ready for the retreat as for the battle."

In these Observations Napoleon holds the Russians to task for claiming that the Austrians lost the battle; and oblivious of the many feats of courage of the Russian army, and not foreseeing the campaign of 1812, he speaks plainly, but not ungenerously, of the conduct of the Russian soldiers. After his wonderful victory he could afford to be generous. He points out, however, that the Russians, according to his figures, lost forty thousand men, all the train, more than fifty standards and two hundred guns; and he even states that those Russian soldiers who lost their flags received praise when they returned home, whereas the French sol-

dier who loses his eagle suffers dishonor, and has hard and long labor to recover it.

"The counsel we have to give to the Russian is, not to talk any more about this battle. It belongs to posterity. We will give them another, that is, not to come and take a hand in our business. It is possible that they may have obtained successes against the Persians, the Turks or the Poles, but they are not organized to obtain such against the French." The prophecy proved a poor one.

At the Treaty of Presburg, December 26, 1805, expired the Third Coalition against France. Austria was mulcted heavily. She ceded to the Italian kingdom all Venetia, and to Bavaria the Tyrol and Inn-Viertel, and received Salzburg. The King of Naples "ceased to reign." Bavaria, now a kingdom, was still more closely knit to France by the marriage of Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, to Amelia, daughter of the king. Würtemberg was erected into a monarchy.

Drum Major.

The decree of December 7 gave the widows of generals killed at Austerlitz six thousand francs a year for life; those of colonels and majors two thousand four hundred francs, of captains twelve hundred francs, of subalterns eight hundred francs and of soldiers two hundred francs.

The decree of December 7 says: "1. We adopt all the children of the French generals, officers and soldiers killed at the battle of Austerlitz. 2. They shall be kept and educated at our expense, the boys in our Imperial Palace of Rambouillet, and the girls in our Imperial Palace of St. Germain. The boys shall be placed in situations and the girls married by us. 3. Independently of their names of baptism and family, they shall have the right to join thereto the name of Napoleon."

On December 27 a Proclamation went forth to the army: "Soldiers! Peace between me and the Emperor of Austria is signed. You have in this late season made two campaigns. You have performed everything that I expected of you. I am leaving to go to my capital. I have given promotion and rewards to those who most distinguished themselves. I will do all that I have promised you. You have seen your emperor partake your perils and fatigues. I also wish you to come and see me surrounded by the grandeur and the splendor which belong to the sovereign of the first people of the universe. I will give a great Fête in the first days of May in Paris. You shall all be there, and after that we shall see where the happiness of our country and the interests of our glory will call us. NAPOLEON."

On December 15 Napoleon wrote Ney: "I understand your regrets at not having been at the battle. I also felt sorry, remembering your fine conduct of Elchingen, that you were not at so memorable an event; but you could not be everywhere."

On the Continent Napoleon's dominance was unequivocal. Had it not been for the victory of Trafalgar, October 21, the destinies of Europe would have been delivered into his hands. Returning to France, he devoted himself to political duties. It was apparent that England could neither be conciliated, nor combated, except at sea, and on this element the emperor's efforts bore ill fruit. Beyond an occasional captured prize, all attempts to cope with England were sorry failures. Until a real French navy could be created, England must be attacked on the Continent. Russia was still at war with France; Austria, humiliated, breathed only vengeance. Prussia was unequal to a match against the two huge eastern powers, and was of no avail as a buffer-state. No course remained open to Napoleon but to federate the small neighboring states and ally the others with France, so as to secure her preponderance. Thus were born the kingdoms of Naples and Holland, and the Confederation of the Rhine.

While all this was occurring, Pitt died January 23, 1806; and when Fox, a friend of peace, succeeded him, Napoleon harbored some hope of seeing an end to the antagonism of Great Britain. But war was not at an end. Prussia had refused to ratify the Haugwitz treaty, on account of certain engagements existing with England with regard to Hanover. Russia stood ready to second Prussia. Desiring to be fair, Frederick William accepted the treaty with certain conditions. But as these emasculated it, Napoleon would none of them, and insisted on less favorable terms, which Prussia was fain to accept, in the Treaty of Berlin, February 15, 1806. And when some friction occurred in carrying out the Treaty of Presburg, Napoleon asserted his power against Austria in an unmistakable manner.

Joseph Bonaparte was made King of Naples, again conquered by Massena. The royal family retired to Sicily, aided by the British and Russian fleets. In July, 1806, Sir John Stuart, with four thousand men, landed on the coast and defeated at Maida a somewhat superior force under Reynier. But the victory had no result, and the expedition returned to Sicily. Louis Bonaparte was crowned King of Holland. Eugene Beauharnais was nominated as viceroy and Napoleon's successor to the throne of Italy. His other relatives were provided with coronets. The Confederation of the Rhine was created by joining Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau under a Prince Primate, with Napoleon as "Protector." The emperor would have been glad to add Saxony, but the time was not ripe. It would have been wise to make Prussia the head of the Confederation, which would then have given France allies from the Rhine to the Niemen; but Napoleon was far from always acting judiciously. His rôle was a new one and full of puzzling questions. To cap all, the Emperor Francis abdicated the ancient crown of Imperial

Germany on August 6, 1806, declared himself Hereditary Emperor of Austria, and set the seal of his approval on the new Confederation.

The emperor's work for the internal welfare of France was the best. Finances were established on a strong basis. A new nobility was created. Paris was ornamented with splendid monuments. Public works of all kinds were fostered.

Negotiations were again opened with England, in which Napoleon was disposed to yield too little. It would have been to his ultimate gain to settle at any price once for all with England, for this would have given him free hand on the Continent. The negotiations were almost reduced to a matter of yielding or keeping Sicily; but they came to naught. A treaty of peace with Russia was signed July 20, 1806, with a Russian ambassador, but this the czar refused to ratify. During the negotiations with England, Napoleon had played fast and loose with Hanover, a fact which Prussia, who expected to acquire it, resented highly, and the people at once grew inflamed for war. The war party was injudicious, gained control of the court, and sent to Napoleon an ultimatum demanding that he should summarily evacuate Germany, give up Wesel, and send an answer to the Prussian king's headquarters before October 8. To throw down the gauntlet to Napoleon, who had one hundred and eighty thousand veterans already in Germany, while Prussia's ally, Russia, could not get her troops on the probable theatre of operations for months, was as short-sighted an act as can well be conceived. To Napoleon this meant war; and he determined to have done with Prussia before the Russian troops could arrive at the seat of war.

In opening the French legislative body, March 2, 1806, Napoleon said: "My armies cease to vanquish only when I order them to stop fighting. I have avenged the rights of the

Every old soldier knows the difference between an army accustomed to marching and fighting and an army which has the habit of campaigning yet to learn. Of all European nations, only Austria had been as constantly at war as had France, and the Grand Army alone had acquired the habit of victory which beyond all other things makes troops invincible. Not only this, but the Grand Army had learned that if it could fight, its leader could show it the way of fighting to the best advantage; and while one must yield to the Austrian troops the fullest praise for constancy and good behavior, and to some of the Austrian generals the homage of ability, yet with an old-fashioned and bad system opposed to a new and better one, and with an average of only mediocre generals opposed to the greatest of leaders, it could not be expected that the Austrians should be in the same class with the Grand Army. As Napoleon stood like a giant among all other captains of the age, so the Grand Army held itself among all the armies of Europe.

It is practically impossible, within the compass of a chapter, to give with any definite accuracy the organization or tactics of the French troops. During the generation of continuous wars of this epoch, such constant changes were made in both, that a statement of what existed in one year will not apply to the next. However, as a *résumé* of what was said in the prior chapters of this work, and has since been referred to in the history of the French campaigns, the reader may be reminded that on the infantry of the Grand Army — as on that of every great army — the reliance of the captain was placed. This arm comprised line infantry and light infantry, each half-brigade (regiment) of which at this time had two or three battalions, while one remained in the rendezvous or depot organizing for reinforcements. Although from time to time these varied, in the line infantry each battalion was supposed to have one

grenadier, one voltigeur and seven or eight fusileer companies. In the light infantry were one carbineer and eight or nine chasseur companies. Certain equalizations hinted at in the Correspondence as being projected by the emperor remained for the nonce unfulfilled. To the modern eye there seem to have been too many classes of infantry, yet they worked well together, and were indeed not so very unlike. When fighting was to be done, the grenadiers were held in reserve for a final blow. The light infantry went out ahead as skirmishers and sharpshooters, taking advantage of every accident in the ground, and were forbidden to work in close order. The voltigeurs, who were selected for their natural activity, could, if needed, vault on behind the cavalrymen, accompany them some distance, and thus form a body to sustain them by infantry fire. The line fusileers fought in the same close order which had grown up during the early days of the Revolution, but otherwise differed less from the other European troops than the cavalry and artillery. If one reads an ancient book of French tactics, it is not easy to see how the complicated minor tactics was executed. The times and motions of firing in Gustavus' era were nearly one hundred; even a century ago the tactics of the soldier, squad and company were far from as simple as they now are. Yet it is certain that the French infantry did move in an astonishingly able manner, though perhaps part of its success was due to the surprise never lost by the enemy at the unusual, one may say unpardonable, because unrecognized, method it indulged in on "the theory of the impossible." There does not seem to have been as accurate a tactical regulation of the light troops as there was of the line, but light troops none the less played a great rôle in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic campaigns. And, after all said, the work of the several classes of French troops was kept so nicely separated that even with the difference in weapons they

remind one of the old Roman division of the legionaries into Velites, Hastates, Principes, Triarii. Beyond the classification there always stood out in marked prominence the reliance of the leader on the French character, which led the men forward with the bayonet from a natural enthusiasm, rather than from long-imposed discipline. Just as Frederick, having inherited the soldier created by his father's love of parade and the Old Dessauer's extraordinary powers of drill, was able to put this soldier into active service with a knowledge of his actual power, which no one but a man of genius could have done, so Napoleon, having inherited from the Revolution a soldier with exceptional fire, patriotism, initiative and zeal, put him to such use as to be a terror to his contemporaries and the wonder of posterity.

Chasseur of Guard.

The heavy cavalry was divided into cuirassiers and carbineers. The light horse was divided into dragoons, mounted chasseurs and hussars, though the dragoons often served as heavy horse. The regiment averaged four squadrons. In 1804 much had been done to the cavalry arm, but even so late as 1806 the French cavalry had not yet reached the standing of the successors of Seydlitz and Ziethen. Yet Napoleon impressed his cavalry officers with peculiar daring and initiative, which is the right arm of the horseman; audacity is the chief quality of horse, as stanchness is of foot; and beginning with the Austerlitz campaign, the French cavalry kept on growing in value.

The artillery was not everything to be desired; in fact, three years later the arm was reorganized. At this time the artillery stood on the basis of what had been founded in 1803 upon

the old system of Gribeauval, long time chief of this arm. The field artillery had long and short six-pounders, long and short twelve-pounders, six and eight inch howitzers. There were foot and horse batteries in the ratio of eight of the former to five of the latter, each company having a battery of six pieces. But there were too many calibres, and old-fashioned guns were common. The amount of artillery varied much in the several corps. Though an artillery train had been created in 1801, yet at the opening of the 1806 campaign there was so great a lack of horses that this arm could not reach a proper footing without very large purchases.

What yields peculiar interest to Napoleon's military career is the extraordinary precision with which he handled bodies of troops on the great scale in his strategical operations; and the equally astonishing manner in which he utilized his divisions in the grand-tactical disposition of his battlefields. But it would be difficult to collect from the old Regulations a clear idea of what was the School of the Soldier, the Squad, the Company and the Battalion; nor is this perhaps as essential to this work, or as interesting, as the sketching of Napoleon's wars from the larger point of view. The Regulations of 1791 appear to have persisted up to and beyond the Jena campaign, and inasmuch as the soldier had become used to them, and his Gallic nature loved the elbow-room he had made for himself in spite of them, as well as the cheering momentum of the column charge, they seem to have answered every purpose in a dormant way. Only in details were they observed; in the large tactics they were ignored. But they were not rescinded.

While to a modern soldier the tactics of the battalion seems complicated, yet by practice it had been made simple. Several battalions moved by the same tactics as one battalion. To ploy into column and to deploy into line rapidly was

about all that was required. The cavalry had for its duty the outflanking of the enemy. The artillery officer was not so much bound down by hard-and-fast rules, as he was instructed to keep his eye well fixed on the movements of the other two arms, and to select at any risk good positions for his guns. One great difference between the Grand Army and all other armies was, that the latter placed more stress on the parade form, while the French demand was for that form which was most available on the battlefield. The man who has seen war knows that the war-hardened division cannot compare with the depot troops in the nice performance of any tactical feat, from the handling of the musket to the larger evolutions of the division; but he also knows that with this lack of formality there exists the habit of war which is worth ten times the pipe-clay of the depot-drilled soldier; and the Grand Army essentially possessed the habit of war. The French soldier had acquired in the field great effectiveness in skirmish-firing, and to this he had added a sharp and sudden attack in close column with the bayonet, which parades will never teach. Moreover, his leaders had learned to combine the work of the three arms, and the less formal marshaling of the troops for battle possessed enough elasticity to make it fit each particular case.

From another point of view, the normal battle order of the French division was in four lines; in front the light foot, fourteen companies strong, whose duty it was to protect the formation of the heavy foot behind it, to harass the troops of the enemy by creeping up upon them and firing from behind whatever shelter they could find. This force of skirmishers was at times somewhat increased. Two hundred paces in their rear came the first line of heavy foot of twenty-two companies, and in its rear again the second line of thirty companies. These two lines were divided into two wings. In rear of all

was the reserve at times made up of grenadiers. A squadron of cavalry stood behind each brigade. The guns were on the flanks. For attack — and this was the constant resort of the Gaul — the division was formed into battalion columns, those of the second line three hundred paces behind those of the first and in their intervals. The one duty of the column was to gain all the ground possible, a thing which skirmishers can scarcely do.

A cavalry division had five regiments, of which two were in line, and three close behind it in column at about half-deploying distance. There was in addition reserve cavalry, whose duties were prescribed for the moment by the army or corps commander.

The artillery was divided into division and reserve guns, and was wont to be used in masses, while a part was held back out of fire for use at certain moments. The battery commanders had orders to concentrate their fire on the point of attack, and were usually covered by skirmishers. At this moment, however, the artillery was not equal to what it became a year or two later.

Although it is often said, and in a certain sense with truth, that Napoleon gave little power or scope for initiative to his lieutenants, yet this statement is more applicable to his marshals than to the lesser officers. For each one of the latter was expected to exhibit a great deal of originality and ability of purpose in what he did. He was not tied down by formal rules as much as the officers of other nations, and he really did exhibit in all his work a great deal of independence as well as unquestioned bravery. It was no ideal phrase that every man's knapsack held a marshal's baton, and the man who could accomplish more than his fellows always came to the fore.

While not bound down by any particular regulations, the

commanding officers were held to accomplish certain things, especially rapid formation of all troops. The captain must be ready for the march in five minutes. The chief of battalion must have his battalion in line within the same short period. Larger bodies must be reported ready within a quarter of an hour. Absolute knowledge of the characters of their men and of the condition of the horses under their charge was essential. It was insisted that each officer should impress his own characteristics upon his men. He should keep them acquainted with the work to be done. He was constantly to be beside them. He must never lose his interest in the individual soldier, and whether in battle, or on the march, or in camp, he was to exert his interest in and care for his men.

Officer of Engineers.

Nothing is more marked in the whole Napoleonic military scheme than the intimate knowledge possessed by the emperor of just how to use the national character in accomplishing results. It has already been shown that it was not he, but the fathers of the Revolution, who began this system; but he it was who perfected it, and worked it up to its highest ideal. In addition to the tactical utilizing of the Gallic temperament, this was also fired by the Proclamations, Orders of the Day, and by the habit of commanding officers addressing their troops before battle, and calling upon their patriotism, their love for the emperor, and their pride in victory for their utmost exertions. In these little addresses the troops were usually told something about what was to be done. The French soldier had not the feeling that he was driven to battle; he was led to think the task before him an easy one, and the risk small.

We all know the sentiment that prompts a man to go with confidence to battle. During our Civil War the cry of "Boys, we have beaten them before, and we can beat them again!" was a not uncommon incentive to victory. So the French soldier, fired by his emperor's words and his captain's friendly and stirring address, entered into the conflict with the feeling that he would certainly emerge from it the victor. Music was held to play inspiring airs. The standards were ceremoniously saluted. No troops ever worshiped their eagles more than Napoleon's. If a body of troops lost its eagle, the men had to regain it by some signal act of bravery. All these factors were of the kind that singularly affected the Frenchman.

Medical treatment in those days fell far short of what it is to-day, yet the French soldier was always given to understand that if wounded he would be speedily and well cared for. It was purposed to get the dead out of sight of the troops as quickly as possible, and the habit was to say little about them. Nor were the bodily things forgotten. No man can fight well on an empty stomach, and it was a rare case for the French soldier to go into battle without having had a meal accompanied by a taste of brandy.

Sœur Marthe.
(The Florence Nightingale of the Grand Army.)

Splendid as were Napoleon's battles, his strategic marches are yet more interesting. The emperor knew when and how to save and rest men who had not a great distance to go, and when to get the utmost possible out of human effort. As a rule, two corps would march along the same road, with a half day's distance between them. The checkerwise advance

of troops along a number of parallel roads is not, as often claimed, of modern origin, but was perfectly shown in the movement around Ulm. In marches distant from the enemy the troops were allowed considerable latitude in conduct. In marches anywhere near the enemy all troops were held to be ready for battle. No commanding officer, for any reason whatever, was allowed to leave his troops for even a moment. The heads of column were always led by officers of the general staff, and the troops were kept in the best of order for fighting.

The marches of the French troops near the enemy averaged from sixteen to twenty miles a day; route marches were considerably less, and forced marches ran up to thirty and even thirty-five miles a day. Infantry was held to cover two to two and a half miles an hour, according to roads, and cavalry from three to three and a half miles an hour, including rest. Stops were made every two hours, and on forced marches every four hours, and were each half an hour long. The ten minutes' rest every hour with which we are familiar was not practiced. The French peasant has always been a particularly good marcher. The organization of French agricultural land tenure, and the fact that the workman lives in a village perhaps three or four miles from his daily work, obliged him at that time to march a number of miles a day in addition to his severe farm work; and this had so habituated him to early and long hours that the loss of sleep and hard footing of the soldier were no novelty to him.

The route marches of the Grand Army were often wonderful. In 1805 the army marched from the British Channel to Brünn in seventy-eight days, and during this time delivered a series of wonderful combats and battles; and yet this vast body of troops covered an average distance of nearly fourteen miles a day.

Camping was governed by careful rules. The several bodies of troops camped according to their order of service. The light infantry performed the outpost duties. All commandants were held to remain with their troops. The cavalry and artillery were, as far as reasonable, placed in quarters. At four o'clock every morning the army was ready for its day's march. Each battalion breakfasted and was reported ready for service. If it had not to march, it returned to camp.

Although feeding the troops upon the country had been begun by the Revolutionists, and was uniformly practiced throughout Napoleon's campaigns, so far as was possible, yet his large armies made it necessary to mix with this means, to a considerable extent, the old-fashioned magazine system ; and as, while marching, troops could not always find magazines at hand, their leaders were held, when these were lacking, to continue their prescribed march and live upon the country. Yet whenever there was a period of rest, it was found that Napoleon's commissaries had accumulated victual so as to be availably near. In fact, commissaries marched with the vanguard, and obliged the authorities of the towns traversed to bring together rations for the oncoming troops ; and these supplies were frequently increased to the proportions of magazines. But, nevertheless, the fashion of living on the country, that is to say, of collecting food in the land traversed, on the small and large scale, as against wheeling it from depots already established at other places, was more prominent in the victualing of the Grand Army than the magazine system. The food thus collected was admirably distributed to the soldiers, despite the fact that we find many complaints in the Correspondence over shortcomings of commissaries. Still it must be allowed that there was a great deal of cheating done by the civil officers of the French government, although this was gradually checked under the Empire.

There was food carried along in the train in reasonable quantities, consisting of hard bread and durable vegetables like rice; and cattle were driven along behind the armies. It was generally understood that there should be four days' rations with the troops, and four upon the wagons. This was not, to be sure, always managed. Field bakeries were, however, well organized; they could be easily got ready and set up; and an enormous quantity of bread could be quickly baked for issue in the vicinity. This manner of doing things is on the Continent of Europe no novelty to-day, but at that time it was new, and is accordingly interesting.

One curious weakness at the time was the fact that the transportation of the Grand Army was done by a private enterprise, the Breidt Company, and there was a good deal of just complaint about this company's misdoings. Unquestionably there was more or less irregularity in the dealings between some of the higher officers and the company.

The days' marches were carefully mapped out by the emperor. These marches were ordered by Berthier, and they were almost always executed. If not, an extremely good reason had to be given to save the officer responsible from a severe reprimand.

The infantry was armed with a musket made according to the pattern of 1787, which would carry one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards and stand the wear of twenty-five thousand shots. It was probably at that time the best in Europe, certainly superior to the Prussian. The men carried fifty cartridges, and thirty more came along in the caissons. Practice munition was plentiful. The cavalry was mostly armed with sword, carbine and pistols. The cuirassiers had the long straight sword and pistols alone. The artillerymen carried a dragoon musket with a bayonet.

In clothing the Frenchman was also well off. He was sup-

posed to have on hand and in the army train three pairs of shoes, with a fourth coming along from depot, although we notice constantly in the Correspondence that this rule was not observed. His uniform was of good cloth, and he carried a long cloak which was serviceable in many ways.

While the French soldier was not always fed in the best manner, yet early in 1806 a decree had been issued providing for extra nourishment, and during the Jena campaign, foraging being little checked, he certainly lived like a prince.

The pay of the conscript at this time is given by some authorities as nearly two hundred and fifty francs (fifty dollars) a year for the foot soldier, nearly three hundred francs (sixty dollars) for the horseman. This is greatly in excess of the sums specified in the laws or decrees already quoted. A large part of the legal pay was retained for the various "messes," of clothing, washing, shoes and rations. The balance only was due the soldier. This even was not always regularly paid, but the soldier knew he would receive it on his return home, or that his family would get it in case he fell.

All that has just been said in nowise interferes with the former statements in this work about the indiscipline of the French troops. Under the emperor's stronger sway many of the difficulties which weighed heavily upon even the First Consul were disappearing. The French soldier was, in a certain formal sense, not well disciplined, but for the purposes of field work, — that is, for marching and fighting, — his discipline was perfect. What is usually understood by *pipe-clay* did not exist. What the little French infantryman is to-day, he was then. Far from being well set up, far from having the grand military air, he was yet hard as nails, willing, able to march, and ever ready to fight. When well led and successful, it is hard to find his superior in military virtues. If

discipline be divided into garrison and field discipline, of the former he had little, of the latter he had much. The Grand Army at Boulogne had much pipe-clay to boast of. The Grand Army after Austerlitz had little. It was not a parade army, but it was a fighting-machine. Whoso remembers the travel-stained, often ill-clothed and ill-equipped soldiers of the Army of the Potomac and the Western armies, who paraded through Washington at the end of the Civil War, will understand what is meant by the above. Whoso has been a part of those noble bodies will appreciate it still more keenly. Any State could have turned out a militia regiment which in appearance and minor tactics would have shamed these veterans of four years and hundreds of pitched battles. But he who had served with them could recognize that every musket was in order and every sabre sharp, and that the men knew how and were ready to use their weapons. Among all the troops the world has seen, it is doubtful whether one hundred thousand men could ever have been collected from any source equal, for intelligence and all-round soldierly qualities combined, to the one hundred thousand that might have been chosen from the men who passed before the White House on that two days' national review. After such fashion must we judge the common soldier of the Grand Army: he was not handsome to look at, but he was untiring on the march and terrible in battle. If he was wanting in military discipline, this was more than made up by his war discipline.

Indeed, there was every reason why the French soldier of the day should do his best. His ambition to become an officer was not infrequently satisfied. We know how many of the marshals of France came up from the ranks. Rewards for good conduct were constant and real. An army treasury was erected for the benefit of the soldier, and kept full by his captures in war. The man who returned to France wounded

was made to feel that he stood like a hero among his fellows. Feasts were given to the returning troops, and though these rewards may have appeared to be often long deferred, yet, as the Proclamations recited, it was never the emperor, but the enemy, who was at the bottom of this delay, and few soldiers of any age have been better fed with enthusiasm by their rulers, or have thriven on it better, than the rank and file of the Grand Army.

As above said, there was every incentive for any Frenchman to aspire to a high place in the profession of arms. While grievous reprimands were not rare for the higher officers, yet rewards were also marked. In this Jena year Napoleon created twenty-two dukedoms with princely incomes to be given to his lieutenants. To all these the appointments were not at once made, so that not only could the new marshals look forward to magnificent rewards, but every private in the ranks knew that if he could show the necessary ability, he could be one of these marshals. Was not Ney the son of a butcher? Was not Soult a peasant lad? Had not hundreds of men come up from the lower middle classes to distinction?

The creation of the military division during the Revolution has already been referred to. In each foot division were from six to twelve brigaded battalions, six to nine squadrons, and eight to twelve guns. The divisions of horse consisted of twelve to eighteen squadrons and three guns. There was no normal size for either division. So it was with the corps; two, three, four divisions went to make up a corps, the larger number as a rule confided to the more able marshal.

The bulk of the cavalry was assembled in a reserve under Murat; but while the cuirassiers sometimes remained as a battle reserve, the dragoons were constantly used on reconnoitring and outpost service.

In the same fashion there was an artillery park, which,

however, does not always appear to have been successful in its scope. It was wont to follow from one to two days' march behind headquarters, and was useful only to draw from to supply the battle-gaps.

While Napoleon's staff was in a certain sense the predecessor of the staff of to-day, it can scarcely be called equal to the worst that now exists on the Continent. It is said that the emperor's intention in having no staff officers, except the older ones, of a higher rank than captain, was to make men seek duty with the troops rather than duty with the staff; but this left no places fit for men who had risen in the line to return to. Yet while Napoleon's staff officers worked hard and did good service as far as their power went, such a thing as a thoroughly well-organized general staff, which could take from the leader practically all the details of administration, and leave him time for the more important work, was unknown to Napoleon. So long as his activity remained abnormal, so long as he retained his power of doing the equivalent of a week's work every day, so long did his staff as organized fulfill its purpose; but when his bodily vigor no longer enabled him to see everything with his own eye, and do everything with his own hand, he began to feel the want of having about him the educated men who are really necessary in every army beyond a given size. Berthier, "the Major General," as the head of the staff, was really a most useful man. Far from being a great one, he yet understood administration if he did not strategy, and he and his fellows grew so used to Napoleon's ways that much of the work got done by habit. Yet this was not a general staff, as understood to-day, or as it should be.

Perhaps no subject has been more often discussed than the actual military skill of the marshals of the First Empire. Skill they had, astonishing service they did to the master

who had made them. Under certain conditions this service was limited by the emperor's requirements, or by his unwillingness to give them a free hand. That Napoleon's marshals possessed in a very high degree the practical side of the art is unquestionable. How many of them were actually imbued with the divine part of the art will ever remain a question. Left to themselves in Spain, they failed to succeed, some of them even against irregular Spanish troops. That they could not succeed against Wellington, who was a man of an entirely different stamp, and who as a leader of men vastly outranks them all, is not to be wondered at. It is not meant to say that as the chief of a *corps d'armée* Wellington could ever have done more brilliant or solid work than Ney, or Davout, or Massena; but this is not the test we seek. Judged from the broad point of view, Wellington stood far above any soldier who served under Napoleon. Even though we may not allot to him a companionship with the Great Captains, yet Wellington certainly stands beside his great fellow countryman, Marlborough, and may be reckoned among the greatest soldiers of history save only the chosen six, who have taught the world so much. To say that Napoleon's marshals failed against Wellington is not to underrate them; but as exceptional intellect, exceptional character and exceptional opportunity have been made the requirements to produce the great captain, so the denying to Napoleon's marshals of great opportunity to show their power of necessity held them back from rising to more than the rank of lieutenants. Not one of them ever had Wellington's opportunity.

It is possible that the current phrases in which the lack of independence and initiative of the Napoleonic marshals have been set forth may have been overdrawn. No one familiar with the extraordinary campaigns in which they bore their brilliant part can deny them singular ability. Within certain

bounds they were also allowed independent action. At times the emperor merely told any given marshal to go ahead and do a certain thing, leaving him the entire scope of action; but as a rule these things were a limited part of one great whole, which resided exclusively in the mind of the emperor, and whatever character and intellect the marshal of France may have possessed which would enable him to rise out of the ranks of the average able soldier was not accompanied by the opportunity to do the best that was in him. How many of the Napoleonic marshals might have risen to the second rank with such opportunity, it is as impossible to tell as it is to gauge the actual power of such great men as Sherman, Thomas and Sheridan, within whose control the entire operations of a nation in arms never fell. While they were commanders of armies, they yet were the lieutenants of Grant, — and his honest, loyal lieutenants. And while upon the accomplishment of these splendid lieutenants a considerable part of the fame of Grant must necessarily rest, it also remains true that posterity is robbed of the ability to show what place in military fame Sherman, or Thomas, or Sheridan might have reached had either been in command of the whole strategic field, or of one undivided part of it. Thus it is with Napoleon's marshals. Except those in Spain, none had that independence of action which we phrase "opportunity." Scarcely indeed had they.

After Austerlitz, the first great battle of modern history, Napoleon was more sure of himself than ever before. This is noticeable in his orders, letters, and his reported conversations with all who surrounded him. He was less careful to phrase his fault-finding than before, and no one who served under him or stood about him failed to bow before that iron will and stupendous character. He was the prime motor in every step, great or little; turning from the strategic theatre

of the whole of Northern Europe to the least detail of the clothing, or munition, or rations of the private soldier, or to the most essential or trivial of the civil requirements of the state. This unity of action, coupled with able direction, is what wins in war, if it does not make the perfect commonwealth; and even putting aside all other factors in which the Grand Army was better than the opponent it was about to attack, the fact that it was led and managed in every sense by one man gave an incalculable superiority. Not only this, but strategically and tactically the Grand Army was always ahead in time, and was able to keep this all-important element running in its favor; and its art consisted in doing the practical thing at the right moment.

Enough has already been said about the perfection of the Napoleonic strategy; but in addition to this, the divine side of the art, may be noted: The checkerwise movement of the army across the country; the constant and invaluable superiority in numbers at the point of attack; far-reaching reconnoissances and endless striving to obtain information of the enemy; the living upon the country; and the effort to push to its ultimate result the smallest success or the greatest victory.

In grand-tactics, in the same way, the successive waves of forces falling upon well-chosen points, the withholding of the secondary effort from too rapid employment, and the bringing about of a final result by a massed blow, or the display of one, on the critical point, are prominent. But we shall not see in the coming campaign the employment of artillery on the great scale, and of massed divisions of horse. This came later; and as Napoleon grew to recognize the battle value of massed attacks, it was but natural that he should have continued more and more to put them into use.

While the Grand Army lay in its yet peaceful but threat-

ening attitude behind the Main, let us see what the condition of the opponent was, who had so cavalierly thrown down the gauntlet, and challenged the best troops of the day and the greatest soldier of modern times to armed conflict. In 1806 Prussia had some twelve million men from which to draw its army, including its ally, Saxony. We all know what the character of the brave and toilsome Brandenburger was, who, upon the substratum of unfertile sand, had built for himself the country which good rulers had improved, thanks to him, and which bad rulers had also, thanks to him, been unable to ruin. Prussia was not rich, nor had she the ability to draw on the future for the uses of the present. For generations she had kept her monetary system in gold and silver, and not until the summer of 1806 was paper money issued. If the government of France was striving towards the modern idea, the government of Prussia was old-fashioned to the last degree. Everything dated back to the wonderful days of Frederick, but the inspiring soul of the Last of the Kings was no longer there. The present king was supreme, but he was handicapped by a ministerial Council, at the head of which was Prince Hardenberg, who might almost as well have been the sovereign. Much has been said for and against this strong and able man, but when Prussia was overwhelmed under his administration, it became hard for his supporters to maintain the value he undoubtedly possessed.

The French Revolutionary idea had made but small impression on Prussia, although the factor of the individual had begun to acquire more recognition than it had had under Frederick. But the army had not thriven. From a child of the monarch, it had become, as one German author aptly says, the step-child. The population did not love or pet the army as it once had done, and it is impossible to keep on foot the most efficient army unless the people look upon the sol-

dier as the best among the citizens. There were a good many foreigners in it, recruited from every source. Under the Regulations of 1792 every man, theoretically, owed the country service for a period of twenty years, but as a matter of fact the man served but one year, and thereafter was called to manœuvres only every second year. Thus the infantryman had all together less than two years and the horseman about two years and a half of real service, spread over a long period. This did not suffice to maintain a good army. It was, indeed, barely a sound militia. Nor was this the only difficulty. The system of furloughs which legally prevailed gave to the captains of companies the authority, as a matter of state economy, to allow men to remain off duty; and frequently less than a quarter of the members of any given company were present in the ranks.

Prussia was supposed, in 1806, to be able to raise two hundred thousand men. Of these ten thousand were in distant garrisons, sixteen thousand in the reserve corps, and thirty-three thousand on necessary duty in the interior. When hostilities were determined on, one hundred and forty thousand men were collected near the Thüringer Forest, and adding to these the Saxon contingent, there was probably at the beginning of October a paper force of one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty thousand men ready for duty. But behind this field army, which, indeed, did not all assemble, there was no actual provision for the defense of the kingdom. The result of this proved lamentable.

A new law had been made the 5th of July, 1806, providing for the reorganization of the Prussian infantry; but this had not actually been carried out, and the infantry regiments were not of equal strength or formation, some having two, some three battalions, some more grenadiers or fusileers; and there were fifty-eight third battalions to be used as reinforcements.

Each company had ten sharpshooters; the fusileer companies had twenty.

The old line system prevailed. Frederick's rule of advancing while keeping up a strong fire, which had at one time made so much stir in the military world, had not been forgotten. But of this fine idea there really remained only the mechanical *pas de charge*, and a wonderful speed in the times and motions of loading and firing. The infantry still stood in three ranks, although the value of the third rank in firing had grown to be considered questionable; and alignment and direction were much insisted on. Indeed, this cannot be better illustrated than by the fact that officers had upon their half-pikes astrolabes to enable them to correct the dressing of the line. The drill and manœuvres were not practical. Under Frederick the review work had been a direct preparation for war as it then existed, but the Prussia of 1806 did not know what war as introduced by Napoleon meant; and while the Prussian soldiers were able to make a remarkably good appearance on parade, what they there learned was in no sense equal to the field requirement for opposing the wonderful French infantryman with his theory of the impossible. Frederick had not underrated the skirmishers and sharpshooters. Indeed, the light troops of Austria had taught him many a bitter lesson; but his descendants cast aside the skirmishers as a class tending to relax the discipline of the line troops, indeed as naturally a nuisance, and believed that the brawn of Brandenburg, elbow to elbow, could overwhelm any opposition in arms. In thinking of the French as opponents, they remembered only Rossbach.

The cavalry included cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars, of which the regiments varied in numbers and squadrons; and there was a sprinkling of Polish lancers. It was better mounted than the French, fairly well exercised in riding and

the use of arms, and habituated to do work in small bodies; but it had never been used in masses, and the generals and staff officers were all too old to do the best of cavalry service. That an occasional cavalryman retains his fighting powers to a good old age is only the exception which proves the rule.

The artillery was not as good as the cavalry. It was divided into battalion guns and batteries, the latter organized into foot regiments of four to nine batteries each, having six twelve-pounders and two ten-pounder howitzers, and one horse artillery regiment of twenty batteries, having six six-pounders and two seven-pounder howitzers. In addition to these there were eight reserve batteries of twelve-pounders. Half of the mounted batteries only were fully equipped, much less in the foot artillery. The material was poor. In the Berlin arsenal was stored no end of reserve stuff, but a large part of it was out of date or worthless. In order to mobilize, the farm horses from every part of the land had to be drawn upon, and the artillery drivers were wont to be invalided cavalrymen, or untrained recruits. There seem to have existed no regulations or tactics for the artillery in this year, and altogether the *personnel* was wanting.

There was a pontonier corps of two companies and a half, and a corps of miners and sappers of four companies; and the three pontoon-trains were fairly good.

It must not be assumed that Prussia was idling away her time; this was in no sense the case. Prussia was doing good military work — in the wrong direction. She had not waked up to what modern war required; and while her annual manœuvres drilled the men in quick and exquisite execution, all the great values she deemed to be the soul of war in the beginning of the Nineteenth Century remained as they had been fifty years before. While her effort was to move

a number of battalions towards a certain point in good order and all together, she seemed to forget that it was essential to know and to select the key-point. For these annual manœuvres much study was required of the officers; days and weeks were consumed in preparing for them. Nothing was to be done on the spur of the moment, but everything by square and rule. Lineal tactics and echeloned lines alone were known. The column as a means of fighting was as much looked down upon as skirmishers. Both these essentials in modern tactics were practiced by the French; but though the Prussian would none of them, he stood as ready to use the bayonet as was the Gaul. And looking over the entire Prussian field during the months antedating the battle-day of Jena and Auerstädt, one cannot help feeling that the courage was there, that many of the best qualities were prominent, but that everything that Prussia could best do was of a fashion which Napoleon had been showing the world for ten years to be utterly inefficient to meet the method he had inherited from the Revolution and himself improved. And Prussia had not learned the fact.

Owing to the conditions above explained, practice in marching formed no part of the training of the Prussian soldier. Field service of any kind was rarely essayed, not even the posting of sentries or the placing of grand-guards. As a rule, the men camped and were not cantoned.

Victualing was ill done, the magazine system being the one thing known. This left the train enormous and unwieldy, and prevented the soldier from activity in manœuvring. The use of this system was partly due to the fact that the idea of the day in Prussia was that to raise victual in the country traversed was a relic of barbarism, and in your own country nothing short of a crime. Wherever the Frenchman raised his rations and ate, there the Prussian, forbidden to forage,

starved. This was saving the peasantry and destroying the army; and, curiously, there was a rule, which reads rather absurdly, that when no bread was in the magazine or was to be had from the country, the bread-penny was to be paid to the men. Of just what use under these circumstances the bread-penny was, it is hard to divine. Thus, although the train was enormous, the men were ill-fed. Tents, endless cooking utensils, the fact that even a subaltern was permitted a horse to ride and a horse for his baggage, made the train so impossible to be handled that it is wonderful how the Prussian army managed to move at all.

The arms of the Prussian foot soldier, introduced in 1782, are acknowledged to have been the worst in Europe. This was partly due to state economics. The sharpshooter was better off with his rifle. Little ammunition was given for practice firing, and there had been no war experience. The infantry was only fairly clad, and, having no cloaks, suffered much during the cold nights. The whole army was fitted out with a superfluity of unnecessary and an absence of necessary things. The difference between the Prussian soldier of this year and the Frenchman was about the same as that between the Federal recruit as we remember him before starting on his first march and the same man hardened by two years of strenuous service.

No one will deny the gallantry of the Prussian officer ever since Prussia was a nation. But the Prussian officer of 1806 was so ill-paid that he could not feed himself in the field without drawing from the mess of the men. The men received two to two and a half thalers a month, — a thaler is about seventy-five cents, — and when not in the field were obliged to eke this out by work they were permitted to do outside. In fact, the company fund was largely kept up by the pay which the men would give for permission to absent themselves, so as

to work to keep their families from want. When we add to this that the hungry man was beaten with stripes if he took from a field he passed some potatoes to keep him from falling in his tracks from inanition, we can see that, however humane its laws for peace, for the purpose of carrying on war the Prussian army was not well organized. Too much consideration for the well-being of the population, so far as regarded feeding and quartering the troops, had been exerted. While this is, of course, a wise act in one's own land, it may yet be carried too far; and hardship might readily be inflicted upon the people of a country by paying so much heed to their welfare as to incapacitate the army that protects them.

There is much that is contradictory in the contemporary statements about the prevailing conditions of discipline in the Prussian army at this time. The treatment of the men was harsh. While no military crime was punished with death, very light ones were punished with the rod, and by blows with the stick. It is said that the king desired to modify the punishments, but his efforts did not result in the good of the so-called discipline of the day. As far as could be outwardly seen, the condition of the army was excellent, but those who were able to gauge its actual value shook their heads. This may account for the difference of opinion above referred to. It is far from easy to state wherein consists what is called discipline. It depends largely upon national character, and on the way this is moulded. It depends upon the particular work troops are expected to do. For one purpose a condition would be that of indiscipline, for another the same state of discipline would suffice. Our Volunteers in the Civil War had little discipline according to Continental standards; but they were law-abiding as well as battle-trained in an exceptionally high degree.

The Prussian officers were of a different class from the men. Frederick's rule that he would have no officer who was not of noble birth was practically still in force, and in the Prussian army the officers did their full duty on the battle-field in this unhappy year. As far as knowledge was concerned, it is probable that the Prussian officer was better instructed than the French in books, and in the so-called military knowledge of the day, but this was not all that could be asked. Associated with other qualities, book-knowledge is of the greatest value to the soldier. Apart from the other required qualities, it is practically worthless.

The republican or the constitutional monarchist naturally frowns upon the Hohenzollern scheme, as embodied in the motto, "Ex Deo rex, ex rege lex;" but once accept the scheme, and you cannot deny that, since the days of the Great Elector, it has been carried out after a fashion which is altogether admirable. No people has ever more heartily acted up to the war cry, "For God, King, and Fatherland!" than the Prussians under the Hohenzollern régime. Especially are the nobles imbued with this sentiment. Although a large and restless part of the population of Prussia is striving for greater and more modern extension of its liberties, yet there remains among the peasantry and middle classes of Prussia so strong a feeling of belief in the divine right of kings, that it will take much in our day to overturn the power which has accomplished so great results in Germany, despite the fact that its methods are not those of the Anglo-Saxon. Speaking from a four years' daily intimacy with Prussian officers in their own capital, the author cannot too highly express his admiration for their constant and unselfish, their courageous and honest fealty to their ideals.

On the whole, then, this much must be said, that the Prussian army did not possess the requisite warlike spirit, if this phrase

means the ability to hold itself upon the field of battle. It believed itself to be the first army in the world, and this in a way is the most helpful of all feelings. Nothing aids to win victory like the belief that one is invincible. This belief the Prussians had, but they had not the wherewithal to sustain it. It was from the traditions of the past that this feeling had grown, and it existed mainly among the officers. But in the rank and file, it is the work of the immediate past which tells. That his fathers won in battles of *auld lang syne* will not inspire the soldier as well as the fact that the army of which he is a member has won well-contested battles within the year. For the officer tradition may amount to more; for the man in the ranks it needs the success of the present to inspire him to the effort that wins further success.

Scharnhorst.

With regard to the larger organization of the Prussian army, the old regimental system, each regiment belonging to some particular section, still remained. Shortly before the campaign opened, at the suggestion of Scharnhorst, the Prussian and Saxon army was organized into divisions on the French system. That this should not have been able to work effectively at such short notice is hardly to be wondered at.

The leaders of the Prussian army were sound men, according to their own standard, but they must be accused of criminal blindness in not heeding the events of the last ten years. It is hard to understand how people with such a military past within fifty years should have remained so obtuse to the demonstration of the new method which Napoleon had made. The Prussian officer did not lack ability, and he proved that he lacked neither courage nor devotion to his cause, so long

as any hope was left. As man to man, the Prussian officer was probably as good as, and possibly better than, the Frenchman. But living in the past, they would not recognize, would scarcely give a glance at the lessons of the present.

The French view of war was not only a practical one, but it was directly drawn from practice. The Prussian view of war was an ideal one, founded upon the knowledge of the work done in generations past.

As the highest strategy is generally the product of the greatest brain, so the Prussian leaders could scarcely be held to bring to the fore as good a system as Napoleon. And as in grand-tactics little remained of Frederick's great work, except the one idea of the oblique order, so the great Prussian past was practically useless to the men who so gallantly threw themselves, in October, 1806, across the path of the invincible Grand Army. There had been much thinking among the Prussian officers, but in the Prussian army criticism of what existed was frowned on. Frederick had practically forbidden his officers to indulge in the writing of books or treatises; and from his autocratic standpoint this was well enough. But the idea had crept down to the present day in so narrow a form that, however intelligent his suggestion, the man who wrote a book, or expressed himself except within moderate terms about things military, was apt to be looked upon with distrust, if not openly attacked. Bulow had practically prophesied the disaster of 1806, and yet when he published his early treatises, he was considered by many of the old-fashioned soldiers of the day as little short of a malefactor. Criticism of the existing system was deemed unpatriotic.

Bulow.

It seems that there had been a number of officers in the Prussian army who had followed the victorious army of the French, but as this work had been done mainly against the Austrians whom Frederick's troops had so often beaten, they attached small importance to what they saw. Some Prussian officers had been in France, but it would seem that the First Consul had not permitted their eyes to be opened as to the actual state of his fighting-machinery, and their reports to Prussian headquarters were misleading.

In his efforts at reform of the army, the Prussian king had gone but half-way, and the system of furloughs of the men had emasculated much of what he had tried to do. Three years after the Regulations of 1792, a Commission was created under Mollendorf, to which were handed in numberless suggestions by Prussian officers and others as to what it was wise to do; and finally a reserve of militia for the protection of the country was determined upon, to consist of seventy-eight battalions of six hundred men each; but as a matter of fact this did not get done before the campaign of 1806 began. It was not laziness nor unwillingness to reform the Prussian army, but simply a blind belief in the excellence of the institution which had made Prussia so great under Frederick.



Mollendorf.
From an old Print.

The leaders could not see that the soul had passed from the body of the system. The Commission expressed the whole matter well when, in answer to pleas for more modern methods, it said: "It appears impossible to understand how anybody can desire to make an entire change of the organization

of a victorious army, which has been and will remain an inimitable pattern for all Europe, when such a change will reduce it to the state of mere militia." Not all, indeed, of the officers of Prussia were blind. It is said that, recognizing Napoleon's capacity for arms as extraordinary, the Duke of Brunswick undertook the command with a certain reluctance. These things could not, of course, be spoken openly, but to-day one finds, in the unpublished writings of men of that period, many a hint that all might not go well.

It is not always true that the feeling of invincibility will bring victory. Neither is the reverse true. The manifold accidents of war forbid this. Bonaparte in 1796 took a disheartened army and led it from victory to victory. On the other hand, no army ever believed itself invincible more fully than the one which was beaten under Frederick at Kolin. Although the feeling of invincibility is one of the most potent of factors in a successful army, this sentiment has its bounds. The soldiers of the Grand Army went into the Jena campaign with the feeling that they could not be beaten, but it is not wonderful that they knew nothing about the army of Frederick. To the young Gallic conscript Frederick was merely a name, and scarcely more so to the regimental officers. With regard to the Prussian army, opinions have constantly varied from one to the other extreme. According to the better opinion, there seems not to have been an altogether strong feeling of self-reliance among the Prussian troops at Jena. Despite this, however, they fought well on that fatal day.

The condition of the two armies may be summed up in this: the French army believed itself to be superior and was actually so; the Prussian army believed itself to be superior and was not.

Vastly more knowledge had come to Napoleon's attention

about the Prussian army than had reached the Prussian authorities with regard to the French army. On November 20, 1805, Hauterive wrote to Talleyrand: "You may choose whatever army you like of those which belong to the great powers of Europe, I do not except even those of Portugal and Spain, there is not one of them which is not in a condition to give lessons of courage, of pride, and of elevation to that of Prussia, which has not a reasonable right to hope to intimidate it, to weaken it by desertions, and to conquer it." And a week later, "Oh, great Frederick! within eighteen years of thy existence, see what they are doing with that great army which thou hadst taken so much pains to form!" Even earlier than this, Duroc had reported to the First Consul about the Prussian troops: "I believe that the soldier has rather the appearance (than the reality) of being good, and that he lacks entirely nerve and intelligence;" and on the 18th of September, 1805, Duroc wrote Talleyrand: "Certainly the Prussian army is nothing less than ready to enter in campaign;" and Napoleon's Correspondence proves that, on this and other statements, he had founded his belief that the Prussian army could not resist him.

It might be added to this comparison of the French and Prussian armies that the Austrian forces were, in this era, far more able to cope with Napoleon than the Prussian, because inured to war. It was the genius of the great captain against whom they fought that brought defeat to the Austrians. On the other hand, it was to the Prussian shortsightedness that the overwhelming disaster of Jena was mainly due. That Napoleon would have won the 1806 campaign with the Grand Army, even had Prussia been as war-hardened as Austria, is not a subject of doubt; but the victory would scarcely have been as sweeping, nor the inability of Prussia to resist the onset after one great battle as marked.

It was not to the Prussian nation, nor indeed to the Prussian army, that defeat was traceable in this wonderful campaign; it was to the ruling classes and to the superior officers, who stood still while their opponents moved onward with the world's ideas.

Sword of the Period.

arrested. My intention is that they shall be brought before a military commission and shot within twenty-four hours. It is not an ordinary crime to spread libels in places where the French armies are, to excite the inhabitants against them. It is a crime of high treason. The sentence shall be to the effect that wherever there is an army, the duty of the chief being to watch for its security, such and such individuals, convicted of having attempted to raise the inhabitants of Swabia against the French army, are condemned to death." This was certainly a high-handed way of looking at the matter.

Acts of this nature have helped engender the habit of laying the blame of all the Napoleonic wars at the door of the emperor. This is only in part a correct view. The wars were the natural sequence of the conditions produced by the French Revolution, the result of which he was working out, and of the corresponding jealousy of French successes and of the sudden rise of this non-divine ruler. Yet it is true that the wars were in part due to Napoleon; and though he may at this time have striven to avoid war, — while having his own way, perhaps, — it is evident that he looked on war as constantly possible for the purpose of advancing the interests of France. In his letter to Berthier from Paris, February 8, he said: "You can write them (Ney, Soult and Davout) a little confidential letter to tell them that everything is not finished with the Prussians, . . . that they are to hold themselves always ready, that everything should be reorganized, and that nothing should escape them." On the 14th he wrote Berthier to order Bernadotte to occupy Ansbach in the name of the King of Bavaria, as the Prussian troops had been occupying Hanover according to the treaty; that good discipline was to be maintained there, and they were "to speak with great praise of the King of Prussia, and to pay all the compliments usual in these conditions." . . . Mortier

was to be moved up to sustain Bernadotte. Davout was to go to Eichstädt and Ney to Augsburg. "Let every one be on his guard, and remain at his post. I alone know what I am to do." . . . The King of Bavaria, said he, was not to mix himself up in this Ansbach matter, "so as not seriously to irritate Prussia."

Light Infantryman. (1806.)

On March 21 Napoleon ordered that none of the French corps should repass the Rhine; yet on March 22 a decree provided that the troops in France should be put on a peace footing. And on the 4th of April he wrote to the King of Prussia a flattering letter in which he says: "War against Prussia has never been possible by any act of mine." Even if disingenuous, as many will assume, yet these advances distinctly made towards peace, and they were intended so to do. On August 6, 1806, Napoleon wrote to Soult: "The peace with Russia and the negotiations that I have with England make me believe that all will calm itself, and that a profound peace will succeed all these warlike movements. But I none the less have reinforced my army." On the 17th he wrote to Berthier, "We must seriously think of the return of the Grand Army, because it seems to me that all doubts as to Germany are quieted." On the 26th he ordered Berthier to so arrange the dispositions of troops that the French would be the least possible in contact with the Prussian territory. And Berthier was to spread abroad in every way the idea that the French troops were returning home. "You will in effect put in march a few artillery wagons, and you will give the heavy baggage

a movement towards the Rhine. Give orders that nothing which is at Strasburg or Mayence shall pass the Rhine." And on the 3d of September he again wrote him: "I was about to send you orders for the return of the army when I learned that the Emperor of Russia had refused to ratify the treaty. We must wait a few days to see what will happen. . . . Meanwhile, do nothing. . . . Send some emissaries, some Polish officers, to the Russian frontier to see what is being done."

Again, matters shortly appeared to improve, so that, on September 4, Napoleon wrote Berthier that leave of absence might be given to several officers, and that he might take one himself. All this by no means looks as if Napoleon desired to force a conflict. It rather bears the impress of a desire for peace on what seemed to him fair conditions; but meanwhile nothing was to be relaxed which was essential to sustain French claims. No one can dispute the good policy of this line of conduct. Never ruler used peace to prepare for war more consistently than Napoleon. And now he exhibited his wonted activity.

On September 5 he wrote to Berthier: "My Cousin, send some officers of engineers to make good reconnoissances at every risk on the debouches and the roads which lead from Bamberg to Berlin. Eight days after I shall have given the order, my armies, whether that of Frankfort, or that of Passau, or that of Memmingen, are to be concentrated at Bamberg in the principality of Baireuth. . . . From the frontiers of Bamberg I estimate ten days' march to Berlin. Tell me what is the nature of the country on the right and left, that of the roads and of the obstacles the enemy could present. What is the Saale River, and the Elster, at Gera? . . . You will send intelligent officers to Dresden and Berlin by different routes. They are to go and ask on your part . . . what signify the movements and concentrations of the Prussian troops. They are to say that you appear very disquieted at all these movements, not having received from Paris corresponding orders. . . . They are to stop everywhere on the route to breakfast, dine, sleep. They are not to travel at night, and can thus study

carefully the locality. Give me also details about the Spree. I have no need to say that the greatest prudence is necessary to gather these facts, for I have no designs on Berlin. I desire to be furnished with these details solely to be ready. I imagine that between Bamberg and Berlin there is no fortress except Magdeburg."

Within a few days the Prussian war-cloud became dark. The Russian army was cantoned on the Niemen, of no immediate use to the Prussians, though certain to come to their assistance later; for the French and Russians were still nominally at war, and Napoleon was striving to bring about action by Turkey against Russia, to keep the latter from nearer Continental fields. The situation found Napoleon ready to act. On September 10 he wrote Berthier from Paris: "My Cousin, the movements of Prussia continue to be very extraordinary. They need to receive a lesson. I am having my horses start to-morrow, and in a few days my Guard. They leave under the pretext of the Diet of Frankfort." And on the same day, to Caulaincourt: "Have all my field-glasses arranged. Have sixty horses start to-morrow from my stables, among them eight of those which I ride. This is to be done with all possible mystery." It was but a short step for the emperor from peace to war.

Prussia had placed herself in grave danger by not stopping to reckon, as Napoleon always did, the thousands she could promptly raise in men, and the days' marches they must make to be of real use on the strategic theatre. Apparently remembering only Rossbach, her leaders held the French army, and even Napoleon, at a cheap rate, and acted accordingly; while the emperor's first step had been to send officers out to study up the proposed field of campaign with all its topographical values, and to formulate his plan. On the 9th of September he wrote Berthier: "If I made war against Prussia, my base and line of operation would be Strasburg, Mannheim, Mayence to Würzburg, where I have a strong place, so

and a formidable body, capable of being used to marked effect on the field of battle.

Despite all the emperor's care, some things would not get done as he wanted them. On September 17 he wrote Berthier that he noticed from the morning reports that he had too few aides, that he ought to have three times as many. On September 20 he wrote again: "Have we got a bridge equipment? I see none on the *état de situation* (morning report). It would be absurd for General Songis to have left so big an army without means of passing a river. In any event, I hang to the belief that the bridge equipment will be in Augsburg before October 4. If it is at Strasburg, how, without bridge equipment, shall I cross the Elbe?"

Grenadier and Voltigeur of Line Infantry. (1807.)

It would seem that the pontoon-train had in fact been neglected, — a singular oversight; for on September 30, "General Songis is wrong to excuse himself," the emperor wrote. "A park of artillery without bridges is a thing too absurd. If those at Vienna are good for nothing, lighter ones should be sent. This I approve much. I have ordered General Rapp to direct the twenty-five pontoons of Strasburg on Bamberg. They will reach there October 5, I hope." On September 20, with reference to the strategical manœuvres, the emperor wrote Berthier: "As the places of Königshofen, Kronach and Würzburg may become the

leaning-points of the Grand Army, it will be necessary that good commandants shall be named for them, and that companies of artillery and engineer officers shall be sent thither." And on the same date, in orders to the King of Holland with regard to the Wesel forces, he says: "I desire that the troops should be on the march in the first days of October, because it is a counter-attack that you are to make to attract the attention of the enemy, while I manœuvre to turn him. All your troops are to move upon the territory of the Confederation, and to spread themselves up to its frontiers without passing them, or committing any act of hostility. This is not the time for jeremiads." Like a very upstart, Louis had been finding fault with his new kingdom. "It is energy that you must show. . . . I will never make any but an honorable peace, or I will crush all my enemies."

The same care is here apparent in preparing for this manœuvre which was seen in the correspondence preceding the campaign of Ulm, and especially in acquiring a full knowledge of the topography. On September 21 Napoleon sent Marmont orders to travel over a prescribed itinerary, with an ostensible diplomatic errand, but really to spy out various matters on the territory of the allies.

"You will go with suitable precautions to see the fortress of Hanau, whether it can be seized out of hand or not. If it is prudent, you will go and see the fortress of Marburg. . . . There are several little places near Frankfort. You will inform yourself about them. . . . From Hesse-Cassel you will take the route which leads directly to Cologne, — always by day. You will observe the system of the localities and the country between Wesel, Mayence, Cassel and Cologne. You will get information on the roads from Cassel to Gotha, from Cassel to Göttingen, from Cassel to Paderborn. What kind of a place is Cassel? Is it armed, and can it hold out? Cast your eye on the elector's troops, on their actual condition, the artillery, the militia, strong places. . . . You must feel how important it is that you should get these things into your

head, not only for the opening of the campaign, but more for what follows." On the same day he wrote Augereau to send an intelligent engineer officer on a like errand: "To observe all that shall be possible, . . . he is to make short day-journeys, breakfast, dine and sleep on the way. He will observe everything with prudence, the nature of the roads, the mountains, the rivers, the population of the towns, villages, distances." . . .

On September 24 Napoleon wrote Berthier to hasten up Soult's movements. "It is essential that he should reach Amberg quickly, because the enemy is at Hof, an extravagance of which I did not think him capable, believing that he would remain on the defensive along the Elbe. . . . I can be, on the 1st of October, at the vanguard, if circumstances require it. The object of this letter is to make you understand that I want you to accelerate the movements I have ordered without tiring the troops, and without giving too much disquiet to the Prussians."

And though dealing with the larger problems of strategy and statecraft, Napoleon never forgot the details of his work. To Soult, on September 29, he wrote: "Take for a principle in all your formations for battle, whether you shall be placed on two or three lines, that one same division shall make the right of the two or three lines, another division the centre of the two or three lines, another division the left of the two or three lines. You have seen at Austerlitz the advantage of this formation, because a general of division is in the centre of his division." And the next day he wrote to Berthier, speaking of wagoners: "They are not to be employed as servants, they are not to be attached to the wagons of officers, of generals. I shall be inexorable on this point; and I will not suffer that any one shall make use of the artillery horses or caissons." This was followed up by a monition to Berthier: "I hold you responsible if, twenty-four hours after

receiving this order, there are horses or wagons taken for individual service."

Once near the army, Napoleon, whose strategic plan was already clearly defined as a manœuvre to turn the Prussian left flank and cut them off from Berlin, began shifting the bulk of his forces towards his right flank, and orders were sent to Soult to move forward to Baireuth on the way to Hof; to Bernadotte to advance on Kronach; to Ney to march to Nürnberg; and to Lefebvre to head his corps on Coburg. Murat with the cavalry reserve was then on the road between Schweinfurt and Kronach; and Wrede with the Bavarian auxiliaries was headed on Nürnberg. To Berthier, from Mainz, September 30, Napoleon wrote that he proposed to be at Saalfeld before the enemy could reach that place in force.

Louis Bonaparte.

In addition to Würzburg, Forchheim was now definitely selected as a place to lean on, and by the end of September the emperor's plan was fully matured. On September 30, in speaking of his choice of Forchheim, Napoleon says to Berthier: "You have enough experience of war and of my manner of directing operations to feel the importance of the fortresses of Forchheim and Würzburg. Add to this that Forchheim has the double advantage of serving me against Bohemia, and that there might be such an operation as that, withdrawing entirely my left, I should be deprived for some

time of the *point d'appui* of Würzburg." In addition to Würzburg and Forchheim he wished Kronach to be fortified, so that with vanguard in Kronach, his right in Forchheim and his left in Würzburg, he would be leaning on three strong places. And next day he wrote that these three places were to be provisioned and to be filled with material, because "One must calculate that the enemy will come to Würzburg." With regard to his plan he wrote Louis on the 30th, from Mainz, what his operations would be, and that these would probably commence October 6.

"My intention is to concentrate all my forces on the extremity of my right, leaving the entire space between the Rhine and Bamberg entirely disgarnished, so as to have nearly two hundred thousand men assemble on one and the same battlefield. If the enemy pushes parties out between Mayence and Bamberg, it will not trouble me, because my line of communications will be established on Forchheim, which is a little strong place, and from there to Würzburg. . . . The nature of events which might arise is incalculable, because the enemy, who believes my left to be on the Rhine and my right in Bohemia, and who believes my line of operation to be parallel to my front of battle, may take great interest in turning my left; and in that case I can throw him upon the Rhine. Do you occupy yourself in putting Wesel in the best possible state; so that you may, according as circumstances demand it, have all your army repass on the Wesel bridge and march along the Rhine, to hold back any parties, and that they may not be able to go beyond this barrier. . . . These observations are a matter of caution. My first marches threaten the heart of the Prussian monarchy, and the deployment of my forces will be so imposing and so rapid that it is probable that the whole Prussian army in Westphalia will fall back on Magdeburg, and that everything will start in forced marches to defend the capital. It is then, but then only, that you are to push out the vanguard to take possession of the Mark, Münster, Osnabrück, and East Friesland. . . . But the mass of your forces must not leave Wesel." The emperor apparently proposed to increase the borders of the Dutch kingdom to the Weser.

His own great mass Napoleon was preparing to assemble

at the Bamberg-Baireuth rendezvous, and project it forward, part by way of Saalfeld and part by way of Hof, around the left flank of the Prussian army, cutting it from its base on the Elbe, just as he had turned Mack's right in 1805 and cut him off from the Inn. This operation practically resulted in Napoleon's giving up Mainz in favor of Mannheim, which lay more in rear of the position the army must occupy, so that the French line of communications would run from Forchheim back through Würzburg on Mannheim. Yet Napoleon did not propose to sacrifice Mainz, as he wrote to Louis.

By October 2 the 8th Corps, Mortier's, was to be in Mainz, twenty thousand strong; from here it was to sweep its front clear as far as Frankfort; and should the above-mentioned necessity arise, to recross the Rhine and reach out with its left towards Louis and his army coming on from Wesel, so as, between them, to hold the river.

Having thus secured the Rhine, Napoleon proposed, in case of disaster, not necessarily to look to this river, but rather to the Danube, as his base. But all these arrangements, he said, were merely a matter of military prudence which the operations of the great army would — as they did — render nugatory. Louis' army was to be considered only as one of the corps, whose duty it was to attract the enemy's attention "until the 12th of October, which is the moment when my operation will unfold itself."

To these large precautions Napoleon was led from a high opinion of the Prussian army. Especially the king's cavalry was deemed of fine quality, and every one looked forward to a fighting campaign. The emperor expected a harder task than with the Austrians. This feeling Madame de Rémusat expresses in her Memoirs: "The reputation of the Prussian troops was great; people spoke much of the excellence of the

cavalry, while ours inspired, as yet, little confidence; and military men expected a stanch resistance." "And the emperor remarked at that time," says Lecomte, "'I believe that we shall have more to do than with the Austrians; *nous aurons de la terre à remuer.*'"

On October 5 also the emperor wrote to Soult: "It seems that what there is most to fear with the Prussians is their cavalry, but with the infantry that you have, and by holding yourself always in position to ploy into squares, you have little to fear. Nevertheless, no means of war is to be neglected. Be careful that three to five thousand pioneer tools march always in front of your divisions, so as to make, if needed, a redoubt or even a simple ditch." These were wise precautions from the standpoint of what Napoleon knew or believed; but the expected echoes of the days of Frederick, of the Dessauers and Schwerin, of the gallant rides of Ziethen and Seydlitz, were not to be again heard.

There were three lines along which Napoleon could operate: by his left, debouching at several places from Mainz to Wesel, and thence into Westphalia; from the centre by way of Cassel on Eisenach and Leipsic; by the right on Gera and Hof to cut the enemy from his base. The last was the only one which afforded all the advantages, and which best suited the then positions of the French corps, coming, as they were, from the Danube.

According to one excellent authority, the Prussian army, in 1806, had of field troops one hundred and thirty-six thousand infantry, forty-five thousand cavalry, twelve thousand artillery, or one hundred and ninety-three thousand men. To this are to be added fifty-eight thousand men in garrison. The king had contrived to persuade the Saxon army to join his own, and Hesse-Cassel was about to do the same. This added over twenty-five thousand men. At the end of Sep-

tember the forces were well posted, under the leadership of the Duke of Brunswick. The main Prussian army, which formed the centre, stood at Naumburg, sixty-two thousand strong on paper, but with its reserve of thirteen thousand men still far in the rear. Frederick William was with his force in nominal command. Prince Hohenlohe with a corps of twenty thousand men, whom a body of twenty thousand Saxons was to reinforce, held the left at Chemnitz; but the Saxons were slow in mobilizing, and part of this body, under Tauenzien, was out as a flying van at Hof and Schleiz. Ruchel's corps, forming the right wing, was extended on the line Erfurt-Gotha-Eisenach; and though it was supposed to number about twenty thousand men, some of its battalions were still back in Westphalia.

Hohenlohe.
From an old Print.

The eagerness with which the Prussian war party rushed into conflict with Napoleon's huge and perfectly appointed army exhibits with only too much force how ill the lessons of 1805 had been heeded in Berlin. Here was the general of the age, who for ten years had been surprising the world by his wonderful feats of arms, who had defeated every army sent against him, and who was now placed where he could concentrate a force much superior to their own in a position threatening their flank and rear; and no one in power in Berlin could recog-

Tauenzien.

nize the danger. Just as Mack had been unwilling to wait for his Russian auxiliaries, and braved the onset of Napoleon on the Iller, so here, at the rugged range of mountains known as the Thüringer Wald, the Prussians showed courage untempered by discretion; for their allies, the Russians, on whom alone they could rely to equalize the contending forces, were now still farther away than they had been from Mack. Indeed, so little did the leaders know of their opponent that they imagined that Napoleon would take up a defensive position and await attack behind the upper or Franconian Saale, or, indeed, upon the Main.

Though ready, Napoleon was still uncertain as to what would happen. From Mainz, September 29, he wrote Berthier, while ordering forward Bernadotte and Lefebvre: "Moreover, war is not declared. We are to hold ourselves on the *qui vive*, and let reports reach me every day. Do not uselessly tire the cavalry. . . . Our language should be quite pacific; we are not to commit any hostilities." And to Murat, on the same day: "We must not even cross the borders of the country of Würzburg and of Bavaria. One might pass a certain point, if it was necessary to occupy a good position which should favor debouching into Saxony." And to Soult: "War is not yet declared, but it holds by a very feeble thread. . . . Prepare to execute the following plan (which follows). . . . You will be the first destined to enter the enemy's country. . . . You and your army corps must see the esteem I bear you." . . .

For the Prussians there had been but one of two things to do: either to mobilize rapidly and early and advance on the French corps before they had left their cantonments in Franconia; or to mass their forces defensively on the upper Saale, with the left on the Erz Gebirge. If then beaten, their retreat would have been safe on Dresden, or, if forced back

farther, on Silesia, to meet the Russians. Their reaching out to Eisenach may have been intended for its political effect on the Elector of Hesse-Cassel; but they could not have played Napoleon's strategical game to better advantage than they did by concentrating on their right and leaving their left in the air. To Prussia the Elbe was what the Rhine was to France; but they neglected its defense.

Moreover, as has already been detailed, the Prussian army was no longer that of Frederick. The generals were all antiquated, living on the memory of the Seven Years' War. The Duke of Brunswick, now seventy years old, son of Ferdinand, the solid soldier of Frederick's era, had served as vanguard leader under his father, and since then had seen no service except at Valmy and Kaiserslautern. Moreover, he belonged to the peace party. His next in command, Mollendorf, was equally lacking in experience of modern war. Hohenlohe and his chief of staff, Massenbach, were just of the quality to choose the wrong turn in the road. In the Prussian army were such men as Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Blucher. The first two, at least, were intelligent enough as soldiers to recognize the weak points of the Prussian operations. But, as juniors, they were powerless. Not one of the Prussian generals in high command saw that in crossing to the west of the Saale they were opening their left flank to Napoleon's turning ma-

The Duke of Brunswick.

nœuvre. Secure in the belief that they would push the French back to the Rhine, they had not even looked to the fortifications of their own strong places, while Napoleon, vastly their superior in numbers and skill, had left no stone unturned to put his rear beyond danger of attack. The contrast is striking. Still, the Prussian army, as such, was in good discipline, and efficient, if well led; the artillery was a superior arm; the cavalry had not forgotten Seydlitz; and the staff was better taught in details than the French. But in the whole structure the soul was lacking. Nor did the army know war.

Gneisenau.

From Mainz, September 30, Napoleon wrote a note on the general defense of the empire to Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, telling him that between the King of Holland, at Wesel, and Kellermann stationed from the Moselle up the Rhine, there was no danger along that river. This note shows that the troops left at home were quite sufficient to hold themselves against any operation by the English on the coasts. It discusses possible descents on Hanover, Boulogne, Cherbourg, Brest, Bordeaux, Toulon, and shows how to provide against each. Full instructions were also given September 30 to Kellermann for his coöperation with the King of Holland. Nothing was left to chance.

Although, as above said, the great Corsican had for a decade been conducting war on the new principle in Europe, Asia, Africa, yet but one man had divined his method, and had grasp enough of war to see why he did what he did, and what he was apt next to do. This was Jomini, then a junior on Ney's staff. It was about this time that Jomini handed in to his chief a memorial showing the direction which the

emperor's operation must take, and stating that if the Prussians stood at the Thüringer Wald, the emperor would choose their left flank as the objective. "The left flank of the allies would then become the point at which all our movements would aim, which would have for object to reach the road from Baireuth to Hof with superior forces, to crush this wing, and then follow the other parts, and always to hold the road on which the Russians could come to their aid." This memorial had no particular results. If it had come into Napoleon's hands, he would have been more apt to suppress it than to promote the writer. He was by good right jealous of any equality of knowledge. And as Frederick gave severe orders to keep secret his "Instructions" to his officers, so Napoleon proposed to retain as his own, so far as possible, the new system of war he had created.

Drum Major and Drummer of the Guard.

The emperor was, of course, but partially informed as to the whereabouts of the Prussian army. He had reports of movements in Westphalia, and a small detachment had been met with at Hof; but he was well aware of his immense numerical superiority, and whether the enemy placed himself across his track or not, he felt certain he could beat him; and as his direction was strategically sound, that is, aimed at the centre of the Prussian dominions, it would have been an error to change it. The Prussians must

either retire or fight; and in either case the French army was on their sensitive flank.

It was on the evening of October 1 that Napoleon left Mainz; and he reached Würzburg the next night. Though the situation had not cleared up, Berthier, on October 2, wrote the King of Bavaria: "The Prussian army is making marches and countermarches, and it seems as if its principal point of concentration forward is Erfurt. The emperor's armies are in position."

The Grand Army was advancing in three columns.

On October 5 Napoleon wrote Marshal Soult the status: "I have occupied, armed and provisioned the citadels of Würzburg, Forchheim and Kronach, and I shall debouch with my whole army on Saxony by three outlets. You are at the head of my right, having, a half-day behind you, the corps of Marshal Ney, and at a day behind, ten thousand Bavarians (Wrede), which makes more than fifty thousand men. Marshal Bernadotte is at the head of my centre; he has behind him the corps of Marshal Davout, the greatest part of the reserve, and the cavalry of my Guard, which forms more than seventy thousand. He will debouch by Kronach, Lobenstein and Schleiz. The 5th Corps (Lannes) is at the head of my left, which has behind it Marshal Augereau's corps. It will debouch through Coburg, Gräfenthal and Saalfeld. They form more than forty thousand men. The same day that you shall arrive at Hof, all the rest will have arrived in positions equally far advanced. . . . You may imagine that it will be a fine thing to move around this place (Dresden) in a battalion square of two hundred thousand men. Still, all that demands a little art and certain events."

Augereau had been intended to march on Cassel as a threat to the Elector, and thence to oblique to the right; but this idea was abandoned in favor of keeping him in the "battalion square." The emperor spent two days in inspecting the supply department, and when, on the 4th, the several corps had presumably got into position, the order for the advance, as above detailed, was given. The army now consisted of:

The Emperor, with Berthier as Chief of Staff.

The infantry of the Guard under Lefebvre.			4,000 men.
The cavalry of the Guard under Bessières.			5,000 "
	Inf'y Div'n.	*Light Cav. Div'n.*	
1st Corps, Bernadotte.	Rivaud.	Tilly.	
	Drouet.		
	Dupont.		25,000 "
3d Corps, Davout.	Morand.	Vialannes.	
	Friant.		
	Gudin.		33,000 "
4th Corps, Soult.	St. Hilaire.	Margaron.	
	Leval.		
	Legrand.		35,000 "
5th Corps, Lannes	Gazan.	Treilhard.	
(*vice* Lefebvre).	Suchet.		23,000 "
6th Corps, Ney.	Marchand.	Colbert.	
	Malher.		21,000 "
7th Corps, Augereau.	Desjardins.	Durosnel.	
	Heudelet.		16,000 "
			162,000 "

Cavalry Reserve:	*Heavy.*	*Dragoons.*	*Light.*	
Murat.	Nansouty.	Klein.	Lasalle.	
	Hautpoul.	Beaumont.	Milhaud.	
		Grouchy.		
		Sahuc.		20,000 "
Special arms (engineer corps, etc.).				8,000 "
Bavarian corps under Wrede.				8,000 "
				198,000 "
8th Corps under Mortier in Mainz.				15,000 "

Of the army corps thus marching forward on three lines, Lannes with the left was ordered to reach Coburg early October 8, Augereau a day's march behind him along the same road. In the centre, Bernadotte via Kronach was to get within one march of Lobenstein by the 8th, in his rear Davout, who was to pass Kronach, and the Guard behind Davout. On the

right, Soult was to be in Münchburg on the 8th, ready to advance on Hof, Ney a day's march behind him, and Wrede considerably in the rear, to reach Baireuth October 9. Headquarters on the 8th in Lichtenfels.

It will be seen that the original Prussian position, Chemnitz-Naumburg-Erfurt, was a complete defense of the Elbe and the communications back to Berlin; or, in case of defeat, would allow a withdrawal in good order to the Oder to meet the Russians; but that by concentrating on their right towards Erfurt the Prussians opened the heart of their kingdom to the emperor's thrust, and their left flank to being turned. If they meant to move around the French left and get on Napoleon's communications, it was essential that they should be much more ready and much more rapid.

From Bamberg, October 6, was issued a

PROCLAMATION.

Soldiers, the order for your return to France had been sent. You had already approached it by several marches; triumphal fêtes were awaiting you, and the preparations to receive you had already been commenced in the capital. . . . But cries of war were heard in Berlin. For two months we have been provoked every day more. . . . Soldiers, there is no one among you who would return to France by any other path than that of honor. We must not return thither except under arches of triumph. . . . Shall we live to hear it said that the French eagles fled in terror at the aspect of Prussian armies? . . . Let them learn that, if it is easy to acquire an increase of territory and power with the friendship of the great people, its enmity . . . is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean.

The French army was in prime condition and perfectly placed. It was held by the emperor like a greyhound in the leash, ready to spring into full speed at an instant's notice. Those qualities, whose perversion by abnormal success later ruined both his character and career, were now at the height

of their usefulness, and in this advance we see the expression in the highest degree of Napoleon's theory of war. His front was less than forty miles wide, from Coburg to Münchburg, and not more than two days' march deep. This concentration enabled him to get together his entire army of two hundred thousand men at any point in forty-eight hours. On the 5th he wrote Soult, from Würzburg: "With this immense superiority of forces reunited on so narrow a space, you feel that I am in the desire to hazard nothing, and to attack the enemy with double forces wherever he will make a stand."

In a Prussian council of war held at Naumburg it had been determined, September 24 and 25, to move offensively through the Thüringer Wald on Schweinfurt. How the Prussians could have judged the Napoleon of 1796 and 1805 so ill as to imagine him now remaining in a defensive attitude to see them debouch from the mountain defiles, it is hard to conceive, but such was their idea. In consequence of this the columns had slowly advanced towards their own right, and on October 5 lay thus: Hohenlohe in the triangle Jena-Erfurt-Rudolstadt, with outposts pushed out towards Gräfenthal, and towards Schleusingen and Eisfeld south of the mountains. Brunswick stood from Erfurt to Langensalza, outposts towards Gotha. Ruchel was at Eisenach, but part of his corps, under Blucher, coming on from Westphalia, had only reached Cassel. The reserves were yet at Magdeburg. The Prussian front from Cassel to Jena and Rudolstadt, on the north of the Thuringian forest, was over ninety miles long; and on its south Napoleon's front from Münchburg to Coburg was, as stated, considerably less than forty. Let us deploy in the first space something over a hundred thousand men, and in the second nearly two hundred thousand, and, quite apart from direction, Napoleon's strategical concentra-

tion leading up to battle will be shown in its proper value. In Erfurt, on October 4, 5 and 6, there were further and never-ending councils among the Prussian generals, and finally the conclusion was reached not to pass the Thüringer Wald, but to remain on the north of the range, with Brunswick substantially at Erfurt, Ruchel at Eisenach, Hohenlohe at Blankenhain, pushing out parties through the mountain defiles, but awaiting further French developments. The decision was wise from the point of view of what they knew and what they had already done; but the place for the Prussian army to concentrate was Hof, and the time when they should have concentrated there was past by many days. Nothing but a decisive victory in battle could now save Prussia from annihilation.

When Napoleon learned of the presence of the Prussian main army at Erfurt, he drew the conclusion that by it was meant a threat to his own left, as he wrote Soult from Würzburg, October 5. During the succeeding night he went, as usual in his traveling coach, to Bamberg. What the average general would have striven to do was to seek the enemy and beat him in battle. Not so Napoleon. When he fought, he was bound to destroy the enemy. First compromise him by a sound strategic opening of the campaign, and then only go forward to battle. To cut the Prussians off from the Elbe meant to expose his own left, but if the Prussians attempted this operation, Napoleon could all the more readily about face and fight them. He was on their communications, and the farther west from Gera they marched and he followed to battle, the more roads back into Franconia he uncovered by which the French might retreat in case of disaster.

The regular advance of the three columns had been going on; and, in accordance with orders, on the 8th Lannes, leading the left, was at Coburg, with Augereau a day behind;

Murat, heading the centre, was at Saalburg, Bernadotte at Lobenstein, Davout at Nordhalben, the Guard in Kronach; Soult and the right at Münchburg, Ney a long march behind at Baireuth. Only Murat had struck any Prussian outlying parties. This was a Prussian detachment holding the Saale crossing at Saalburg, which, when attacked October 8, fell back.

A glance at the map shows the Grand Army on October 8 on the point of absolutely turning the Prussian left flank with what, when it wheels to the left into line for battle, will become its first line heading for Saalfeld and Roda, and its second line heading for Gera, with its reserves following along through Hof and Plauen. Its own line of communications, either to the Rhine or the Danube, is open. It has already practically seized that of the enemy, and is nearer Berlin. This situation, traced out from the time when the several army corps left the Rhine, the Main and the Danube, up to include the pursuit after the battle of Jena, is as satisfactory a study as any of the combinations of this great captain, or of any other.

On the 7th a letter was received from the King of Prussia, "which was nothing really but a poor pamphlet against France," Napoleon wrote Talleyrand, "to which was appended the demand for the evacuation of Germany, and immediate reply. 'Marshal,' said the emperor to Berthier, 'they have given us a rendezvous of honor for the 8th; never did a Frenchman miss one; but as they say that there is a beautiful queen who wishes to be witness of the combat, let us be courteous, and let us march, without resting, for Saxony.'" "What there is amusing in all this," said the letter to Talleyrand, inclosing that of the King of Prussia, "is that the Prussians gave me their ultimatum for the 8th, and that I, without knowing this, entered on the 7th into Baireuth

country, and that I had commenced my movements." To Soult, the same day, he wrote: "I have received this morning the ultimatum of the King of Prussia, dated October 1. It is the height of unreason and folly. He wants nothing less than to make us evacuate Germany by day's marches. When the nation shall have knowledge of this demand, it will tremble with anger." The 1st Bulletin of the Grand Army, dated Bamberg, October 8, 1806, begins: "Peace with Rus-

Cornets of Infantry.

sia concluded and signed July 10; negotiations with England, commenced and almost carried to their maturity, had borne alarm to Berlin." It then goes on to give the French view of the quarrel, states that the Russian treaty was not ratified, and puts the best foot forward in explaining the war. It bears hard on the popular anti-French feeling in Berlin, and its gaining the upper hand of the king, who desired peace. On the 6th of October "two carbine-shots were fired by

Prussian hussars at an officer of the French staff, and the two armies had to consider themselves in presence of each other."

Napoleon reached Kronach October 8, impatient for news of the enemy. He wrote Soult on this day: "Give me more frequently of your news. In a war of combinations like this one, we cannot reach fine results except by prompt communication; put that in the rank of your first cares. This moment is the most important of the campaign. They do not expect what we are going to do. Woe to them if they hesitate and lose one day."

The next day, October 9, the French columns again advanced. During the afternoon the centre under Bernadotte struck at Schleiz a detachment of seven thousand men under Tauenzein, — Hohenlohe's van, in fact, — whither it had retired from Hof on the approach of the French right column. On being smartly attacked, this detachment retired on Mittel-Pöllnitz. Following Bernadotte in the centre, Davout reached Lobenstein; Lannes, on the left, got to Gräfenthal, Augereau to Neustadt. On the right Soult got to Hof, and Ney behind him to Münchburg. Headquarters having reached Nordhalben, Napoleon had ridden out to the head of the centre column, where he watched the combat at Schleiz, and at once pushed on his headquarters to Ebersdorf, with part of the Guard. Although he as yet possessed no information that enabled him to determine which flank would first get in touch with the enemy, he was inclined to believe that it would be on the French left. He notified Lannes that he expected Saalfeld was being strongly held; that if Lannes found this so, he was not to attack until Augereau came up; and that should it appear to him that the main force of the enemy was there, he was to hold Gräfenthal defensively until Napoleon could debouch from Saalburg and fall on the Prussian left flank. Should the main Prussian body advance on him,

Lannes was to retire, and Napoleon would wheel to the left and take them in reverse; should they retire, Lannes was at once to occupy Saalfeld. "As you form the left of the army, I think it will be very useful, when you have your divisions bivouac, to have them bivouac each division in battalion square. Arrange for me to have frequent news of you. Also make for me a description of the country you pass," Napoleon wrote him October 9.

The Prussians were still debating; they had somewhat shifted positions, but had arrived at no settled plan. Ruchel was at Gotha and Eisenach; Brunswick at Erfurt, with a detachment pushed out to Meiningen; Hohenlohe at Mittel-Pöllnitz, with a strong van at Saalfeld to hold the defile. This latter force, under Prince Louis of Prussia, Lannes struck early October 10; and engaging its attention by a smart frontal attack, he moved about its right flank. The Prussian detachment held on to Saalfeld too tenaciously, unaware that it was being trapped, and Lannes was able to take the place, almost destroy the Prussian force, and capture one thousand men and thirty guns. "Seeing thus the rout of his people, Prince Louis of Prussia, like a brave and loyal soldier, engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with a quartermaster of the 10th Hussars. 'Surrender, colonel,' said the hussar, 'or you are dead!' The prince answered by a sabre blow. The quartermaster returned the thrust, and the prince fell dead. . . . His death was glorious and worthy of regret. He died as every good soldier desires to die. Two of his aides were killed at his side," states the 2d Bulletin. At the same time, on October 12, Napoleon said to Lannes that "the death of Prince Louis seems to be a punishment of Heaven, for he was the real author of the war."

Napoleon was disenchanted with the Prussian army. The story of Leuthen, Prague, Zorndorf had given him a high

conception of the Prussian fighting qualities. But there was no cause for wonder. The capacity to fight depends as much on leadership as it does on racial courage. If we examine the statistics of war, we find that about as much gallantry has at times existed in one race as in another. The quality may differ as the intelligence differs, or as the task may be suited to the genius of the people. The Spanish infantry of the sixteenth century was among the best that ever bore arms. The Dutch were once at sea the most redoubtable of all opponents. Few troops have ever reached the level of Gustavus' Swedes. The whole history of Austria is one of noble gallantry and devotion. The Russian foot has filled military annals with deeds of stubborn courage. From whom has the English soldier ever needed to ask praise or odds? No grenadiers ever more fully acted out than the Brandenburgers the Old Dessauer's aphorism: "Wenn du gehst nicht zurück, so geht der Feind zurück." But every great soldier has been able to evoke higher courage in the same troops than his less able compeer. These Prussians were the sons and grandsons of the same men who beat the Austrians three to one, who routed the French at Rossbach; but the soul of Frederick and of the officers he had personally trained was no longer present with the army. The pig-tails and the touch of elbow were still there, the brawn of Prussia was in the ranks, as of yore; but the divine spark that lights the ever-conquering flame in the soldier's heart had gone out when the Last of the Kings was buried beside his father in the old garrison church at Potsdam. Napoleon recognized this, and now saw more clearly yet his battle won.

Says the 2d Bulletin of October 12: "Four companies of the 27th Light Infantry, finding themselves on a plain, were charged by the Prussian hussars, who then saw how French infantry receives Prussian cavalry. More than two hundred horsemen remained on the field."

The 3d Bulletin of the Grand Army opens : "The combat of Schleiz . . . and that of Saalfeld . . . carried consternation to the enemy. . . . Consternation is in Erfurt, where are yet the king, the queen, the Duke of Brunswick, and where they are still discussing what to do without coming to an understanding. But while they deliberate, the French army marches. . . . The weather since the campaign opened is superb, the country abundant, the soldiers full of vigor and health. They make marches of ten leagues and no stragglers. Never an army was so fine." This may be an exaggeration of the Prussian status, but as a fact, too many Prussian cooks spoiled the broth.

As this affair at Saalfeld, added to that at Schleiz, led Napoleon still more directly to the conclusion that there was no great Prussian force in front of his right flank, he gave Ney instructions to march forward to Tanna, and ordered Murat to thoroughly reconnoitre the ground towards Saalfeld and Auma, so as to determine absolutely whether the enemy's main force lay in front of the centre or left column. The emperor's ideas, founded on what actual knowledge he had, are expressed in his dispatch to Soult from Ebersdorf October 10:

"It seems that the Prussians had the plan to attack ; that their left wing was to debouch via Jena, Saalfeld and Coburg ; that Prince Hohenlohe had his headquarters in Jena and Prince Louis his in Saalfeld; the other column has advanced on Fulda via Meiningen. . . . My junction with my left is not yet made. . . . When my junction is made, I will push forward as far as Neustadt and Triptis. After that, whatever the enemy may do, if he attacks me, I shall be enchanted ; if he lets himself be attacked, I will not fail him. If he moves on Magdeburg, you will be before him in Dresden. I much desire a battle. If he has wished to attack me, it is because he has great confidence in his forces. It is, however, not impossible that he may attack me. That is what he can do which is most agreeable to me. After this battle I shall be in Dresden or in Berlin before him."

Thus believing the mass of the enemy in front of his centre and left, Napoleon deemed it wise to keep in close touch with the marshal commanding there. This was the junction

referred to, and he was now sure of the success of his right wing, and that he should reach the Elbe before the Prussians. And having received an intimation from Soult that in his opinion the enemy would concentrate near Gera, the emperor added to the above dispatch: "I doubt whether they can assemble there before I reach the place myself." Despite scant news, Napoleon's general deduction from the situation was as sound as that of the Prussians had been erroneous.

On the 10th of October Soult reached Plauen; but under fresh orders he was to oblique at once up the Elster via Weida towards Gera. Ney, also ordered to the left, got to Gefell. Davout hurried on to Schleiz, where headquarters was established. Augereau reached Gräfenthal. On learning of the capture of Saalfeld, which he had already guessed by the sound of the guns, Napoleon ordered Lannes to march next day to Neustadt, so as more surely to get on the enemy's left. Thus the army was all being headed on Gera, where Napoleon expected the situation to clear itself up, and to show that he had fairly cut the direct Prussian line of retreat; for he would hold the road to Dresden, and be nearer to Leipsic. This moving forward of the French line, so soon as known, necessitated corresponding action by the Prussians, and as there had been no complete plan formed, Hohenlohe fell back on Kahla; and the main force under Brunswick, finally recognizing that the French presence near Schleiz was a threat to its touch with the Elbe, marched by its left on Blankenhain to approach Hohenlohe. But these were scarce half-way remedies, and on the evening of the 10th the news of the defeat at Schleiz constrained the Prussian leaders to make a general concentration to the rear on Weimar, and Ruchel had already moved in towards Erfurt. This shows how reliable Napoleon's intuitions as to the enemy's movements were. Though knowing nothing positive, he felt sure that

the Prussians would concentrate towards their communications, as they did, and the emperor's thrust on Gera, far enough to the east to turn their left flank, was absolutely

Music of Line Infantry. (1806.)

correct. This sense of what the enemy must do was one of the chief factors in Napoleon's military equipment.

Accompanying the centre column, Napoleon was not far in the rear of Murat's light cavalry and Bernadotte, when, on October 11, they struck Gera, with the rest of the cavalry reserve close behind. No enemy was at hand, and Murat sent out reconnoitring parties west to Jena and north to Zeitz. Davout got up to Mittel-Pöllnitz, Ney to Schleiz, Soult near Zeulenroda; Lannes to Neustadt, Augereau to Saalfeld, headquarters to Auma. As Gera had been unoccupied and there

was no sign of Prussian troops on the line of the Elster, Napoleon began to believe that the enemy was farther to the west than he had been thinking. So he rode back from Gera to Auma at night, and there ascertained from news running in to headquarters that the Prussians were still near Erfurt, or at all events that they had not crossed to the right bank of the Saale. This state of affairs led him to make a left wheel with the whole army towards the Saale, so as finally to cut off the enemy from the Elbe; and he issued, in the early morning of the 12th, orders to that effect. Murat, and Bernadotte in his rear, were to head for Zeitz; and if, from information gleaned there, the Prussians proved to be about Erfurt, they were to speedily file to the left on Naumburg. Soult was to come on to Gera; Ney to Auma; Davout to head for Naumburg; Lannes to Jena; Augereau to Kahla; the Bavarians to Plauen. Meanwhile, on the Prussian side, Hohenlohe had withdrawn from Kahla to Jena on the 11th, and the main army had reached Weimar, Ruchel also starting to come up.

Writing to Lannes, the emperor said: "All the letters intercepted let us see that the enemy has lost his head. They hold councils day and night, and know not what course to take. . . . The art to-day is to attack all you meet, so as to beat the enemy in detail and while he is assembling. When I say that one is to attack all that one meets, I mean that one is to attack all that is on the march, and not in a position which makes it too superior. . . . Up to this hour they (the Prussians) well show their ignorance of war."

On October 12, from Gera, Napoleon wrote the King of Prussia, proposing peace: —

Monsieur My Brother, I received Your Majesty's letter of September 25 only on the 7th. I am sorry you were made to sign this species of pamphlet. I answer you only to assure you that I shall never attribute

to you the things therein contained. They are all contrary to your character, and to the honor of us both. . . . I received immediately afterwards the note of your minister of October 1. He gave me a rendezvous for the 8th. Like a good cavalier, I have kept faith with him. I am in the middle of Saxony. Pray believe that I have forces such that all your forces cannot long hold victory in the balance. But why shed so much blood ; for what good ? I will hold to Your Majesty the same language that I held to the Emperor Alexander two days before the battle of Austerlitz. . . . Sire, I have been your friend for six years. . . . If you had asked for possible things, I would have yielded them. You demanded my dishonor. You must have been certain of my answer. . . . You have said to me that you have frequently rendered me services. Well, then, I wish to give you the proof that I remember them. You are master to save your subjects the ravages and evils of the war just commenced. You can stop it, and you will do a thing that Europe will thank you for. . . . I beg Your Majesty to see in this letter only a desire I have to spare blood. And I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

NAPOLEON.

Like many — and yet by no means all — of the emperor's actions, this particular letter cannot be deemed to have been quite ingenuous. There was in writing a double chance in his favor. Whether the king accepted or rejected the proposal, it would have, Napoleon probably reckoned, a marked effect on his mind during the 13th, and would keep him from marching with his whole army on Freiburg in the effort to again regain his communications, and thus avoid the battle Napoleon was anxious to deliver. By what even Jomini calls this *ruse de guerre*, Napoleon put on the garb of a peace-lover, while never a moment stopping his onward march. It was by no means the least of the clever manœuvres of this wonderful campaign, a stratagem worthy of Hannibal, father of stratagems. What Frederick William would have done, had he received the letter in season, cannot be said ; his war party, still as dominant in camp as it had been in Berlin, would probably have insisted on battle. But as it happened, the bearer of the letter, a

staff officer named Montesquiou, was arrested at the outposts on the night of October 12–13, not having taken the precautions usual with parliamentarians; being thought to be a spy, he was kept at Hohenlohe's headquarters; and the battle of Jena was in full swing before the king received the letter.

On October 12 Napoleon issued a note relating to the exchange of prisoners, and prescribed that each Prussian soldier who was a prisoner in France should, providing French prisoners were treated in the same way by the enemy, receive as ration twenty-four ounces of flour, made of three quarters wheat and one quarter rye, a half pound of bread, one ounce of rice, and three sous a day and lodging. To non-commissioned officers one third more.

To sub-lieutenants	50	francs	a month.
" lieutenants	80	"	"
" captains	100	"	"
" field officers	150	"	"
" colonels	180	"	"
" major-generals	400	"	"
" lieutenant-generals . . .	600	"	"

"Women, children, surgeons and all officers of administration are to be sent back, not being considered prisoners of war."

While the French corps were advancing in the direction given them, Napoleon again rode to Gera, and during the 12th Bernadotte reached Zeitz, which Murat had passed on the way to Naumburg; Soult reached Gera, Ney Auma, Augereau Kahla; Davout with the van got to Naumburg, with his corps back at Schkölen; Lannes had reached Jena and driven in Hohenlohe's outposts which held the town. This Prussian marshal had taken up a position farther to the rear, facing southeast, with his right on Kapellendorf, and his left out towards Camburg. Napoleon still believed that the Prussian army was at Erfurt, for his reports all showed it to be behind the Saale; and his present plan was to cross this river and move to the attack.

There exists a most interesting memorandum in Napoleon's handwriting, probably made October 10, in which he sets down the various hours' march between all the leading places in the region, the dates on which the Guard, Hautpoul's and Klein's cavalry divisions, which had all remained somewhat in the rear, could get up, and the route given each; and placing each corps in such a location as best to concentrate at Weimar for an advance on Erfurt.

NOTE.

Guard, 10, in the evening, at Bamberg; — 11, at Lichtenfels; —12, in front of Kronach; — 13, Lobenstein.

D'Hautpoul, the 11, two leagues in front of Kronach; — 14, Auma; — 15, Jena.

Klein, the 11, two leagues in front of Kronach; —
13, at Jena.
14, at Jena.
15, at Auma.
Klein, the 12, at Lobenstein.

Jena to Weimar, four leagues.
Naumburg to Weimar, seven leagues.
Kahla to Weimar, five leagues.
Neustadt to Jena, five leagues.
Gera to Jena, seven leagues.
Zeitz to Jena, seven leagues.

Cavalry reserve, the 14, at Jena.
Guard, the 15, at Jena.
Park, the 15, at Auma.
Davout, the 14, at Apolda.
Lannes, the 15, at Weimar.
Augereau, the 14, at Mellingen.
Bernadotte, the 14, at Dornburg.
Soult, the 14, at Jena.
Ney, the 14, at Kahla.

Here, again, it is evident that, according to his own maxim, Napoleon was to collect all his forces before he reached the field of battle. Early on October 13, indeed, from Gera he wrote Murat: "My intention is to march straight on the enemy. . . . I shall leave here at 9 A. M., to be at noon or one o'clock at Jena. If the enemy is in Erfurt, my object is to move my army on Weimar, and to attack him the 16th. General Klein and the heavy cavalry have arrived at Auma." The crossing of the Saale was then set for the 14th.

Sergeant of Guard Chasseurs — Summer Dress.

The Prussians did not seem to awake to the fact that the French had outmanœuvred them until the harm had all been done; but when Napoleon had seized Naumburg with its rich magazines, and thus controlled the straight road from Weimar to Leipsic, even Brunswick began to appreciate the situation, and from Weimar, where the Prussian army was concentrated, determined to regain the Elbe with the bulk of the Prussian forces. Accordingly, during the afternoon of the 13th, Frederick William and Brunswick started with the main army for Sulza, whence, if they could not recapture Naumburg, as they believed they yet might do, they could at least branch off towards Freiburg, and by way of Merseburg reach Halle, and thence the Elbe at Wittenberg; and to protect this march, Hohenlohe remained at and near Kapellendorf, to face the French, who, the Prussians now plainly saw, were ready to debouch in force from Jena. To sustain Hohenlohe, who led the left wing of the forces facing Jena, Ruchel with the right wing fell in towards Weimar.

This Prussian left wing under Hohenlohe was posted as

of the opinion that he had fifty thousand men in his front, and was looking hourly for an attack. Davout and Bernadotte were therefore ordered forward to Jena whenever they should hear sounds of heavy fighting there, otherwise they were to remain *in loco* to await orders for the morrow. Arriving at Jena, the emperor found that Hohenlohe, having on the approach of the French withdrawn whatever troops he had there to the line Lützerode-Closwitz, Lannes had taken the town, and had also occupied the steep heights of the Landgräfenberg lying behind it, driving before him Tauenzien and Hohenlohe's left-wing van. Jena was not a convenient place from which to deploy forward into battle; but to the men who had crossed the Alps and marched around the Fort of Bard, it was a trifle.

Foot Grenadier of Guard.

This sharp advance of Lannes enabled Napoleon, about 4 P. M., to ride up on the Landgräfenberg, which is a plateau dominating the entire country to the west. Dismounting, the emperor walked forward alone to within musket-range, and studied the enemy's position at Kapellendorf, and the nearer Lützerode. It appeared to his trained eye that he had the main Prussian army before him, though he could see only some forty to fifty thousand troops, lying, as he made it out, in three lines; and he recognized that here on the 14th, instead of at Erfurt on the 16th, the battle would take place. Knowing Frederick's habit of fighting in one body, it was natural for Napoleon to assume that the Prussians now were concentrated in front of Weimar, and ready for battle. That they should add to their strategic errors the tactical error of dividing when battle was immi-

nent, he could scarcely expect. To protect the crossing at Jena of the other corps was then Napoleon's first thought; and Lannes was ordered to place his entire corps on the heights, which work, much to the joy of the troops, Napoleon personally supervised, with his habitual nervous activity, during most of the night; for he anticipated that the enemy would try to recapture the position; and Lefebvre with the Guard and Soult were ordered up by forced marches, and Ney and Augereau instructed to reach Jena by the 14th. But no attack came. It was not in the Prussian scheme. Hohenlohe remained quietly in his bivouacs and camps, to cover the retreat of Brunswick and the main army, as has been indicated, from a possible French attack on its flank as it passed along towards Naumburg. If the Prussians meant to regain their communications by a retreat, it behooved them to be quick about it; but they were, on the contrary, slow, and by the evening of the 13th Brunswick had only reached Auerstädt, while Ruchel was still at Weimar. Napoleon, meanwhile, lost not a moment, but true to his principles of war, having cut the enemy's line of retreat, he proposed to force battle on him without delay. Meanwhile Davout and Bernadotte had reached Naumburg, Davout passing through and occupying the pass of Kösen, while Bernadotte, late in the night, marched on Dornburg; Murat with sixty squadrons of reserve cavalry was between Kamburg and Naumburg; Lannes was on the Landgräfenberg, with Augereau coming up on his left, and reaching, during the night of the 13th, the mill-brook at the foot of the Flohberg at Jena, followed by the bulk of the Guard; Soult, rapidly approaching from Gera, reached Jena with his own and St. Hilaire's cavalry during the night, and made ready to push on up the heights through the Rauthal; Ney from Roda came up with his van of three thousand men, ready to be put in at the opening of

the battle. So soon as the Guard got within reach, Napoleon hurried it up by the narrow Rauthal path on the Closwitz heights, which, like a bridge-head, it was essential to hold, to enable the French army to debouch and get into line.

With the knowledge of substantially where these troops lay, but unfamiliar with the local names, Napoleon issued the following: —

ORDER OF THE DAY.

Dispositions of the Order of Battle.

At the Bivouac of Jena, October 14, 1806.

Marshal Augereau will command the left. He will place his first division in column on the Weimar road, as far forward as where General Gazan got his artillery up the plateau. He will put the necessary forces on the left-hand plateau as far forward as his head of column. He will place skirmishers opposite the whole line of the enemy at the different outlets of the hills. When General Gazan shall have marched forward, he will debouch on the plateau with his entire army corps, and will march afterwards according to circumstances, to take the left of the army.

Marshal Lannes will have, at the point of day, all his artillery in his intervals, and will keep the order of battle in which he has passed the night.

The artillery of the Imperial Guard will be placed on the height, and the Guard will be behind the plateau, ranked in five lines, the first line, composed of the chasseurs, crowning the plateau.

The villages on our right shall be cannonaded by all General Suchet's artillery, and immediately attacked and taken.

The emperor will give the signal. Every one is to be ready at the point of day.

Marshal Ney will be placed, at the point of day, at the extremity of the plateau, so as to be able to move up and march towards the right of Marshal Lannes at the moment when the village shall be taken, and thus there shall have been made room to deploy.

Marshal Soult is to debouch by the road which has been reconnoitred on the right, and will hold himself always connected, so as to hold the right of the army.

The general order of battle shall be, for the marshals to form on two

lines without counting light infantry. The distances between the two lines shall be at most a hundred toises (two hundred yards).

The light cavalry of each army corps shall be placed so as to be at the disposition of each general, to be used according to circumstances.

The heavy cavalry, as soon as it shall arrive, is to be placed on the plateau, and will be in reserve behind the Guard, to move wherever circumstances require.

What is important to-day is to deploy upon the plain. The dispositions indicated by the manœuvres and the forces the enemy shall show will be taken afterwards, so as to push him out of the positions he occupies, and which are necessary for deployment.

(Signed) MARSHAL BERTHIER, by order of the Emperor.

Sword of the Period.

that they were not yet in complete force, or ready for battle on the heights. Still, it was no part of Hohenlohe's plan to force a battle. He was acting a defensive rôle. Inasmuch as Lannes had to oust Hohenlohe's van from the ravines and sunken roads which lead westerly off the plateau, the progress was slow. Tauenzien, aided also by the fog, fended off this attack for nearly three hours. About nine o'clock the fog lifted, and showing the ground in front, enabled the French line, with the right leading, to forge ahead against Hohenlohe's much weaker van, drive it out of Closwitz, and shortly push it back beyond the Dornberg. Lannes followed sharply on, and halting for naught, broke up this body completely, capturing a number of guns; by ten his corps was on the line which had been indicated by Napoleon, from in front of Closwitz to Lützerode. The needed room had been won, but almost too early in the day. "The emperor could have wished," says the 5th Bulletin, dated Jena, October 15, "to put off close fighting for two hours more, so as to wait for the oncoming troops, and especially his cavalry, in the position which had been taken after the morning's attack." But once at work, not only could the corps not be recalled, but events could not be made to march backward. Had Napoleon been correct in his assumption that he had the whole Prussian army in his front, these two hours might have been perilous; but as he had only Hohenlohe, and this officer charged with a duty demanding defense and not attack, he was safe. Dame Fortune had stood by him.

While Lannes had been gaining ground forward on Closwitz, and Soult at daylight had likewise marched up the heights and taken position with St. Hilaire in advance of Zwätzen, a Prussian detachment under Holzendorf, which had been sent by Hohenlohe the previous evening to seize the Saale crossing at Dornburg, debouched from Rödigen, north

of the Landgräfenberg. It had been attracted by the sound of the guns, and, expecting to rejoin the main force under Hohenlohe, found itself suddenly in contact with the French line ; and in order to extricate itself, was compelled to attack. Soult replied, and readily threw back this detachment to Nerkwitz beyond the brook, from whence it moved to the rear on Stobra and Apolda. At the same time Hohenlohe, so soon as attacked, made haste to assemble, and led forward his corps to a line which he had drawn through Vierzehnheiligen and Isserstädt, with Tauenzien prolonging his left. The oncoming French divisions reached the heights in such rapid succession, however, that he could not fully marshal his brigades. Ney's van of three thousand men pushed in between Lannes' two divisions on Vierzehnheiligen, and some of his light troops occupied the village before the Prussians could reach it in sufficient force ; the Guard moved up in reserve behind Lannes, and Augereau, with Desjardins, moved to and deployed on the Flohberg, drawing up in two lines opposite the Liskau valley, while his other division under Heudelet moved slowly along the Weimar road, which was much clogged with artillery and wagons. To meet Hohenlohe's further advance, Ney gradually got into first line at Vierzehnheiligen, with Suchet on his left at Isserstädt, and Gazan on his right. Having for the moment no other reserve, Napoleon continued to hold the Guard back of the Dornberg. It had been an error on Ney's part to push forward in such haste, instead of remaining in reserve as he was expected to do ; and for some time he was exposed to the superior Prussian forces at Vierzehnheiligen. But as this marshal could never be kept out of the hottest part of the fray, so, once in, he never failed to hold his own. Not having been at Austerlitz, he proposed to do double duty here. No harm resulted, chiefly owing to Hohenlohe's defensive rôle.

The Prussians had had no idea that a battle would be fought this day. Hohenlohe, even after the early attack, did not take means to put his troops in action on a systematic plan, and it was by his own motion that General Gräwert moved his division up to Tauenzien's aid to Vierzehnheiligen. But when, later in the forenoon, the attack grew too much in earnest to neglect, Hohenlohe got together his cavalry and moved forward in checkerwise formation in rear of Gräwert, who had four Saxon battalions behind his right wing in second line. The rest of the Saxons held the south outlet of the Liskau valley and the upper Schnecke, and posted their artillery on available lines.

Officer of Guard Grenadiers.

Though the Prussian strategy had been faulty, their fighting, despite all the slurs cast in later days, and especially for troops for the first time in action and with no leaven of veterans, was admirable. The French skirmish line fell back, and Isserstädt not being held by enough men, was abandoned by Suchet; but Vierzehnheiligen was so stoutly defended by Ney that the Prussians were compelled to order up their artillery to drive him out. Ney pushed forward his cavalry between Vierzehnheiligen and Krippendorf, but the horsemen made no progress against the enemy, and he was compelled to throw his infantry into squares. Finally, two fresh cavalry regiments came up and by their able charges made him room. The Prussian foot was checked so that it stood and resorted to salvo-firing. This interchange lasted until noon, neither side making any serious impression on the other, Ney clinging to the village, and the Prussians being able to make no further advance. About noon the

French had managed to get ployed into one battle-front, the belated divisions began to come up, — Leval and Legrand of Soult's corps, Marchand of Ney's, — and now that Napoleon had at hand an abundant reserve, he ordered forward on the enemy the divisions already engaged, secure of being able at any moment to sustain them. Until now he had been fighting for time. Indeed, it may not unfairly be said that he had begun the battle before he was ready.

In his turn, Lannes now took Vierzehnheiligen, and fell upon Gräwert's left. This general met the onset bravely, until Ney advanced through the village, and attacking the Prussian centre, thus aided Lannes to hold himself. Meanwhile Napoleon sent Suchet against Isserstädt, and sustained Lannes and Ney with the Guard, advancing it to Vierzehnheiligen; and Desjardins of Augereau's corps was ordered across the Liskau valley to attack the same place. Yet, though he had not a chance to win, at one o'clock Hohenlohe still thought his prospects bright. In hurrying up Ruchel from Weimar, he said: "At this moment I am beating the enemy." But Ruchel was unpardonably slow in coming up, and the French were fast getting more and more men on the ground. The Prussians had suffered severely from the French fire by file, which proved more effective than their own salvos, and as the fresh-arriving French now pushed in, their superior numbers told.

At the same time the Saxons were being hard handled by the French on the Weimar road, and about the same hour, from the retreating fire at Nerkwitz and Stobra, Hohenlohe could see that his left was in marked danger. He gave up any further attempt on Vierzehnheiligen, which so far had been the key of the field, and made preparations to hold himself where he was until Ruchel could come up. The Saxons under Zeschwitz were ordered to hold the Schneke defile at the outlet of the Mühlthal at all hazards.

Meanwhile Lannes and Soult kept pushing forward on the Isserstädt woods, and struck harder blows at the Prussian horse as well as Gräwert's division. The latter retired to Gross Romstädt, the horse to Hermstädt. The French in much superior force now moved heartily on, and every attempt by Hohenlohe to reform his line was a failure. Dyherr's Saxon brigade for a brief moment held gallantly on to Isserstädt, but Desjardins and Suchet cut it to pieces.

Vivandière and Train Driver.

The Prussian infantry, outnumbered and having neither two lines, nor any reserve, gradually fell back through Gross and Klein Romstädt, and by forming square at intervals strove to hold their own. But Soult again attacked the Prussian horse, and drove it beyond these villages. Before three o'clock the battle was in the hands of the French, and the arrival of Ruchel could in no wise alter the result.

Instead of preparing to protect the retreat or to create a diversion by a flank manœuvre, Ruchel made a front attack upon the French at Frankendorf, and marshaled part of his forces on the Sperlingberg. The Saxons drew up on his right behind Hammerstädt. From these positions Ruchel advanced, but soon found himself overwhelmed. Soult planted his guns where he could enfilade his line, while Desjardins attacked his right, and St. Hilaire fell on his left with the bayonet; and after a resistance worthy of better success, Ruchel was pushed through Kapellendorf back towards Wei-

mar, carrying with him the Frankendorf and Hammerstädt forces. So rapid, indeed, was Ruchel's retreat that Hohenlohe's effort to rally some of his broken troops and lead them up to his support was fruitless, for gaining space to manœuvre, the French cavalry now fell to with much energy. An effort was made to rally at the Weibicht woods, north of Weimar, and the troops which had already crossed the Ilm were assembled near Sachsenhausen and Liebstädt. The Saxons behaved well; but they could not hold the Prussian right to any advantage when Hohenlohe's centre was falling back and uncovering their left flank. While Augereau attacked them in front, Napoleon sent Marchand in through Isserstädt on their naked flank, and standing too long from excess of courage, they were surrounded and mostly cut down or captured. By 4 P. M. the battle was decided by the success of every French division. Napoleon advanced several columns on Weimar to follow up the enemy, who was retreating thither. The cavalry reserve under Murat came up just in season to push out on this duty; Ney got together his division to join in the pursuit, and both again threw back the Prussians, who strove to assemble at Weimar, but were thrust across the Ilm below the town. There were isolated cases of stanch resistance on the part of the allies, but nothing could resist the impetuosity and numbers of the French. Lannes got to Umpferstädt, Augereau and Ney to Weimar, Soult to Schwabdorf. The emperor with the Guard returned to Jena, believing that he had beaten the main Prussian army. In this he was quite mistaken. The fifty thousand men under the Duke of Brunswick had been held in check by Davout's gallant thirty thousand at Auerstädt, while at Jena the French under Napoleon, fully ninety thousand strong, had been faced by Hohenlohe and Ruchel, numbering not over fifty thousand men.

Let us now turn to Auerstädt, and Davout's masterful work.

When, as already narrated, the Prussians had finally waked up on October 12 to the fact that the French were cutting off their retreat across the Elbe, it was determined to fall back, and next day the main army under the king and the Duke of Brunswick started from Weimar in one column, strung out by divisions by the left, so as to reach Auerstädt before the enemy. It was understood that Hohenlohe should remain *in situ*, and Ruchel come on to Weimar and occupy the position vacated by the main army. The movements began at ten o'clock, Schmettau in advance, Kalkreuth in the rear.

Fifer. (1806.)

When Schmettau reached Apolda, he heard cannonading at Jena. He was about to stop his column, when word was brought him that it was only a small affair. He should not have relied upon this news, but should have ascertained definitely what French force was in that vicinity. In an hour or two a couple of intelligent staff officers from different points of view could have ascertained that Lannes was pushing back Tauenzien and taking possession of the Landgräfenberg. There was abundant time to arrest the fatal division of the Prussian forces which was going on. Had this been done, it is probable that the battle of Jena might have had a different issue. It would certainly have been less disastrous to the Prussians.

Marching along his line of retreat towards Naumburg and Freiburg, Brunswick had not pushed his headquarters beyond

Auerstädt, under the impression that the Kösen pass was not held in force, and that it could be taken on the morrow.

Schmettau reached the hills north of Auerstädt and camped, sending a battalion to Eckartsberg, and placing outposts at Gernstadt. From here he sent out a reconnoitring party. This ran across a similar detachment from Davout's corps, and capturing a few prisoners, learned that Davout was in Naumburg, as the latter learned of the presence of the Prussians. Even this did not rouse Brunswick into action, and he allowed the other two divisions, which came up late, quietly to camp — Wartensleben, with the Prince of Orange in his rear, and the reserves under Kalkreuth — behind Ranstadt. The Prussian right thus leaned on the Ilm. There had been carelessness shown with regard to rations, and the Prussian soldiers had only bread and water, while the French were fully supplied from the rich Naumburg stores. Nothing better exhibits the thorough inability of the Prussian leaders to grasp the situation than the fact that the queen, who was with this army, could hardly be persuaded by Frederick William to return to Weimar.

The Prussian main army contained fifty-two battalions, seventy squadrons and sixteen batteries, some fifty thousand men, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. It was really cut off, for not only was Davout at Naumburg in rear of his force in the pass, but Bernadotte was also with him, having got up during the evening, both corps standing astride the Prussian main line of retreat. Davout, with his three divisions, Gudin, Morand and Friant, thirty battalions of foot and fifteen squadrons of light horse, all together about thirty thousand men, stood west of Naumburg, between the Flemmingen villages, and held the defile of Kösen with a battalion.

In the belief that the whole Prussian army was before him at Jena, at 10 P. M., October 13, Napoleon, from the bivouac

on the Landgräfenberg, had ordered Davout to push out to Apolda early the 14th and take the enemy in the rear, or left flank, saying that he did not think he would meet much opposition. To this order was added: "If the Duke of Ponte-Corvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you can march together. The emperor hopes, however, that he will be in the position which he has assigned to him at Dornburg." This order reached Davout at 3 A. M. on the 14th, and Bernadotte, though some doubt has been expressed whether the order itself got to him personally, seems to have understood what he did receive to confirm the instructions earlier sent him from Gera. Davout interpreted the matter from the standpoint of his reconnoissance, which had convinced him that he had a very large force in his front; and he strongly urged Bernadotte to remain, going so far, indeed, as to offer him the command of the two corps. But Bernadotte, persisting in literal obedience to his orders (one of the inevitable effects of the Napoleonic method), started for Dornburg. This proceeding, founded on very natural lack of information on Napoleon's part and on Bernadotte's literal obedience, was to result in setting one corps, unsupported, in motion against more than one half of the Prussian army. It was fortunate that it was Davout who was thus left in the lurch.

Before 6 A. M. Davout started his corps towards Apolda. The direct road from Naumburg to Weimar leads over the Kösen bridge and through the defile, and in order to debouch successfully across the Saale, Davout at once made an effort to seize the heights of Hassenhausen, nearly half-way to Auerstädt, and at the fork of the road to Freiburg. The battalions which had held Kösen were pushed out with a squadron of horse, and Gudin, Morand and Friant followed along. At about the same time Brunswick set out from Auerstädt. The latter's plan, since ascertaining the presence of Davout

at Naumburg, was to file off to the left from Hassenhausen towards Freiburg, and thus evade a conflict at the defile of Kösen; and he ordered Schmettau to take position on the heights of Hassenhausen, which also commanded Kösen, and protect the flank of the army, during its march, from Davout's onset. He little knew how heavy a blow Davout could strike.

The whole Prussian situation was abnormal. If Brunswick were able, by this device, to escape from Davout, yet he was abandoning Hohenlohe and Ruchel to the mercy of the whole French army. If escape it was to be, why expose fifty thousand men to be sacrificed? A third of the number would have accomplished the same result by containing Napoleon at Jena a few hours; even Tauenzien and some cavalry might have done it; and by forced marching the bulk of the Prussian army had a fair chance to escape, by the sacrifice of only a small body, and to keep itself intact for a fresh trial of strength nearer the capital.

At daybreak, then, the Prussian column broke up and, a good deal retarded by the fog, began to make its way towards Hassenhausen, Schmettau, accompanied by the king, in the lead. At this place Blucher's cavalry, twenty-five hundred strong, which was out as a flying vanguard, ran across Davout's head of column, — Gudin's division, — which had made good speed during the early morning to get through the defile and hold the ground in its front for the purpose of enabling the rest of the corps to debouch. While the French had been rapid, the Prussians had lost much time. Had Gudin been an hour later, the Prussians might have seized the right of way. His small force of cavalry in the lead charged in heartily on Blucher, and, though driven back, gave time for some guns to come up and for the first foot brigade to form square. Blucher was surprised to find himself received by artillery. Some Prussian guns were also ordered up, but the fog pre-

vented anything but loose work, and through the careless fire of the inexperienced cannoneers, the bulk of the Prussian missiles landed in the midst of Blucher's column. His own horse was killed, and his column, recognizing the origin of the fire, fell back in disorder on Spielburg. The French brigades, now supported by more artillery, which came up on the main road, held their own and enabled the rest of the division to double-quick into line. This gave Gauthier's brigade the chance to occupy the heights, and deploy as a nucleus to form on. The appearance in his front of so large a body, the good countenance of which indicated strong supports in the rear, compelled Schmettau and his whole force of Prussian foot likewise to deploy into line of battle. As Davout's troops arrived, he lengthened his right flank, which the Prussian horse was again threatening; and by 8 A. M. Friant came up and a heavy combat was engaged, Blucher still gallantly striving to turn Davout's right flank, as a means of keeping open the road to Freiburg. Orange and Wartensleben being delayed because they had camped far in the rear, Friant was, however, enabled to push forward, and occupied Spielburg.



Blucher.

This sharp French resistance had taken the Prussian leaders by surprise. Brunswick advised to form line and wait for the fog to clear. The king, on the suggestion of Mollendorf that the French could not possibly be in great force, reverted to the original line of retreat, via Naumburg, and ordered forward the divisions of Wartensleben and Orange to clear the

way and drive the enemy back through the Kösen ravine. Had they but done this during the preceding night, they would have caught the French on the march, and Auerstädt would probably have been a Prussian victory, to compensate for a defeat at Jena. Now it was too late. As Wartensleben's foot came up, it went in on Schmettau's right, so that Davout's left was seriously threatened, as they advanced towards Hassenhausen heights; and when successive Prussian brigades began to arrive, the French under Gudin were unable to maintain their position in the open in front of Hassenhausen, and gradually fell back into the village. But here they made so stout a defense that they continued to maintain it against all frontal attacks, as, a dozen miles to the south, their companions under Ney were fiercely holding Vierzehnheiligen. The Prussians were unfortunate in losing officers. These exposed themselves without reserve. Schmettau and Wartensleben were both wounded, and Brunswick was mortally hit in a smart bayonet attack he personally led on the village of Hassenhausen. Despite this, however, the Prussian battalions fought with distinguished bravery. But meanwhile Friant had moved up on the French right near Zeckwar, and had placed his batteries in such a manner as to enfilade the enemy's line. His sharpshooters also pushed on into Bendorf and Zeckwar, and the Prussian army was obliged to fall back on its reserves near Auerstädt. About the same time Blucher rode around the French right and, debouching from Puncherau, attacked it in reverse. But the French had formed checkerwise squares, and their fire was so steady and cool that the Prussian horse could accomplish nothing against it, and again retired in marked disorder to the north of Spielburg. In no previous battle had the Revolutionary tactics, put into use by Davout and the really able division commanders he had trained, better shown its superiority over the old lineal system

which had come down in a spiritless form from Frederick the Only.

The Prussians paid too much heed to their alignment and steadiness in salvo-firing; the French fought in skirmish lines, and fired at will from behind hedges and walls, trees and rocks, and out of ditches and sunken roads. This fire was murderous; the gallant Prussian officers were picked off one by one; courage availed not against this surprising audacity, against this trick of doing the unexpected; and finally the Prussian foot, oblivious of Frederick's constant rule of going forward, came to a standstill in line of battle, resorted solely to salvo-firing, and suffered grievous losses from the fire of the half-concealed French. Yet they kept up their efforts, and an attempt by fresh troops to turn Gudin's left was met only just in time by the arrival of Morand's division, which had finally crossed the Saale, and came up into action on the double-quick somewhat before noon. Having suffered heavier losses than the French, the arrival and ambitious onset of this fresh division markedly unsettled the order of the Prussian lines.

It being evident that the Prussian foot could make no further headway, Frederick William sent in Prince Wilhelm with his heavy horse to break down Morand's resistance. But in battalion squares in checkerwise formation, the French withstood every charge, and their fire by file at close quarters emptied half Prince Wilhelm's saddles, he himself being wounded at the head of his men. The Prussian squadrons could do no more, and fell back towards Sulza and Auerstädt.

Friant meanwhile had forced his way forward on Taugwitz, and threatened to turn the Prussian left under Prince Heinrich, and Morand, rid of the Prussian cavalry, advanced on Rehhausen. Frederick William, with true kingly gallantry, had been in the thick of the battle, and had had a

horse killed under him. As a final effort, he led part of his reserves against the French right flank, but Davout had taken up a position on the Sonnenberg, from which the fire of artillery and infantry was too hot for the Prussians to stand. Gradually dissolving, Brunswick's divisions began to fall back in more or less disorder. Davout saw that the key of the position now was at the heights near Eckartsberg, for to gain these would strategically cut the Prussians off from any approach to the Freiburg road, as well as tactically turn their left; and Gudin's division was hurried thither by way of Taugwitz, while Friant marched via Lisdorf on the same point. Nothing could now resist the fervor of the French; Mollendorf, wounded, turned over the command to Kalkreuth; but the Prussian divisions could not stay Davout, determined to have the Eckartsberg heights. Since one o'clock the Prussians had been yielding ground through Poppel and Taugwitz, on their reserves at Gernstädt; the French followed hard upon. Kalkreuth, in command of the second division and the reserve, had not yet been put in, and though Blucher's cavalry and the heavy horse had been driven back, this enterprising soldier was still full of fight, and the two generals proposed to renew the attack with all the forces at hand. But as no news ran in from Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the king deemed it wiser to fall back on his, he hoped, uninjured divisions of the right, so as to renew the battle in one body on the morrow. Kalkreuth was therefore ordered to about face, and started back towards Weimar.

The French victory was complete. No praise is too high for Davout's intelligence and courage. Every brigade and battery of the French troops had been skillfully put in. A battery of howitzers now took position at Bendorf and began to throw shells into Auerstädt, which soon took fire and added to the Prussian difficulties, and their main army was shortly

hurrying to the rear towards and beyond Auerstädt; and only at the Ems brook did Davout cease his pursuit, about 5 P. M. The French camped south of Eckartsberg.

Davout.

The Prussians made a night march to Weimar, and at Malstadt they saw the camp-fires on the heights of Apolda. These they at first believed to be Hohenlohe's, but soon finding out to their dismay that they were French, they recognized that their retreat on Weimar was cut off. The disorder in which they had left the field at Auerstädt was now multiplied tenfold. Untried troops could not resist such a disaster. In 1792 and 1793 the French raw levies had more than once decamped in equal disorder. So at times have new troops of every nation.

Meanwhile Bernadotte reached Dornburg, and finding much difficulty in crossing the Saale, did not get to Apolda until nightfall. He had no doubt been justified in obeying orders; but a corps commander is held to more than this. Whoso rises to military eminence must be held responsible for errors which in a lesser light may be overlooked. It is not permitted him to make mistakes. Had Bernadotte exhibited half of Davout's resourceful skill, he could have crossed the Saale at Camburg, and taken the Prussian forces in reverse at Sulza. As it was, his tardy appearance at Apolda put the finishing touch to the demoralization of the king's forces, which soon dispersed all over the country, as green regiments are most

apt to do if their first battle be disastrous. The 13th Bulletin, of October 20, says, "Nothing more resembles in fact the actual state of the Prussian army than the débris of a wreck."

At this juncture the king received Napoleon's letter, and seizing on it as a ray of hope, sent Count Denhof to him, asking for an armistice of six weeks. The emperor answered that after victory it was impossible to give the enemy time to rally. He had won too much to stop now. He would treat only in Berlin. He was relentless in his measures. To defeat the enemy was not enough; he must overwhelm him.

There are no reliable statistics with regard to the losses of the French at Jena, but it is likely that they lost as many as Davout at Auerstädt, which would make the killed and wounded fourteen thousand men at this double battle. Young officers had to be drawn from the schools of Metz and Fontainebleau, by order of October 25, 1806, to fill the gaps made by the casualties among their seniors.

The Prussians had lost all save honor. This they had kept, as an excessive number of officers and a score of thousands of killed and wounded testifies, as well as the marks they had left on the French. Davout's losses were seven thousand men out of the thirty-three thousand with which he started the campaign. Gudin lost half of his division: one hundred and thirty officers and thirty-five hundred men killed or wounded.

Auerstädt was a famous battle. Davout had done such wonders that Napoleon could scarce believe his reports to be unexaggerated until facts from Prussian sources established its truth. For what he did, the emperor gave him abundant credit.

On October 15 he wrote to Talleyrand: "Marshal Davout, placed at the outlets of Kösen in front of Naumburg, prevented the enemy from

debouching. He fought all day, and put to flight more than sixty thousand men, commanded by Mollendorf, Kalkreuth, and by the king in person. This army corps covered itself with glory." And next day he wrote Davout: "My Cousin, I make you my compliments with all my heart on your fine conduct. I regret the brave men you have lost, but they died on the field of honor. Make known my satisfaction to all your army corps and to your generals. They have acquired forever the right to my esteem and my gratitude. Give me of your news, and let your corps rest a few moments in Naumburg." The 5th Bulletin reports: "On our right Marshal Davout's corps did prodigies. Not only did he contain, but he pushed back, while beating, for more than three leagues, the bulk of the enemy's troops, which were to debouch by way of Kösen. This marshal displayed distinguished bravery and firmness of character, the first qualities of the man of war. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Daultanne, his chief of staff, and by the rare intrepidity of the brave army corps. . . . We will not speak of the French infantry; it has been acknowledged for a long time that it is the best infantry in the world. The emperor declared that the French cavalry, after the experience of two campaigns and this last battle, had no equal."

"The battle of Jena," says the 5th Bulletin, "wiped out the affront of Rossbach" — fought fifty years before, a dozen miles from this field. "A corps of fifty thousand men of the left marched to cover the defile of Naumburg and to seize the debouch of Kösen, but it had already been anticipated by Marshal Davout. . . .

"The enemy's army was numerous, and showed a fine cavalry. Its manœuvres were executed with precision and rapidity. The emperor would have desired to retard getting into action by two hours, so as to wait, in the positions he had taken up after the morning's attack, the troops which were to join him, and especially his cavalry; but French ardor carried the day. . . . In less than an hour the action became general. Two hundred and fifty or three hundred thousand men, with seven or eight hundred guns, spread death everywhere, and afforded a spectacle rare in history. Either side was manœuvred constantly, as if on a parade. Among our troops there was never the least disorder. Victory was not for a moment uncertain. . . . If there was a moment of hesitation, the one cry of Vive l'Empéreur! reanimated courage and filled all souls. . . . With chagrin it could not dissimulate, the Imperial Footguard saw the whole army hand to hand and itself inactive. Several voices spread the word 'Forward.' 'What is that?' said the emperor. 'It can only

be a young man who has no beard, who wishes to prejudge what I should do. Let him wait until he shall have commanded in thirty pitched battles before pretending to give me advice.' "

The coming night did as much damage to the Prussian forces as the day. The dispersed regiments of the Prussian main army encountered at Büttelstädt the stream of retreating battalions of the Jena forces, and the confusion was worse confounded. Only Hohenlohe was left. No provision had been made for retreat — the greatest fault a commanding general can commit. Nothing could arrest the fugitives, who fled towards Erfurt, Colleda, Sommerda. In a single day the Prussian monarchy had been destroyed. Its forces had been utterly dispersed, and the French had taken two hundred guns, sixty flags and twenty-five thousand prisoners. The Saxon prisoners were sent back with a proclamation by the emperor to the Saxons, and assurances that he had nothing against them. He was fighting Prussia and Russia.

Marching from Colleda to Weissensee with six thousand horse, Blucher ran across Klein's cavalry, but he cleverly escaped by stating that an armistice had been concluded. Kalkreuth, on the 16th, at Greusen, tried the same stratagem on Soult, as the 5th Bulletin informs us: "General Kalkreuth expressed a desire to see Marshal Soult, who went to the outposts. 'What do you want?' said the Prussian general. 'The Duke of Brunswick is dead, all our generals are killed, wounded or taken. The greatest part of our army is in flight. Your successes are great enough; the king is asking a suspension of arms. It is impossible that your emperor should not accord it to him.'

"'General,' said Marshal Soult, 'for a long time people have acted in this way with us; they call on our generosity when they are beaten, and they forget an instant afterwards the magnanimity that we are accustomed to show. . . . After the battle of Austerlitz the emperor accorded an armistice to the Russian army. This armistice saved the army. Now see the unworthy manner in which to-day the Russians are acting. . . . We have in nowise provoked the unjust war which you are making. You

declared it in your gayety of heart. The battle of Jena has decided the fate of the campaign; our trade is to do you the utmost harm that we can. Lay down your arms, and I will wait in this situation the orders of the emperor.' Old General Kalkreuth saw that there was nothing to answer. The two generals separated, and hostilities began again in an instant afterwards."

In the 10th Bulletin, of October 18, it is said, among the flags taken at the battle of Jena was one of the Body Guards, on which the legend was written in French. Strange reminder of the great Frederick!

In the 11th Bulletin, of October 19, it is stated that "the officer on duty near the emperor, Montesquiou, who had been sent as a parliamentarian to the King of Prussia two days before the battle, has returned. He was carried along during several days with the enemy's flight. He describes the disorder of the Prussian army as inexpressible. Yet on the eve of the battle their boasting was without equal. There was question of nothing else than of cutting the French army, and carrying off columns of forty thousand men. The Prussian generals mimicked as much as they could the manners of the great Frederick. Though we were in their country, the generals seemed to be in absolute ignorance of our movements. They thought that there were on the plateau of Jena only four thousand men, and yet the largest part of the army debouched on this plateau."

Throughout the Correspondence, in all the Bulletins, the emperor speaks in scarcely warrantable terms of the Queen of Prussia as being the one who stirred up strife, when the king would have gladly avoided it. While it is true that she did head the war party, it is also true that she did nothing unworthy of a woman or a queen, or that was not fully justified. In the 9th Bulletin, October 17, we are told that "the emperor is lodged in the palace of Weimar, where a few days before the Queen of Prussia was lodged. It seems that what they say of her is true. She was here to fan the fire of war. She is a woman with a pretty face, but with small intelligence, incapable of foreseeing the consequences of what she did. To-day, instead of accusing her, we ought to pity her." To the empress, October 13, 2 A. M.: "I am to-day in Gera, my good friend. My affairs are going well, and everything as I should wish it. By the aid of God, in a few days all this will have taken a very terrible character, I think, for the poor King of Prussia, whom I personally pity, because he is good. The queen is at Erfurt with the king. If she wishes to see the battle, she will have this cruel pleasure. I am very well. I have grown fat since I left, and yet I cover personally twenty or twenty-

five leagues a day on horseback, in a carriage, by every means. I lie down at eight o'clock and I rise at midnight. I sometimes think that you are not yet abed."

From the 23d Bulletin we learn that "up to this hour we have a hundred and fifty flags, among which are those embroidered by the hands of the beautiful queen, — a beauty as fatal to the people of Prussia as Helen's was to the Trojans."

Sword given by Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Carvo, to Count Le Marois.

in Mainz. Nothing could have been more secure than Napoleon's position prior to the battle of Jena.

But no strategical position, from the very nature of things, can be without danger. Owing to the uncertainty of the enemy's whereabouts, always present in war, Napoleon was quite capable of exposing one of his corps to a sudden conflict with the mass of the enemy; but as he was moving in a very concentrated body, such a disaster would at once have given him the clue of where to strike, and the loss of one corps would have been an advantage to the whole army.

Marine in Full Dress.

Jena was a battle of accident; it was planned for the 16th near Erfurt, and took place on the 14th twenty-five miles farther east. Only on the 13th did Napoleon fairly well know where the enemy was, and even then he was partially in error. But his position and his concentration were such that in any event he must prove superior to the Prussians whenever he struck them, or they him. Lannes might have been beaten, but on falling back on the main army he would have led up to a decisive battle, and one in which there was small doubt of a French victory.

During the battle Napoleon kept his hand on the reserves, and even went so far as to risk disaster to Lannes and Ney, rather than to use these before the proper moment. When sufficient reinforcements came up, then the moment to push forward to Lannes' and Ney's assistance had arrived, and the emperor promptly moved them up. Until then Lannes and Ney had as their task to hold their own, at whatever loss or risk.

Napoleon's mind dealt with the stupendous, and the Decree which he issued October 15 from Jena showed that he recognized the length and breadth of his victory. "Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy. Considering that the result of the battle of yesterday is a conquest of all the country belonging to the King of Prussia this side of the Vistula, we have decreed, and do decree the following dispositions." Then follow the amounts to be paid by each state of the enemy as an extraordinary war contribution, beginning with —

Prussia,	100,000,000 frs.
Saxony,	25,000,000 "
Hanover,	9,000,000 "
Hesse-Cassel,	6,000,000 "
Brunswick,	5,500,000 "
and others, down to	100,000 "

for small principalities. Friendly states are excepted. All the English merchandise found in any place was confiscated for the benefit of the army.

Although this decree opens up a vast scheme of what some might call premeditated conquest, yet events proved, and the emperor then knew they would do so, that he was correct in his prognostications. Small wonder; he had just captured twenty-five thousand prisoners, sixty standards and two hundred field-pieces in one battle. Yet, had he not pursued as he did, and as no one since Alexander had done, the scattered fragments of the Prussian army, this prophetic claim would not have proven true. That this poor son of Corsica had risen to the dizzy height of proclaiming as his own the kingdom of Frederick, that far greater man, if no greater soldier, was a warrant in a way for the magnificence of his conception. Forgetful of the growing national aspirations of Europe, he was capable of believing that a larger empire than

Charlemagne's would become his. The soldier overrode the statesman. Had Napoleon been less a captain, he would have been more distinguished in statecraft; but the idea of conquest or something very similar to it never left his mind until after 1812.

Early October 15 the several corps received orders to pursue. Bernadotte was to march up the Unstrut and block the road to Querfurt, Davout to hold Naumburg, Soult to follow on to Büttelstädt, Murat to Erfurt with Ney in his rear. Augereau and Lannes were to remain for the moment in Weimar. The Prussian king, with the army beaten at Auerstädt, had passed Weimar on the way to Erfurt; but on learning of the utter defeat at Jena, had headed for Sommerda, which place he reached early October 15, in lamentable condition, many desertions and eccentrically retreating small commands having depleted his army to the lowest ebb. Mollendorf at Erfurt with six thousand men and eight thousand wounded was surrounded by Murat and Ney, and the town was surrendered, though capable of a good defense. At Sommerda orders were sent Hohenlohe to assemble what was left of his corps, so as to march with those the king had kept together on Magdeburg, where stood the reserves, fourteen thousand men under the Duke of Wurtemberg. When some ten thousand men of Hohenlohe's forces had been got into a semblance of cohesion at Nordhausen, Napoleon sent Murat, Ney and Soult to follow them up, while he, with the other corps — Lannes, Davout, Augereau and the Guard — started for the Elbe, to gain the direct road to the Prussian capital, and to elbow to the north any Prussian troops which might seek to reach the Oder. The enemy was moving on the arc of a bow of which Napoleon held the chord, and unless much detained at the Elbe crossings, the French could easily get to Berlin first, and keep the Prussians on a line of retreat

ending only at Stettin. A day later Lannes was headed on Merseburg, Bernadotte on Querfurt, Davout on Leipsic, while Augereau and the Guard followed Lannes. Mortier was ordered to Fulda. On the 16th Napoleon rode to Weimar.

When Bernadotte reached Querfurt October 16, and learned that the Prussian reserves had marched forward from Magdeburg to Halle, he gave his men a few hours' rest and, breaking up at 2 A. M. October 17, marched on Halle. The duke had received confused news of the great disaster. He was expecting two thousand more men to come from Magdeburg along the Saale left bank, and neglected to cut the bridge, intending perhaps to fall back by the same road. At the head of Bernadotte's column was Dupont; and with true French *élan* this able officer attacked the Prussian battalions at the bridge-head, drove them in, crossed the bridge abreast with them, and seized both the bridge and the town. The bulk of the Prussian forces were outside the city, and made a gallant attempt to regain possession of it; but Dupont debouched by the Leipsic gate, cut the road to Magdeburg, and Rivaud and Tilly's cavalry coming up, the joint forces drove the Prussian corps in dismay and with much loss on Dessau, the road to which Bernadotte in fact had almost seized. At Dessau Wurtemberg crossed the Elbe, half burned the bridge, and retired on Magdeburg, having lost thirty guns and five thousand men, including the oncoming contingent. Perhaps the Prussian demoralization was excusable; but the duke had had a fine opportunity of sending word to his reinforcement to save itself by a retreat on Magdeburg, to cut the Saale bridge, and falling back towards the Elbe, to cut the other bridges on that river, and thus delay the French for two or three days in their march on Berlin, and perhaps by this gain of time save the retreating Prussian columns. Perchance he feared to sever the only means of retreat of the beaten army.

On October 19 Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia: "Monsieur my Brother, I have received Your Majesty's letter. I much regret that the letter that I sent by one of my aides, who arrived in your camp the 13th, was unable to prevent the battle of the 14th. Any suspension of arms that should give time to arrive to the Russian army, which you appear to have called on during the winter, would be too contrary to my interests . . . for me to subscribe. I do not fear the Russian armies. . . . I saw them the last campaign. But Your Majesty will have more to complain of than I. . . . Nevertheless, I wish to reiterate to Your Majesty that I will see with satisfaction means of reëstablishing, if this is possible, the ancient confidence which reigned between us."

Mounted Chasseur of Young Guard.

By October 20, of the French left wing, Murat had reached Magdeburg, with Soult close behind him at Wanzleben, while Ney had got to Halberstadt. Of the right wing, Bernadotte was at Bernburg and Kalbe, Lannes crossing the Elbe at Dessau with Augereau coming up, and Davout, having passed Leipsic the 18th, making rapid passage at Wittenberg, where the bridge, which the emperor presumed to be destroyed, had been only damaged. This town was selected for a secondary base. Quite aware of the strategical value of the crossing here, on October 20 Napoleon wrote Davout: "As you are the only one who has boats, I have no doubt a bridge will be thrown during the day or the night of the 20th or 21st. The bridge once thrown, have a good bridge-head drawn and set to work on it. Seize Wittenberg. If this place is as good as is assured me, have it put at once in

a good state of defense." There being no further need of Murat's cavalry corps with the left wing, the emperor ordered him in to the main column, so as to have his horse brigades nearer at hand. On the same day Napoleon transferred headquarters to Halle. Bernadotte moved down the Saale, with orders to throw a bridge somewhere opposite Zerbst, and cut off the Wurtemberg corps, which, however, reached Magdeburg ahead of him. What was left of the Prussian main column, now under Hohenlohe, had also reached Magdeburg; and a second column under Blucher had been so beset by the elated French on its march from Nordhausen through the Harz mountains, that it had been compelled to retire eccentrically on Brunswick. Here Blucher joined a third column under the Duke of Weimar, which had been the van of the main army and had been pushed out to the Werra, but had luckily retired by a circuit in season to escape the disaster.

Hohenlohe, to whom Frederick William on leaving for the Oder had left the assembling and reorganization of the army, to be made if possible at Magdeburg, soon found this task quite out of the question, unless he retired within walls and submitted to a siege by Soult, Ney and Murat, who were close upon his heels. To retreat to Stettin proved to be his only chance, for Magdeburg had not been victualed or armed for a long defense. He hoped that the Elbe bridges had been destroyed before the French could reach them, so as to give him a good start. Hohenlohe could perhaps have collected fifty thousand men and begun a fresh campaign, but his demoralized troops were no longer able to hold head to the enthusiastic French, and he gave up the idea after short consideration. In fact, so marked was the confusion that Kalkreuth camped his large body of horse on the left bank instead of on the right bank of the Elbe; that, instead of providing only a moderate garrison for Magdeburg, some fifty battalions were

left behind to be captured; and that Hohenlohe was compelled to precede the cavalry along the route to Stettin. The latter, owing to its wrong position, was obliged to cross at Sandau, and could no longer perform its natural duty of fending off the French from the foot column on the march. Hohenlohe, of course, could not take the direct road via Brandenburg, as the French were already debouching from Wittenberg. He was compelled to march via Ruppin and Prenzlau.

The 14th Bulletin, of October 22, tells us that "the language of the Prussian officers is much changed. They demand peace in loud tones. 'What does your emperor want?' they say to us. 'Is he to follow us forever with a sword in our ribs? We have not had a moment of repose since the battle.' These gentlemen were no doubt accustomed to the manœuvres of the Seven Years' War. They wished to ask for three days to bury their dead. 'Think of the living,' answered the emperor, 'and leave to us the care of burying the dead. There is no need of a truce for that.' "

Leaving the all-too-big garrison in the city to be invested by Ney, Hohenlohe broke up October 22 from Magdeburg, and reached Wusterhausen and near-by Neustadt the 24th. His speed was by no means equal to the demand of the occasion. He did not keep well closed up. He habitually cantoned his men instead of going into camp; and was far behind the French in energy, when only energy could save him. How could he equal these veterans with his half-trained troops? On the same October 24 Napoleon with Murat, Lannes and the Guard reached Potsdam, while Davout was knocking at the gates of Berlin, and Bernadotte, belated at the Elbe crossings, was trailing far behind. For this delay Napoleon held the marshal severely to task, induced thereto by his failure to be of value on the memorable day of Jena.

On October 21 Berthier wrote Bernadotte: "The emperor, Monsieur le Maréchal, charged me to write you that he is much displeased that you should not have executed the order . . . to throw a bridge at Barby. Still you must have felt that all the dispositions of the emperor were combined. His Majesty, who is very angry that you should not have executed his orders, reminds you in this connection that you were not present at the battle of Jena. . . . The emperor also charges me to tell you . . . that despite the order you received yesterday, you have not yet sent him three companies to escort your prisoners."

On October 23 Napoleon wrote Bernadotte personally: "I received your letter. I have not the habit to recriminate about the past, because it is without remedy. Your army corps was not on the field of battle, and that might have been very fatal to me. . . . You should have found yourself at Dornburg. . . . Not having executed these dispositions, I had notified you during the night that if you were yet at Naumburg you were to march towards Marshal Davout and sustain him. You were at Naumburg when this order arrived. It was communicated to you, and yet you preferred to make a false march to Dornburg. . . . Chances have been offered since to give proof of your zeal, others will offer themselves, where you can give proof of your talents and of your attachment to our person."

Indeed, compared with Davout's march, Bernadotte had not much to boast of. Davout, from October 10, at Schleiz, had done the bulk of the work in the battle of the 14th, and had reached Berlin a fortnight later, a distance as the crow flies of one hundred and sixty miles. Counting the possible marching days as twelve, this is over thirteen miles a day, or adding one sixth for the bends in the road over a quite flat country, fifteen miles a day, for a body of over twenty-five thousand men. And while Bernadotte was perhaps not wholly to blame, this was no reason why Napoleon should not find fault. Like Frederick, on extraordinary occasions he demanded extraordinary exertion and accomplishment.

A decree of October 23 begins: "Art. 1. Possession shall be taken in our name of all the Prussian states situated between the Rhine and the Elbe. Art. 2. The Prussian eagles

shall be everywhere taken away. Sequestration notices shall be placed on the palaces and public magazines and offices. Revenues shall be collected for our account."

In the effort to cut out the retiring body of the Prussian army, and learning at Potsdam of the march of the Hohenlohe column towards the northeast, Napoleon on October 26 sent out Lasalle's light brigade of cavalry to Oranienburg, whence he was to scout the country in his front to ascertain its whereabouts. This road would strike the one Hohenlohe was pursuing near Zehdenik; but the Prussian general ought to have got beyond this place long before Lasalle could reach it. Shortly other troops were hurried in the same direction.

Lasalle.

Although to conciliate the Elector Napoleon had released the Saxon prisoners, he yet had no idea of relaxing his grasp on that country. With regard to its management he wrote Berthier, October 23: "Much formality, much red tape, many kind things. But in reality take possession of everything, especially means of war, under the pretext that the Elector has no need of them." And out of the great amount of English cloths found in Leipsic, the emperor made a present of a complete new uniform to every French officer, and of a cloak and a coat to each soldier.

The picture of Napoleon at Sans Souci is one which will forever impress the lover of the great King of Prussia. While Napoleon reverently uncovered his head when he stepped within the portal of the narrow Potsdam vault, where beside his testy but honest father rest the ashes of this great man,

he whose lineage and whose character were incomparably lower than those of the dead hero could yet not refrain from taking Frederick's sword and belt, as well as other strictly personal relics, to send to the Invalides, where were yet a few of the French soldiers who had fled from Prussian skill and valor at Rossbach, as their victors' sons were now fleeing from theirs. These relics, essentially Prussian, belonged at Sans Souci. Napoleon would have done himself credit by leaving them where they had so long been. But he was a new-born emperor, as Frederick had been a true-born king. The main thought of the one was for himself; the other's only thought had ever been for his people. Says the 18th Bulletin, of October 26: "The emperor made a present to the Hôtel des Invalides at Paris of the sword of Frederick, of his cordon of the Black Eagle, of his general's belt, as well as the flags carried by his Guard in the Seven Years' War. The old Invalides of the army of Hanover will receive with a religious respect all which has belonged to one of the first captains of whom history conserves the memory." In finding these trophies the emperor is said to have exclaimed, "I would rather have these than twenty millions!"

Speaking in the 17th Bulletin, of October 25, of the recent visit of the Emperor of Russia to Potsdam, Napoleon states as his opinion that Frederick would not have approved it: "His genius, his spirit and his wishes were with the nation he so much loved (meaning France), and of which he said that if he was king of it, not a cannon would be fired in Europe without his permission."

Strange conception of Vater Fritz, who, while he harbored an undoubted fondness for the softer ways of sunny France, had in the bottom of his heart no sentiment except love for the rugged, toilsome country which he had received from his ancestors so little, and which he left to his descendants one of

the powers of Europe, with the germ that at Sedan made it the leading nation of the Continent.

From Potsdam, October 26, was issued a

PROCLAMATION TO THE ARMY.

Soldiers! you have justified my expectations, and replied worthily to the confidence of the French people. . . . So long as you shall be animated with this spirit, nothing will be able to resist you. . . . Soldiers! the Russians are boasting that they are coming to meet us. We will march to meet them. We will save them half the distance. They will find Austerlitz again in the country of Prussia. . . . Soldiers! I cannot better express the sentiments that I have for you than by saying to you that I carry for you in my heart the love which you show me every day.

On October 25 Davout entered Berlin, but a single courier — as a curious fact — having anticipated his corps with the news of the battle. The abandonment of the superb arsenal and plentiful supplies was an additional cause of congratulation. Only a few royal archives had been carried away. On October 28 Napoleon made his triumphal entry, as he had in Milan, Cairo and Vienna; and while the unthinking populace after a fashion welcomed him, the better classes were sullen. Augereau and Davout were kept in Berlin; the first held the main bridges on the Havel, to protect the line back to the Elbe; the latter threw out his light cavalry to Oderberg.

Spandau, a fortress which could have indefinitely held out had it been in condition, surrendered, October 25, to Murat (who had just arrived) and to Lannes, with eighty guns in the arsenal and a garrison of twelve hundred men; and these marshals were now ordered in pursuit of Hohenlohe. Soult and Bernadotte, the latter of whom had reached Brandenburg, were also sent on the same general quest. On the 26th Lasalle, at Zehdenik, met and defeated a cavalry detachment under Schimmelpfennig, which was acting as flanker for Hohenlohe's column marching via Prenzlau on

Stettin; and two days later Murat reached Prenzlau almost at the same time as Hohenlohe, who hoped to seize the defile at Locknitz, and, holding it, to safely reach Stettin. The Prussian general, however, managed to pass through the town ahead, and took up a position on the Pasewalk road; but being deceived by the representations of his chief of staff, whom he sent to Murat, as to the force of the French, though as Murat had actually only cavalry at hand, he could have made a good stand, he surrendered his twelve thousand men without burning a cartridge. Happily, such weakness has been rare in Prussian annals, save only in this unfortunate campaign. On the 30th Stettin, with five thousand garrison, opened its gates to Lasalle and his light cavalry.

The 26th Bulletin, of October 31, speaking of the Russians, says: "They will not bear to come to meet us. The day of Austerlitz is present to their eyes. What annoys sensible people is to hear the Emperor Alexander and his Senate say that it was the allies that were beaten. All Europe well knows that there is not a family in Russia which does not wear mourning; it is not the loss of the allies they deplore. The one hundred and ninety-five Russian battle-guns which were taken, and which are at Strasburg, are not the guns of the allies. The fifty Russian flags which are hung up in Nôtre Dame at Paris are not the flags of the allies."

In the eccentric retreat of the several Prussian detachments, Blucher had marched towards the Elbe and crossed it on the 26th at Sandau, anticipating Soult and Ney, who, being near Magdeburg, had followed him up in the effort to cut him off. He had kept on in the path of Hohenlohe as a species of rearguard, and at Boitzenburg, October 29, had learned of Hohenlohe's surrender. Being by nature of more obstinate build, Blucher, increased by Weimar's column, now under Winning, making a force of twenty thousand men, de-

termined to retire to the lower Elbe, and October 31 he reached Waren. Bernadotte was at Strelitz when he heard of the surrender of Hohenlohe and of Blucher's march, and guessing Blucher to be aiming at Stralsund, he marched against him, reaching Stargard October 31, while Soult got as far as Zechlin. Ascertaining the facts, Soult sent his cavalry against Blucher, and with his foot strove to cut him from the Elbe. Bernadotte got in touch with Blucher's rearguard November 1, and Murat from Stettin followed on via Demmin. But Blucher thus early showed the stuff of "Marschal Vorwärts," and pursued by Bernadotte and Soult, yet kept ahead, hoping to cross the Elbe at the Boitzenberg on that river. Finding this impossible, he bore to the right via Gadebusch on Lübeck, which city he reached November 5. But the next day the French came up and without delay stormed the place; Blucher retired on Ratkau with what troops were left him, expecting to reach Travemunde. The French were, however, too rapid in their pursuit, and, caught in a *cul-de-sac* on the 7th, the gallant soldier and ten thousand men were compelled to lay down their arms. This was the last of any Prussian troops between the Elbe and Oder. Napoleon's claim of October 15 had been made good. He had conquered all Prussia this side of the Vistula.

Some of the rulers who had opposed him Napoleon punished ruthlessly.

With regard to the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, the 27th Bulletin says: "He will pay for his hostility by the loss of his states. There has not been in Germany a single house which has been so constantly the enemy of France. For many years he sold the blood of his subjects to England, so as to make war against us in both hemispheres, and it is to this traffic of his troops that he owes his treasures." And November 5 he wrote Lagrange: "Disarm the country entirely. Let there be not a gun there, nor a musket. Follow the measures I have ordered. Arrest and send into France the colonels and the officers. . . . Still you may treat the

country with kindness; but if there is the least movement anywhere, make a terrible example. Let the first village that moves be pillaged and burned. . . . No princes of the house of Hesse, even women, are to remain in the country. Give them passports to go away."

Poor Prussia suffered bitterly. Lübeck was given over to plunder, as having been taken by storm. Discipline was quite relaxed, and the French soldier was rewarded for his gallant fights and exhausting marches. Napoleon looked solely for results; and if his men could accomplish what he desired, he was ready to yield them any return they asked. "No ridiculous consideration, one has always time to be magnanimous," he wrote to Lannes from Schönbrunn in 1805. "We wage war with all its force and severity," he wrote Joseph in March, 1807. And it was even so. The soldiers knew no bounds in their demands or acts; the officers were nearly as bad; and Prussia saw herself in sorry case for having gone to war without reckoning the cost.

Yet the emperor found time to do an occasional act of grace — especially to a woman. The Prince of Hatzfeld had been found guilty, by his own letters, of duplicity not admissible in war. He was arrested, and would have been summarily condemned. The Princess Hatzfeld came to see Napoleon, attributing his fate to his enemies. "You know the writing of your husband," said the emperor, "I will make you judge," and he showed her the one fatal letter. She could not deny her husband's writing. "Well," said the emperor, "you have the letter in your hands, throw it in the fire. With that destroyed, I can no longer find your husband guilty."

From Charlottenburg and Berlin Napoleon had closely watched and directed the operations of his corps. Though sumptuously housed, he labored none the less steadily to complete the work begun. As part of his task he carefully oversaw the supply department, and made arrangements for the

future. For the present, "my will is that Berlin shall contribute everything in superfluity which is needed by my army; and that nothing shall be spared, so that my soldiers shall in all things have even what is unnecessary."

Ney had kept on with the siege of Magdeburg; and on November 8 the city surrendered with twenty thousand garrison and six hundred guns, to an equal number of French. Augereau and the Guard remained in Berlin; Davout had been sent to Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which place he reached October 31, and the next day Cüstrin surrendered to Gudin's division. This fortress, situated on an island in the Oder, had in the Seven Years' War been defended for a number of days by a very small garrison; but on this occasion the garrison went so far as to furnish boats for the French to cross the stream and take possession. All Cüstrin officers were released on parole, and the soldiers sent to France. In similar fashion one place after another was given up with scarce a sign of defense, — a sad offering to the *manes* of Frederick. Perhaps history furnishes no more lamentable example of weak resistance. And yet the brawn was there. It was the brain that was lacking. The old Prussian field-marshals seemed to have no power to resist the young and unscrupulous French marshals. From Frankfort Davout marched towards Posen, and Augereau came on to the Oder to take his place. The Guard sufficed for Berlin. Meanwhile Fulda had been captured by Mortier with part of the 8th Corps, and he and Louis advanced on and occupied Cassel, Hanover, Bremen and Hamburg. The Bavarian and Wurtemberg contingents were made into a 9th Corps, and

Artisan of Engineers.

marched from Plauen on Dresden, whence they advanced towards the Oder and got into touch with Davout. Other smaller auxiliaries were used as garrisons. Saxony was glad to be admitted to a French alliance.

It was at Berlin, November 21, 1806, that Napoleon issued his decree of blockade and reprisal against Great Britain. To summarize this decree, it was a mere paper-blockade, such as most of those declared by Great Britain had been; and it subjected all Englishmen and English property to arrest and seizure whenever found abroad: —

DECREE.

IMPERIAL CAMP AT BERLIN, November 21, 1806.

NAPOLEON, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, KING OF ITALY, ETC.

Considering: —

1. That England does not admit the rights of peoples followed universally by all civilized peoples.

2. That she considers as an enemy every individual belonging to the enemy's country, and consequently makes prisoners of war of not only the crews of vessels armed for war, but also the crews of the vessels of commerce, and trading vessels, and even commercial agents and merchants traveling for the business of their trade.

3. That she extends to commercial vessels and merchandise, and to the property of individuals, the right of conquest, which can only be applied to that which belongs to the enemy's state.

4. That she extends to villages, towns and unfortified ports of commerce, to harbors and to the mouths of rivers, the rights of blockade, which according to the reason and usage of all civilized peoples is applicable only to strong places. That she declares to be blockaded places before which she has not even a single ship of war, although a place is not blockaded until it is so invested that one cannot attempt to approach it without imminent danger. That she declares in a state of blockade even those places which, with all her forces joined, she is incapable of blockading, entire coasts and an entire empire.

5. That this monstrous abuse of the right of blockade has no other end than to prevent communication between peoples, and to build up the

commerce and industry of England on the ruin of the industry and commerce of the continent.

6. That such being the evident aim of England, whoever on the Continent does business in English merchandise is favoring by so doing her designs, and becomes her accomplice.

7. That this conduct of England, worthy in everything of the first days of barbarism, has profited this power to the detriment of all the others.

8. That it is a natural right to oppose to the enemy the arms he uses himself, and to fight him in the same manner as he fights, when he repudiates all the ideas of justice and all liberal sentiments, which are the result of civilization among men.

We have resolved to apply to England the usages which she has consecrated in her naval legislation.

The dispositions of the present decree will be constantly considered as a fundamental principle of the empire until England shall have recognized that the right of war is one and the same on land and on sea. That it cannot be extended to private properties, whatever they may be, nor to the persons of individuals foreign to the profession of arms, and that the right of blockade is to be restricted to strong places really invested by sufficient forces.

We have in consequence decreed, and we do decree, as follows : —

Art. 1. The British islands are declared in a state of blockade.

Art. 2. All travel and all correspondence with the British islands are interdicted. In consequence, letters or packages addressed to England or to an Englishman, or written in the English language, shall not be carried by the mails and shall be seized.

Art. 3. Every individual subject of England, of whatever state or condition he may be, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops or by those of our allies, shall be made prisoner of war.

Art. 4. Every storehouse, all merchandise, all property of whatever nature it may be, belonging to a subject of England, shall be declared subject to seizure.

Art. 5. Commerce in English merchandise is forbidden, and all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from her factories and from her colonies, is declared subject to seizure.

Art. 6. Half of the product of the confiscation of the merchandise and properties declared subject to seizure by the preceding articles shall be employed to indemnify the tradesmen for the losses they have sustained

by the capture of vessels of commerce which have been taken by the English cruisers.

Art. 7. No vessel coming directly from England or from English colonies, or which has been there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received in any port.

Art. 8. Every vessel which by means of a false declaration shall make a breach of the above dispositions shall be seized, and the vessel and the cargo shall be confiscated as if they were English property.

Art. 9. Our tribunal of seizures at Paris is charged with final judgment in all the suits which may occur in our empire, or in the countries occupied by the French army, relative to the execution of the present decree. Our tribunals of seizures at Milan shall be charged with final judgment in the said suits which may occur in the territory of our kingdom of Italy.

Art. 10. The present decree shall be communicated by our minister of foreign relations to the Kings of Spain and Naples, of Holland and of Etruria, and to our other allies whose subjects are victims like ours to the injustice and the barbarism of English naval legislation.

Art. 11. Our ministers of foreign relations, of war, of the navy and the finances, of the police, and our directors general of the post, are charged, each one as it concerns him, with the execution of the present decree.

NAPOLEON.

In part right and in part wrong, this Decree, the basis of the "Continental System," became the *motif* of the whole future Napoleonic scheme. The nation that would not or could not accept the decree as a guide was the enemy of France.

At one time matters looked as if Napoleon and Frederick William would come to an understanding; but the more Napoleon got, the more he demanded; and as town after town surrendered, and with Prussia at his feet, he gazed towards Russia, whose emperor he also would fain punish for daring to defend what he properly deemed his own. As a soldier he was right: better afford no time to the Russians to assemble their forces. As a statesman it must be said that Napoleon

never knew when it was wise to stop. This will more forcibly appear when in later and less successful campaigns the emperor refused to accept terms from the allies which were fair, and would have been much better for France and for himself.

The war of seven weeks had been unparalleled. Napoleon's power had apparently — one almost says actually — advanced from the Rhine to the Vistula. A hundred thousand prisoners, four thousand guns and other trophies wholesale, had been the result of one able strategic manœuvre over an adversary oblivious of the maxims of war. "To deny the existence and the influence of these principles is to deny the sun; it is to prove that one has not understood war." Napoleon's power had consisted in applying these principles constantly, and in extending them to their utmost possible limit.

From Berlin, November 22, Napoleon wrote to General Lacuée, director general of military conscription, drawing his attention to a message to the Senate by which the emperor called in the conscription of 1807: "I will not put down my arms until I have peace with England and with Russia." Then follow details for carrying out the project, and stating where the fresh troops were to be placed, some to be along the coast to forestall descents. He also orders that a regiment of "Vélites of the Guard" shall be turned into fusileers, not being suitable for the work intended. "I have not lost many men, but the project which I have taken up is more vast than any I have ever had, and for this reason I must place myself in position to respond to all occurrences."

On November 27 Napoleon wrote from Meseritz to General Clarke, Governor General of Prussia, about keeping Berlin quiet: "Pay great heed that there shall be neither

cannon nor arms in Berlin, and that there shall be none except in the strong places. Send people to inspect the places where there have been combats, in the direction of Prenzlau country. Take away all the guns which may be found, and send them to the strong places."

The iron hand lay strong upon poor Prussia.

Sword of the Period.

treat with the conqueror. Of this quite natural action Napoleon strove to make the king bear the load. On December 5, from Posen, he wrote imputing to him the blame of not concluding peace, because he had cast his lot with the Russians. "You have taken the box and thrown the dice. The dice shall decide," said he.

In forcing Prussia to his terms, Napoleon had looked far beyond this kingdom across the Russian steppes. He had at Austerlitz beaten the Russian auxiliaries of Austria, and we remember that he had demanded, as one of the terms of the truce which succeeded the battle, that they should then and there march back to Poland. But the Peace of Presburg was made with Austria only: Russia remained at war with France, and her present attitude could in no sense be ignored. As an ally of Prussia, who failed to be a part of the recent Jena campaign only because he could not get his troops on the theatre of war as rapidly as the French could do, some terms, according to Napoleon's programme, must clearly be forced on Alexander; for when Napoleon had last suggested peace, the czar had declined the proposal. Yet in a fashion Napoleon hoped for peace. Writing to the King of Wurtemberg from Posen, December 10, he says: "I count upon this war being the last. It is quite time that all nations should indulge in peace, and that things should be put on a definitive basis." Just now, however, the moment had arrived when the Russians and French must come to terms or blows; there was no middle course.

As a factor in dealing with the question, Napoleon recognized that Poland was the most important. To regain its ancient status as a kingdom, Poland was ready to promise any aid; but would Napoleon not have been wiser to attach Prussia to his cause by a timely generosity he could well afford? To use Poland meant to restore it; to restore it was

to take vast territory away from Austria, Prussia, Russia; and this again meant to create for these three otherwise antagonistic powers a common standpoint against France. Moreover, one might lean on a rehabilitated Prussia; Poland would always remain a broken reed. Though as a rule exceptionally open to the lessons of history, it can scarcely be said that the emperor appreciated this fact at its true value.



Cambacérès.

From Posen, December 1, he wrote Cambacérès, informing him that all Poland was taking to arms. "It is difficult to conceive an idea of the national movement of this country. . . . Priests, nobles, peasants, all are unanimous. . . . The nobles furnish the expenses of the army." The 36th Bulletin states that "it is difficult to paint the enthusiasm of the Poles. . . . Their first passion, their first desire, is to become a nation again." And to forestall complaints from the new allies, Prince Jerome was ordered to "maintain a severe discipline, especially in Poland," and to "have a few pillagers shot for an example." To assist the Insurrection, as the raising of troops is called, quantities of arms were taken from Silesia to issue to the Poles.

Notwithstanding his reliance upon their promised aid, Napoleon treated the Poles *de haut en bas*, and made demands on them beyond their power to fill. Nevertheless, they saw their only salvation in clinging to him, and absolute ruin in

failure to sustain him. The Poles have ever been gallant and faithful, despite their unsteady character, and the devotion of the ruling class was now marked. Indeed, a beautiful young Polish noblewoman became the mistress of the emperor, hoping to influence him towards the liberation of her native land, though it is said that later she became a willing captive to the charms of this singular man. Their son was distinguished under the Third Empire.

Jerome Bonaparte.

Napoleon could not delay in moving against the Russians, for the season was late, and happily there were in his rear, to which any consideration need be paid, only Stralsund and the Swedes, and Silesia with its fortresses, to take. Mortier was readily able to hold the coast line of the Baltic and the North Sea; Louis had gone back to protect Holland from the English; and Kellermann was raising fresh levies which could be used to repress any uprisings in the rear.

For the moment Napoleon neither knew the whereabouts of the Russian army advancing on the Vistula, nor its strength, though so soon as he ascertained that the czar had sent an army into Moldavia against the Turks, he saw that he was not to be opposed by the entire Russian army. This, indeed, would have given the emperor a much more serious task. It was for the purpose of ascertaining these essential facts that he had, after the capture of Frankfort-on-the-Oder

and Cüstrin, sent Davout forward into Posen, with Augereau to follow in his left rear, and Jerome Bonaparte in his right rear with the new 9th Corps, made up of Bavarians and Wurtembergers. Having been tried and found wanting in a naval command, the emperor had placed his brother at the head of a corps, with Vandamme beside him, to learn the profession of arms on land. Davout's orders were not to be drawn into a serious engagement single-handed, but if he met a superior force of the enemy, to manœuvre for time until supported. Napoleon had heard that on October 9 the Russians had been quite a distance in the interior, at Kamenz-Podolsk, and as he reckoned that they could not reach Warsaw before November 20, he purposed to throw the whole army into Posen. "Send four geographical engineers to Posen, so that they may make a reconnoissance in a circumference of twelve leagues, of which Posen (city) would be the centre," he wrote Berthier from Berlin, November 7, "for it is there that I have the project to deliver a battle to the Russians, if they will advance."

On this same November 7, however, trustworthy news ran in to the effect that Bennigsen, with fifty-six thousand men, had not many days before been seen in the region about Grodno, advancing in four columns, so that with average marches they would be able to cross the Prussian border by the end of October, and be at Thorn with the first line by the middle of November, and with the second line ten days later.

In Bennigsen's left rear, though Napoleon had not heard the fact, Buxhovden, with thirty-six thousand men, was moving forward to the Narew; while a reserve of fifty thousand men was being formed on the Niemen. On the other hand, the French army had received eighty thousand conscripts, and with the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine, Saxony and Poland, had about two hundred thousand men.

The facts being as given, Napoleon proposed to concentrate in Posen province by November 18, under command of Murat, the corps of Davout, Augereau, Lannes and Jerome, the Guard and part of his cavalry, say eighty thousand men, to be followed up by a second line. Davout had reached Posen city by November 9, and seeing no sign of the Russians, had continued his march on Warsaw; Augereau headed direct for Thorn, while Lannes was ordered via Bromberg on the same place, and Jerome on Kalish. Murat's cavalry, Soult, Bernadotte and Ney, though released from their duties near the Prussian capital, were yet in second line, some distance back, and heading towards the Oder. Part of Kellermann's new levies had already reached Berlin, where they relieved the Baden and Würzburg regiments and the Legion of the North volunteers, who then advanced after the main army to cover its rear. A division of cuirassiers under Espagne had come up from Italy to join the army; and Oudinot's grenadiers were also on the road to Warsaw. The successive waves of reinforcements in rear of the army were ably organized by Napoleon, and amply sufficed for his needs. Though the front of the first line had to be considerably extended to obtain early information of the enemy, yet Napoleon still kept in view the necessity of prompt concentration



Bennigsen.

for battle, and wrote Davout, November 13, from Berlin: "You see that I desire that you should not pass (to the south of) the road to Kalish, but that you should approach as much as possible the road to Thorn. Give me some information on the nature of the country as far as Warsaw, and from Thorn to Grodno. Do not tire your troops by false marches. In all this there is but one very important matter, and this is that my three corps and my cavalry shall be able to concentrate in short time, if the movements of the Russians should make it necessary."

On November 27 Napoleon personally reached Posen. At this moment Warsaw was the all-important point.

Towards the end of November the position of the army corps was this: The van of Murat's cavalry division had struck some Russian cavalry at Blonje and driven it back to Warsaw; Davout was one march in the rear; Lannes was at Lowicz; Augereau at Gostymin; Ney and the Guard still at Posen; Soult was leaving Frankfort-on-the-Oder; and Bernadotte had not long left Berlin. Though Jerome had advanced to Kalish, his duty was changed, and he was personally ordered back to Silesia to capture and then put all its strong places in condition of defense, so that the Oder might become a basic line. But for political reasons, Breslau was ordered to have its fortifications demolished, the citadel alone to be kept.

Mortier, as above noted, had come on to Mecklenburg and Pomerania. Though Warsaw had recently been held by a Russian advance detachment of Bennigsen's army, when this retired, November 28, from the city to the suburb, Praga, on the right bank of the Vistula, Murat with his cavalry entered the ancient Polish capital, followed two days later by Davout's corps. Here was already a substantial footing for the French, a good secondary base.

Under Alexander's fostering care the Russian army had made great progress since Austerlitz. It now consisted of eighteen divisions, each (except the Guards) containing six infantry regiments, ten squadrons line cavalry and ten squadrons light horse, a company of pioneers, two heavy batteries, three light batteries, and one battery of horse artillery. Thus each division had eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons and seventy-two guns, thoroughly organized and served, while the cavalry had been vastly improved. The army was divided into: First, the Guards, under the Grand-Duke Constantine. Second, the army destined to go to the aid of Prussia, numbering nine divisions. Third, the army to march against the Turks in Moldavia, consisting of five divisions. Fourth, a corps under Apraxin, as reserve. Fifth, the Finland, Georgian and garrison troops. The first four bodies numbered three hundred and twenty-four battalions, three hundred and thirty-five squadrons, and one thousand and thirty-eight guns.

Of the two Russian armies advancing to the aid of Prussia, towards the end of November, Bennigsen's had already been some days at Pultusk, with a large van at Praga suburb; and the one under Buxhovden was yet many marches in the rear. As a flying wing to the Russian army, the Prussian corps of eighteen thousand men under Lestocq stood at Thorn, and had been made subject to Russian orders.

In view of the existing French superiority, Bennigsen was fearful for his left flank. He had profited by Napoleon's manœuvres at Ulm and Jena, and saw that his position might be turned. On December 1, then, he vacated Praga and retired to the line of the Narew, Lestocq at the same time giving up Thorn and moving back on Strasburg. This retreat gave satisfaction to Napoleon. He wrote Murat from Posen, December 1: "If the enemy should be foolish enough

to evacuate Praga, do you seize on this suburb, reëstablish the bridge, and have a good bridge-head constructed. . . . I shall be well pleased if you pass the Vistula at Praga. Immediately after that, try to cross the Bug." Thus early in December, while Ney with the left took post at Thorn, and Lannes as reserve reached Warsaw, the right under Murat and Davout crossed in boats to Praga, and pushed out towards the line of the Bug. Though Napoleon, in Posen, knew little of the Russian movements, yet, understanding as he did the strategic situation, he sent orders to Murat to be sure to build bridges and bridge-heads on the Vistula and the Bug, especially at the confluence of the Narew and Vistula; having done which, Murat was to place the cavalry at Pultusk, sustained by Davout at Sjerock. The marshal at once set about his task; and when eventually constructed, the intrenchments at Praga consisted of eight redoubts making a circuit of about a mile, and three bastioned curtains of nearly half a mile. It was really an intrenched camp.

According to Napoleon's dispositions, the French army was thus advancing with Ney, to be followed by Bernadotte, as the left wing, Soult and Augereau in the centre, and Davout and Murat as the right wing, sustained by Lannes. Bessières with part of the reserve cavalry was to keep touch between left and centre; Murat to keep touch between centre and right with another part of the cavalry.

In calling on his soldiers for unusual exertions, Napoleon issued a Proclamation from Posen, December 2: "Soldiers, a year ago to-day, at this same hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalions, bewildered, were flying in rout, or, surrounded, were giving up their arms to their victors. Next day they spoke words of peace, but they were deceitful words." Then the emperor gives the reasons for his action against Russia, and encourages his men

system of magazines." Nor did the clothing supply and other essentials come up to the required standard. "The cloaks and shoes sent from Berlin are worth nothing. The cloaks from Leipsic are ridiculously little. I have seen some that do not reach the knees. Prescribe conditions for the measure of cloaks, so that they cannot be evaded, and make the commissaries responsible for the cloaks and shoes that they receive. The shoes, especially those furnished in Berlin, are of the worst quality." It had become evident that the emperor could not get what the soldiers urgently needed in the coming winter campaign; nor could he hold his marshals to the task of feeding their men upon the country.

The early winter weather of 1806 was good. In the 42d Bulletin it is said that "the season astonishes the inhabitants of Poland. It does not freeze. The sun shines every day, and it is yet autumn weather." It was indeed this warm weather that kept the roads so bad. And later Napoleon wrote: "The weather is extraordinary here. It is warmer than in the month of October in Paris, but it rains, and in a country where there are no *chaussées* (paved roads) one is always in the mud." Early in January snow fell, and it froze for three days, but the thaw soon set in again.

As had been ordered, the several corps, just after mid-December, had crossed, or were engaged in crossing the Vistula; Ney was marching on Strasburg, Augereau stood opposite Sacrochim, Soult was still near Vlozlask; while Davout, debouching from Praga, had built a bridge over the Narew at Okunin. Napoleon in person reached Warsaw from Posen December 19, and found that Bennigsen was at Pultusk, with outposts along the Ukra; and Buxhovden meanwhile had reached Ostrolenka, while Lestocq, attempting to regain Thorn, was met by Ney and driven back to Lautenburg. Ney's immediate programme, as a preliminary to the grand turning opera-

tion, was to manœuvre by his right on Bjeshun and Soldau, and while threatening the enemy's right, seek to cut Lestocq from his touch with the Russians. Speedy action was on the cards. On December 21 Napoleon wrote Daru: "Everything leads us to believe, Monsieur the Intendant General, that in three or four days we shall have a great battle. It is therefore most important to take all the measures relative to ambulances. Where are they? In what state are they? And where are the surgeons?"

Pultusk being, then, the point where Napoleon believed he could reach the Russian army, the several corps were headed thither, some moving slowly, while the others by forced marches got up abreast of them; and on December 22 Ney was in front of Strasburg on the left; next him Bessières, followed by Bernadotte, was near Bjeshun; Soult and Augereau put over at several available places in their front; Davout was making ready to cross at the Okunin bridge, and Lannes was behind him at Warsaw. Next day Napoleon reached the front at 9 A. M. and began to reconnoitre the Ukra, behind which a Russian division stood from Charnovo to Pomjechovo. This he did thoroughly, and from the roof of a small building in an island near the confluence of the Ukra and Narew, he dictated his order for the preliminary attack he proposed at once to make.

The bridges were to be thrown from the island referred to, and here Morand's division was to cross and attack the enemy's left flank at Charnovo, while part of Gudin's division was to follow and move on Pomjechovo, the balance holding the bridge-head, towards which Lannes came nearer. By evening of the 23d this scheme was matured, the troops were put in, and in a night combat the Russians were ousted from their position, falling back on Nasielsk. By the feel of the resistance to his onset, the emperor saw that he had reached the

main force of the enemy; but he knew nothing of his strength. This, however, did not delay his active proceedings. On the 24th Lannes was ordered across the Narew, while the Guard came up from Warsaw to take his place; Augereau was to advance on Novemjesto, and Soult to keep close up to him, heading on Plonsk; Davout was to follow up the enemy to Nasielsk.

As soon as Kamenski heard of the French crossing of the Ukra, he ordered part of his troops stationed at Novemjesto up to the aid of the corps at Nasielsk, and when Davout, accompanied by Napoleon, struck this town about noon on the 24th, the Russians under Ostermann were able, though the French attack was stout, to hold the place until night, when they retired on Stregozin. The rest of the Russian troops along the Ukra at Novemjesto and Koloshomb were ordered in to Pultusk; and on the way Augereau, who was passing the Ukra, fell in and crossed swords with them near Koloshomb. It was Napoleon's purpose that Davout should manœuvre by his left to keep touch with Augereau and Soult, who were obliquing towards him by way of Novemjesto and Plonsk. Napoleon now brought his headquarters to Nasielsk, and ordered Lannes to come on to this town early next morning. On December 25 Davout started promptly on the track of the Russians. To be near both Augereau and Davout, the left and right wings of this minor advance, the emperor rode to the front, so as to direct whichever should be most earnestly engaged; but though he soon recognized that the Russians were not opposing him with all their force, he could learn nothing about the position of the several corps of the enemy. Lannes' direction was therefore changed

Gendarme Orderly.

to one via Sjerock on Pultusk, in the hope that he could seize the enemy's line of retreat at the Narew bridge at that place.

Napoleon's general scheme was now curiously turned into a concentric operation to move around Kamenski's right, by sending Soult via Jechanov, with Ney in second line, through Mlava on Makov, while Augereau and part of Davout's men should march via Golymin on the same place; and the rest of Davout's division through Nasielsk and Lannes through Sjerock should attack the enemy in front. This was not a clever manœuvre. It was quite unlike Napoleon.

Kamenski, whom age had robbed somewhat of his natural vigor, though at first he had advanced, was now for retreat before even crossing swords with the enemy; he feared he might lose his artillery and train by delay, and in fact he was all but on the point of abandoning them; but his lieutenants, Bennigsen and Buxhovden, kept him in the field. Bennigsen held Pultusk, and Buxhovden was now concentrated at Makov; while a large detachment from each army was holding Golymin, the salient of the line between them.

As Napoleon seems to have had the impression that the bulk of the Russians had fallen back on Golymin, he pushed Davout out on the road towards that point on the 25th; and this corps reached Stregozin, while Murat, in his front, advanced to Slubowa. On this same Christmas Day Lannes got as far as Sbroshki; Augereau and Soult each made a march in the prescribed direction; but Bessières and Bernadotte were still far behind in the country in front of Bjeshun. Ney had his work to do in pushing back Lestocq, who acted with much vigor; and he got only to Soldau and Mlava. In fact, compared to the Prussian officers in the Jena operations, Lestocq developed a great deal of enterprise. Not content with an effort to take Soldau, in which he failed, he next essayed to seize Bjeshun; but though this place was held only

as Napoleon was impressed with the idea that the main Russian body must be in that direction, Augereau had been sent after him. Soult was pushed on to Jechanov with instructions to speed his march on Ostrolenka and cut off the Russian line of retreat at that point. This confined the original turning manœuvre to a smaller circuit; but Bernadotte by a larger one was ordered across and beyond the upper Omulew; and Murat, who had been at Slubova, was at the same time advanced in support of Davout. To the student of Napoleon's earlier campaigns, all this seems out of place. Instead of concentrating his forces on the plan which had always won success, and striking the enemy one solid blow, or beating him in detail, the emperor was working on exterior lines, yielding to the enemy the very central point which he had always striven to hold himself, and was adopting the concentric operation he had so often condemned, so superciliously criticised in his opponents. And what he had on other occasions foretold for others, now happened to himself. His reliance on Soult and Ney and Bessières to come up in season to be of use proved worthless. The bottomless roads of necessity retarded their advance, and none of them could reach the scene of conflict. Still, on December 26 Davout attacked heartily in front, while Augereau took Buxhovden in flank, and the fighting swayed to and fro for many hours. But Buxhovden, not being in superior force, did not pretend to make a real stand. He fought steadily and effectively in retreat against the divisions of Davout, Augereau and Murat, which came into action,

Barclay de Tolly.

not together, but one after another; and holding their own until nightfall, though they lost some guns stalled in the mud, the Russians then fell back unpursued on Makov, aiming for Roshan and Ostrolenka. Soult managed to reach Jechanov, but this was many miles away; Ney's sharp advance induced Lestocq to move back on Neidenburg, but had no other marked effect. Though Kamenski had moved his headquarters to the rear to Lomza, Bennigsen and Buxhovden had some idea of renewing the battle, should the French again advance, but this was not to be.

The 47th Bulletin from Pultusk, December 30, says: . . . "The entire and precipitate retreat of the Russian armies has terminated the year and the campaign." It then speaks of the combat of Pultusk as won by the French, and narrates how at the combat of Golymin Davout attacked in front while Augereau took the enemy in flank, and Murat made several charges. "However, the night arriving too soon, the combat continued until eleven o'clock. The enemy made his retreat in disorder, leaving his artillery, his baggage, nearly all the haversacks and many dead. . . . The Russian army has lost eighty guns, all its caissons, more than twelve hundred wagons of the train, and twelve thousand men killed, wounded or prisoners. The movements of the French and Russian columns will be an object of lively curiosity for military men, when they shall be traced on the map. We shall there see how little was wanting that all this army had been taken and destroyed in a few days, and that by the effect of a single fault of the Russian general. . . . We have lost eight hundred men killed, and we have two thousand wounded. . . . We have pushed the enemy more than forty leagues distant."

While this statement is absurdly inaccurate, it is scarcely more so than some of the battle reports of all generals who have written their own, from Cæsar down. It is not only sailors and travelers who may "lie by authority."

By night Napoleon reached Paluki; and the report of Lannes' failure to beat the superior Russians at Pultusk, the evident intention the forces in his own front had the day before shown to retire up the Narew and not stand for battle,

and especially the terrible condition of the roads, the question of victualing and the advanced season of the year, brought him to the conclusion that it was time for him to stop and rest his overworked troops, before from being impatient they became disheartened. The campaign was practically ended, and both contestants could fairly claim success: the Russians because they had checked the French advance; the French because they had driven back the Russians. Napoleon had met something analogous to what had arrested him in Egypt and Syria, — climate and a limitless continent. The immense Russian theatre, the half-peopled, half-civilized condition of the country, an enemy who was at home while he himself was constantly meeting factors foreign to his experience, worked on him as nothing in Europe so far had done. Napoleon had never yet found it a *sine qua non* to resort to the magazine system, which Frederick had inherited, and which more or less hampered all Prussian operations in his era. The foot-free soldiers of the French Revolution, casting to the winds all military precedents as unworthy of the new birth of France, had marched to and fro over an enormous territory without the use of magazines. They ate and laughed when food could be got; they starved and laughed when food was wanting. Napoleon had come on the stage and, seizing this new Gallic ardor, had improved upon it — mainly because he had conducted his campaigns in rich countries, where by robbing the peasantry of nearly their last loaf, even a large army could subsist. Here precisely the reverse conditions obtained. On the Po or the Danube, for every mile there was food for many people, at hand or hidden; food which by some means, fair or unfair, could be obtained. Here, for every mile there was perhaps an eighth as much; and because in Russia, as in Italy, an army must move upon its belly, and Napoleon had not been able to fully calculate for magazines

and transportation, he was fain to call a halt. Again, the troops were really exhausted, and this was a factor which the emperor now found that he must recognize. So far in his career he had been able to disregard even this. But in a country filled with fruitful farms, exhaustion is one thing; in a vast stretch of forest marshes and plains, where a sparse population earns a more than precarious livelihood, exhausted troops have little to encourage or maintain them. Pursuit of an ever-retiring enemy over such a country was out of the question. The aphorism that where the enemy has strength to flee, the victor has strength to follow, is generally true — not always. Here the enemy was in his own land and falling back on his magazines; the pursuer was in an eaten-out country, with victual distant and insufficient transportation behind him.

Napoleon never spared his troops, and his men forgave him because of his splendid triumphs, which especially appealed to the Latin nature, and because at times they could indulge in rampant indiscipline and enjoy, in the countries they overran and the cities they traversed, those brutal sweets of conquest so prized by the soldier of a hundred years ago, so unfortunately manifested in the recent Chinese war. But here, on the limitless steppes, there was no Lübeck delivered to their savage license as a reward for their marches and their courage. Roads so deep in mud that the artillery had not been able to get up to help the fight at Golymin; short chilly days with scant food; long cold nights with scant fuel; constant rain or snow; a country which was but a marsh and, poor at best, was now stripped clean by the retiring Russian army; — whatever harm a further French pursuit might have done the Russian army, tenfold that harm would fall upon Napoleon's own divisions. This advance was really still the Prussian pursuit following the battle of Jena; the soldiers

began to complain. "You must have a bee in your bonnet to lead us over such roads without bread!" they cried to the emperor as he rode by, says Savary; and Napoleon saw ahead no city to storm, no country full of fruits which might reward their labors. Vater Fritz's soldiers bartered rough jokes with their king; but these were never of the kind that

Light Horse Lancer.

showed just what the temper of the French divisions now plainly exhibited. Napoleon was wise. He decided upon winter quarters.

At the end of December, 1806, orders were issued from Golymin and Pultusk to go into cantonments. On January 7, 1807, from Warsaw, the detailed plan for winter quarters was given out. Bernadotte was sent to the Drewenz to protect the lower Vistula from Osterode to Elbing, with Mari-

enwerder as a depot. His position cut the Russians off from access to Danzig, and gave the French an additional large territory from which to victual. Ney was to hold the line Soldau-Mlava-Corshele to protect the approaches to Thorn, with his depot at that town. Soult was cantoned at Jechanov, Prasnysh and Makov, with depot at Plock. Augereau was in his rear on the Ukra at Novemjesto, with depot at Vyshogrod. Davout held the angle at the confluence of the Bug and Narew, with outposts as far forward as Ostrolenka, and reached to the left out to Pultusk and Golymin, with his depot at Pultusk. Lannes was at Praga, with depot at Warsaw, holding the territory between the Bug and Vistula, and reaching to Sjerock. The Guard and headquarters were in Warsaw, to which city Napoleon came on January 1, 1807. On January 8, from Warsaw, a decree was issued ordering the method of fortification at the several confluences of rivers, of Sjerock, Modlin, Pultusk, Praga, Thorn. On the work of these fortifications the army and the peasants were to be put, and they were to be duly armed so as to be ready by the first of March. In case the enemy should advance during the winter, the rendezvous were to be: for Bernadotte, Osterode; for Ney, Mlava; for Soult, Golymin; for Augereau, Novemjesto and Plonsk; for Davout, Pultusk; for Lannes, Sjerock. Praga was fortified as above stated, and strong bridge-heads were built on the Vistula at Modlin and on the Bug at Sjerock. Great magazines were erected at Thorn and Sjerock; for the ten thousand wounded, abundant hospital supplies were procured; and thirty thousand tents found in Prussia were issued. Nansouty's cavalry was on the left bank of the Vistula along the Bzura; Hautpoul's cavalry lay in front of Thorn between Gollud and Rypin; Klein near Plock along the Vistula; Lasalle in Soult's vicinity; Becker in Davout's; Espagne at Posen.

French success in Silesia was, in a way, a compensation for failure at Pultusk. The fine fortresses erected here by Frederick to hold the land were each in turn captured, and now became a barrier to Austrian aggression, should this supervene, as well as made a strong secondary base.

As the Russians had apparently gone into quarters near Lomza, the French army could also settle down for a much needed rest; and from Warsaw Napoleon undertook to provide for its victualing, reorganization and welfare, as well as to arrange the endless details of the government of Poland. Against the spring's campaign he proposed to have the ranks filled up, and to utilize for this the auxiliaries offered him by Poland, although what was called the "Polish Insurrection" was apt, like the same levy in Hungary, to produce a mob rather than the material for an army, — being a sort of feudal clustering of peasants around each nobleman. The difference at that day was marked between Old Prussia, which, said Napoleon, was as fine a country as existed, and Poland, where, as soon as you crossed the border, you left behind rich towns, smiling farms and contented people, for poverty-stricken hamlets, palaces surrounded by huts and misery; and yet the climate and the soil was the same — government and religion alone being responsible for the difference.

Polish Legionary.

The curtain thus fell on the first act of this memorable campaign, which should have taught Napoleon more about Russia and its people, about the czar and his soldiers, than it

really did. The Russians had retired from Napoleon's advance without the loss of a battle, and in quite as good, one might say better, order than the French, who claimed the field they had striven for. Hitherto, although Napoleon's Bulletins had been exaggerated enough, they had had some exceptional accomplishment for a basis. Now we notice in the emperor's correspondence and dispatches to Paris claims which the facts scarcely warrant, to the general effect that had the days not been so short, and had the roads not been so deep, and had victual not been so scant, scarce a man of the Russian army would have got away. Looking at the facts, these utterances are more in the nature of an apology than Napoleon had up to date been obliged to make. A few weeks before he had utilized these bad roads and short days to demand all the more of his corps commanders: "As the roads are bad, the enemy's artillery and baggage must fall into your hands," wrote Berthier to Murat December 26.

On December 29 Napoleon wrote to Cambacérès: "My Cousin, you will see from the Bulletins the brilliant successes we have gained over the Russian army. Without the rigor of the season we should have obtained greater ones, yet I think the campaign is finished. The enemy has put between us marshes and deserts. I am going to take my winter quarters." And to Fouché, "We have made the Russian army evacuate all the important positions it occupied, and we have taken its baggage and its artillery; but the bad season and the mud and the awful roads that we have here have decided me to make my army take winter quarters. It is worth while to let the rumor run that it will not be long before the emperor arrives in Paris. . . . My headquarters here is in a wretched garret." And to General Clarke: "Without bad roads not a man of these two armies would have escaped."

In the 51st Bulletin Napoleon says: "If General Buxhovden has made on his side a truthful narrative of the combat of Golymin, it becomes evident that the French army was beaten, and that by reason of this defeat it captured one hundred guns, sixteen hundred wagons, all the Russian hospitals, all the wounded, and the important positions of Sjerock,

Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and obliged the enemy to move back eighty leagues." This is at least well put.

The 54th Bulletin, of January 27, says: "Eighty-nine pieces taken from the Russians are ranked on the Palace Square of the Republic at Warsaw. They are those which have been taken from Generals Kamenski, Bennigsen and Buxhovden. . . . It is easy to understand the effect that the sight of so magnificent a trophy produces on the people, who are charmed to see humiliated the enemy who has so long outraged them."

This campaign differs from those previously conducted by Napoleon, all of which had ended in one great and successful battle; and the point at which the Pultusk campaign began to vary from the others was when the several corps were started on their concentric marches, instead of being assembled before reaching the battlefield. Napoleon is scarcely recognizable in this operation. At Jena he knew no more of the enemy's whereabouts than at Pultusk; but he kept his corps together, and was in a condition to deliver a heavy blow wherever he might find him. Here, on the contrary, he strove strategically to surround his foe before he could tell where the tactical blow could be delivered; he operated along several lines from Thorn to Warsaw on Pultusk or Golymin; his corps were not concentrated as they should have been, according to his own constant working maxim, on the hither side of the Ukra; and as a result, what he had often foretold in other cases happened in his own: his blow was partial and resultless. The enemy was not where he imagined him to be; one of his concentrically moving bodies struck at the air; another came up too late; and still another ran up against a superior force. Had the Russian commander been as able as Napoleon, this campaign might well have ended in an eccentric retreat by the French, as the previous campaign had with the Prussians, after the battle of Jena.

From Pultusk, after the battle, Bennigsen had retired

across the Narew along the road to Bjelstok, while Buxhoven had fallen back on the right bank towards Grodno. In the vicinity of Chutshin the two corps had reunited, under command of Bennigsen, who now took Kamenski's place. Lestocq retired to Angerburg.

Napoleon's vigorous and intelligent efforts to replace the French army on a sound footing were, as usual, successful; and at the reopening of operations, the several corps could be reckoned at: —

The Guard	15,000 men.
1st Corps, Bernadotte	18,000 "
3d Corps, Davout	20,000 "
4th Corps, Soult	28,000 "
5th Corps, Lannes	18,000 "
6th Corps, Ney	16,000 "
7th Corps, Augereau	16,000 "
Cavalry Corps, Murat	14,000 "
Artillery and Engineers	5,000 "

or a total of one hundred and fifty thousand men of all arms.

It was not, however, enough to have the army prepared; a knowledge of what the enemy was doing was even more important; and in order reasonably to obtain this information, Napoleon had detailed to remain with each of the cavalry parties which stood on all the roads leading beyond the line of outposts, two orderlies or aides, and with each of the outposts an adjutant-general and two aides, to keep up a constant report of any movements beyond the line. The fortifications insured sufficient time for his troops to rendezvous; and in orders he notified the several corps to let the men rest, and not to invite operations on the part of the enemy by undertaking any of their own.

Napoleon had occasionally to hold back Ney. On December 10 he wrote him: "If ever, as I do not believe, the Rus-

sians should march on you in force, do not get into an affair with unequal numbers. In this case rather recross the Vistula. Especially hold a circumspect conduct until I notify that the Narew is passed; then the enemy will be taken in flank, if he makes a serious movement upon you."

But Ney was, as always, restless; and when Lestocq opened up the straight road to Königsberg by his retirement on Angerburg, and perhaps with a view to increase the territory

Aide-de-Camp of General Staff.

from which he could victual, this marshal could not refrain from a thrust in that direction. Breaking up from Neidenburg in the early days of January with a considerable part of his corps, he marched via Wartenburg and Gutstadt on Bartenstein; but the enemy was alert, and to his surprise he here found his road barred by Lestocq with thirteen thousand men.

For several days the opposing corps indulged in skirmishing, with no marked result; when Ney, recognizing his error in making this demonstration, sent an aide to the emperor to report proceedings. But Napoleon had meanwhile heard of Ney's unwarranted advance, and from Warsaw, January 8, Berthier wrote him: "The emperor, Monsieur le Maréchal, needs in the *ensemble* of his plans neither advice nor schemes of campaign; no one knows his thoughts, and our duty is to obey." Then followed a sharp order for Ney to return to his position, and Jomini was sent to him to express the emperor's dissatisfaction. By the 23d of January Ney had slowly retired to his old quarters at Neidenburg.

In the Order of the Day, Warsaw, January 4, 1807, additional money was ordered paid to officers, because there were not abundant places in which to quarter themselves, the payments to begin January 1:—

To colonels	500	francs	a month.
To commandants of battalions and squadrons	200	"	"
To captains of companies	120	"	"
To lieutenants	100	"	"
To staff officers in lesser ratio			

And in an unpublished order of the same date marshals and generals were given an extraordinary gratuity:—

To each marshal of the empire . . .	10,000	francs	a month.
To the commandant of artillery . . .	5,000	"	"
To the commandant of engineers . . .	5,000	"	"
To each division commander . . .	3,000	"	"
To each brigade commander	1,500	"	"
To officers without commands in lesser ratio.			

And in an order dated January 5 additional mess money was granted to the Guard.

The 52d Bulletin, January 19, speaking of abundance of excellent victual and general comfort, says: "There is no sickness in the army. Still, for the conservation of the health

Apart from the unauthorized manœuvre of Ney, Bennigsen, now in command of the Russian army, had conceived the idea of an operation by which he might turn Ney's left flank and annihilate his corps, drive Bernadotte across the Vistula, and by then seizing Danzig and Graudenz, make himself better winter quarters in east Prussia, and be well located for opening the next campaign. He had been reinforced by two divisions from the Russian reserve, and Ney's movement towards Königsberg may have caused him anxiety on the score of this last relic of the Prussian monarchy, now Frederick William's sad refuge, which, indeed, in honor he was bound to defend. While Bennigsen's thrust was not in the proper strategical direction, yet, if followed up when once initiated, it might have resulted in a serious check to the French. In pursuance of his design, he had left General Essen on the Narew with his own and the two fresh divisions, had broken up with seven divisions, some sixty thousand men, by January 18 had reached Rhein, and five days later Bischofstein, whence he could also control Lestocq. He was headed by three light brigades under Bagration, and Lestocq, in order to coöperate with him, marched towards Preussisch-Holland. It was at this time that Ney's corps, after its unauthorized raid, had got back into position at Gilgenburg. The French were not quite ignorant of the proximity of the enemy, but they were not aware of the active intention of the Russian

Voltigeur and Carbineer of Light Infantry. (1807.)

force; and Bernadotte, hearing of Ney's retreat and of the Russian advance, speedily assembled part of his corps to defend the line from Osterode to Elbing. The French had an effective outpost system, but the enormous forests in this section hid Bennigsen's operation. Moving via Heilsberg, on January 24 his van crossed the Passarge, reached Liebstadt, and broke through the French lines. Next day he got to Mohrungen, and here his van encountered some of Bernadotte's troops, and was thrown back on Liebstadt; but the Russian van was quickly reinforced from the main corps, and in its turn pushed hard on Bernadotte's brigades, which fell back on Strasburg; and the Russians followed along through Osterode to Lobau. Here the Russian general, though meeting but moderate resistance, seemed curiously unwilling to go on with his original scheme, and though Bernadotte had yielded him ground, yet he pushed no farther, but retired and put his troops into cantonments between Gutstadt and Mohrungen. Had Bennigsen started earlier and promptly fallen on Ney's rear, instead of trying to cut him off by his head of column, as he did, he might have done this corps a grievous damage. As it was, he had accomplished little. Napoleon had not been inclined to consider either Ney's meeting with Lestocq, or Bernadotte's with Bennigsen, as an indication of a general Russian operation; and, as he wrote Soult, January 24, rather referred the enemy's activity to an attempt to meet Ney's recent advance, which Bennigsen may have feared was on a large scale. That Napoleon was anxious to let the troops rest may have weighed in leading him to this conclusion.

A new corps, the 10th, of twenty-two thousand men, was now organized, under Lefebvre, from the Polish militia, the Baden contingent and one French division; and this was destined to operate against Danzig and Colberg, while the

Hesse contingent blockaded Graudenz. It is evident that Napoleon was not satisfied that he was correct in his conclusion, for a day or two later he wrote Lefebvre that "the outlook was for offensive movements by the enemy;" and he gave him orders to be ready, not to march on Danzig, but to cover the Vistula and Thorn. This city appears to have grown in the emperor's estimation as of special strategical value. We have seen how careful Napoleon always was to provide for his retreat, should such become necessary; and while Warsaw would naturally strike one as the most available base for immediate operations, yet to Napoleon it appeared to be too liable to be turned by the north; and it was the fact that Thorn lay in the more direct line to the rear that made it particularly available as a strong place on which to depend. It is interesting to note that the situation here was much like that in the Austerlitz campaign. Then the French line of communications had run from Augsburg to Vienna straight in rear of the army, until the eccentric retreat of the Russians compelled Napoleon to move to the left up towards Brünn, away from a point covering this line; whereupon he at once looked forward to a retreat, if this should be forced on him, through Bohemia on Bavaria and the Danube, say at Ingolstadt, or to his secondary base at Braunau. Now the line ran from Berlin, or the Oder, to Warsaw, and for the operation near Pultusk and Golymin fully sufficed. But when the enemy appeared near Mohrungen, the case was different, as Napoleon had to transfer the bulk of his forces to the left; and in order to secure a more direct and shorter line of communications back from a front which should meet the Russian approach in this section, his mind reverted to Thorn as the most available place. He had, in fact, deemed it of much importance a month or more ago. And now its fortification on the most approved method was determined on.

The Russian actual advance was followed by the determination, natural to Napoleon's mind, to anticipate the enemy by an offensive of his own. He was loth to enter on a winter campaign, but, like Frederick, he knew of but one method of waging war: to keep the initiative in his own hand. It was for the moment cold, the Vistula and the other rivers were filled with heavy floating ice broken up by the late thaw, and this made the operation of throwing bridges almost impossible; the ground was covered with snow, and the men were far from being well shod; victualing was intermittent on account of insufficient transportation and bad roads. Yet here was a chance of cutting off the Russian army by its left, and Napoleon, not knowing how far Bennigsen proposed to go, embraced it. "The enemy seems to manœuvre to hold himself at Elbing, and to defend his communications with Danzig. In this situation, I will break up my quarters and make a countermarch. It would not be impossible that a corps of ten or fifteen thousand men might be thrown on Danzig and from there on Stettin," he wrote to Clarke, January 27, from Warsaw. Having guessed Bennigsen's intention, he proposed to move around his rear and push him into the angle between the Vistula and the sea. That Bernadotte had fallen back to Lobau and Neumarkt, indeed as far as Strasburg, worked in the right direction; while Soult, Ney, Davout, Murat, Bessières and the Guard were to move up in echelon parallel with the post-road from Warsaw to Königsberg. Bernadotte was sent word what Napoleon's plan would be, and that if he could seriously engage the enemy's attention, it would fit into the general scheme; if he could not hold himself, he was to fall back on Thorn and cover this town, aided by Lefebvre's 10th Corps which had been ordered thither. Meanwhile Murat and Soult were to assemble at Willenberg, Ney at Neidenburg, Augereau in second line at Mlava,

Davout at Pultusk, and Lannes at Brok on the Bug, — an operation which could be accomplished in three or four days. On January 28 Napoleon changed his orders to Davout and Augereau so as to have them assemble farther to the front, the latter at Neidenburg and the former at Myshinez, while Ney moved to Gilgenburg and Murat advanced to Ortelsburg. "It is essential," Napoleon wrote the latter, January 28, from Warsaw, "not to let any movement be noticed. You must flee from the Cossacks; you must do nothing which will make the enemy uneasy. Do not let a single man be captured, so as not to be anticipated by the loquacity of some soldiers." "Let all the movements be made with the least noise possible." The enemy was to be held in place three days more, and then, as Berthier wrote Bernadotte, "the emperor will be at the van in front of Willenberg before daylight February 1, and assume the offensive against the enemy with his united forces. . . . The intention of the emperor is to break through the enemy's centre, and to throw aside to right and left those parts which do not retreat in time."

In referring to the centre, it is probable that he meant that he would cut in between Bennigsen with the Russian right wing, and Buxhovden, who was, he believed, still on the Narew with the Russian left wing. Thus Napoleon marched against Bennigsen with four corps and the cavalry (Murat, Davout, Augereau, Ney, Soult), while Bernadotte remained near Thorn, and Lannes, along the Narew and Bug, was to hold the Vistula. There was a chance of another Jena.

During the succeeding two days Napoleon was kept busy attending to the thousand details required by the proposed manœuvre; and when, on January 30, he left Warsaw for Pultusk, and found Lannes sick and unable to lead his corps, he went on to Prasnysh and here turned the corps over to his aide, Savary. The special duty of the new commander was

to hold the Bug and Narew, with headquarters at Brok, and to secure the right of the army, during its offensive advance, from the attack of the Russian corps left by Bennigsen under Essen, eighteen thousand strong, now standing on the Bobr. Napoleon's orders to Savary were, that he was not to be led into an attack in hope of a tactical gain, unless sure of his ground ; that the important duty was to hold the line of the Narew from Sjerock up, and the Omulew.

Standing with Napoleon in Prasnysh, the manner and speed of this great captain's concentration out of winter quarters strikes one with renewed admiration. On the fourth day after issuing his orders he was to stand with one hundred thousand men ready for action, the first echelon along the line Myshinez-Willenberg-Gilgenburg, with a second in its rear along the Mlava-Prasnysh line, with eighteen thousand men to secure his right flank, and forty thousand men on his left flank to sustain the advance, or to protect the Vistula from Bromberg to Thorn, and hold the latter place. If Bennigsen continued his offensive operation towards Danzig with his seventy-six thousand men, he was sure to be turned and beaten. If he retired, he confessed defeat at the opening of the campaign, and French honor would be satisfied. Standing where he was, near Mohrungen, Napoleon could turn his left flank and seize his direct communications. Bennigsen was indeed in peril, for at this moment he was unaware of Napoleon's position.

This country, it will be remembered with interest, was that over which Gustavus Adolphus, in his early wars against the Poles, marched to and fro for so many campaigns, and developed the new idea of systematic war which was to crown him with the laurels of the Great Captain, and make him the Champion of the Reformation.

For the operation, which was to begin Feburary 1, Napoleon

issued his final orders January 31 from Willenberg, to which place headquarters had come. And on the same day he wrote Talleyrand: "I am on the march on all sides. It is probable that in a few days there will be events of great importance."

There now intervened one of those unfortunate accidents which will sometimes happen in war, and upset the ablest calculations. The order for Bernadotte, in which not only were prescribed this marshal's movements, to wit, to march around the Russian head of column and join Ney, but in which was likewise set down *in extenso* the why and wherefore of the manœuvres of his own and of the other corps, fell into the hands of the enemy, and did not reach Bernadotte. Napoleon was not then making use of the cipher which he afterwards adopted; the staff officer bearing the dispatch ran across some Cossacks, and had no time to destroy his papers before he was captured. Nor, by a less pardonable oversight, was he followed by a second courier to Bernadotte to confirm the orders; so that this marshal remained in complete ignorance of the general operations for several days. The Russian commander-in-chief was thus, on February 1, and without Napoleon's knowledge, put in full possession of the French plans. According to the programme, Bernadotte was to advance to Gilgenburg so as to join in the general advance, and received no orders to do so; Bennigsen was to be kept in ignorance of the French scheme until he was compromised, and was now fully apprised of his danger. As a consequence, Bernadotte did not move; Bennigsen, with his eyes open, made haste to get out of the trap prepared for him, ordered his army rapidly to assemble back on Jonkendorf (Jonkowo), and Napoleon, with his eyes half shut, began the operation, the objective being Allenstein, on what had been, but was not long to remain, Bennigsen's rear.

Ney advanced to Hohenstein, with Augereau in his rear at

Neidenburg, and next day both advanced towards Allenstein; Murat and Soult drove the Russian outposts from Passenheim, and next day reached Allenstein, whence a Russian detachment there posted retired to Gottkendorf; Davout was at Myshinez, and next day got to Ortelsburg. Bennigsen, meanwhile, had assembled the main part of the Russian army to the rear at Jonkendorf, and Napoleon moved headquarters to Passenheim, supposing Bennigsen to be on the retreat to Gutstadt. From here he wrote Talleyrand, February 3: "Up to this hour the enemy is pushed back. One can see that he looks with annoyance on our manœuvre, and would like to prevent it, which leads me to believe that he has started in wrong. The rumor in the country is that he is in retreat on all sides, in the effort to avoid the blow which threatens him. If you can get some news of the Russians through Galicia, send it to me. There is a fine cold spell of three or four degrees below freezing, and the weather is superb." To stand for battle seems to Napoleon too great a danger for Bennigsen to run: "Everything leads one to think that the enemy will try to assemble at Gutstadt; it is impossible to conceive that he will allow his left flank to be turned," he wrote Murat; though, as he also wrote Davout, "I think that we are not far from a battle. It is possible that the enemy, in order to rally, might fight to-day with the thirty thousand or forty thousand men he has at hand." We see from the emperor's correspondence that, as was natural enough, he was by no means correctly informed as to the situation of affairs, but constantly strove to be. He asks Murat: "Is the road from Allenstein to Osterode free? If Ney has not reached Hohenstein, you must march with much more prudence. For if the enemy . . . marched on Allenstein, we should be much disquieted. Let your foot then march quietly and in good order, and make reconnoissances on Mohrungen, Liebstadt and Osterode. . .

February 5: "The emperor thinks, mon prince, that the enemy's aim must be to reach Landsberg before us. It is also probable that he has gone between Liebstadt and Gutstadt. . . . The emperor hopes that you will gather news of the enemy at the village of Arnsdorf, which is a great place, situated at the crossing of the roads from Gutstadt to Landsberg. His Majesty would not be astonished if the enemy assembled there to-day." In this pursuit, the French corps on several occasions, as at Walthersdorf and Deppen, reached the Russian rearguard; but in each case they found that the enemy was able to hold himself with steadiness long enough to favor the retreat of the main body, and then to retire. Russian rearguards usually do their work thoroughly. To hold a position at any cost has to them a definite meaning.

Lestocq now found out how near he had come to being cut off, and on February 5 started from Mohrungen towards the Spanden crossing of the Passarge; and at the same time Murat and Ney followed up the Russians on Arnsdorf, Davout and Soult threatened the Russian left from Gutstadt, and Augereau followed on in reserve to Ney. But hearing of Lestocq's presence at Mohrungen, and guessing his probable march down the Passarge, Napoleon ordered Ney, with whose corps he was at the moment riding, to file off to the left towards Liebstadt, and if in season, to get in ahead of the Prussian column; but if Lestocq should fall back to the west, Ney was not to follow too far, "for," Berthier wrote him, "the emperor desires to have his whole army to fight the Russians if he succeeds in outflanking them." Ney speedily set out on his task, and meeting a flanking column which Lestocq had put out at Walthersdorf, he drove it back on Mohrungen; but, as might have been assumed, reached Liebstadt too late to cut off the main body of Lestocq, who had got well along toward the Passarge at Spanden. Murat and Soult

reached Freimarkt, with Friant, of Davout's corps, the rest being near Gutstadt, and Augereau at Lauterwalde. Headquarters was at Arnsdorf, and Napoleon supposed Bernadotte to be advancing in support, and to have perhaps reached Osterode; when, as a matter of fact, all communication had been cut off from Bernadotte, and he was still in the Thorn country.

Bennigsen on this day was at Drewenz, on the Heilsberg-Mehlsack road; but by a night march he reached Landsberg early February 6.

Though somewhat mistaken as to facts, Napoleon was well satisfied with the situation. From Arnsdorf, on February 6, he wrote Talleyrand: "Our affairs go on in the best way. A corps of twenty thousand men has been cut off. The Russian army flees without knowing where it goes, and in the greatest disorder. Artillery, baggage, magazines fall into our power." Whether such exaggeration is helpful to the leader is a question; but it came partly from habit, partly because Napoleon loved accomplishment and delighted to have others know what he had done; but it was mainly for its effect at home. The emperor was at this period in the very best of health, and therefore the more inclined to look upon things from a hopeful standpoint, as well as able to do all that was essential to make things go his way.

During the night of February 5–6 Napoleon gave out the orders for further pursuit. Ney was ordered to Wormditt in the effort to cut Lestocq fully off from the Russians; Davout to advance via Heilsberg, followed by Augereau; Murat and Soult to go by way of Freimarkt. Bernadotte, with whom communication had been opened, was to coöperate with Ney; but he had only just reached Osterode, and got in touch with the army. Lestocq cleverly kept ahead of Ney's pursuit. Bennigsen had left a rearguard in front of Hof and occupied

either side of Eylau. There were in and about the village on the evening of the 7th, Murat, Soult, Augereau and the Guard; Ney was at Orschen, Davout on the road from Bartenstein, a half day's march away. The emperor bivouacked on the hill at Ziegelhof behind Eylau, uncertain whether the Russians would stand for battle on the morrow or not.

The main Russian army, of one hundred and twenty-six battalions and one hundred and ninety-five squadrons, between seventy-five and eighty thousand men, had been drawn up on the 7th along the low plateau, a thousand paces north and east of Eylau, with the right in front of Schloditten and left leaning on Serpallen. Bennigsen had assembled the cavalry attached to the divisions in large bodies on the right and left, and in the centre in reserve. The five divisions of foot stood in two lines of battalions, alternately in line and in column in mass. This marshaling of the infantry was in partial imitation of the French system, the success of which Alexander had noted. The reserve was in two deep columns behind the centre, with twenty-eight squadrons under Gallitzin on its left. Tuchkov commanded the right, Tolstoi the left, Sacken the centre, Doctorov the reserve; but these commands were shifted during the battle. The division artillery stationed along the line is said to have numbered one hundred and fifty twelve-pounders and two hundred and fifty six-pounders or howitzers. These guns were collected in big batteries of forty or fifty each, and trained mainly on the Eylau debouches. To the reserve artillery were added the sixty pieces of the horse batteries.

Sacken.

The field of Eylau is well accentuated, with a few woods here and there; and between the hills run brooks which form

ponds in places. These ponds had been frozen over and then covered with snow, so that the troops, including the cavalry, manœuvred over them without knowing what was under their feet. The French position on the hills which run from Eylau to Rothenen dominated the Russian, except at the heights of Klein-Sausgarten.

The forces were not far from equal. Murat, Augereau, Soult and the Guard, one hundred and eighteen battalions and one hundred and forty-eight squadrons, numbered, counting losses during the past week, about sixty thousand men; and Davout, with eighteen thousand more, would be up by noon; while Napoleon hoped that Ney, with his fifteen thousand men, would succeed in throwing Lestocq aside and also get up in season to be of use. In artillery, as stated, the Russians were far superior; and, moreover, all their forces except Lestocq were on hand and ready for immediate action.

Yet Napoleon, though not superior in force, as he always preferred to be, believed that he would win the day. The Russians had been falling back for a week, a fact which would discourage almost any troops; and the emperor had as yet never seen the Russian soldier at his best, that is, in reverse. There is no stancher man in Europe. He fights no better when he wins than when he loses, so long as his officers keep their heads; and the Russian army was now under good commanders. In a desperate situation, he has, perhaps, on the Continent of Europe, no equal. You cannot get him on the run. He will rally on his colors as scarce another soldier.

At early daylight on February 8 Bennigsen, who had gradually been convinced that he must eventually be brought to battle, and who, for the honor of the Russian arms, had determined to stand here, — much to the gratification of his lieutenants, — began the engagement by a heavy cannonade of Eylau, which, as an opening to the battle, he hoped to

away from the Königsberg road, and into a position where they could be driven towards the sea and taken in the rear. The emperor hoped to delay the battle for a few hours by clever artillery work, so as to enable Davout to reach the field. This tactical plan was a corollary to the strategic manœuvre that he had been striving to carry out, which the capture of the courier to Bernadotte had interrupted, and from which Bennigsen had so constantly retired. Accordingly, when about 9 A. M., after the heavy cannonading, the Russians advanced on the French left in front of Eylau, Napoleon permitted this wing, without calling on it for desperate resistance, to fall back on the village. The day before Soult had lost heavily in the fighting at this point, and now again Legrand's division was to be sorely taxed to hold itself against the serious assaults of Tuchkov and Doctorov. These generals, after Soult had retired to the confines of Eylau, pressed in heartily, and serious fighting went on in the gardens and streets and houses of the little town, the Russians striving to recapture the town as a *point d'appui;* but Soult, though his brigades had been severely handled, stuck to his position with as much stubbornness as he had shown *élan* in taking it the night before. For hours the fighting went on in and around Eylau, without regard to the operations of the right French wing.

Meanwhile Napoleon ordered Augereau and St. Hilaire, with Eylau as pivot, to execute what was a half oblique, or, rather, a wheel to the left against the Russian left wing, or, as the tactics of the day expressed it, to march on the Russian left wing with the right shoulder in advance. For an hour or two a strong wind kept blowing the falling snow so as almost to hide the view. It was the kind of weather in which one would not care to deliver a pitched battle, because troops could not easily manœuvre. In fact, Augereau and St.

Hilaire soon lost touch, the latter edging to the right towards Serpallen. At the same time the Russians were advancing their left, sustained by the reserve, on the point where Augereau and St. Hilaire were moving forward, while a division was sent out to take the French in the right flank. The view was so limited that before they knew it, part of Augereau's force, moving too far to the left, found itself entangled between the Russian columns of foot and horse; so sudden, indeed, was the encounter that no time was left to form square; and the snow had wet so many of the muskets that the French fire, usually telling, was most unequal. The Russian reserve artillery was turned against Augereau; the Russian foot fell on it from one side and the Russian horse from the other; the hottest fighting the French had ever seen came on. "These Russians fight like bulls," Marbot quotes the soldiers as saying about Eylau. The division of Desjardins was half cut to pieces, and Heudelet's had no better fate. Desjardins was killed and Heudelet severely wounded; Augereau, also struck, was incapacitated for a period, and for an hour or more the 1st Corps was quite on the verge of annihilation. The French soldiers were learning the quality of their foe when conditions were equal. St. Hilaire had not been able to keep in line so as to sustain Augereau's right; and isolated as he was, the advance of the Russian cavalry surrounded him on all sides. Augereau and his divisions fought hard; no slur can be cast on their gallantry; but it was no more than a fight for existence. As Bennigsen had put in his reserve thus early, though the French did themselves every credit, being much outnumbered, they were mowed down by a murderous fire of musketry and guns, ridden down by the Russian heavy horse, and finally forced back with loss of full one half the corps. To disengage Augereau, Napoleon sent Murat and his cavalry in on the Russian left centre. In close

masses the gallant horsemen rode through the Russian lines until they reached the third, backed up against a wood. Here, with blown horses, they came to a stand, and the Russian divisions behind them — though sabred right and left, still undaunted and strong — closed in on their flanks and rear. Hautpoul, Dahlman and other generals were killed; scores of necessary officers were stricken to earth; the return was more fatal than the advance; and as they cut their way back, they were followed by the Russian reserve cavalry, and roughly handled.

Hautpoul.

During this severe encounter, enough to have won the average victory, one of the cavalry columns which had aided in the defeat of Augereau had passed through the edge of Eylau, and had charged towards the hill occupied by the emperor and his suite. The staff began to fear for Napoleon's safety; Berthier ordered up the saddle-horses; Bessières brought along the chasseurs of the Guard with the cry: "Save the Emperor!" But Napoleon was quite unmoved. His battle-trained and rapid eye saw that no body of cavalry could ride so fast and so far as to reach the height on which he stood; he merely ordered up a battalion of his foot Guards in his front, and exclaiming "What audacity!" stood his ground. And in fact, at the sight of a fresh line of foot, the Russian cavalry slowed up and then stopped, turned, and rode back, decimated by the Guard's heavy fire. As a counter-blow to this, Napoleon again sent in Murat with what remained of the cavalry of the right wing to fill the gap caused by the retreat of Augereau, and to enable the harassed French troops to rally. Both sides had already put in all the reserves at hand; but Davout and Ney were yet to

come up, while Bennigsen had only Lestocq to expect. The noble French fighting had prevented their being overwhelmed by the superior Russian forces of the forenoon.

Murat's counter was, after some wavering to and fro of the Russian and French bodies of horse, and mainly from mutual exhaustion, fairly successful. Each side had lost frightfully in the morning fighting, for Bennigsen had begun by forcing the work, in the hope that Napoleon's full numbers had not yet reached the field. The battle slowed down into another artillery duel.

While Napoleon's left and centre had been thus heavily engaged, St. Hilaire and part of the right-wing cavalry had been fighting against part of Sacken and Osterman, who, with the division named Kamenski in reserve, had been grouped around the village of Serpallen. Each side had had about equal success. Near Eylau, while the Russians and the French strove to reorganize their depleted forces, a long pause ensued, during which only the sullen booming of the guns was heard. No one could say when the fighting would be again begun by the Russians, and the emperor impatiently awaited Davout's arrival, for this alone could assure the victory, could perhaps avert disaster. But when by noon Davout's head of column came up at Mallwitten, and by one o'clock the body of the corps had followed, driving before it the brigades of Baggavut and Barclay, the Russians were shortly compelled to give up Serpallen and retire to Klein-Sausgarten. Against this new threat Bennigsen at once detached the Kamenski division, but this did not suffice; St. Hilaire had rallied and re-formed his division, and now fell in on Davout's left; Milhaud's cavalry joined them, and all advanced around the Russian left flank, forcing back Osterman, Baggavut, Barclay and whatever troops they met, until they had reached Kutschitten on the Russian rear, and fairly

themselves with glory. Russian honor was safe. The greatest captain of modern days had been checked, if not defeated.

It had been a day of bitter fighting. The losses had been enormous, greater than Napoleon had ever yet seen. On both sides the killed had reached nearly ten thousand men, and not far from thirty thousand wounded were perishing in the snow, or had dragged themselves into the neighboring barns and villages. The superior Russian artillery had greatly increased the losses of the French. Augereau's casualties had been so heavy that the corps, on February 21, was dissolved. Though he was wounded, Napoleon did not think Augereau should have left the field. "What a massacre and without any result!" exclaimed Ney. Could he have but come up sooner on the Russian right!

Foot Artilleryman. (1807.)

It was late when Napoleon returned to headquarters and ordered the troops to bivouac in the several positions they occupied at nightfall. He was by no means sure that the event of the day had not been in favor of the Russians. His remarks to those around him were of a nature far different from the exultation he usually indulged in after a battle. At three o'clock at night he wrote to the empress: "Mon amie, there was yesterday a great battle. Victory remained to me, but I lost many men." And to the man he always most frankly talked to, Duroc, later in the morning he wrote: "There was yesterday a great battle at Preussisch-Eylau. . . . The battlefield remained ours, but if on either side many men were lost, my distance makes my loss much the more sensible. . . . It will soon become necessary for headquarters to be collected in Thorn.

Let the Intendant General stop at Cüstrin and Posen the convoys of money which have not got beyond, for it is possible that, to have winter quarters safely sheltered from the Cossacks, and from this cloud of light troops, I may move to the left bank of the Vistula. It is also important that the Intendant should consider the means of subsistence at Bromberg and Thorn." And the emperor's first measures were all directed to this end, in cautious arrangements for the security of his army, of his line of communications, and of the new base he now determined to create.

This was not the attitude of a conqueror; but it shows us the emperor's other side — and his clean-cut ideas of what to do in case of defeat. This he would not accept until he had to do so. And when by daylight the entire retreat of the Russians was made plain, and there were left in front of the French only Cossack lines, Napoleon's tone changed at once to that of the victor. He could not fail to recognize that this was a Pyrrhic victory; but he began to indite dispatches more in the tone of those of yore. To Cambacérès, in the afternoon, he wrote that he had captured forty guns and twelve thousand prisoners; that the Russians had lost four thousand dead and ten thousand wounded, without exaggeration; and that he valued his own loss at fifteen hundred killed and four thousand wounded. "If the Bulletin has not arrived, have put in the *Moniteur* that a great battle was fought in Old Prussia, that the Russian army was put to complete rout, and forty guns, sixteen flags and ten or twelve thousand prisoners are the result of this action, . . . which is one of the most memorable of the war." On February 12 he wrote him: "All that is now learned of the details of the battle is that the loss of the enemy was triple our own, and our own was considerable, as you have seen." And to Talleyrand, "that the valuation of losses in the Bulletin was rather exaggerated than cut

down." This valuation was, "that our loss reaches exactly nineteen hundred killed and five thousand seven hundred wounded." Had not such fabrication abundant precedent in all wars, it would be lamentable.

From the 64th Bulletin we learn that "after the battle of Eylau the emperor passed, every day, several hours on the battlefield, — horrible spectacle, but rendered necessary by duty. It took much work to bury the dead. Forty-eight hours after the battle there were more than five hundred Russians wounded that they had not yet been able to carry away. We had them served with brandy and bread, and one by one transported to the ambulance. Let one imagine on a space of a league square nine or ten thousand corpses, four or five thousand dead horses, lines of Russian haversacks, broken guns and swords, the ground covered with cannon-balls, munition, twenty-four guns, beside which were seen the corpses of the drivers killed at the moment when they were making efforts to carry them off, — all of which was given more relief by the background of snow: this spectacle is made to inspire princes with the love of peace, and the horror of war."

Kettledrummer of Light Horse Band.

This Bulletin also claims the capture of the following guns since crossing the Vistula: at Pultusk and Golymin eighty-nine guns; at Bergfried four; at Allenstein five; at Deppen sixteen;

at Hof twelve; at Eylau twenty-four; at Braunsberg sixteen; at Ostrolenka nine; in all one hundred and seventy-five.

Napoleon, for the first time, was now reduced to apologize for a victory. *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse*, or at least exhibits weakness.

From Osterode, March 11, he wrote General Clarke in Berlin: "The report of Colonel Aubert made me laugh. One must conclude from it that this officer, finding himself in a fire much too lively, lost his head. . . . The battle of Eylau was won at four o'clock in the afternoon, when Marshal Davout heartily put in his troops. I was a little exposed to the cannonading, but that was necessary. It is possible that to a person who did not know what was happening, the affair seemed compromised, but I, who was awaiting my columns, I could only be annoyed by the half-hour of snow which fell. As to the fifteen thousand French who took to flight, that is a horrible calumny. A few stragglers and the train took to flight, because some one cried out that the Cossacks were charging. That made a flurry among eight or nine hundred led horses. The colonel saw in it the flight of fifteen thousand men. . . . If this colonel had been at Marengo, at Rivoli, and at twenty other battles I have delivered, he would understand that to go under fire and encourage his troops by his presence is not to believe everything lost. Moreover, this is a tissue of lies. This officer cannot have been there, for I was not afoot an instant of the battle." On March 6 Napoleon wrote to General Clarke: "During the battle of Eylau and at the rear of the line a panic terror was started, on the cry that the Cossacks were coming. The stragglers and camp-servants took to flight. They say that there are some who fled beyond Thorn and who are heading for the Oder. Give orders that they shall be arrested and sent to their corps depots. . . . Send patrols along the main roads on which they are fleeing, to make them ashamed and send them back to their divisions. They assure me, which I have much difficulty in believing, that there are among them some officers. If this is true, . . . try to catch a few so as to make a severe example of them." From the 59th Bulletin, of February 14, we learn that "the enemy has circulated the notice hereto annexed: 'On the 8th there was a bloody battle at Preussisch-Eylau. Twice the French were masters of the town, but in the end Prince Bagration arrived with a strong column which carried the town at the point of the bayonet. General Lestocq with his

corps attacked the enemy in flank, which decided the victory in favor of the Russians. The Russians lost twenty thousand men killed or wounded, among them eight generals and four hundred officers. The French must have lost thirty thousand men. Seven eagles have been taken and carried to Königsberg. The Russian headquarters has moved to Wittenberg.' Everything in this is false. The enemy attacked the town and was constantly repulsed. He acknowledges the loss of twenty thousand men killed or wounded; his loss is much greater. The capture of nine eagles is as false as the taking of the town."

A note entirely in the handwriting of the emperor, of date presumed to be February 12, shows his method of controlling the ideas of the French people. "It was found in the army that the Bulletin of the battle of Eylau had exaggerated our losses, and that it is less advantageous than it should have been to the army. The emperor said on this occasion 'that a father who loses his children sees no charm in victory. When the heart speaks, even glory has no more illusions.' "

But these quotations, however interesting as a study of the great man, anticipate the course of events.

In this battle, the bloodiest since Malplaquet, from 11 A. M., when Soult had been driven back into Eylau and Augereau almost annihilated, Napoleon deserves high praise for the good countenance he made until the arrival of Davout. In this campaign it is, however, not the battle, but the initiative so sharply pushed by the emperor which is most remarkable. For a brief moment Bennigsen seized the initative and pursued it. He then paused, and permitted Napoleon to take it from him. As Jomini says: "At the opening of a campaign one must well consider if one is to advance or not; but when the offensive has been set in motion, one should carry it through to the utmost limit possible." Bennigsen's excellent plan weakened at Mohrungen; Napoleon came up with his resistless vigor, and by his skillful manœuvres, his superiority in men, and yet more by his force of character, pushed Bennigsen back towards Königsberg.

Yet, on the day after this murderous struggle, the emperor

did not attempt to pursue, though the promise was great, as Bennigsen had retired into a *cul-de-sac*, where he could be easily cut off and forced to surrender. Had Napoleon not been appalled as well as depleted by his frightful losses, had he not been hindered by the lateness of the season, he would have pursued. A march to Tapiau would have been strategically decisive. And it was the very operation he would have undertaken. But Bernadotte and Lefebvre were distant, and only Ney had not been engaged, only he had not suffered exceptional losses. For once Napoleon, fairly exhausted, arrested his operation before its legitimate ending. This is a reproach to neither his ability nor his determination. Even his endurance had found a limit.

On the 10th Murat and Ney were sent along the Königsberg road, while the troops were made more comfortable in and around Eylau. On the 11th Murat crossed the Frisching to Wittenberg, and, getting in touch with Bennigsen's rear, followed him on to Königsberg. To sustain Murat, Ney, Bernadotte (who had now come up with his corps and Nansouty's cuirassiers) and Davout were advanced to the Frisching. But Napoleon's determination to go into winter quarters along the Passarge was not altered, and on February 16 the return was begun. It had been the Russians who had brought on the winter campaign, which Napoleon did not desire. He had but picked up the gauntlet they threw down. He was expecting reinforcements, guns, ammunition, supplies of all kinds; and he was wise to continue the campaign no further.

Nansouty.

"Thus the offensive expedition of the enemy," says the 58th Bulletin, "which had for aim to reach Thorn by turning the left of the Grand Army, has been fatal. Twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners, as many men *hors de combat*, eighteen flags, forty-five guns, which trophies are too dearly paid, no doubt, by the blood of so many brave men. . . . This expedition is terminated, the enemy beaten and thrown back one hundred leagues from the Vistula. The army is going back to its cantonments and its winter quarters." From the 65th Bulletin, of March 10, we learn that "the army is cantoned behind the Passarge: the Prince of Ponte Corvo at Holland and Braunsberg; Marshal Soult at Liebstadt and Mohrungen; Marshal Ney at Gutstadt; Marshal Davout at Allenstein, Hohenstein and Deppen; headquarters at Osterode; the Polish Observation Corps, commanded by General Zajonchek, at Neidenburg; the corps of Marshal Lefebvre before Danzig; the 5th Corps on the Omulew; a division of Bavarians, commanded by the Prince Royal of Bavaria, at Warsaw; the Corps of Prince Jerome in Silesia; the 8th Corps in observation in Swedish Pomerania."

The left of the winter quarters was thus covered by the Passarge, the Alle covered the centre, and the Omulew the right. The emperor's headquarters and the Guard were, after April 1, at the castle of Finckenstein. The cavalry was distributed among several corps. "No earnest action is to be undertaken," said the Instructions of February 20, 1807, "and from the moment when the enemy shows himself in mass, each marshal may of his own accord assemble his army corps on his reserve, in order to hold himself ready to march from there, at the first order, on any other point indicated."

Warsaw was vacated, as far as considering it part of the communications was concerned, and all administration and staff officers, and most of the material, were transferred to Thorn. Yet it was ordered, April 2, not to draw too much from the magazines in Warsaw, but always to keep at Pultusk, Sjerock and Willenberg ten to twenty days' supply of flour. And the emperor gave instructions to hold the confluences of the rivers between Warsaw and Pultusk with a

strong hand. The Guard was at first stationed at Osterode, and this, being somewhat in rear of the general line of the army, was to be the general rendezvous. The plateau was looked on as an excellent place for a battle, and here, in thirty-six hours, Napoleon figured that he could concentrate nearly one hundred thousand men. In many ways this advanced position entailed more difficulties than cantonments behind the Vistula; and Berthier, at the suggestion of several officers high in command, is said to have so represented to the emperor; but the latter, well aware of the value of a confident appearance, listened to no advice. But the question of feeding the troops was serious. Frequent reference is made to this difficulty in the Correspondence.

In a letter to Soult, March 18, answering a statement that he had insufficient rations, Napoleon says: "I must remark that your commissary has very little cleverness, having Marienwerder entirely in his disposition and drawing nothing from there. Yours is the army corps which has the best country, the most resources, and which lives the worst. As to salt, send two wagons to Elbing and you will have as much as you want. You may say to me, 'I have no wagons,' — but all the other corps have some." And on the same day he found fault with Soult's report on men under the colors, and, as he was wont to do, with a knowledge of his regiments which was curiously accurate, keenly picked flaws in the report.

"When did the 14th ever have an effective of nineteen hundred men? It had only thirteen hundred on opening the campaign. It has received some detachments since, but this regiment has lost much in all the battles. It cannot have had, since the first of September, less than six hundred killed, wounded so as to be unable to return, and prisoners. The 10th Light Infantry lost at Jena, lost by sickness, lost at Eylau; its effective cannot be to-day fourteen hundred men. The 36th, the 43d and the 55th would scarcely have the effective given if they had not lost any-

thing at Jena and Eylau. . . . The 18th is far from having the effective of two thousand men, and especially of having nine hundred men in the hospitals. . . . I look upon this report as one to be made over." This criticism well shows how the emperor kept his finger on the pulse of his army. He knew it through and through.

On the extreme right of the French line, Lannes' corps, under Savary, was attacked by the Russians, near Ostrolenka, about the time Napoleon was cantoning his men. Luckily Oudinot had received orders to sustain Savary if necessary, and came up in good season. After some sharp manœuvring and fighting, the affair turned in favor of the French. Though interesting, the movement is not here detailed. This corps was shortly reinforced by Wrede's division and given to Massena, February 24. Savary was needed beside Napoleon, and returned to his former duties. On March 8 Napoleon wrote Lannes: "When your health shall be perfectly reëstablished, you will return to me. You do not doubt the pleasure that I shall always have in seeing you, but especially on a day of battle. But, before all, get well again. Never doubt my friendship."

During the winter Napoleon was constantly busy at increasing his artillery, laying up munitions of war, and preparing for the campaign shortly to open. All the companies of cannoneers in France were ordered to the front and supplied with batteries from the Prussian arsenals, and some French guns were recast to equalize the calibres. Over fifty thousand fresh troops were coming up from the rear in successive waves.

Shortly after the battle of Eylau, and as a means of strengthening himself before hostilities again began, Napoleon made advances to the King of Prussia, sending to him "General Bertrand, my aide-de-camp, who has all my confidence. He will tell Your Majesty things which I hope will be agreeable.

I pray you believe that this moment is the finest of my life. I flatter myself that it will be the epoch of a durable friendship between us."

Bertrand was instructed to say that Napoleon would receive a plenipotentiary, and that peace would be signed, giving back to the king his states to the Elbe. But this meant rupture with Russia, "for neither England nor Russia could reëstablish the Prussian dominions, while Napoleon wished to reorganize the Prussian nation."

On February 26 Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia: "I desire to put a term to the misfortunes of your house, of your peoples, and to reorganize promptly the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediary power is necessary to the tranquillity of all Europe. I desire peace with Russia, and if this government has no project against Turkey, it seems to me that an understanding would be possible. Peace with England is not less necessary to all the peoples." He then says that he is desirous of having a Congress between France, England, Prussia, Russia and Turkey; but that this might last for years, whereas Prussia could not remain as she was. "I wish Your Majesty to hold for certain that I am in the disposition most favorable to reëstablish our ancient good-will." Nothing came of these approaches.

There can be no denial, despite his enormous losses, of Bennigsen's enterprise. In four days after Napoleon had withdrawn his troops from the Frisching, he broke up and followed the French corps, watched them go into the position assigned to each as winter quarters, and kept in touch with their outposts, his mass remaining near Preussisch-Eylau. Bennigsen believed that Napoleon would retire behind the Vistula, and he proposed to push Lestocq, who was now at Heilsberg, on to Elbing, and himself follow up the French retreat. Napoleon readily guessed the Russian commander's

purpose. Berthier wrote Ney, February 26: "There is no doubt that the enemy desires to see us retire across the Vistula, but it is also probable that he will not yet run the danger of a battle." Lestocq, in effect, advanced by way of Wormditt down river on Braunsberg, and the French vacated the latter place; but on February 26 Napoleon ordered Bernadotte to recapture it and throw Lestocq behind the Passarge. This was done, and the left wing was thus made secure.

Soldier of Imperial Guard of Honor.

The emperor remained of the opinion that Bennigsen's advance was not to be a general movement. "The enemy is not ready to do foolish things" (*pour faire des sottises*), he wrote Soult. But had the Russian leader really advanced via Gutstadt on Mohrungen, Napoleon had his plan ready to turn his right flank by a march on Mehlsack. He wanted Gutstadt held so as to cover the Passarge, and when Ney gave up the town on Bennigsen's approach in the night of February 26–27, the emperor ordered him to take it again. "We must hold ourselves in the situation where we are, because it is this that protects Danzig, that furnishes us victual from Elbing, and gives us a formidable position, because it will promptly lead to peace. Had Braunsberg been, for whatever reason, evacuated, my intention was to recapture it."

On February 29 Napoleon wrote Bernadotte, who was at Preussisch-Holland: "It seems that the enemy is making movements far around our right. . . . We live from Elbing, and the route of the army will pass through Marienburg, Dirschau and Stettin. Once established, the enemy will find his plan spoiled. My intention is to debouch from Braunsberg, where is General Dupont, if the enemy should extend too much on our right." He tells him that Marienburg must be well fortified; having provided for which the emperor then placed the other corps so as to sustain Ney, in case there should be a hearty opposition to his advance on Gutstadt. Ney took the town without much difficulty, March 3. In his orders for this operation Napoleon wrote to Soult: "I advise you to be full of the spirit of the thing, to lay aside all little rivalry, and to fall firmly on the flank of the enemy, if to-morrow a combat should be engaged between Queetz and Gutstadt." This struck the keynote of a grave difficulty in the Grand Army, — the jealousies between corps commanders, — to become later of more consequence. And he stated as a further purpose, "to capture the enemy's cannon, and to frighten him; to beat his foot and give him the counsel not to come again so near with his guns, but to be content to observe us with his cavalry." That he adds, "The undertaking must be looked at like a sortie from a fortress," shows clearly that he deemed his present position a defensive one. And this it really was, assumed for the purpose of taking Danzig. "There are marches, and countermarches, a little musketry, but nothing of importance," he wrote Talleyrand March 6. This was, in fact, the status.

The emperor's activity in these Vistula days was wonderful. Victualing he got rapidly regulated; reinforcements came forward with great speed, the emperor anticipating the law by calling out the eighty thousand levies of 1808; all but

the slightly wounded were sent to the rear; the divisions were made comfortable in their quarters. Everything in turn seemed to come within his abnormally active mind. Nothing was too small, nothing too vast, to escape his attention. Every word deserves to be pondered.

In a letter to Soult of February 28, he said: "I saw with annoyance in one of your reports of yesterday that a peasant had come from Elditten to Liebstadt. Shall we never know how to do our service? . . . Not even a hare should pass the line. The first one who passes, have him shot, innocent or culpable. This terror will be salutary. We do not know what the enemy does, and he should not know what we do." With reference to the contract system of transporting and furnishing supplies, Napoleon wrote, April 22, to Cambacérès: "I see with annoyance that the minister has replaced the Breidt Company with another company. These companies exist with no good sense. Why do we need companies? They are people who steal, that is all. What prevents Minister Dejean from organizing two or three thousand wagons, which, once here, would be useful to us!" Why, indeed, the emperor did not order this done, remains a mystery.

Napoleon used every means to control public opinion. On the 28th of February he wrote Fouché: "Circulate the following news, but in a manner not official. It is nevertheless true. Spread it first in the salons, afterwards have it published in the journals. The Russian army is disabled to that degree that there are regiments that are reduced to one hundred and fifty men. There are no more troops in Russia; all the good regiments are with the army near Königsberg. Even Essen's corps is composed only of recruits, as was seen at the combat of Ostrolenka, where it did not do itself honor. The Russian army demands peace. It accuses certain great lords of being bought by England and of selling Russian blood for English gold. The generals, after the battle of Eylau, sent General Bagration to St. Petersburg to represent that the army was almost destroyed, and could not sustain the coming campaign, and that there was no reason that they should wish to get up a new war against a nation more populous than Russia, which has more means of recruiting, and which has more resources in officers and able men."

From politics he turned to strategy, and referring to the position of Bernadotte, on March 6, he wrote: "Neither a river nor any line can be

defended without having offensive points. For when one has done nothing but defend one's self, he has run chances without obtaining anything; but when one can combine defense with an offensive movement, one makes the enemy run more chances than he can make the corps which is attacked run." Then the emperor tells him to perfect the bridge-heads at Spanden and Braunsberg, and to reconnoitre the country, "for a little earlier or a little later, if the enemy takes the offensive, I think it is there we shall fight. The enemy made many mistakes. If I had had bread, and the bad weather had not stopped me, I should have arrived at Königsberg before him, and I should have beaten him in detail." From strategy the emperor then turns to recruiting and equipment, and to General Dejean, March 15, in speaking of the remounting of the cavalry, he says: "You must order that for the chasseurs and the hussars smaller horses shall be taken, without which France cannot raise them." And to General Lacuée the same day: "We want big cuirassiers; but height is quite useless to hussars and to chasseurs; on the contrary, it is harmful; by reason of great height in the men one must have big horses, which doubles the expense, and does not give the same service. Present to the Council of State a project for a decree so that a man shall not enter the chasseurs and hussars if he stands more than five feet and one inch (five feet four inches, English). You must cut down the height of the horses by an inch. The horses of the hussars and the chasseurs are real dragoon horses. In this way we shall utilize the great number of little horses that we have in France. I think that for hussars and chasseurs we must have horses of four and five inches (meaning four or five inches above a certain standard, not easy to determine). Order the depots of dragoons to receive men without respect to height." And from army remounts Napoleon turns to the wounded veterans, and on March 22 writes Talleyrand: "I have the habit of giving to wounded soldiers one napoleon, and to officers five. Make a list of the wounded at the last combat of Ostrolenka who are in Warsaw, and when you have it, go to the hospitals yourself and make the distribution."

On March 23 he wrote Prince Eugene: "I recommend you especially not to leave troops in unhealthy places. The thoughtlessness of generals on this subject is incalculable. They would be capable of leaving troops for an entire year in the marshes of Mantua without moving them. If I have sick in Istria, it will be you I shall blame. If I have any in Italy, it will also be your fault. It is because I have always taken the greatest care in these details that my armies have not had sick in proportion to

others." And on April 10 he wrote Marshal Berthier about his brother, General Berthier, who, it appears, had visited his wife during confinement: "I hold it to be dishonorable for a general to leave his troops. As to the lying-in of women, I do not enter upon such details. My wife might have died at Munich or Strasburg, that would not have disarranged a quarter of an hour the execution of my projects or of my views."

From Danzig, which occupied much of his attention, Napoleon turned to Massena on the right. This corps, he wrote in a detailed Note on the Position of the Fifth Corps, May 17, from Finckenstein, had three objects: to cover Warsaw; to form the right of the army; to assume an offensive attitude to attract the army's attention. To select the best situation to carry out these objects, as the enemy could advance either along the Bug or along the Narew, needed care. To cover Warsaw, Sjerock was the best place; and the farther up the Narew Massena went, the less he protected it. To act the part of right wing of the army necessitated a position on the Omulew, say from Ostrolenka to Willenberg. To draw the enemy's attention, the Ostrolenka position was the best, because if the Russians advanced along the Narew to attack, this was a strong place; if they advanced along the Bug, they could from Ostrolenka be taken in flank and rear. Massena was accordingly advised to place one division at Willenberg and a second one near Ostrolenka, strongly intrenched. This Note, which is too long to quote, has much interest for the military student.

To Massena, March 13, Napoleon wrote with reference to holding Willenberg: "My intention is to march against the enemy in a couple of weeks. I can bring together by composed marches one hundred and forty thousand men and exterminate him." The intention was deferred, however, for several weeks. Despite the multiplicity of his duties, Napoleon always seemed to have time to attend to any matters of civil interest. On March 19 he wrote Cambacérès: "My

Cousin, they demand in Genoa that all marriage contracts shall be made in French. Take measures that people shall be at liberty to make them in Italian or in French. This is a matter of indifference, and it is very annoying for the people who do not know French to sign what they cannot understand." From Osterode, March 26, Napoleon sent a long note in form of instructions on the situation of the empire, and dispositions to be taken against aggressions on the part of England, showing all the men on the coasts, and what to do with them. These consisted of: —

National Guards,	12,000	men.
Marine troops,	28,000	"
Line troops,	40,700	"
Gendarmes,	3,000	"
Coast Guards,	12,000	"
Total,	95,700	men,

a force shown to be amply sufficient. At the end of March a table was made of how to utilize the conscription of 1808. Of the sixty thousand active men, twenty thousand were to go to the five Legions, fifteen thousand were to go into Italy, and twenty-five thousand to the Grand Army. Of the twenty thousand reserve conscripts, ten thousand were to go to the Legions, five thousand to Italy, five thousand to the Grand Army. This enabled drafts to be made on the older soldiers in France.

While Napoleon manufactured public opinion, yet he keenly desired it to be favorable. In a letter to Cambacérès, April 10, finding fault with some things done in Paris which retarded the conscription of 1808, he says: "The mere notion that I should meet in France with the least opposition would make several of the powers declare against me." He felt his status none too secure in the European economy.

During the fall and winter, affairs in Spain, suffering from the blockade of its ports by the English, had been giving serious trouble; and the siege of Constantinople by the English, though it resulted in their retreat, threatened to release the Russian troops which had been campaigning in Moldavia, so that these could then have appeared on the Bug. The position of Napoleon was far from established, as the last quotation shows plainly that he recognized; but aware that the first appearance of feebleness would be fatal to his standing, by the firm countenance he could so readily assume under the most trying conditions, he imposed on both Austria and Spain. The camp at Castle Finckenstein was a diplomatic arena, in which representatives of all the powers contended. But though Napoleon now would have much desired Prussia as a future ally, this monarchy and Russia could not be separated; and Frederick William and Alexander signed a treaty offensive and defensive at Bartenstein in April, in which England had a part. On the other hand, Napoleon, after Mortier had defeated its army, concluded a treaty with Sweden, which put an end to the English project of collecting, on Napoleon's rear at Stralsund, a force to consist of forty thousand Anglo-Hanoverians, twenty thousand Swedes, fifteen thousand Russians and all the Prussians who could be rallied. Such a movement might have been a serious threat.

Meanwhile the Elbe army was increased by the two divisions of Boudet and Molitor, and one Italian division from the Po, part of Louis' Dutch forces and the Spanish contingent, up to fifty thousand men; St. Cyr remained in Naples with Joseph Bonaparte, and Marmont continued his campaign in Montenegro. The capture of all Silesia, where Jerome's corps, really led by Vandamme, had in eight months taken six fortresses, one thousand five hundred guns and twenty thousand prisoners, and finally the capitulation of Danzig, added much to the French prestige.

This latter city was fully shut in March 12, and Napoleon proposed to take it before he undertook other operations. "I am waiting until the season grows better, until Danzig is taken, and until all my provisional regiments have arrived, to deliver a knock-down blow" (*coup de massue*), he wrote Kellermann, May 8, from Elbing. Danzig was defended by Kalkreuth, with over twelve thousand garrison. It needed a good deal of pushing on Napoleon's part to keep Lefebvre up to the mark; this marshal was apt to listen to too many outside suggestions, and the emperor strove to make him stick to one plan. On May 18 he wrote: "I have received your letter with the greatest surprise. I thought you had more character and opinions. Is it at the end of a siege that you should let intriguers persuade you to change the method of attack, and thus discourage the army and do wrong to your own judgment? . . . You are on the point of taking Hagelsberg. Chase from you with kicks in the rear all these little critics. Attack Hagelsberg. Master of Hagelsberg, you are master of the place. . . . and you will see with what rapidity the place will fall. But once again give your confidence to an engineer; give it to Chasseloup, who is the best and the most experienced in these matters. . . . Never doubt the esteem I bear you."

Finally, on May 26, Danzig, which had been handsomely defended, and which the Prussians and Russians had made one serious but futile attempt to relieve by sea, was given up, the defensive position came to an end, and the emperor set June 10 as the date of resuming offensive operations.

Napoleon's reaching out to the Orient was again shown in his efforts, in April, 1807, to draw Persia nearer to him. He sent thither his aide-de-camp, Gardanne, to strive to make an ally of that country, and to get the Shah to act with him against Russia and England. He offered to send arms if

they were needed. From Persia Gardanne was to study the road to India. His report ran in towards the end of 1807. He recommended the taking of Cyprus for a base of supplies; and gave as the best the route that led through Bir, Mardin,

Horse Artilleryman of the Guard.

Teheran, Herat, Cabul and Peshawur, adding that forty to fifty thousand French with an equal number of Persians might reach Delhi.

Among the thousands of the minor items which passed under the emperor's eye, a few more may be quoted. On May 27, from Finckenstein, he told Lecepède: "Write a letter to Corporal Bernaudat of the 13th of the line, so that he shall not drink again, and that he shall behave better. It seems that the cross was given him because he is a brave man. We must not, because he is a little fond of wine, take it away from him. Make him feel, nevertheless, that he is wrong to put himself in a state that besmirches the decoration he wears."

On June 4, to Champagny: "For twenty years there has been growing

in the north of Europe a disease called croup, which carries off many children. During a few years past it is spreading in France. We desire that you should institute a prize of twelve thousand francs, which will be given to the doctor who is the author of the best paper on this disease and the manner of treating it."

To Fouché, May 3, Napoleon wrote: "You tell me that you have advised Lacuée to diminish the height for the conscriptions. I do not understand this, for I receive men of four feet ten inches (five feet two, English), and we would even receive smaller ones. Thus height is not a reason for interfering with the conscription."

To Fouché, April 29, Napoleon wrote: "The Russians and the Prussians have the greatest need of weapons. They really need four hundred thousand muskets. . . . Write to Holland, and ascertain the situation at Liège and elsewhere, where muskets come from. Pay the utmost attention to this subject, which is the most important of all. However bad the muskets may be, none must be allowed to leave."

And again on May 24 he wrote Fouché: "Have made in the journals articles which show up the King of Prussia as having expelled from his side . . . statesmen who are really Prussians, and as being altogether led to-day by Hardenberg, who is entirely at the disposal of Russia. Make it felt that this monarch in his fallen condition is yet smaller by his conduct than by his misfortunes. That in the suite of the Emperor of Russia, to whom he is less than an aide-de-camp, he often hears harsh statements against his nation and his army. That in reality they pay no heed to his interest, nor to those of his peoples, whose distress does not seem to touch them."

Sword of the Period.

used partly for a garrison of Danzig, and partly to reinforce the others. The Elbe Corps of Observation, of thirty-two thousand effective, was placed under Brune.

The Russian army had been reinforced by a foot division, and also by a division of Guards under the Grand Duke Constantine, containing thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons.

Foot Artilleryman and Train Driver.

An army of reserve under Labanov was approaching the Niemen, and the Emperor Alexander had come on to Tilsit to watch operations. The Prussian Court had sought refuge in Memel. Including the forces on the Narew, the Russian first line was not far from one hundred and twenty thousand strong. Opposed to the French on the line of the Passarge, seventy-four thousand Russians under Bennigsen were posted in the Bartenstein-Heilsberg country ; the twenty thou-

sand Prussians under Lestocq stood about Heiligenbeil on the east side of the lower Passarge ; while Tolstoi, with fifteen thousand men, was facing Massena on the Narew and Omulew. Platov's Cossacks covered the entire Russian front, and were almost as annoying to the French as their congeners of Hungary had proved to Frederick sixty years before.

Königsberg had been supplied by sea with an immense amount of material, and made into a magazine of the first order ; but being geographically in a *cul-de-sac*, it was strategically weak as a base. Bennigsen, now in supreme command, and desirous of illustrating his position, had no idea of allowing the French the initiative. Though in each case he had ceded the battlefield, he had not felt that he had been defeated at either Pultusk or Eylau, and in excellent spirits he planned to advance in several columns on June 5 against Ney. He would have been wise to push the advance he undertook while the French were busied with Danzig, and could less well afford to be interrupted ; but better late than never, he thought, and indeed his date was five days prior to the one Napoleon had set for opening his own operations. To occupy Soult, Bennigsen detailed ten thousand men to take post at Elditten ; and to Lestocq was assigned the task of containing Bernadotte near Spanden.

The Russian right was at Wormditt, the centre at Arnsdorf and the left at Launau ; the line thus leaned on both the Passarge and the Alle ; and still another Russian body was detailed to turn Ney's right, between Gutstadt and Allenstein, by forcing the Alle at Bergfried. Ney's left wing was at the same time to be attacked by Bennigsen's left wing, and the Russian centre was to pass the river above Elditten to cut off his retreat. Had the Russians taken the pains to capture the road from Gutstadt to Deppen, Ney would have in reality been cut off.

To his surprise, then, early on the morning of June 5 Ney found himself assailed at Altkirch by heavy successive columns of the Russian army, and though he was as cool and rapid as the Russians were uncertain and deliberate, he found it wise to retire at once on Gutstadt. His report of this situation, received early in the afternoon, did not at first impress Napoleon as showing a general operation on Bennigsen's part. To Bernadotte, at 2 P. M., he wrote: "My Cousin, Marshal Ney sends me word that he was attacked to-day at six in the morning. Is it an affair like yours, or is it a serious attack?" To Davout at the same time: "Is it a serious attack, or is it only a skirmish? We must nevertheless be ready." And to Soult later on the same day: "What does all this mean? Everything leads us to think that the enemy is making a movement, though it would be absurd on his part to begin a general affair now that Danzig is taken." The other corps commanders were nevertheless apprised of the attack, and Murat was ordered to get into line his cavalry divisions, which had been spread over a good deal more country than was now advisable, and to station Lasalle and Latour-Maubourg at Elbing, with Espagne in the rear at Marienburg, Nansouty at Christburg, St. Sulpice at Bischofswerder, Milhaud at Soldau, and Grouchy in his rear at Strasburg. From Gutstadt, Ney had meanwhile been forced back on Ankendorf; but Bernadotte and Soult, also attacked with considerable vigor, held themselves behind their good works on the Passarge against repeated assaults by Lestocq's Prussians at Spanden, and against Doctorov at Lomitten. Bernadotte was wounded.

Bennigsen had really succeeded, much to his credit, in surprising the French, and Ney's later reports having convinced Napoleon that the attack was made in earnest, he ordered Lannes to break up at daylight June 6, and march forward to Christburg, with Mortier, who had reached Dirschau, in

support. A staff officer was sent to the front at Deppen to report on the situation. And at 5 P. M. the emperor wrote Lemarois: "We are in full movement. The enemy has commenced hostilities, all the cantonments are broken up, and soon important events will take place." The reports which came in during the night of June 5–6 had not been reassuring. Ney had manifestly been pushed back by superior forces; the centre of the cantonments had been ruptured; but the emperor sent Ney word to hold on to Ankendorf if possible; if not, to retire south of the Narien Lake, while Bernadotte was given Preussisch-Holland and Soult Mohrungen as rallying places. Davout was to hold the upper Passarge: "I count on the courage of your army corps, and on your firmness. But have plenty of guns and good positions, so as in every case to gain as much time as possible," wrote the emperor. Grouchy's and Milhaud's cavalry was to move forward to Osterode. The Guard started for Saalfeld. Napoleon had again reverted to his proper plan of concentrating at a place well in the rear of where battle-contact with the enemy would be apt to ensue. His failure at Pultusk had not been without its lesson. The general centre of this rally was thus Saalfeld, to which place he personally went; and it was on this town that the several corps were to retire or advance. By noon of June 6 all this had been provided for; but to decide how he should advance offensively, the emperor still awaited further news from the enemy; and another full day would in any case elapse before the French army would be ready.

This news came in soon enough. Bernadotte and Soult had been no further disturbed; but Ney had been forced back by Bennigsen on Deppen, where he had crossed the Passarge and held himself. The Russians had advanced against him in three masses, but the lakes which protected Ney's flanks forced them to make a wide circuit, and thus gave him

the chance to pass the river, though he was hard put to it before he accomplished the feat, and lost over six hundred men. On his arrival at Saalfeld Napoleon found that Ney still held this river; and though he clung to the idea that Bennigsen was aiming to turn the French right at Allenstein and cut the army from its line to the Posen country through Thorn, he thought the indications pointed to the fact that the Russian onset had weakened. But even should the enemy's aim

Cuirassier. (1807.)

be accomplished, Napoleon now had a satisfactory line of retreat on Danzig down the Vistula, from which he could not be cut off; and he determined to disregard this possible menace and, using as a pivot Davout, whom he had already ordered to assemble by forced marches at Osterode and move forward to the Passarge, to swing around, turn Bennigsen's right, and cut him off from Königsberg. He was

manœuvring with sixty-five thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, to about an equal force of the enemy.

In furtherance of this plan, while Bennigsen was at Heiligenthal, with van at the Passarge, and Lestocq at Mehlsack and Heiligenbeil, also reaching out towards this river, on the evening of June 6 the French army stood: Victor with Bernadotte's corps at Spanden and Dupont's division at Braunsberg, Soult at Liebstadt, Ney at Deppen, Davout practically all at Allenstein, Lannes and Mortier near Christburg, and the cavalry at the places above given. On June 7, from Saalfeld, Napoleon wrote Bernadotte: "I have learned with the greatest distress that you have been wounded. I desire that you should not lose a moment in getting to Danzig or Marienburg. It is possible that I may make a movement, and you know all the dangers attached to the rear of an army. . . . I have sent General Victor to temporarily command your corps. To speak frankly, I have a mediocre confidence in General Pachtod ; I have much in General Dupont, but the division he commands is so important that to change him would be too inconvenient. General Victor needs to do something to distinguish himself. Moreover, I hope that he will hold his command but a short time."

Not only had Napoleon rightly guessed that Bennigsen had been stopped in his advance by the bridge-heads of the Passarge, but he felt that he himself could dominate the situation ; and though his wheel around the Russian right really did open a chance for a Russian dash at Thorn, yet with Danzig safe he had no fear that Bennigsen would undertake this. In fact, Bennigsen, having already found that his plan to surround Ney with superior forces had failed, and that now that Napoleon had concentrated it was he himself who was outnumbered, had determined to act defensively, had selected Queetz as a proper first point on which to assemble,

bank, and into this chosen position. On the evening of the 9th of June several divisions were on the right bank behind a circular row of redoubts, and with some strong outposts thrown forward holding the wood between Gutstadt road and the river. On the left bank other divisions stood in several lines behind four strong redoubts. The cavalry prolonged the line to the right towards Grossendorf, and a van in the centre was thrown out to Bewernicken. Four bridges over the Alle kept up the connection between the wings thus separated. Here Bennigsen was confident he could beat the French, if he could tempt them to attack him, as, knowing Napoleon's proclivity to deliver battle, he had strong hope of doing. The French followed up the enemy along a number of roads on the left bank of the Alle.

Napoleon's general operation against the Russians was yet in the strategical phase, and as Bennigsen had given him abundant time to collect superior forces, it was evident that unless Austria made an unseasonable movement, necessitating heavy detachments, the chances were much in his favor. But, as always, he saw the wisdom of striking fast and hard, both for the effect on his opponent and that on the Emperor Francis. There was, as Jomini points out, a choice of two manœuvres. The first and better one was a movement by the right to take up a position facing northwesterly, with left towards Gutstadt and right towards Bartenstein, thus basing on either Thorn or Warsaw. This would not only oblige Bennigsen to vacate his intrenched position, but it would place Napoleon where he could reach the Pregel at Wehlau before the enemy, should the latter seek to retreat; and if he beat Bennigsen in battle, he would throw him back on the sea at Königsberg. This was, in a way, similar to the position of Naumburg when the Prussians were at Weimar. The second manœuvre was to advance straight on

Heilsberg, and to reach out with a heavy body towards Eylau to cut the enemy off from his communications with Königsberg, and thus compel him to yield up his intrenchment at Heilsberg. The first was the true strategical manœuvre. Napoleon chose the second because his left already pointed in that direction, and because he had observed that Bennigsen was nervous about his line to Königsberg, where lay most of his present supplies and material. Napoleon for the moment threw over his broad ideas of strategy for minor reasons, such as the question of victualing his army, or the fact that his position more readily led up to the operation by the left.

Napoleon was not blind to the fact that by pushing his turning manœuvre he was giving Bennigsen the chance of operating by his own left, and thereby cutting the French communications back to Prussia, and of shutting Napoleon up in the angle of the Pregel and the sea. But he had already gauged Bennigsen, and believed him incapable of so bold a strategic manœuvre. Moreover, Napoleon did not push beyond Landsberg until he ascertained that Bennigsen had really retired from Heilsberg; he had the superiority of numbers which permitted him to run a risk to which he might at any time put an end by a battle; and as a last resource in case of accidental mishap, he could have retreated to the lower Passarge by way of Mehlsack, and thence to Danzig, by sacrificing a strong rearguard. Napoleon's turning manœuvres always possessed the element of success, not only because they were strategically sound, but because they partook of his superior incisiveness over his opponents. As a matter of fact, Bennigsen did not assume the offensive, but retired, as the emperor had convinced himself he would do. Of this fashion of risks war is necessarily full. To gauge these at their exact value brings success; to misunderstand them, failure.

Neither had Napoleon, though aware of their existence,

any idea at that time of assaulting the Heilsberg works. Having adopted the plan of manœuvring by his left, he proposed first fully to cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg ; and then he would find suitable means of attacking him wherever they might meet. In pursuance, then, of his own ideas, which

Dragoon and Dragoon Sapper. (1807.)

nothing that was reported of the Russian movements gave him reason to change, he ordered Murat, followed by Soult and Lannes, forward on Heilsberg to occupy Bennigsen's attention, while Davout and Mortier were to complete the turning manœuvre, and he would retain Ney and the Guard in reserve. On the 10th, accordingly, during the forenoon, Murat in his advance ran across a weak Russian rearguard under Bagration at Launau on the left Alle bank, and driving it back through Bewernicken, kept on towards Langwiese; while Soult, following in his tracks, was for a while held back by the rapid fire of Bagration's artillery. Shortly Legrand's division moved towards the left along the Launau

wood to Lawden, whence he was to attack the Russians standing on the east of that village. St. Cyr, followed by St. Hilaire in second line, took possession of Bewernicken, and threw back the Russian detachment. Meanwhile Murat had got past Langwiese, expecting to deploy beyond the village, when he was charged on the left by Uwarov's Russian cavalry and checked, but only for a time. St. Cyr came up, and falling to with a will, pushed the Russians beyond the Lawden brook, but was unable to force them farther, until St. Hilaire relieved his tired troops; when the Russians, smartly attacked by the fresh division, fell back.

On the French left, Legrand was also charged by the Russian cavalry north of Lawden; but, strengthened by two regiments from Soult's corps, he was able to drive them back, and took possession of the wooded heights east of Lawden. The Russian cavalry and the rearguard all fell back. Thus, though the Russians kept on putting over men from the right bank to the left and pushing them out up river, they had to retire from the French onset; and as their plan was to fight a defensive battle, they elected, after a number of sharp exchanges, attended by heavy casualties, to withdraw towards Heilsberg. Although the duty of Murat and Soult was merely to contain Bennigsen, Napoleon, who had arrived on the field some time before noon, and had become familiar with the situation, instructed these marshals slowly to follow up the enemy, despite that there was no reserve at hand, that the enemy was manifestly luring the French towards a dangerous field for battle, and that before the dispositions were effected the day was far spent. In pursuance of these orders, about 6 P. M. Murat and Soult came in contact with the Russians, drawn up in their intrenched position. Though the enemy was sufficiently pinned to his intrenchments to satisfy every strategic requirement, the emperor was tempted

by his false position astride the river, and now saw fit to seriously attack, proposing to concentrate his efforts on the left of the Russian right wing, that is, of that part which was drawn up on the left bank astride the road to Wormditt, and by a vigorous onset cut the enemy in two. He was not in superior force, and it would have been wiser to confine himself to the duty which he had assigned his marshals, — that is, to arrest Bennigsen's operations until the turning column had completed its work. But, in presence of the enemy, he could not well resist his growing inclination to fight; Pultusk and Golymin seemed to have taught him no caution; perhaps, indeed, they spurred him on; and Murat and Soult were ordered in. While battle under proper conditions is to be commended as the most economical of means in both time and men, yet battle without a definite object can never be approved; and here no gain could well be made.

The Kamenski division came up to reinforce the Russians. Soult's first division had suffered severely, and St. Hilaire now moved towards the Russian intrenchments, with St. Cyr in support, and Legrand held the left at the Lawden wood, and from there moved forward with the rest. One of the outlying redoubts was taken, but Warneck's Russians recaptured it in a bloody hand-to-hand fight. In the advance, Legrand and St. Hilaire now became separated, and into this gap the Russian and Prussian cavalry forced itself; and, taken in flank, St. Hilaire fell back in some disorder beyond the Lawden brook. Here he contrived to hold himself, but was confined to protecting the left of the French cavalry until night. As might well have been predicted, not only had the French divisions been repulsed in their assault on the Russian works, but the Russian counter-sortie from their secure position on the French battalions, somewhat disordered by their failure, had thrown both Murat and Soult well back,

and with heavy losses. In reality, no good whatsoever had been accomplished.

By nine o'clock Lannes came up, and, although darkness was close at hand, and the venture was clearly unwarrantable, yet, inasmuch as the emperor felt unwilling to end the day with a lost engagement, he threw him also on the works, although Ney and the Guard were not near enough to be looked on as a reserve. Though having had none too much time to marshal his troops, somewhat leg-weary with their long march, ever-eager Lannes went in with a will in the descending twilight, sending Verdier and one regiment of Legrand's to attack the Russian redoubt. But the Prussian cavalry took the column in flank and drove it back. One French regiment, however, moved over to Grossendorf and threatened the road to Eylau and Königsberg. This was to an extent helpful; but, despite his brave men's stoutest onset, despite heroic work on the part of Lannes himself and all their leaders, the troops could make no lodgment in the Russian works; and after an hour's gallant struggle against sure defeat, they were hustled back with a yet more grievous list of casualties, — the total having reached over six thousand men out of some fifty thousand put into fighting contact. The Russian loss was yet greater. Several general officers were shot. The engagement did not stop until eleven, and, as Savary states, it was fortunate for the French that night did come on and stop the Russian gains. The three French corps had in effect contained the enemy, — as it had been aimed to do, — but at a heavy and quite unnecessary sacrifice. The emperor bivouacked on the heights northwest of Bewernicken, in ill mood at his failure, but hoping that Bennigsen would retire during the night and leave him the field, so that at least the victory might be claimed.

Fault has often been found with great soldiers for attack-

ing works. This criticism is sometimes sound, sometimes not. As has more than once been stated in these pages, Gustavus Adolphus was justified in attacking the Alte Veste, because there was nothing else left for him to do, if he was to win; and, indeed, he was on the very eve of success. Almost all of Frederick's assaults, foolhardy as they would have been in any other than this prototype of Bismarck's "blood and iron," were justified by the circumstances, and by success were placed beyond criticism. But here, there was nothing to excuse the battle, let alone the assault of strong works. All the French right wing had to do was strategically to contain the enemy until the left wing turned his flank. Unless Napoleon could crisply beat the Russians at Heilsberg, there was nothing to accomplish by assaulting their works that would not be accomplished by a simulated attack. Yet he did attack, with the inferior force he had, and came to grief; and defeat stamped the act as one of the early instances of Napoleon's growing belief that he could fail in nothing; perhaps, as an evidence that his judgment was beginning to be warped by blind belief in his destiny.

Carbineer. (1805.)

Nor indeed was the battle skillfully conducted. At the point of contact, the French could have been superior to the enemy. Over a third of the Russian army was on the right

bank of the river. Had the French, before attacking, waited to concentrate, or had they possessed the endurance of Frederick's wonderful foot, it would seem as if they might have made a lodgment in the Russian works. But the onset was first made by Soult alone, with Murat's cavalry in support, to be sure, but of no use in the assault; and later on by Lannes alone. These successive partial attacks were so unskillful, so contrary to the Napoleonic maxim, that we must continue to wonder, not that the battle was lost, but that it was fought at all. The 78th Bulletin, from Heilsberg, June 12, makes a species of apology for the battle, and tells the usual absurd story of thirty thousand men lost there and in the preceding week by the Russians, to less than three thousand of the French. It is stated therein that "the emperor passed the day of the 11th on the battlefield. He placed there the army corps and the divisions so as to give a decisive battle, to put an end to the war." "The lack of strength in the Russian army, shown by the capture of Danzig, has been yet more shown by the evacuation of the camp of Heilsberg. It is shown by its retreat. It will be shown in a yet more startling manner if the Russians await the French army. But with such big armies, which require twenty-four hours to put a corps in position, one can only have partial affairs when one of them is not disposed to bravely finish the struggle in a general battle." This is the weakest of the excuses Napoleon had felt so far obliged to make for any of his actions.

The other corps, during the battle, kept on with the general operation. Davout reached Altkirch, Ney and the Guard came up to Gutstadt, and Mortier to Heiligenthal.

Bennigsen felt that the position he had prepared had done his troops credit, and he was not yet ready to vacate it. As day dawned on June 11, Napoleon could see that these Russians were not to be so easily handled; and he wisely deter-

mined to go on with the turning manœuvre, while bringing in his corps to closer range, before he again attempted the task of capturing the Heilsberg works. The heavy losses of the 10th had made him pause; and he was learning what manner of man this Russian soldier was — as the Prussian king had learned by the loss of over a third of his army at Zorndorf and again at Kunersdorf. Ney and the Guard came in to Launau, Mortier to Altkirch, and Davout got around the Russian right to the Bartenstein road. This last advance made the Heilsberg position quite untenable, and Bennigsen at nightfall of the 11th withdrew his army to the Alle right bank, set fire to his bridges, and by a circuit evading Davout, headed in four columns on Bartenstein, which place he reached June 12, in the afternoon.

Sending, on the morning of the 12th, a body of horse to keep in touch with this retreat, Napoleon pushed on towards Preussisch-Eylau, to prevent the Russians from regaining the road to Königsberg; and Davout reached the February battlefield, while Murat, Soult and Lannes were echeloned along the same road, and Mortier and headquarters reached Heilsberg. Victor had lost a day for want of instructions promptly reaching him. Two couriers had been sent to him with orders to push Lestocq back through Mehlsack; one of these fell into the hands of Lestocq, who thereupon retired on Zinten; the other reached Victor, and this marshal followed along in the night of June 11–12 by way of Spanden. Napoleon now sent him orders to come in to Eylau and join the rest of the army. Meanwhile Bennigsen kept on, partly by night marches; but finding himself elbowed off the direct road to Königsberg, he advanced on Schippenbeil, where he drew up beyond the town; and later learning of the presence of the French troops at Domnau, he kept on towards Friedland, which his vanguard reached during the late part of

June 13, driving out some French hussars of Lannes' van. Lestocq had been more lucky; having reached Königsberg, he faced about and drew up near Gollau.

In the night of June 13–14 the rest of the Russian army in seven divisions reached Friedland, and took position on the Alle left bank in front of the town, with four bridges over the mill-brook, which cut their line in two. Twelve battalions and some cavalry remained on the right bank in reserve, and a number of batteries protected the standing bridge and the three bridges of boats.

Unable to keep in close touch with the Russian army, Napoleon, on reaching Eylau early June 13, in order to learn its whereabouts, sent Murat forward on Königsberg, along the road to which Soult had already preceded him, and ordered Davout to Wittenberg on the Königsberg road, and Lannes' foot in the right wing on Lampasch, and his cavalry on Domnau. Ney, Mortier and Victor were all instructed to come up to Eylau. Having substantially accomplished his turning manœuvre and cut the Russians off from Königsberg, all Napoleon could now do was to regain touch with Bennigsen, and keep his mass together, ready to be hurled on the enemy. Eylau was now his centre-point, and here during the afternoon of June 13, Napoleon, hearing of Bennigsen's column at Schippenbeil, ordered Lannes' foot to Domnau. Murat had struck Lestocq at Gollau, but with cavalry alone could undertake nothing serious; but Lannes towards evening reported Russian troops at Friedland. This Napoleon, however, did not believe to be the enemy's main column; and he ordered Lannes forward on the town, assigning him Grouchy's cavalry division as support; while Murat, Soult and Davout were instructed to push on to Königsberg as rapidly as possible and take the place.

On the evening of June 13, then, Murat was at Witten-

berg, with Davout behind him at the Frisching; Soult was at Kreuzburg; Ney at Schmoditten; Lannes marching on Friedland, with Mortier at Lampasch, breaking up to follow Lannes during the night; Victor and the Guard at Eylau.

Trumpeter of Empress Dragoons.

About 3 A. M., on June 14, Lannes' head of column, Oudinot's division, reached the vicinity of Friedland and took post astride the road at Posthenen along the mill-brook. Some of his cavalry had preceded the column, and for a brief moment held Friedland. Bennigsen, though his idea still was to retire on the Pregel at Wehlau, allowed himself to be tempted to throw his army on Lannes, whom he believed to be alone, so as to drive him back on Domnau, and at least to score the credit of a partial victory. This was enterprising, perhaps, but unwise, because, with the river behind him, he might be drawn into a general engagement if the French came up in force; and this he had every reason to avoid until Labanov could reach him with his large force from Tilsit. A partial victory is a useless waste of life. But Bennigsen yielded to the temptation, believing that the bulk of Napoleon's force was in the turning column.

Having made up his mind to attack, the Russian leader, preceded by Gallitzin's cavalry, himself crossed to Friedland,

and at an early hour on the 14th began to transfer troops from the right to the left bank of the Alle, and, passing through Friedland, to deploy them out beyond the town. Once begun, he found it difficult, as he might have foreseen, to do the work by halves; and by 9 A. M. he had got over a large part of the army, and posted the regiments from the Sortlack wood, on which the left flank leaned, out towards Heinrichsdorf, which lay in front of the right flank. Under cover of a battery posted north of the Domnau road, Lannes had also been busy deploying his oncoming troops in front of Posthenen, and had reached and taken Heinrichsdorf before Bennigsen got ready to seize the place as a *point d'appui* to his right. The Russians nevertheless attempted to recapture it.

Napoleon's idea of cutting Bennigsen off from Wehlau at the Allenburg crossing had induced him to detail Mortier to sustain Lannes; and just as Heinrichsdorf might have gone lost, Mortier's leading division, Dupas', came up, and readily checked the Russian right, which fell back to its position east of Heinrichsdorf and astride the Königsberg road. Bennigsen soon recognized that he had to do with more than Lannes, and not being as rapid as the French in preparing for action, little except intermittent exchanges along the line went on for some hours, each party waiting for its full force to arrive. Lannes' orders were to hold the Russians in place. He threw out skirmishers, and these opened the fight; but not being in force to hold himself against the Russians, he made some efforts to lead the enemy to believe him stronger. The Russians were in close order, Lannes in open order; he suffered less, and several attacks against either flank of Lannes were cleverly thrown back by the French skirmishers, who had learned how to meet heavier bodies of the enemy. The rest of Lannes' divisions now came up, and were followed not long after by Ney, Victor and the Guard, whom Napoleon, hearing

at Domnau from Lannes that Bennigsen was at Friedland in force, had sent on in rapid strides. By noon Napoleon reached the field, and owing to the Russian commander's slow method — he took five or six hours to do the deploying which able troops should accomplish in two, and meanwhile indulged only in a slight cannonade and a little skirmishing — had time to thoroughly look over the field and to prepare the position. It was the anniversary of Marengo, and to fight the Russians backed up against the Alle was too good a chance to miss. To be sure, half of Murat's cavalry and Davout and Soult were all distant on the turning manœuvre, and though Napoleon ordered part of the forces back now that they had accomplished their task, so as to have them at hand to retire on in case of disaster, they could not reach the battlefield in season. There were, however, left him some eighty thousand effective, to Bennigsen's sixty thousand men actually put into action, and this afforded him a good chance for a decisive victory. The problem was of quite a different kind from the one at Heilsberg.

Napoleon did not deem it wise to defer the battle. He saw that Bennigsen was in a peculiarly dangerous position. He had written to Murat that he might leave Soult to look after Königsberg and speed back to Friedland with Davout and the cavalry. "This is all the more urgent as it is possible that the affair will last over to-morrow. Try, then, to be here by one o'clock in the morning. If I find, at the inception of the action, that the enemy is in too much force, I might content myself with cannonading him, and await your arrival." Here again we see the scrupulously careful leader reckoning on his every man.

Friedland lies in a small elbow of the Alle, and at the bottom of the elbow the town and the approaches to it are squeezed in between the river and a long mill-pond or marshy

brook. In front of this awkward place, about as bad a backing as an army could have, Bennigsen, after his first line had fallen back, was drawing up his forces. The left wing of four divisions under Bagration leaned on a big curve in the Alle above Friedland, with its right on this mill-pond, being thus cut off from the right wing, except for some bridges. This right wing, of three divisions under Gortchakov and two thirds of the cavalry, was drawn up facing Heinrichsdorf and backing on the river. There were three temporary bridges thrown across the Alle, one above and two below the town, and one permanent bridge stood near by. Napoleon instantly saw that if the Russian left wing could be broken, while he lured the right wing forward and beyond Heinrichsdorf, the bridges could be seized and the right wing be thus compromised. It took but a moment to decide; and when by 3 P. M. his troops were all within close call, he gave his orders for action.

ORDERS.

In Bivouac back of Posthenen, June 14, 1807.

Marshal Ney will take the right from Posthenen towards Sortlack, and will lean on the present position of General Oudinot. Marshal Lannes will form the centre, which will begin on Marshal Ney's left, from Heinrichsdorf up to nearly opposite the village of Posthenen. Oudinot's grenadiers, which at the moment form the right of Marshal Lannes, are to edge insensibly to the left to attract to themselves the enemy's attention. Marshal Lannes will ploy in his divisions as much as possible, and by this ployment he will gain the facility of forming in two lines. Marshal Mortier will form the left, and will, while holding on to Heinrichsdorf and the Königsberg road, stretch out opposite the Russian right. Marshal Mortier will undertake no advance (*n'avancera jamais*), as the movement is to be made by our right, which will pivot on our left.

The cavalry of General Espagne and the dragoons of General Grouchy, joined to the cavalry of the left wing, are to manœuvre so as to inflict on the enemy the greatest possible damage, so soon as, pressed by the vigorous attack of our right wing, he feels the necessity of falling back in retreat.

had begun to withdraw troops to the farther side of the Alle, when he was sharply called on to turn and face the enemy, if he was not to be attacked in the rear. Ney with Marchand and Bisson advanced rapidly from the Sortlack-Posthenen line on the Russian left and towards Friedland, under cover of a battery of thirty pieces on the heights north of the road. But though uncertain of his ground, Bennigsen had prepared to give Ney a hearty reception; he had massed a number of guns near the town, and these were sustained by plenty of Russian troops and Russian pluck, though the concentric fire of the French guns tore huge gaps in their ranks. Ney, in the *élan* of his onset, swept back the first line, dashed in on the second, and for a moment it looked as if he would, by his first tremendous blow, crush the enemy's array. The Russians replied with a charge on his right flank by a heavy cavalry column; but this was met by Latour-Maubourg. Ney kept on, none the less; but as he advanced, his divisions were received with such a withering fire of canister and musketry that they slowed up, paused: at this instant the Russian Imperial Guard advanced for a counter-blow. Bisson's division was checked; Marchand's hesitated; the body began to waver, then stopped; the Russians pushed in firmly, and Ney's divisions, despite their best efforts, were thrown back whence they came. Though Bennigsen had recognized his error in placing his men in a pocket, yet he sent in division after division, and the Russians fought with noble ardor, while their commander strove to get together some of his reserve artillery on the right bank, and to place the guns so as to enfilade the French line.

Happily, Napoleon had provided for the possibility of a first failure by having Ney followed closely by Victor. As the 6th Corps fell back, Dupont's division, which had once belonged to Ney's corps and was anxious to rival the efforts of its

ancient comrades, marched up in firm alignment through Ney's retreating ranks, and as smartly drove back the Russian Guard as the latter had just thrust back the French. Close behind Dupont came Senarmont with the thirty-six guns of Victor's corps. These galloped up, and, coming in battery close to the Russian line, fired rapid volleys of grape and canister upon the masses huddled into the close ground between pond and river. Friedland caught fire, which added to the horror of the scene.

Bennigsen showed wonderful countenance; he put in brigade after brigade, only to be mowed down by the French fire. Marchand rallied. Bisson followed. The French divisions would not now retire; in a front of five hundred yards, sixty thousand men were fighting with desperate fury: the French to win Friedland, the Russians to save themselves from being driven into the Alle. Bennigsen, foreseeing defeat, and in the effort to save his artillery, withdrew it as rapidly as it could cross the bridges, leaving the foot and some cavalry to cover the retreat. He gradually placed one hundred and twenty pieces of the reserve artillery above the loop in the river to protect this force, and the guns were well served; but the French fire had all but broken up the Russian formation. The whole of Ney's corps had now rallied, and joined again in the onward push; and Dupont crossed the mill-stream and forced his way towards Friedland along the Königsberg road. To save his right wing, Bennigsen now strove to recross some battalions to the left bank, but it was of no avail, and by 8 P. M. Friedland was fully in possession of the French. Bennigsen retired the last battalions of his left wing, set fire to the town where not already aflame, and burned the bridges.

Meanwhile Lannes and Mortier, commanding the centre and left, had contented themselves with fending off the attacks

of the Russian right and centre; and they even allowed Gortchakov some easy successes to keep the pressure from the French right, and to let him believe he could regain the road to Königsberg; but when, notified by the flames of Friedland and by the fleeing soldiery of the disaster to the Russian left, Gortchakov strove to regain the town, a horrible butchery ensued among the Russian and French troops shut up in its narrow lanes. The bridges near Friedland had disappeared; Ney and Victor met the head of Gortchakov's retiring regiments, while Lannes and Mortier fell upon their rear. But no white flag was shown by the Russians. The best French brigades had all they could do. Oudinot exclaimed, "Quick, Sire, my grenadiers can hold no longer; but give me reinforcements, and I will drive the Russians into the river!" The enemy strove to find the lower bridge, but Lannes had broken it down by his artillery fire and set it aflame. Thousands of brave men threw themselves into the Alle opposite Kloschenen, to wade or swim to the farther side. No quarter was given or asked; and the large body of Russian troops thus cut off, abandoned, as it were, by their leader, was wholly cut to pieces. Night fell, and Bennigsen, much broken, retired on Wehlau, pursued by such French cavalry as could be got across the river. The Russian army had lost at least twenty thousand men *hors de combat*. The 81st Bulletin tells us that after a charge of cuirassiers, Murat passed in front of them. "Prince," said the colonel, with his sabre dripping blood, "pass in review my regiment, and you will not find a soldier whose sword is not like mine." The French bivouacked on the battlefield. They had done themselves abundant credit by squarely defeating such worthy opponents as the Russians. But it was Napoleon's skill that had won the battle, as it was Bennigsen's errors which had lost it.

While the battle was going on, Murat, Soult and Davout

had pushed Lestocq and the Kamenski division back into the works of Königsberg, and surrounded the town on the left bank of the Pregel. The orders to return had not yet reached them, and were soon countermanded. When the Prussian general learned of Bennigsen's defeat, he vacated the town, June 16, and Soult took possession of it. Three days later the entire French army stood on the Niemen.

The battle of Friedland had been a series of Russian errors. Bennigsen should have attacked Lannes at once while he outnumbered him. He should have pivoted on his left and thrown out his right to Heinrichsdorf, which, if he could hold it, would at least secure his retreat to Wehlau along the left bank. No good soldier can fight in the bottom of a bag such as this was. And yet Bennigsen lacked neither enterprise nor ability. He was a plucky, old-fashioned soldier, here dominated by a greater man.

The day after the battle of Friedland Napoleon wrote Josephine: "My children have worthily celebrated the anniversary of the battle of Marengo. The battle of Friedland will be as celebrated, as glorious, for my people. The whole Russian army is routed, eighty guns taken, thirty thousand men captured or killed, twenty-five Russian generals killed, wounded or taken, the Russian Guard crushed : it is a worthy sister of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena."

From the 79th Bulletin we learn that "the battlefield is one of the most horrible one could see. It is not to exaggerate to carry the number of dead on the side of the Russians to fifteen or eighteen thousand men. On the side of the French the loss does not run to five hundred killed, nor to more than three thousand wounded." On June 19 Napoleon wrote Cambacérès : "The Russian army is more crushed and beaten than ever was the Austrian army. Bennigsen, who commands it, has shown small talent. Their soldiers in general are good. Their weakness and their discouragement are to-day of the highest degree. My army is superb, and has not suffered."

The French losses are given by some authorities as twelve thousand men.

Bennigsen crossed the Pregle at Wehlau, June 15, and marched on Tilsit on the Niemen. Murat pursued him along the left Alle bank, passed the Pregel at Tapiau, and hung on the Russian rear. Having left Königsberg, Lestocq joined the Russian army, and both crossed the Niemen on the 18th. In Königsberg Soult found an immensity of stores, and one hundred thousand muskets from England, destined to re-arm the Prussian soldiers. The Grand Army marched down to Wehlau, crossed the Pregel the 16th and 17th, and by the 18th stood beyond Gross Skaisgirren, determined "to march on Tilsit and to deliver battle to the enemy, if he indulged in the boast of putting on the appearance of awaiting us," as the emperor wrote Murat; but should the enemy, without concluding peace, retire to the interior, he would, he said, rest his army along the Niemen and await their return. On the 17th of June orders were issued for intrenched cantonments along the Niemen. Murat reached Tilsit June 19. Napoleon personally came up the same day; and when Bennigsen asked for a truce, Napoleon wisely granted it. To Clarke, June 20, he wrote: "The battle of Friedland appears to have put an end to the war. The Russians, driven beyond the Niemen, demand an armistice and peace."

For the victory of Friedland the emperor thanked his divisions.

TO THE GRAND ARMY.

IMPERIAL CAMP AT TILSIT, June 22, 1807.

Soldiers! On the 5th of June we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army. The enemy mistook the causes of our inactivity. He found out too late that our repose was that of the lion. He repents having broken in upon it. . . . From the borders of the Vistula we have arrived at those of the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of my crowning, you have this day worthily celebrated that of the battle of Marengo, which put an end to the war of the Second Coalition.

Frenchmen! You have been worthy of yourselves and of me. You will reënter France covered with your laurels, and having obtained a glorious peace which carries with it the guaranty of its duration. It is time to finish with this, so that our country may live in repose, sheltered from the malign influence of England. My rewards will prove to you my gratitude and all the breadth of the love I bear you.

Alexander came on from Memel to his beaten army. He had not been heartily supported by England; Austria had been slow in taking his part; though victorious in Turkey, he had a double war on his hands; alone, of all Europe, he was holding head against the French. What was he gaining?

The two emperors first met on a raft in the Niemen.

The 86th Bulletin, dated Tilsit, June 25, 1807, describes the meeting: "The 25th of June, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the emperor, accompanied by the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Neufchâtel, Marshal Bessières, the Grand Marshal of the Palace Duroc, and the Grand Master of the Horse Caulaincourt, embarked from the shore of the Niemen on a boat prepared for this purpose. He went to the middle of the river, where General La Riboisière, commanding the artillery of the Guard, had placed a big raft and erected a pavilion. Alongside was another raft and a pavilion for the suite of Their Majesties. At the same moment the Emperor Alexander left the right bank on a boat with the Grand Duke Constantine, General Bennigsen, General Ouvarov, Prince Labanov, and his first aide-de-camp, Count Lieven.

"The two boats arrived at the same moment. The two emperors embraced each other as they stepped upon the raft. They entered together the room which had been prepared, and remained there two hours. The conference finished, the individuals of the suites of the two emperors were introduced. The Emperor Alexander said some agreeable things to the military men who accompanied the emperor. The latter, on his side, held a long conversation with the Grand Duke Constantine and General Bennigsen.

"The conference finished, the two emperors each entered his boat. It is conjectured that the conference had a most satisfactory result. Immediately afterwards Prince Labanov visited the French headquarters. It was agreed that half of the town of Tilsit should be made neutral. The

lodging of the Emperor of Russia and his court was marked there. The Imperial Russian Guard will pass the river, and will be cantoned in the portion of the town which is destined for it.

"The great number of people who from one and the other army assembled on one or the other bank to be witnesses of this scene made a spectacle so much the more interesting, because of the fact that these spectators were brave men from the extremities of the world."

What transpired at the interview no one knows. The numberless stories about it are pure fabrications. It is said that Alexander remarked that he had no less cause for dissatisfaction with England than had France. "Then peace is made!" replied Napoleon, who was glad to see an end to a situation far more troublesome than he was willing to acknowledge. In his further commerce with Alexander, Napoleon conceived a high regard for his mind and character; but until after 1812, he believed that the czar hid a trait of feebleness, a conception he too late discovered to be far from true. After the interview on the raft Alexander said that he had never been so prejudiced against any man as against Napoleon, but that after three quarters of an hour of conversation his prejudice disappeared like a dream, and he wished he could have met him sooner, for he would have escaped falling into many errors. He was not the first to feel the power of Napoleon's persuasiveness. One idea of Napoleon's which may have had its weight with the czar took the form of a veiled suggestion that they might join in a partition of Turkey. Was this a renewal of his Oriental dreams?

Peace was signed July 7, at Tilsit. Next day Napoleon wrote Prince Eugene: "My son, peace was signed yesterday and ratified to-day. We leave each other to-day, the Emperor Alexander and I, after having passed twenty days together here. We exchanged with each other marks of the greatest friendship. At the last interview he appeared with

the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor, and I with the Grand Order of St. Andrew."

On July 11, from Königsberg, Berthier was ordered to stop all the engineering works everywhere throughout the army; and next day the movements of a large part of the army and its other disposition were indicated. The Guard was sent back to Berlin. Napoleon's staff remained with Berthier in Königsberg, until he should be ordered back to Paris. Warsaw was left under Davout. Soult was given command of Old Prussia to the Oder. The reserve cavalry was ordered to the vicinity of Berlin for easier foraging. Mortier was left in command of Silesia, Brune in Pomerania, Bernadotte personally in the Hanseatic towns, and his corps under Victor in the Spandau region. Murat was given leave; Massena, Lannes and Ney were ordered to Paris.

In the Peace of Tilsit, Prussia was the victim. She had not only supported Napoleon's army of two hundred thousand men since the war opened; but she had paid four hundred million francs in contributions to the French treasury. She now was to retain Silesia, and Old Prussia between the Elbe and Niemen, Bialystok to go to Russia. Westphalia, a kingdom made up for Jerome Bonaparte from the Prussian provinces on the left bank of the Elbe to Magdeburg, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick, and later Hanover, were added to the Confederation of the Rhine. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw was created out of what Prussia had seized in Poland, and was given to Saxony, which also joined the Confederation. Napoleon became the protector of the Confederation, the frontier of which the new Grand Duchy carried to the Russian border. Danzig was to be a free city with a French garrison. Some German princes were restored to their holdings. The czar recognized Napoleon's changes in Naples, Holland and Germany, and the new kingdom of Westphalia. Napoleon con-

tween any ports obeying the Continental System, under pain of confiscation. As a rejoinder Napoleon issued in Warsaw, January 27, a decree seizing all merchandise of England and her colonies in all the Hanse towns. And as what one might term a surrejoinder, England, on March 11, again enforced the blockade of the north German coast. And so it went on. Napoleon's view was that "the sea must be held in subjection by the land." England, on the other hand, believed in the influence of the sea power.

At Tilsit Napoleon admired the steadiness and fine appearance of the Russian Guard. "If to their discipline and extraordinary firmness could be added the electric enthusiasm of the Frenchman, it would be the first in the world," he said. And to a military connoisseur he remarked: "My soldiers are as brave as it is possible to be; but they reason too much. If they had the unruffled firmness and the docility of the Russians, the world would not be big enough for me. The French soldiers love their country too much to make Macedonians of them."

On June 30 at Tilsit a decree gave to various marshals and generals of the Grand Army titles to properties in Poland: —

To Davout, an estate in Warsaw, valued at 5,000,000 francs.
" Lannes, in Kalish, one " " 2,600,000 "
" Berthier, in Bromberg, one " " 1,600,000 "
" Soult, in Posen, " " " 1,400,000 "
" Verdier, in Posen, " " " 1,000,000 "
" Bertrand, in Warsaw, " " " 1,000,000 "

And to others, including Grouchy, Mouton, Marchand, Friant, Legrand, Ney, Belliard, Massena, Nansouty, Bernadotte, St. Hilaire, Savary, Walther, Songis, Suchet, Oudinot, Reboisière, Mortier, Dupont and Chasseloup, estates varying from two hundred thousand francs to a million in value.

From Königsberg, July 13, a decree was issued by which silver eagles

of the Legion of Honor were distributed to the army, to the number of three thousand four hundred and seventy, about half to go to the officers, and half to the enlisted men.

From Tilsit, to Josephine, July 3, Napoleon wrote: "Mon amie, Monsieur de Turenne will give you all the details of what passes here. Everything goes very well. I believe I told you that the Emperor of Russia drinks your health with much amiability. He dines, as does the King of Prussia, every day with me."

On the same day he wrote Cambacérès: "The best harmony continues to reign between the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia and myself." Yet Napoleon's bearing towards Frederick William was haughty and reproachful. He advised him to dismiss Hardenberg, — indeed, the emperor later refused to treat through this minister. Most conferences were held without the presence of Frederick William.

Hardenberg.

And to Fouché Napoleon wrote: "Watch that there shall be no more slighting references directly or indirectly made about Russia. Everything leads one to suppose that our system is about to be bound to that power in a suitable manner."

In Tilsit Napoleon seems to have changed his ideas with regard to the Queen of Prussia. He wrote Josephine, July 7: "Mon amie, the Queen of Prussia dined yesterday with me. I had to defend myself against her wish to make me give some further concessions to her husband, but I was gallant, and yet held to my policy. She is very amiable. I will go and give you details which it would be impossible to tell you without writing at too great length." The queen, it seems, had pleaded hard for Magdeburg. In reply Napoleon talked

about fashions. At the conclusion of dinner, Napoleon offered her a rose. "May I consider this as a gift of Magdeburg!" said the queen. Much diversity of opinion existed among the Prussian ladies as to Napoleon's looks. The queen's lady-in-waiting, Gräfin von Voss, spoke of him as extremely ugly, with a fat swollen face, and dumpy; with big eyes which rolled gloomily in his head, severe expression, and with no good feature except his mouth and teeth. The queen said he had a head like Cæsar's.

Next day the emperor wrote: "The Queen of Prussia is really charming. She is full of coquetry for me, but do not be in the least jealous. I am an oiled cloth, off which all that only slides. It would cost me too much to play the gallant."

Although the battle of Friedland occurred at a time and place unexpected by the emperor, yet it has all the features of a deliberately planned battle, rather than those of the battle of accident. It resembles Austerlitz, rather than Jena. In a strategical sense, the campaign is of remarkable interest. It is Jomini who first criticised Napoleon's operation by the left rather than by the right. Had the emperor manœuvred around the Russians' left flank, driven them back on the coast or on Königsberg, his succeeding battle, if won, would have ended the war, whereas his actual manœuvre permitted the escape of the enemy. What, then, were his reasons? As already pointed out, victual was one. He had found it far from easy to feed his troops, though he could now rely on the rich Danzig region, and its port. Bennigsen desired to hold on to Königsberg, and it is an excellent rule to do what the enemy does not want you to do, as well as never to do that which he wants you to do. The army was already partially headed in this direction, and time was of the essence. These were all good and valid reasons. But Napoleon had never given

the minor reasons much weight in his campaigns. He had drawn up the great general plan, according to the rules he had learned from study of his predecessors and had himself perfected; and he had then made lesser difficulties subject to the matured plan, which was always to compromise the enemy before he fought him. The result showed Jomini's criticism to be sound. Bennigsen escaped to the Niemen, and it was purely by good fortune that the war was closed. Had Alexander proven as obstinate at Tilsit as he was after Moscow was reached in 1812, Napoleon would have had a long and perilous campaign before him. He would not have had the Marengo, Ulm, Jena situation, but one where he had accomplished nothing except a barren victory.

Wartenburg acutely asks: Was this failure to act on the proper strategic plan the beginning of Napoleon's downward course?

Sword once belonging
to Napoleon.

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